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SIDDHA-BHĀRATĪ (सिद्ध-भारती)

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of

Dr. SIDDHESHWAR Varma, M.A., D. Litt.



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CONTENTS

SECTION IV—STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY & RELIGION

SECTION V –STUDIES IN LITERARY HISTORY

SECTION VII—MISCELLANEOUS STUDIES

SECTION IV

Studies in Philosophy & Religion

Vallabhācārya's View of Error[1]

By

G. H. BHATT, *Baroda.*

The doctrine of error, generally known as the *khyātivāda*, is an important part of Indian epistemology. The different systems of Indian Philosophy have discussed the problem of error in their own way, with the result that there have come into existence several theories, such as (1) the *ātmakhyātivāda* of the Yogacāra School of Buddhism, (2) the *asatkhyātivāda* of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism, (3) the *viparītakhyātivāda* of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsakas, (4) the *akhyātivāda* of the Prābhakara school of Mīmāṃsakas, (5) the *anyathākhyātivāda* of the Nyāya school, (6) the *sadasatkhyātivāda* of the Sāṅkhya school, (7) the *anirvacanīyakhyātivāda* of the Śaṅkara school, (8) the *akhyātivāda*, or sometimes known as *sat-khyātivāda* of the Rāmānuja school, (9) a kind of *anyathākhyātivāda* of the Mādhva school, and so on. The object of this short paper is simply to give a brief exposition of the doctrine of error, according to the *śuddhādvaita* school of Vallabhācārya.

The world, according to Vallabhācārya, is a reality, is an expression of the *sat* element of *Brahman*, and, as such, it should not leave any scope for error. But error is a common phenomenon in the world. It is, therefore, necessary to show how error takes place, without sacrificing the reality of the world. A clear line of distinction has been drawn, in the *śuddhādvaita* Vedanta, between the world and the *saṃsāra*, the former being real, while the latter being unreal as it is the creation of nescience. The *saṃsāra* is defined as consisting of *ahaṃtā* and *mamatā*, and, is destroyed by right knowledge. *Brahman* is possessed of many divine qualities, and, has created the world from Himself for the sake of pleasure. One of these divine qualities of *Brahman* is *māyā* which is capable of becoming all things at all times and in all places. One of the aspects of this *māyā* is technically called *vyāmohika māyā*, and, is solely responsible for error in this world.

The patent example of error is to look upon nacre as silver. The writers of the *śuddhādvaita* school divide the cases of error into two classes, viz. (1) *nirupādhika*, and (2) *sopādhika*. The illustration of the first type is furnished by the well-known case of nacre and silver, while that of the other type by the case of a jar that is taken to be revolving.

1. Sources :—(i) Vallabhācārya's commentary on the *Bhāgavata*, II. 9.33 and III. 32. 28; and Puruṣottamaji's commentary thereon, (ii) Puruṣottamaji's *Khyātivāda*, and (iii) Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa's *Khyātiviveka*.

In perception, a substance such as a jar or nacre is actually and directly connected with the eyes, the sense-organ operating in this case. As long as the contact of the eyes with the substance continues, so long one can see the actual substance without any possibility of error. But when there is some cause such as the operation of *māyā*, or a defect in the eyes, or great distance between the eyes and the substance, or the preponderance of old impression of an object similar to the substance in question, there arises error, and, the knowledge so obtained happens to be erroneous. As in the case of right perception, so in the case of error, it is necessary to establish contact between the perceiving agent and the object perceived. Like right knowledge, erroneous knowledge also requires its own object. In the case of nacre and silver it is only nacre, and not silver, that is present before the eyes. How, then, to account for the knowledge of silver in this case ?.

We are told that the eyes which are directly connected with nacre give rise to general knowledge (sāmānya jñāna), and the *māyā*, power of the Lord, first of all creates the quality of *tamas*, and then creates an illusion in the *buddhi* which becomes responsible for the erroneous knowledge of nacre. The product of *māya* is called *viṣayatā* which, in its own turn, does two things, (1) obscuring the nature of an object, and (2) creating another impression. In other words, the *buddhi* under the influence of the *māyā*, power of *Brahman*, obscures the real nature of nacre, and creates in its place silver on account of the preponderance of old impressions, and the similarity of brightness etc., qualities which are common to both nacre and silver. Thus, it is this imaginary silver created by *buddhi*, which is comprehended by *buddhi* alone. In the initial stage when the contact between the eyes and nacre gives rise to general knowledge, the silver, as it is not existing at that time, cannot be comprehended by the eyes ; and when the silver is created by *buddhi*, it has no real existence and is, therefore, comprehended by *buddhi* only, and not by eyes. In other words, in the initial stage of general knowledge, it is the nacre alone that becomes the object of perception by the eyes, because the general knowledge pertains to it only, while in the later knowledge which refers to silver and which is the creation of *buddhi*, it is only the imaginary silver that becomes the object of comprehension by *buddhi*. In the case of right knowledge *buddhi* comprehends a real, external object, while in the case of erroneous knowledge it comprehends an unreal object created by itself under the influence of *māyā*. Thus silver which is *māyika*, unreal, comes between the eyes and the nacre, and being the creation of *buddhi* is comprehended by *buddhi*, and not by the eyes. In the case of *sopādhika* error, e. g. this jar is revolving, this conch is yellow, the external and real objects such as the jar and the conch are actually perceived by the eyes, and the attributes such as revolution and

yellowness are created by the *māyā*, and are perceived by the eyes, as the substances such as the jar and the conch, which are erroneously associated with the attributes of revolution and yellowness, are perceived by the eyes. What actually happens in this case is that the *buddhi* influenced by *māyā* sees the *māyika* and unreal attributes, revolution and yellowness, takes them to be real and connects them with the jar and the conch respectively. The jar and the conch as connected with the imaginary qualities are unreal, but the jar and the conch by themselves, actually perceived by the eyes, are no doubt real.

It is, then, obvious that in the case of *nirupādhika* error of nacre and silver, the eyes perceive real nacre, and the *buddhi* perceives imaginary silver created by *buddhi* under the influence of *māyā* ; while in the case of *sopādhika* error, the eyes perceive a real jar and a real conch, and, also the imaginary qualities of revolution and yellowness, and, then, the *buddhi* influenced by *māyā* connects the imaginary attributes with the real objects, and, is, therefore, responsible for the impression that the jar is revolving, and the conch is yellow.

Thus, erroneous knowledge also has its own object, technically called *viṣayatā*, which is the creation of *māyā*, and, which, although not connected with the real object such as nacre, appears as connected with it. The knowledge which is based on *viṣayatā* is, therefore, wrong, while the knowledge based on real objects is correct.

In the erroneous knowledge one sees silver which is different from the nacre that is perceived by the eyes, and, which is, again, similar to it. The *śuddhādvaita* system, therefore, accepts (what may be called — Ed.) *anyakhyātivāda*. It is, further, said that those who have got perfect knowledge or who are perfect Yogins can see all things in all places, and hence their knowledge is always correct. There is, therefore, no scope for error in their case, and, consequently, it is necessary to accept another theory of *a*(sic. *ā* — Ed.)-*khyātivāda* for these persons.

Māyā and Exoteric Wisdom in Indian Thought

By

ENRICO GERARDO CÀRPANI, *Bologna.*

The origin and character of the term *māyā* are rather obscure, and what I venture to give here is hardly sufficient for their elucidation. So much, however, seems to be certain, that we have to deal with √*mā* 'to measure', 'to create'. According to Fick, the word is closely connected with the Gr. *metis*[1] 'wisdom', 'craft', 'cunning' (from Gr. *mimos* 'imitator'), and Lat. *mirus* 'wonderful'. It is most probably connected with a Balto-Slavic group of words, thus :— Old Bulgarian, *na-mayati* 'to nod', 'to indicate by sign'; Russ. *nama yanū* 'I indicate by sign', 'deceive'; *ob-mayakei* 'deceiver'; Bulgarian *za-mayvam*; Lith. *māt* 'to nod'; *apmal* 'to enchant'. It is less closely related to the following :— Bulg. *iz-name* 'deceit', 'swindle'; Russ. *ob-nama* 'deceit'; Lith. *monai* 'sorcery'; Let. *manit* 'enchant'; Old High Ger. *mein* 'falsehood'; Little Russ. *mara* 'phantom', 'dream', 'deception'; Old Church Slav. *machati* 'to swing'; Russ. *makhu* 'error'; Czech. *matoha* 'ghost'; Polish *matas* 'to swindle, lie, deceive'.[2] The Indo-Iranian forms are *māyā*, *maia* (?), 'wisdom, art'; Zend. *māya*; *maya*; cf. Gr. *maia*, *maiomac*, *eu-naios*[3].

Roth[4] gives 'art, extraordinary power, miraculous act' in ancient literature. Hillebrandt[5] believes in the uniformity of the significance of the word. Grassmann[6] gives 'super-human wisdom, divine art or magic art; skilful or crafty project and also (i) from divinities or beings taken to be divine, (ii) from demons, (iii) sorcery from malicious persons though to be connected with demons.' According to Neisser (*Fest. Hillebrandt* 1913, p. 144), *māyā* means 'giver of form, shape', originally signifying 'ability', 'power', 'knowledge' (können). Gray[2] means 'super-natural power', 'cmming', 'mysterious will-power'. According to Rajwade[7], there are five senses in the use of the word in *Ṛgveda* :— (i) 'creative

1. Cf. Gr. *me-tron.* I do not understand the meaning given by Fick to the Gr. term *metis.*

2. *Enc. Relig. Ethics,* 8, 503.

3. *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der Indogermanischen Sprachen,* Gottingen, 1890-1909. See *Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā*, Indian Research Institute Publications, Calcutta, 1934, Part IV. p. 63.

4. *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch,* St. Petersburg, 1855-75.

5. *W. Z. K. M.* 13, 316.

6. *Wörterbuch zum Ṛgveda,* Leipzig, 1873.

7. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,* II, 109-116.

power, thaumaturgy (in a large number of hymns), the primary meaning ; (ii) miraculous power, simply (I. 160. 3 ; II. 17.5 ; IV. 30.12, etc.) or by assuming various shapes (III. 53.8 ; V. 63.6 ; VI. 22.6, etc.), (iii) wiles, tactics, tricks (I. 80.7 ; VI. 18.9 ; X. 147.2. etc., ; (iv) sorcery with craft, magic (II. 27.16 ; VIII. 23.15 ; VI. 45.9, etc.), (v) illusion (only in X. 54.2).'

According to the editors of the RV. (Indian Research Institute Publications, op. cit., p. 64), "Lomax (*Theosoph. Rev.*, 40, 1907, p. 306) discussed the significance of the word from the philosophical point of view. The doctrine of *māyā* denies revelation and authority. The word seems to be associated with the first differentiation of undifferentiated substance, when the Unmanifest puts on manifestation ; thus, in Vedānta terminology it is equivalent to *prakṛti*, considered as the upādhi of Para-Brahman. It was the first step in the evolution of the cosmos and came in later, thought to be regarded as a cosmic force, not only the material but the agent of manifestation. *Māyā*, as illusion, is but divine ; it is the first necessary step in the self-limitation of the Infinite. The veils of *māyā*, so to say, are assumed to *reveal* the Divine, not to *conceal* it. Ramaswami (*Journal of Oriental Res.*, Madras, I, 1927, July, p. 281) recognises the doctrine of *māyā* as 'the phenomenal reality which is the sum-total of the refractions by the mind of the eternal, infinite integral, white light of Ātman, and which, as the result of self-realisation, is found to be not a final and eternal reality such noumenal and eternal reality being the Ātman and the Ātman only.' It is highly probable that the word originally meant 'wisdom, intelligence' (Fick, Nir.) and then 'power to do intelligent work'. The word then came to mean, in a good sense, 'divine power, creative power, supernatural power' and, in an evil sense, 'low, malicious tricks, witchcraft', and so forth. From the philosophical point of view, it came to signify 'manifestation', that is, 'assumption of a definite form from the unmanifested'. Already in the *Ṛgveda*, we have the idea of 'assumption of form', 'change of form' from a physical point of view'. It is, perhaps, not possible to come to a certain and indubitable result concerning the question of *māyā*. Our disagreement is caused by many different interpretations of it.

According to exoteric traditions of the Vedic philosophy, thaumaturgy or creative power is the result of self-realisation connected with the physical cosmos of the individual. It may be remarked, in the first place, that *māyā* is to create, in the sense of supernatural power. The identifying idea 'action' should be interpreted in accord with the imaging idea 'devotion', and be conceived as the contribution of influence by influence[1]. It is this psychological inclination which fixes direction

1. In accordance with Prof. Gode's psychological studies in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (*Psychology of Emotions as Represented in Bhagavad-Gītā*, by P. K. Gode, Poona, 1924,

throughout all nature.

Different philosophical significances of the term māyā as shown in the following quotations :—

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, II. 5.16 :—

इदं वै तन्मधु दध्यङ्ङाथर्वणोऽश्विभ्यामुवाच तदेतदृषिः पश्यन्नवोचद्रूपंरूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय । इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते युक्ता ह्यस्य हरयः शता दशेति...... ।

[1]'This, verily, is the honey which Dadhyañc Ātharvaṇa declared unto the two As'vins. Seeing this, the seer spake :—

He became corresponding in form to every form.
This is to be looked upon as a form of him.
Indra by his magic powers (*māyā*) goes about in many forms ;
Yoked are his ten-hundered steeds'[2].

2. *S'vetās'vatara-Upaniṣad*, I.10 :—

क्षरं प्रधानममृताक्षरं हरः क्षरात्मानावीशते देव एकः ।
तस्याभिध्यानाद्योजनात्तत्त्वभावाद्भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः ॥

'What is perishable, is primary matter (*pradhāna*). What is immortal and imperishable, is Hara (the 'Bearer' the soul).
Over both the perishable and the soul the One God (*deva*) rules.
By meditation upon Him, by union with Him, and by entering into His being
More and more, there is finally cessation from every illusion (*māyā-nivṛtti*)'[3].

3. *S'vetās'vatara-Upaniṣad*, IV. 9 , 10 :—

छन्दांसि यज्ञाः क्रतवो व्रतानि भूतं भव्यं यच्च वेदा वदन्ति ।
अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः ॥९॥
मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।
तस्यावयवभूतैस्तु व्याप्तं सर्वमिदं जगत् ॥१०॥

'Sacred poetry (*chandas*), the sacrifices, the ceremonies, the ordinances,
The past, the future, and what the Vedas declare :—

p. 16), devotion (*bhakti*) is the natural extention of the parental feeling which ought to exist between God and Man. ' . . . *Bhakti* has no other motive than the union of the devotee with God. It is niṣkāma or motiveless in the sense that it has no materioal motive to serve. Psychologically it has a motive, *viz.*, the union of the devotee with the object of his devotion and this motive disappears as soon as the self-surrender of the devotee and the consequent union with God is complete. Knowledge is a factor which contributes towards such union in an affective manner, though it cannot be regarded as a necessary antecedent. To begin with, the devotee and his God stand on extremely unequal planes. As the strength of devotion increases, God comes down from His high pedestal and is thus humanized. At the same time the divine element in man being at its height there is now complete communion between the two, on account of the reciprocity of feelings.'

1. Hume : *The Thirteen Upanishads translated*, Oxford, 1921. p. 104.
2. See RV. VI. 47.18.
3. Hume, *op. cit.* p. 396.

This whole world the illusion-maker (*māyin*) projects out of this Brahman,
And in it by illusion (*māyā*) the other is confined.
Now, one should know that nature (*prakṛti*) is illusion (*māyā*),
And that the Mighty Lord (*Mahes'vara*) is illusion-maker (*māyin*).
This whole world is pervaded.
With beings that are parts of Him'[1].

Prof. Sures Chandra Chakravarti says: "It is admitted by all that the use of the word *māyā*, in the sense of illusion", 'can be pointed out only comparatively late, not earlier, that is to say, than S'vet., IV. 10'[2]. In a quotation from *Ṛgveda*, VI, 47, 18, found in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upanishad*, (II,5,19), the word '*māyā*' occurs in connection with Indra, who appears in various forms through the power of *māyā*. The word there has not been used in the sense of illusion. But when we come to *S'vetās'vatara-Upaniṣad*, we find for the first time the word '*māyā*' used, and the great Lord is described as *māyin*. Prakṛti is there called *māyā* and the great Lord, *māyin* or maker, and the whole world is said to be filled with what are his members. Even when the word *māyā* has been used in this Upanishad, it has not been used exclusively in the sense of illusion"[3]. 'The creation is *māyā*, in its original sense of work, then of phenomenal work, then of illusion. The creator is *māyin*, in its original sense of maker, but again, in that character, phenomenal only"[4].

4. *Pras'na-Upaniṣad*, 1.16 :—

तेषामसौ विरजो ब्रह्मलोको न येषु जिह्ममनृतं न माया चेति ।

'To them belongs yon stainless Brahma-world,
In whom there is no crookedness and falsehood, nor trickery (*māyā*)'[5].

[S'aṅ. comm.] 'But to whom is that state of lower *Brahman* marked by the sun, reached by the northern route, untainted, i. e., pure, not tainted like the *brahmaloka* of the moon, subject to increase and diminution, is explained. They in whom fraud does not exist, as necessarily it does in householders, resulting in many conflicting modes of conduct; those for whom falsehood is not unavoidable, as it is in the case of householders on account of play, mirth, etc. ; similarly, those in whom there is no dissimulation as in householders. Dissimulation consists in disclosing one's self in one manner and acting otherwise. It is of the nature of duplicity in behaviour. To tho e men duly fitted, i. e., the *brahmachārin*, the hermit and the *sanyāsin* in whom, from absence of cause, these faults, such as duplicity, etc., do not exist, is this untainted

1. Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 404.
2. Deussen, P: *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 228.
3. Chakravarti S. C. : *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Calcutta, 1935, pp. 190-192.
4. See F. Max Müller : S. B. E., Vol. XV, p. xxxvi.
5. Hume, *op. cti.*, p. 380.

Brahmaloka, according to the means they employ. Thus, this is the goal of those who combine *karma* with *knowledge* (worship). The *Brahmaloka*, previously explained and marked by the moon, is for those who perform mere *karma*'[1].

5. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VII.13-15 :—

त्रिभिर्गुणमयैर्भावैरेभिः सर्वमिदं जगत् ।
मोहितं नाभिजानाति मामेभ्यः परमव्ययम् ॥ १३ ॥
दैवी ह्येषा गुणमयी मम माया दुरत्यया ।
मामेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते ॥ १४ ॥
न मां दुष्कृतिनो मूढाः प्रपद्यन्ते नराधमाः ।
माययापहृतज्ञाना आसुरं भावमाश्रिताः ॥ १५ ॥

'*Māyā*, or ignorance is the inherent quality of the senses and of the body, in which the three-constituents are embodied ; it is not the quality of the Ātman ; the Ātman is jñāna-formed, and is permanent ; and It is thrown into confusion, by the senses' (13). 'This clearly shows that the Blessed Lord refers to the three constituented prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya system as His *māyā*' (14)[2]. 'The Blessed Lord has explained that those who are engulfed in *māyā*, forget the Parames'vara and are destroyed. HE now describes what happens to those, who do not do so, but surrender themselves to the Parames'vara, and worship Him' (15).[3]

6. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VII.24 :—

अव्यक्तं व्यक्तिमापन्नं मन्यन्ते मामबुद्धयः ।
परं भावमजानन्तो ममाव्ययमनुत्तमम् ॥

'The device of giving up the Yoga-form, that is, imperceptible form, and taking up the perceptible form (*Bha-Gī*. IV, 6 ; VII,15 ; XI,7) is called *māyā*, by Vedāntists ; and when the Parames'vara becomes enveloped in this *Yoga-māyā*, He begins to possess a perceptible appearance. In short, the import of this stanza is, that the perceptible universe is *māyic* or non-permanent, and that, the Parames'vara is real, and permanent. But the word *māyā* in this place, and also in other places, is taken by some as meaning 'a super-natural or wonderful power' ; and these say that this *māyā* is not unreal, but is as permanent as the Parames'vara Himself. As the form of *māyā* has been considered at great length, I will here only asy that the proposition that *māyā*

1. S. Sitarama Sastri : ***The Katha and Prasna Upaniṣads and S'rī S'aṅkara's Commentary*** (Translated), Madras, 1923, pp. 116–117.

2. See the *Nārāyaṇīyopākhyāna* of the *Mahabhārata* (S'anti. 339. 44) :—

माया ह्येषा मया सृष्टा यन्मां पश्यसि नारद ।
सर्वभूतगुणैर्युक्तं नैव त्वं ज्ञातुमर्हसि ॥

3. B. G. Tilak : *Gīta-Rahasya*, Poona, 1936, Vol. II, pp. 1018-1019.

is some wonderful and eternal pastime of the Parames'vara is acceptable even to the non-dualistic Vedānta, because, although *māya* is an 'appearance', created by the senses, yet, as this is done by the senses at the direction of the Parames'vara, *mayā*, must be ultimately said to be the pastime of the Parames'vara. The only point at issue is, whether this *maya* is essentially real, or unreal; and on this point the doctrine of the *Gītā* clearly appears from the above stanzas to be the same as that of the non-dualistic Vedānta, namely that, that *māyā* expressed by name and form, by which the imperceptible Parames'vara is considered to have become perceptible—whether it is called a super-natural power or anything else—is merely an 'appearance', or *moha*, created by *ajñana* or ignorance; and that the true essential Parames'vara is different from it. Otherwise, there seems to be no reason for using the words 'abuddhi' or 'mudha' in this place. In short, *maya* is not real, and the Parames'vara alone is real, and the *Gītā* says that, being confused by this *maya*, people run after various deities. In the *Bṛhadaraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* (I.4.10),[1] there is a similar statement; and it is stated there that those persons, who, not recognising that the *Ātman* and the *Brahman* are one and the same thing, run after various deities, with a distinguishing mind are the 'animals of the gods', that is to say, just as men benefit from cows and other animals, so do these deities benefit from these ignorant devotees, and that these devotees do not obtain release. So far, the Blessed Lord has given a description of those, who being fooled by *māyā*, worship diverse deities, with a distinguishing mind'[2].

We now come to some enunciations of the *Brahma-Sūtras* :—

(i) *Māya is a power of Brahman* (II.1.2) :—

इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः ।

'And there being no mention (in the scriptures) of the other entities (i. e., the categories beside the *pradhāna*), (the Sāṅkhya system cannot be authoritative)'.

'Even accepting the *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhyas for argument's sake; for the Vedāntins also recognize *māyā* as the cause of the world, the difference between the two being that the *pradhāna* according to the Sāṅkhyas is an independent entity, whereas *māya* is a dependent entity, being a power of *Brahman*, yet there is no mention of the other categories of the Sāṅkhyas anywhere in the Vedas. Hence the Sāṅkhya philosophy cannot be authoritative'[3].

1. अन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद । यथा पशुरेवं स देवानाम् । यथा ह वै बहवः पशवो मनुष्यं भुञ्ज्युः, एवमेकैकः पुरुषो देवान् भुनक्ति । एकस्मिन्नेव पशावादीयमानेऽप्रियं भवति, किमु बहुषु, तस्मादेषां तन्न प्रियं यदेतन्मनुष्या विदुः ।

2. B. G. Tilak, *op. cit.*, pp. 1023-1024.

3. *Brahma-Sutras*, by Swami Vireswarananda, Māyāvatı, 1936, pp. 159-160.

(ii) *The Lord is able to create the world of diversity through his power of māyā* (II.1.25) :—

देवादिवदपि लोके।

'(The case of Brahman creating the world is) even like the gods and other beings in the world'.

'This Sutra refutes that objection by giving an example of creation by a conscious agent without any extraneous help. Even as gods, in the sacred books, are seen to create without extraneous means simply through their inherent power, so also the Lord through His infinite power of *māya* is able to create this world of diversity. The examples cited above show that it is not necessary that creation be limited by the conditions observed in the creation of pots. They are not universal'[1].

(iii) *Brahman becomes creative through maya* (I.1.5 ; II.1.28 ; 2.7) :—

ईक्षतेर्न, अशब्दम्।

'On account of thinking (being attributed to the first cause by the scriptures, the *pradhana*) is not (the first cause referred to by hem); it (*pradhana*) is not based on the scriptures'.

'That all-knowingness and creation are not possible to *Brahman*, which is pure intelligence itself and unchangeable, is also not true. For *Brahman* can be all-knowing and creative through *maya*. So *Brahman* is the first cause'[2].

आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि।

'And because in the individual soul also (as in the case of magicians etc.) diverse (creation exists). Similarly (with *Brahman*)'.

'In the dream state there appears in the individual self, which is one and indivisible, diversity resembling the waking state (see *Bṛh.* IV.3.10), and yet the indivisible character of the self is not marred by it. We see also magicians, for instance, producing a multiple creation without any change in themselves. Similarly this diverse creation springs from *Brahman* through Its inscrutable power of *maya*, though *Brahman* Itself remain unchanged'[3].

पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्, तथापि।

'If it is be said (that the *puruṣa* can direct the *pradhana*) even as a (crippled) person (can direct a blind man), or a magnet (the iron filings), even then (the difficulty cannot be surmounted)'.

1. Swami Vireswarananda, *op. cit.*, 182–183.
2. *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.
3. *op. cit.*, p. 185.

'In Vedānta, though *Brahman* is indifferent, yet through *māyā* It is endowed with attributes and activity; so It becomes the creator. Again the *puruṣa* and the *pradhāna* are altogether separate and independent; the one is intelligent and indifferent, the other inert and independent'[1].

(iv) *Brahman's power of māyā established* (II.1.30) :—

सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात् ।

'And (*Brahman* is) endowed with all (powers), because it is seen (from the scriptures)'.

"This Sutra gives proof of *Brahman's* being endowed with *māyā*, *S'akti*, the power of Nescience. Various scriptural texts declare that *Brahman* possess all powers. 'The great Lord is the *māyin* (the ruler of *māyā*' ([S'vet. IV.10])".[2]

(v) *Brahman is apparently modified through māyā* (II.1.37) :—

सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च ।

'And because all attributes (required for the creation of the world) are possible (only in *Brahman*, It is the cause of the world).'

'... though in the attributeless *Brahman* an actual change is impossible, yet an apparent modification is possible owing to Its power of *māyā*. Because of this power all the attributes required in the cause for such a creation are possible only in *Brahman*. Therefore, *Brahman* is the material cause of this world, not through actual modification, but through apparent modification, and It is also the efficient cause of the world'[3].

According to Dr. Olivier Lacombe's definition[4], *māyā* is 'l'illusion mystérieuse, co-éternelle à l'Etre, nécessaire comme sa générosité même, et pourtant fuyante, sans consistence, apparantée au néant. *māyā* est l'irrationnel du système de S'ankara'[5]. The same author then proceeds to explain the significance of the word *māyā* from an ontological point of view :— 'Par relativité à l'object la non-différence de *māyā* à l'égard de la lumière infinie se détermine en su jet.' (*op. cit.*, p. 122). 'La pensée est ce qui fonde en l'absolu le mouvement vital par lequel le sujet, qui est de l'être participé mais d'abord perdu pour lui-même par sa chute en *māyā*, se cherche et se retrouve partiellement dans et à travers l'object.' (*op. cit.*, p. 123).

1. Swami Vireswarananda pp. 197 ; 198.
2. *Op. cit.*, p. 186.
3. *Op. cit.*, pp. 191 ; 192.
4. O. Lacombe : ***L'Absolu selon le Vedânta*** (Les notions de ***Brahman*** et d' Âtman dans les systèmes de Çankara et Râmânuja), Paris, 1937.
5. *Op. cit.*, p. 66. There is also the following Sanskrit definition, quoted by Dr. Lacombe : *anadir bhavarūpa sadasadanirvacanīya*.

The conception of *māyā* as constituted by items of *matter* is due to a particular manner of regarding its power-items, and not to any duality belonging to the world itself. However, there is a duality (*power* and *matter*) in the relations of the psychological process. In one set of relations it reports *power*, and in this relation may be said to indentify; in another set of relations it reports *matter*, and in this relation may be said to image. The *material* images must be considered as images of so many assemblies of power-items. An individual's performance (?) of the word, in reference to himself, means always a reference to the maintenance of his own *aequilibrium* as a whole or of some special religious balance-relation in his psychic *aequilibrium*[1]. It is the *ratio rei ratiocinantis, qua cognita sunt in cognoscente, secundum modum cognoscentis.*[2] Nevertheless, the *matter* is *principium individuationis*, according to Plato, Thomas Aquinatis and Dante, and it joins the 'soul' because *I* and *not-I*, spirit and matter, are inseparable, in the general metaphysical sense. 'If we bear in mind', says Dr. Bhagavan Das[3] 'that I and *not-I*, mind and matter, consciousness and object, always go together, the difficulty of this inter-action vanishes. There is no inter-action between two. There is only one action, that of will-ful idea-tion, imag-ination, imag-ing'. Psychologically speaking, there is, however, a correlation in question here between the identification of *acting with design or purposively*, and the image of the human system in action. It is upon my images that I must depend for an analysis of actual power relation and for their specification. Therefore, I must read my own organization as a psycho-physical system, and the organization of other psycho-physical system, from the images, and I must conform my identifications of my own action to these. We have then these equivalents :— (a) I act in accordance with a specific image; (b) I have acted, and know the image of the result of my acting, as identical with the image in accordance with which I acted.

Man never discovers what any happening is, *absolutely*, but only what it is according to his specific and limited powers (*māyā*) of identifying and imaging. The psycho-physical dilemma is to be interpreted *as due* to self-limitation, to will-power (latent spiritual igno-

1. Remember the fundamental teachings of Christian theological philosophy in Dante's *Paradiso* :—

> E come l'alma dentro a vostra polve
> Per differenti membra, e conformate
> A diverse potenzie, si risolve. (II. 45).

2. Scti Thomae Aquinatis. *Summa Theologica,* I. 16. 3.
3. Bhagavan Das · *The Science of the Self,* Benares, 1938, p. 58.

rance and magic wisdom) in the human being. The *will-to-power's* inhibition may be broken off when *maya* humanizes its cosmic-thaumaturgical force in the individual who is catching a glimpse of a radical catharsis, *sub specie interioritatis*, as a propaedeutics to higher forms of exoteric self-affirmation.

Kalābadhī's Conception of God

By

ROMA CHAUDHURI, *Calcutta*

Kalābādhī is the author of the famous Arabic Sufi treatise *Ta'arruf* (Doctrine of Sufi's) in which he collects the sayings of many great Sufi teachers, and tries to prove that Sufism is wholly consistent with orthodox Islam. This treatise was soon accepted as an authoritative work on Sufism, and several commentaries were written on it by eminent persons. The famous author Suhrawardi Maqtul (d. 1191 A. D.) observes : 'but for the *Ta'arruf* we should not have known of Sufism.' European scholars, too, attach great importance to the work. It is held to be 'one of the eight books whose study is the foundation for the history of Sufism, when that history comes to be written' (Nicholson). The following account of Kalābādhī's conception of God is based on this treatise.

His nature :— God is one, alone, single, eternal, powerful, proud, ruler, merciful, living, hearing, seeing, enduring, speaking, desirous, creating, sustaining. God is absolutely distinct from the universe He has created. His essence, atttibutes and names are quite distinct from those of created beings. God has no body, shape, form, parts, particles, elements, members or limbs. In Him, there is neither junction nor separation, neither movement nor rest, neither increase nor decrease. He is beyond all spatial and temporal limits, all faults and failings. In short, no qualities and descriptions of created objects apply to Him. There is nothing like Him, and He is beyond all perception and thought.

His attributes :— God has real attributes wherewith He has qualified Himself, and which He possesses from all eternity. These attributes are knowledge, strength, power, might, mercy, wisdom, majesty, omnipotence, eternity, life, desire, will and speech. Besides these, He has also hearing, sight, face and hand — which are His attributes, but not limbs or parts. These attributes subsist through Him and are not separate from Him, yet they are neither God, nor other than God. In the same manner, amongst themselves also, they are neither diverse nor similar, e. g. His knowledge is not the same as His strength nor other than His strength. His hearing is not the same as his sight nor other than His sight.

Kalābādhī does not explain here as to why an attribute of God is neither different nor non-different from Him and from another attribute. But, evidently, he wants to avoid the following dilemmas :— First, if an attribute be different from God, then God ceases to be the only

principle and His unity is jeopardised. Again, if an attribute be non-different from God, then there is no sense in calling it an attribute, and instead of saying 'God is majestic,' we should say : 'God is God,' which is a mere tautology. Further, on this view, there cannot be many attributes, as God is one. Secondly, if an attribute be different from another attribute, then, in the above manner, God's unity is destroyed. Again, if an attribute be non-different from another attribute, then there is no sense in naming them separately.

This problem of the relation between divine essence and attributes is one of the most disputed problems in Islamic philosophy, and, for the matter of that, in other philosophical systems of the world. In any case, according to Kalābāḏhī, God's attributes are unique, and absolutely different from those of created beings. Hence, it is impossible for human beings to grasp them fully. God is, therefore, indescribable. In the end, God is described only by Himself, and all human descriptions of Gold are necessarily imperfect.

Here we note a distinction between the famous Sufi Ḥallāj and Kalābāḏhī. According to Ḥallāj, in the very beginning, God is attributeless, a pure Being or Essence, and later on attributes come to be manifested in Him through His essence. Hence, though the essence of God is uncreated, uncaused and eternal, His attributes are not so, though they are not due to an external cause—there being nothing besides God —but to his own essence. But according to Kalābāḏhī, the essence and the attributes of God are equally eternal, uncreated and uncaused. 'The Sufis are agreed', he says, 'that since eternity He has not ceased to continue with His names and attributes'. Hence, God is always possessed of attributes. Kalābāḏhī points out that it is absurd to hold that anyone of God's attributes is non-eternal, not present in Him from the very beginning, but coming to Him in time. For, first, that would imply a deficiency in God, — at first God is deficient, not possessing a particular attribute, then becomes complete through possessing it later on. But no want, imperfection or fault can ever subsist in the Perfect Being. Secondly, this would imply change, a passing from one state into another. But how is that possible on the part of an Eternal, Ever-existent Being ? Hence, all the attributes of God are present in Him from the very beginning and will continue to be in Him eternally.

His acts :— Hearing, seeing, desiring, creating, forgiving, and gratitude are generally called 'acts' of God. But they are really God's attributes. No distinction is drawn by Kalābāḏhī between qualities that are acts, such as, seeing, hearing, creating etc., and qualities which cannot be described as acts, such as, greatness, splendour, knowledge, strength ; for His acts are due to His will and will is His eternal attribute, and in this sense, His acts, too, are His attributes. Now the attributes of

God, which are not acts, like power, wisdom etc., are *absolute*, i. e. they can exist by themselves without reference to anything else. But His act-like attributes, like creating, ruling, forgiving etc., are *relative*, i. e. they cannot exist without referring to something else. Creating is meaningless without an object created, ruling without a ruled. Hence if creating and ruling be eternal attributes of God, the created and ruled world, too, must be equally eternal. But this logical conclusion Kalābādhī refuses to accept, because if world be co-eternal with God, then according to Him, God's unity will be marred. The world is created out of nothing by God, hence it is not eternal, but something having an original in time. Hence, Kalābādhī concludes, inconsistently enough, that God is eternally creating and ruling, although the created and ruled world is non-eternal. 'He is', says Kalabadhī, 'without ceasing, Ruler, God and Lord, without subject or slave. It is, therefore, in the same way permissible to say that He is creator, Maker and Former, without anything created made or formed'[1].

He holds the act-like attributes, too, to be equally eternal like other attributes that are not acts. Kalābādhī does not discuss the central problem of philosophy : Why has God created the world ? He simply points out that God does not do things for any cause, for if they had a cause, then that cause would have a cause and so *ad infinitum*. Hence, all His acts like creating, favouring, rewarding, punishing etc. are causeless.

His names :— God's names, too, are eternal like His essence and attributes. Names, too, like attributes are neither different nor non-different from Him. In another place, however, he holds that the names of God are, also, God. It should be remembered that no names are to be applied to God that are not mentioned in the *Qu'rān* and in the Traditions, e. g. we may call Him 'knowing,' but not 'intelligent,' or 'wise', though they all mean the same things ; again, 'liberal' but not 'generous', for the same reason.

His speech :— As pointed out above, speech is an eternal attribute of God. The *Qu'rān* is the eternal speech of God, and, as such, it is neither created nor originated.

1. Although our author himself leaves the matter and does not attempt to probe into the mystry deeply, perhaps the best explanation possible here is that God is ***potentially***, not ***actually***, a Creator and a Ruler in reference to the world yet to be created and ruled. The development or actualisation of a potential power or attribute to an actual one is not to be taken here as a sign of His imperfection, as it is due to His own free will, or as a sign of change, as the essential nature of God remains unchanged.

Gradation, Evolution and Reincarnation

By

ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY, *Boston.*

The so-called conflicts of religion and science are, for the most part, the result of a mutual misunderstanding of their respective terms and range. As to range: one deals with the *why* of things, the other with their *how,* one with intangibles, the other with things that can be measured, whether directly or indirectly. The question of terms is important. At first sight the notion of a creation completed 'in the beginning' seems to conflict with the observed origin of species in temporal succession. But ἐν φρχῆ, *in principio, agre* do not mean only 'in the beginning' with respect to a period of time, but also 'in principle', that is, in an ultimate source logically rather than temporally prior to all secondary causes, and no more before than after the supposed beginning of their operation. So, as Dante says, 'neither before nor after was God's moving on the face of the water': and Philo, 'at that time, indeed, all things took place simultaneously . . . but a sequence was necessarily written into the narrative because of their subsequent generation from one another'; and Behman, 'it was an everlasting beginning'.

As Aristotle says, 'eternal beings are not in time'. God's existence is, therefore, *now* — the enternal now that separates past from future durations but is not itself a duration, however short. Therefore, in Meister Eckhart's words, 'God is creating the whole world *now,* this instant'. Again, no sooner has some time elapsed, however little, but everything is changed; πφυτφ ῥέι, 'you cannot dip your feet twice in the same waters'. So, then, as far Jalālu'd-Dīn Rumī, 'every instant thou art dying, and returning; Muhammad hath said that this world is but a moment . . . Every moment the world is renewed, life is ever arriving anew, like the stream , . . The beginning, which is thought, eventuates in action; know that in such-wise was the construction of the world in eternity'.

In all this there is nothing to which the natural scientist can object; he may, indeed, reply that his interest is confined to the operation of mediate causes, and that it does not extend to questions of a first cause or of the whatness of life; but that is simply a definition of his self-chosen field. The Ego is the only content of the Self that can be known objectively, and, therefore, the only one that he is willing to consider. His concern is only with behaviour. •

Empirical observation is always of things that change, that is, of individual things or classes of individual things; of which, as all philosophers are agreed, it cannot be said that they *are,* but only that they

become or evolve. The physiologist, for example, investigates the body, and the psychologist the soul or individuality : the latter is perfectly aware that the continued being of individualities is only a postulate, convenient and even necessary for practical purposes, but intellectually untenable ; and in this respect is in complete agreement with the Buddhist, who is never tired of insisting that body and soul — composite and changeable, and therefore wholly mortal — 'are not my Self', not the reality that must be known if we are to 'become what we *are*'. In the same way, St. Augustin points out that those who saw that both of these, body and soul, are mutable, have sought for what is immutable, and so found God, — That One, of which or whom the Upanishads declare that 'That art thou'. Theology, accordingly, coinciding with autology, prescinds from all that is emotional, to consider only that which does *not* move, — 'change and decay in all around I see, O Thou who changest not'. It finds Him in that eternal *now* that always separates the past from the future and without which these paired terms would have no meaning whatever, just as space would have no meaning were it not for the point that distinguishes here from there. Moment without duration, point without extension — these are the golden mean, the middle and inconcievably straight way leading out of time into eternity, from death to immortality. I used the word *'consideration'* just now ; it will be worthwhile to remember that it meant originally just what we now call astronomical observation, but with a view to the discovery of the ultimate cause or principle of sidereal motion rather to its measurement alone.

Our experience of 'life' is evolutionary : *what* evolves ? Evolution is reincarnation, the death of one and the rebirth of another in momentary continuity : *who* reincarnates ? Metaphysics prescinds from the animistic proposition of Descartes, *cogito ergo sum,* to say *cogito ergo est* ; and to the question, *quid est* ? answer that this is an improper question, because its subject is not a *what* amongst others but the *whatness* of them all and of all that they are not. Reincarnation — as currently understood to mean the return of individual souls to other bodies here on earth — is not an orthodox Indian doctrine, but only a popular belief. So, for example, as Dr. B. C. Law remarks, 'it goes without saying that the Buddhist thinker repudiates the notion of the passing of an ego from one embodiment to another. We take our stand with Śrī Śaṅkarācārya when he says, 'In truth, there is no other transmigrant but the Lord', — he who is both transcendently Himself and the immanent Self in all beings, but never Himself becomes anyone ; for which there could be cited abundant authority from the Vedas and Upanishads. If, then, we find Kṛṣṇa saying to Arjuna, and the Buddha to his mendicants, 'Long is the road that we have trodden, and many are the births that you and I have known', the reference is not to a pluirality

of essences, but to the Common Man in everyman, who in most men has forgotten Himself, but in the reawakened has reached the end of the road and, having done with all becoming, is no longer a personality in time, no longer anyone, no longer one of whom one can speak by proper name.

The Lord is the only transmigrant. That art thou, —the very man in every man. So, as Blake says:

'Man looks out in tree, herb, fish, beast, collecting up the scattered portions of his immortal body...

Wherever a grass grows or a leaf buds, the Eternal Man is seen, is heard, is felt.

And all his sorrows, till he reassumes his ancient bliss';

like Māṇikka Vācagar :

'Grass, shrub was I, worm, tree, full many a sort of beast, bird, snake, stone, and demon.

In every species born, Great Lord ! this day I've gained';

and Taliesen :

'I was in many a guise before I was disenchanted, I was the hero in trouble, I am old and I am young';

and Jalālu'd Dīn Rumī :

'First came He from the realm of the inorganic, long years dwelt He in the vegetable state, passed into the animal condition, hence toward humanity : whence, again, there is another migration to be made';

and *Aitareya-Āraṇyaka* :

'He who knows the Self more and more clearly is more and more fully manifested. In whatever plants and trees and animals there are, he knows the Self more and more fully manifested. For in plants and trees only the plasm is seen, but in animals intelligence. In them the Self becomes more and more evident. In man the Self is yet more and more evident; for he is most endowed with providence, he says what he has known, he sees what he has known, he knows the morrow, he knows what is and is not mundane, and by the mortal seeks the immortal. But, as for the other animals, hunger and thirst are the degree of their discrimination';

in sum, in the words of Farīdu'd Dīn Aṭṭār :

'Pilgrim, Pilgrimage, and Road was but Myself towards Myself'.

This is the traditional doctrine, not of 'reincarnation' in the popular and animistic sense, but of the transmigration and evolution of 'the Ever-productive Nature': it is one that, in no way, conflicts with or excludes the actuality of the process of evolution as envisaged by the

modern naturalist. On the contrary, it is precisely the conclusion to which, for example, Erwin Schrödinger is led by his enquiry into the facts of heredity in his book entitled: *What is Life?* In his concluding chapter on *Determinism and Freewill,* his only possible inference is that 'I in the widest meaning of the word, that is to say, every conscious mind that has ever said or felt ' ' — am the person, if any, who controls 'the motion of the atoms' according to the laws of Nature... Consciousness is a singular of which the plural is unknown'. Schrödinger is perfectly aware that this is the position enunciated in the Upanishads, and most succinctly in the formulae, 'That art thou...other than whom there is no other seer, hearer, thinker or agent.'

I cite him here not because I hold that the truth of traditional doctrines can be proved by laboratory methods, but because his position so well illustrates the main point I am making, namely, that there are no necessary conflicts of science with religion, but only the possibility of a confusion of their respective fields; and the fact that for the whole man, in whom the integration of the Ego with the Self has been effected, there is no impassable barrier between the fields of science and religion. Natural scientist and metaphysician: one and the same man can be both; there need be no betrayal of either scientific objectivity on the one hand or of principles on the other.

Bhakti in Bhagavad-gītā

By

G. V. DEVASTHALI, *Nasik.*

Inspite of a plethora of views regarding the ultimate teaching of *Bhagavad-gītā* (BG.), there can hardly be two opinions on the point that the most authentic source regarding the teaching of BG. is BG. itself. It would not, therefore, be idle to try to set out the views of BG. about the various paths of absolution by a close study of that work itself and as far as possible in its words only. In the following lines such an attempt is made with regard to the path of *bhakti.*

Even a casual reader of BG. will hardly fail to find that BG. envisages different types or kinds of *bhaktas* on the basis of the object of their devotion or according to the root-cause thereof. From the point of view of the former criterion there are persons who are devoted to the Lord Himself or there are others who are devoted to various other deities. These latter with their wits clouded by their desires, observing various vows and rites, endeavour to propitiate various deities[1], who are, in fact, nothing but various forms of the Lord[2]. Thus these persons are, indeed, propitiating the Lord only, though, of course, they know it not. In other words they are also addressing themselves to the Lord but in a wrong manner[3], with the result. that they miss the real fruit accruing from the devotion to the Lord[4]. It is the Lord Himself that ultimately receives all their devotion, since He is the ultimate recepient of all sacrifices and worships[5]; and it is He only that bestows on these devotees—devoted to other deities as they think themselves to be—their desired objects[6]. The fruit thus accruing to these devotees is circumscribed by their own desires and, as such, is only ephemeral and limited[7]. Quite different, however, is the case with those who are devoted to the Lord Himself. The fruit reaped by them only is ever-lasting; for they, through His favour, attain the Lord Himself[8].

From a different view point *bhaktas* are said to be of four different kinds according as they are actuated by distress, feel thirst for knowledge, have a hankering after some worldly desires or are possessed of knowledge[9].

1. VII. 20.
2. Cf. VII. 21cd, where the देवताs are referred to by the word तनु.
3. IX. 23.
4. IX. 24cd,
5. IX. 24ab ; also cf. भोक्तारं यज्ञतपसां etc. VI. 29 ab.
6. VII. 22.
7. VII. 23ab.
8. IX. 25 d., VII. 23 d ; also cf. मामुपेत्य तु कौन्तेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते VIII. 16 cd.
9. VII. 16.

The first three are evidently much inferior to the last one; and we find the Lord declaring this distinction when He asserts that all these are noble, indeed; but *jñānin* is His very soul[1]. Such a *jñānin bhakta*, it may be noted, is described as being *eka-bhakti* and *nitya-yukta*[2] which shows that a *bhakta* of the highest stage must not only have single-minded devotion but must in addition be possessed of (true) wisdom or insight and also a thorough *yoga* attitude. This very idea is again stated by declaring *bhaktas* as being singularly devoted to the Lord and ever possessed of the *yoga* attitude[3]. Now just as *jñāna* is expressly a characteristic of a *bhakta* of the highest stage and, as such, included in *bhakti*, so also we find that *bhakti* (or single-minded devotion) is included among the constituents of *jñāna*[4]. In fact this single-mindedness is so essential to *bhakti*, particularly at the highest level, that it has been repeatedly[5] mentioned in BG., and we are told that with such devotion, one attains the Lord and becomes free from, all transmigration and worldly bondage[6]. A very lucid and detailed description of such *bhaktas* occurs at BG. XII. 13-20, according to which the main qualities of a *bhakta* appear to be utter indifference to all duals (such as pleasure-pain, praise-blame, friend-enemy, and love-hate), perfect control over one's mind, absence of attachment, and unruffled, calm and contented heart.

Now perfect control over one's mind, which is one of the essentials of the highest *bhakti*, is by no means an easy job. In fact, Arjuna has declared this task as almost impossible of attainment just like the task of controlling the wind[7]; and has, therefore, requested Lord Kṛṣṇa to show him how it may be achieved. Lord Kṛṣṇa, also, agrees with Arjuna that it is a very difficult task, indeed; and points out that it can be achieved by constant practice (*abhyāsa*) and aversion to sensual objects (*vairāgya*)[8]. It is thus that the mind straying in various directions is to be brought under control and made steady[9]. Directions are also given regarding the place, the position and the posture that one should take for this practice. Thus, in fact, *abhyāsa* consists of practising meditation or concentration in a pure, secluded place, neither

1. VII. 18 ab.
2. VII. 17 ab.
3. IX. 14cd ; also cf. X. 10 ab ; and XII. 2.
4. ज्ञान with its constituents is described at BG. XII.7–11, wherein we read : मयि चानन्ययोगेन भक्तिरव्यभिचारिणी XIII. 10 ab.
5. Cf. the expressions : अनन्यया भक्त्या VIII. 22 ; XI.54 ; अनन्यभाक् भजते IX. 30 ; अव्यभिचारिणी भक्तिः XIII. 10 ; परा भक्तिः XVIII. 68 ; अनन्यमनसः IX. 13 ; अनन्यचेताः VIII. 14.
6. Cf. XII.6–8 ; also cf. VIII.8 ; and IX. 32.
7. VI. 34.
8. VI. 35.
9. VI. 26.

too high nor too low, in an erect sitting posture, with eyes fixed on the nose-tip[1], and, before one can hope to achieve one's end, one has to observe strict moderation in sleeping and eating, and in fact, in every thing that one does[2].

Resignation or complete surrender to the will of the Lord is yet another characteristic of *bhakti* referred to in several places in BG. Absolute faith coupled with complete surrender or resignation ultimately leads to freedom from all bondage[3]. This resignation often takes the form of *īśvarārpaṇa-buddhi*, i. e., assigning all activity to the Lord or doing all actions but resigning their fruit or ultimate responsibility to the Lord[4]. This is perhaps the easiest way of attaining freedom from bondage of *karman* or transmigration, since here the devotee has nothing else to do, while the Lord takes all care of him and at last helps him to attain the *summun bonum*[5]. Thus, we are told that one is freed from all bonds of action merely by assigning or resigning every act to the Lord[6]; and that even the worst of sinners, following this path, may soon become a *dharmātmā* and attain ever-lasting peace[7]. The Lord bestowst *buddhi-yoga* on such a devotee and thereby, ultimately, the latter goes to Him. The Lord dispels the darkness of ignorance of such devotees by lighting the bright torch of knowledge[8]. ndeed, the Lord's *māyā* which causes all ignorance and is thus at the root of all transmigratory existence and bondage of action, is very hard to cross. But the Lord's devotees can easily cross it through, since they are helped by the Lord Himself[9].

This should not, however, be construed as partiality on the part of the Lord. In fact, the Lord takes neither the merit nor the demerit of any body[10]. He neither hates any one, nor does He love any body. He is, indeed, equally disposed to all beings[11]. He is the ultimate recipient of all worship and sacrifice[12], and also, the bestower of all sorts of fruit according to merit[13]. The Lord receives the devotees in the way in which they approach Him[14]. It is this reciprocity that easily explains

1. Cf. VI. 11–15.
2. VI. 16f.
3. Cf. XVIII. 62 ; also cf. XVIII. 65f ; VIII. 14f ; IV. 39f.
4. IX. 27 ; XII. 14 ; VIII. 7 ; XVIII. 57.
5. XII. 7 ; also cf. XVIII. 57f.
6. Cf. IX. 27 f.
7. IX. 30 f. ; also cf. IX. 32.
8. X. 10f.
9. VII. 13f. ; also cf. XVIII. 61 f.
10. V. 15 ab.
11. IX. 29 ab ; also cf. V. 19 c, and XIII. 27 ab, and 28 ab
12. Cf. अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव च IX. 24 ab ; also cf. V. 29 ab ; and XIII. 22 ab.
13. VII. 22 cd.
14. IV. 11 ab.

why the devotees are declared to be not only dear to the Lord, but, also, His very soul. This is, again, what is meant by the statement that devotees are in the Lord and the Lord is in them[1].

From the way in which Arjuna ultimately resigns himself completely to the Lord's will or guidance in full faith and full recognition of his ignorance[2], we can infer that full faith and complete resignation are the essential pre-requisites of *bhakti*. Absence of *asūyā* appears as one more qualification which entitles a man to the study of this *Gītā-śāstra*[3], and may as such be said to form the third pre-requisite of *bhakti*. The most important qualification for a man to attain *bhakti*, however, is the end of all sin. It is only those whose sins are at an end (or who have their sins completely washed away by knowledge) that can attain *bhakti* through the Lord's favour[4].

How to destroy all sin or bring it to an end is, therefore, another great problem that one has to solve. And the easiest way of solving it is constantly to think of or to meditate on the Lord[5]. But this meditation may be of two different kinds according as its object is manifest or otherwise. Both these kinds of *upasanās* or meditations lead to the same result, no doubt. But meditation of the non-manifest is admittedly more difficult than that of the manifest[6]. Naturally, therefore, has Arjuna asked the Lord in what manifest forms or manifestations he should meditate on Him[7]. It is in reply to this question of Arjuna that the Lord has described some of His manifestations or *vibhūtis*[8], and ultimately summed up His statement by saying that any thing that is found to be grand, noble or glorious may be looked upon as His manifestation, partial though it may be[9]. This statement should not, however, be construed in a pantheistic light; for inspite of several statements smacking of pantheism found scattered in BG. there is, hardly, any doubt that theism is also known to and accepted by BG., and that as in several other matters, so also here BG. has given us a fine and harmonious combination of these two views about the ultimate principle[10]. Hence it is that we

1. IX. 29 d.
2. Cf. II. 7.
3. XVIII. 67 ; also cf. श्रद्धावाननसूयश्च शृणुयादपि यो नरः XVIII. 71 ab ; and also IX.1 where अर्जुन is described as अनसूयु.
4. VII. 28. ; also cf. V. 17.
5. For the Lord has declared अहं त्वां सर्वपापेभ्यो मोक्षयिष्यामि मा शुचः XVIII. 66 cd ; cf. सर्वं ज्ञानप्लवेनैव वृजिनं संतरिष्यसि IV. 36 cd.
6. XII. 2-7.
7. X. 17 cd.
8. X. 19 ff.
9. X. 41.
10. About this mixture of Theism and Pantheism in BG. read S. C. Roy: *The Bhagavad. gita and Modern Scholarship*, pp. 12-18.

find BG. stating in no ambiguous term that the Lord supports and pervades the whole universe and yet remains above it[1]. Meditating on the *vibhūtis* of the Lord and thus ultimately seeing the Lord in every thing and every thing in the Lord[2] is the easiest way of attaining the equanimity of mind which is, as we have already seen above, an essential characteristic of a *bhakta*. It is thus that one can become sure to be meditating on the Lord at the time of one's last breath which, we are told, leads one to liberation.[3]

It is patent that BG. has preached at least three paths, if not more; and has also stated that the ultimate end realised by all these is the same[4]. And, yet, it would appear that distinction has been made among these all on the basis of the difficulty involved in them[5]. Thus, between *jñāna-mārga* and *karma-mārga*, the former is said to be more difficult and is almost impossible; for it preaches renunciation of action. But without action one may not be able to pull on even for a moment[6]. It is also likely that one may outwardly renounce all objects of pleasure as required in the *jñāna-mārga*, and yet be doing on them in his mind. What a parody of *jñāna-mārga* this would be[7]? It is better, therefore, to control one's mind and sense organs and do all acts that form one's duty which is the essence of *karma-mārga*[8]. But easier still is the *bhakti-mārga* which requires nothing but single-minded devotion to the Lord. One has to do whatever befalls one as one's duty, but never for a moment take any responsibility on oneself. Throwing all responsibility on and resigning all fruit to the Lord is the only thing that one has to do here. Such an attitude on the part of a *bhakta*, naturally, makes the Lord look after him in all respects here and, also, elsewhere[9]. That is why the Lord has declared that he conducts *yoga-kṣema* to his devotees[10]; and bestows *buddhi-yoga* on them, so that, ultimately, they attain Him[11].

This partiality of BG. to the *bhakti-mārga* may be inferred from the various statements in BG. itself. Thus, a *jñānin bhakta* is declared to be the very soul of the Lord. There are also passages where *bhaktas* are declared to be *priya*, or *atīva priya* or even *priyatama* to the Lord[12]. In one passage the Lord has declared that the *bhaktas* are in Him and

1. X. 42 cd.
2. Cf. IX. 4, c ; IX. 6, cd ; VI. 30, ab ; and 31 ab ; X. 20ab ; XVIII. 61ab and 62 ab.
3. VIII 5–7.
4. Cf. XIII. 24 f ; also cf. XII. 12.
5. XII. 9-11
6. III. 4 f ; also III.8 cd : शरीरयात्रापि च ते न प्रसिध्येदकर्मणः.
7. III. 6.
8. III. 7f.
9. Cf. IX. 28 ; XII. 6-8.
10. IX. 22.
11. X. 10.
12. XVIII. 69 ; also cf. VII. 17 cd, and XII. 14-15 etc.

He in them[1], thus showing how the *bhaktas* hold a unique position in point of their relation to the Lord, a position that the followers of the other paths have not been blessed with. In ch. XI, again, the Lord has declared that even the gods are very eager always to have a sight of the *all-pervading manifestation* (vis'varupa) of His[2]; and that it is not possible to have it through the Vedas, austerities, sacrifices, or some other such means[3]. For, the only way to secure it is single-minded devotion[4]. That Arjuna is possessed of such devotion (and also friendship), has been vouchsafed by the Lord Himself[5]. The general impression regarding importance attached to *bhakti-mārga* by BG. created by these passages is carried still deeper when we find the Lord declaring that by resorting to Him even men of low birth such as *vais'yas* and *s'ūdras* and even women attain the highest *gati*[6]. Nay, the Lord has assured Arjuna emphatically that no *bhakta* of His is ruined[7]. The same impression is again confirmed by ch. XVIII, which is a sort of résumé of the teachings of BG. where we find that after a re-statement of *niṣṭhā* on *jñāna* and that on *karman*[8], the Lord, ultimately, advises Arjuna to resort to the Lord who, residing in all hearts, moves every being in this world in the fashion of a machine[9]. It is, of course, far from right to hold that only the path of *bhakti* is preached in BG.; and, yet, a careful reader of it may not but feel that its author has a soft corner for *bhakti* as a means of liberation.

This should not, however, blind us to the harmonising tendency that is so markedly observed in BG. in almost every sphere, and particularly, in regard to the different paths of salvation. It may be observed that BG. has given us description of the perfect man in more places than one. Thus, we have a detailed description of *sthita-prajña*[10] (i. e. a perfect *jñānin*), *yogārūḍha*[11], *guṇātīta*[12], *siddha* or *siddhim prāpta*[13], and *bhakta*[14] in the different chapters of BG.; and it is curious to note that all these descriptions have several ideas and expressions in common. This is enough to show that in the eye of the author, the essential characteristics of the perfect man are the same irrespective of the path followed.

1. IX 29d.
2. XI. 52 cd.
3. XI. 53 ; also cf. XI. 48.
4. XI. 54.
5. IV. 3.
6. IX. 32.
7. IX. 31cd ; also VI. 30 cd.
8. XVIII. 50ff.
9. XVIII. 61f.
10. II. 55-72.
11. VI. 4-32.
12. XIV. 21-27
13. XVIII. 50-56.
14. XII. 13-20.

Again, as has been already seen above, *jñāna* and *bhakti* at the stage of perfection include each other and are far from being mutually exclusive. The same is true of *karma-yoga* or *karma-mārga* which also requires abandonment of all idea of *kartṛtva* and attachment to *phala* and, thus, performance of all actions in a spirit of self-surrender to the sense of duty. But, this also pre-supposes the knowledge that *guṇas*, alone, are active and that the soul has nothing to do with the actions[1]. It is this knowledge that enables one to have the proper attitude of *karma-yogin*. This, therefore, shows clearly that these paths may differ from one another in the emphasis they lay on this or that particular constituent and yet they are essentially one at the point of perfection[2], so that the soft corner of the author of BG. for the path of *bhakti* discussed above would only seem to suggest the idea that in his view the best way to attain perfection is to begin not along the lines of *jñāna* or *karman*, but along that of *bhakti* by resigning every act to the Lord[3]. The perfection to be attained ultimately by this path will have to include, of course, also the essentials emphasised by the other paths.

1. III. 25, 27 f.

2. This topic has been very ably discussed by Dr. Belvalkar in his articles, '*The Bhagavad-gīta ; Trichotomy versus Triune-Unity*' at Prin. Karmarkar Commemoration Volume pp. 1-6.

3. As the Lord himself has preached it when he has asked Arjuna : यत्करोषि यदश्नासि यज्जुहोषि ददासि यत् । यत्तपस्यसि कौन्तेय तत् कुरुष्व मदर्पणम् (IX. 27). This is the same as the कर्मफलत्याग, which has been declared by the Lord as being the easiest way to *summum bonum*, cf. अथैतदप्यशक्तोऽसि कर्तुं मद्योगमाश्रितः । सर्वकर्मफलत्यागं ततः कुरु यतात्मवान् (XII. 11). This very idea is again stated in the last chapter where the Lord says : तमेव शरणं गच्छ सर्वभावेन भारत । तत्प्रसादात् परां शान्तिं स्थानं प्राप्स्यसि शाश्वतम् (XVIII. 62).

Subjectivism and Objectivism in Hindu Philosophy: The Problem of Ātman

By

BETTY HEIMANN, *Colombo*.

It is a wide-spread belief not only among those who merely know some slogans about Indian Philosophy, but also among specialists on the subject, that India has put forth the most subjectivistic solipsistic or even egoistic system within the whole history of world-philosophy. One tries to prove this assertion from the very fact that nearly all Indian philosophical systems centre, in one way or other, around the investigation of the *Ātman*. But is this *Ātman* always, or ever, the exponent of any subjectivistic outlook? Can we interpret *Ātman* really as a kind of individual 'soul' in the Western sense? It is true that the term *Ātman* occurs already as early as the first awakening of the philosophical thought in *Ṛgvedic* hymns. But, on the whole, these early religio-philosophical texts are more concerned with finding, than defining, the position of man in his wider surroundings. Man's dependency on other earthly beings and on atmospheric phenomena is the presupposition of these researches. There is no primary attempt to establish human status apart from these conditions. Besides, there is a general psychological law, evident at any rate in Hindu thought, that not the thing which is near, but the more remote factors which, nevertheless, are felt as highly influential, arouse first the urge for investigation. Even in later times, there prevails the well known *Nyāya* (maxim) that he who counts the persons in a room excludes himself in the counting (10 present, nine counted). The term *Ātman* occurs in a technical sense in *Ṛgveda* I. 115. I. The passage runs: *sūrya ātmā jagatas tasthuṣas' ca*, 'surya, the sun is the *Ātman*, the vital life-force of everything which moves, and which stands immovable'. This proves that a common life-principle is here assumed to underlie and to maintain everything animate and inanimate alike.

During the following period of the *Brāhmaṇas* and early *Upaniṣads* the term *Ātman* is similarly applied to anything which is considered to be the bearer of the essential life-force. Thus, frequently, from an early materialistic outlook, the body, the visible exponent of all vital functions, is termed *Ātman*. Even when in the more developed period of the *Upaniṣads* the psychological aspect of purely human capacities is more closely investigated and when reason, will and thinking power is made the centre of the researches, the fundamental axiom once established is adhered to: this human *Ātman* can never be essentially separated from

the *Ātman* as assumed within all lower and higher animals or from the maintaining force manifested within all so-called inanimate parts of the universe. Such dogma is clearly expressed in *Bṛh-Up.* I. 3. 32 : 'This *Ātman* in man is the same in the ant, the same in the goat, the same in the elephant ... the same in all three worlds, the same in the whole universe'. This programmatic saying holds good throughout all periods of later systematic Hindu thought[1]. But, are there not in the very same *Bṛh-Up.* other sayings of equally axiomatic significance which are, therefore, made the starting point for all those assertions of India's subjectivistic, egotistic, or even egoistic bent of thought ? I recall *Bṛh.-Up.* II. 4. 5., where it is taught that only for the sake of the *Ātman* husband, wife, sons, and all other earthly and super-worldly beings are dear and valuable. Even when taking this teaching as isolated and not, as it ought to be, in connection with the other passages concerning the *Ātman*, this quotation can never supply a basis for any assumption of a purely subjectivistic outlook[2]. For even here in this isolated saying the fundamental dogma of an inseparable connection of all human and extra-human entities is strictly maintained. The context, e. g. the following verse 12, proclaims that this *Ātman* submerges into all psychic phenomena (*adhy-ātman*) and into all cosmic phenomena (*adhi-devatam*). It is compared to a lump of salt which though dissolved in water still keeps its specific flavour, the salty essence, within all its emanations. Even this subjective wording reveals once more the basic idea of the omnipresence of a super-personal life-power within everything that is known. Besides, we have to keep in mind that this *Ātman* is here, as everywhere, invariably identified, not only compared, with the *Brahman*, the material cosmic universal force. Thus here, too, no merely human entity is meant to be isolated. Now to the famous *Upaniṣadic* formula : *tat tvam asi* (that art thou). This formula, too, is interpreted in the sense of a subjectivistic attitude. If under the '*tat*' is understood the universal *Brahman-Ātman* or if it is taken to indicate any single other being of the empirical world, in both cases this saying cannot be valued as a proof for the all-embracing quality at any personal self, but it clearly shows the super-individual concept of the self. In widening the self to the *all*, the idea of a subject, which in itself implies the concept of limitation, is over-stepped.

No essential distinction is ever acknowledged in India between *man* and the other phenomena of the world. Throughout the periods of

1. I thus ventured to use this saying as the moto, as the rule of conduct, for all studies in systematic Hindu ontology, theology, logic, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics etc. in my *'Indian and Western Philosophy – A study in contrast'*, London, 1937.

2. Later on, it will be shown more in detail that all problems are in India dealt with from both angles, the subjective and objective alike.

Hindu thought and throughout all Hindu systems there is the one fundamental dogma which hinges on this general pre-supposition. The law of re-incarnation is based on the principle that an interchange of human forms with animal and plant continuously takes place. Thus no assumption of exclusivity of the human being is ever established for Hindu thought.

Furthermore, no postulate of any purely immaterial and ever active soul is accepted in Hindu philosophical dogmas. The *Upaniṣads*, which through the centuries are considered the texts of ever-valid revelation, teach that the psychic organs of perception, feeling, will and thinking-power and all their functions are built up, and maintained by and dependent on mere *matter*. The finest parts of all food consumed, form and provide the life-force for the *indriyas*, sense-organs, for the *manas*, the centre of perception, feeling and thinking, and for the *buddhi*, the passive and active bearer of consciousness (cf. *Chānd-Up*. VI. 5. 1. ff). Even when the later systematic *Sāṅkhya* arrives, in a way, at the distinction between *matter* and *spirit*, then, too, all psychic and so-called specific human capacities are taken to be mere emanations of *prakṛti*, primeval *matter*. It is true that there is also assumed as a principle the *puruṣa* (or *puruṣas*) a spiritual entity ; but he is aloof and quasi-barren, without having any active part in the whole world-process. Only indirectly he may, through his mere existence, stimulate *prakṛti* to unfold her productive powers.

The notion of an eternal individual soul is no more accepted than the concept of an immaterial and active soul. All emanation of *prakṛti*, which at a certain time came into being, are bound to come at a certain time to an end. Thus also the intellectual faculties, the *sūkṣma śarīra*, the subtle psychic aggregate, is believed to be re-absorbed in a final de-individualisating melting process (*pralaya*). Similarly, the *Vedanta* assumes as a final and ideal stage that individual shapes be re-absorbed into the super-personal and universal *Brahman*.

But, is there not a general Hindu dogma, which pre-supposes the concept of a soul, endowed with constant psychic and ethical faculties? However, this concept of *karman* cannot easily be brought into agreement with any of our Western current ideas. For *karman* indicates originally nothing but the biological development of seed into the adequate fruit. As such, the term *karman* is significantly used in the *Vaiśeṣika* system, as the technical term for the category of any physical motion. Each tendency grows and develops till it finds its adequate shape of efficacy. No idea of reward and punishment underlies originally this *karman*-theory. The re-incarnation of man into an animal shape cannot be measured after our Western canons of value, say as a kind of degradation and punishment. It is merely to be regarded from the biological angle

as a quasi-mechanical urge for attaining the least impeded form for the development of the main tendency by means of future manifestation. Here, too, our Western standards of human ethics fail to supply any equivalent concept.

Not even our Western ideals of development and accomplishment of personality correspond to any Indian aim of perfection. Not only the *Vedānta*, not only the *Sāṅkhya* but also the apparently subjective *Yoga* system holds the views that the *ahaṅkāra*, the principle of individualisation, is solely an empirical fiction which hinders natural inborn true knowledge and has to be given up in the end. Even during the time of its effectiveness in actual proceedings, the *ahaṅkāra* is never considered as specific quality of the human individual only, nor in a wider sense, of an individual of the animate sphere alone. As the *Sāṅkhya* expressly teaches, the *ahaṅkāra* is the property of any shape, even in its vague and un-individuated form of *tanmātras* and *mahābhūtas*, subtle and gross elements, material basic constituents which have in themselves the possibility of later specified manifestation.

Thus, no basis is given in Indian thought for any genuine subjectivism in a Western sense. No predominance is recognised for the human soul, nor is the attempt, ever seriously made to establish an immaterial, ever-existent and ever-active soul.

Closely related to our Western concepts of the human soul is the notion of personality. Our idea of a person is based on the distinction of beings of lower and higher order. We understand under the term 'person' a human or a superhuman being, say a divine personality.

Now the question arises whether not the concept of the Self elevated to the idea of a God-self, may be accepted as a kind of super-self, and thus, if not an ordinary subjectivistic, but a sublimated subjectivistic outlook may underlie Indian doctrines.

But even the God is in India conceived as in some way subject to the general cosmic laws. Very few, and on the whole unconvincing, descriptions are given of God as the creator of the world. He is mainly, even in the cosmogonies, merely conceived as the disposer or ruler of the world which came into being before, and without Him (*vidhātṛ*). In Ṛgveda X. 129, the world is assumed to exist before the God or Gods, and they are on this, the empirical side of the world (*arvāg visarjanena*). In later systematic thought the concept of a God is either omitted altogether (cf. the atheistic *Sāṅkhya*) or He is only introduced as a *laukika* concept for the understanding of the masses (see early *Vedānta* and S'ṅkara) or the one God is submerged in plurality of equally important other deities, and thus gains at the utmost only the significance of a *primus inter pares*. The different divine

personal forms, the 'He's are subordinated under the all-embracing concept of a divine 'It'. The neuter stands higher than the person. As to our Western presupposition of the independent and self-responsible actions of all persons, human and divine, there always stand in India, beside or beyond them, laws of Nature like *karman* and quasi-mechanical development with which no person can interfere.

Thus, having dealt with the idea of prominence of a person or subject and having come to the conclusion that no outstanding prevalence is attributed to either of them, we have now to approach the problem 'subject-object' apart from the question of value, and have to state the facts of actual relation between subject and object from the merely empirical angle. From this aspect there is assumed a continuous co-operation between subject and object and their reciprocal influence is emphasised. Here one comes across the theory of perception. *Bṛh-Up.* III, 2, 1,ff. interprets the preceiving subject as *graha*, the grasper, but the objects as the *ati-grahas*, i. e. the *grahas* which have a wider sphere of efficacy, while grasping and influencing more than one limited subject simultaneously or successively. The sense-organs are lowest in the scale of entities at the top of which stands the Divine, the sense-objebts are for the above given reasons one step higher (*Kaṭh-Up.* III. 10, ff.). The *Yogin* concentrates on one object, either on a part of his own body or on any external object, in order to grasp through the one in hand the essence of them all (cf. also the teachings of the *Mīmāṃsā* that the specimen impilicitly reveals the species). The mastery of the objects which is the *Yogin's* aim, does not end in his accumulated subjective power; even if the *Yogin* has attained *siddhi*, highest personal efficiency, he is not satisfied with being an outstanding personality, but uses his acquired perfection to become a receptive vessal for the influx of all life-forces dispersed. From the fundamental idea that all phenomena contain parts of the cosmic vital force, his subjective mastery lies in his recollecting power. He, as a subject, draws as many objects as possible into his range to contain more than his own limited subjective capacity.

Even if one applies the measuring rod of ethics, then too, no prevalence of, or distinction between, the subject and object in favour of the subject results therefrom. India has adhered to the pre-sophistic cosmic ethics. Not our subjective attitude towards a deed, say a crime, matters so much as the objective fact of the disturbance of cosmic order which is thereby caused. Subjective elements, like will and intention gain for the Indian an objective and material import. Thought and its expression in words are just as material in their effects as a concrete action. Thus, ancient *Ṛgveda* values the dedication of a hymn like a concrete material offering. Consequently, Indian law, throughout all periods of orthodox Indian thought, considers verbal injury almost equivalent to bodily injury and

punishes accordingly. The ontological foundation of Hindu thought leads to an emphasis of the objective, not of the subjective, aspect. A striking example for this is given in Indian epistemology: the term for the subjectively true is *satyam*, which means literally 'existent'. Everything which exists has through its very existence the quality of truth. India's positivism[1] pulls the weight in the direction of the objective. Western critical scepticism, on the other hand, which doubts all existent phenomena as such, may find its only positive hold in the '*cogito ergo sum*'. India's so-called sceptic religions, like Buddhism, never arrive at the complete denial of external empirical data, but only at their later repudiation. Thus Buddhism, on the whole, rejects the belief in permanent values contained in, or gained from, empirical phenomena, but their actual existence is acknowledged while intellectual-and will-powers are mobilised to counter-act their efficacies.

To conclude, if in India any predilection for subject-or objectivism can be stated at all, then only a tendency for taking the objective entities more decisive than the subjective can be deduced.

But India is ever reluctant to accept any one-sided statement. One of her fundamental laws of thought is that of polarity which implies that one part of a pair of opposites can not be exclusively taken into account. Each statement is based on the simultaneous considerations of its counter-statement. Truth can only be gained through *saṃvāda*, gathering of conclusions from several aspects. Natural ambiguity is never lost sight of. Thus the *Vedānta* moves consciously on the double levels of transcendent and empirical aspects simultaneously. The *Ātman-Brahman* is immanent and at the same time external with regard to the phenomena. Similarly, the *Sāṅkhya* views the empirical and transcendental aspects of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* simultaneously. Thus, *Mīmāṃsā* comprises, in its investigation of *artha*, three different aspects: *artha* is the pre-empirical idea, the empirical sense and the teleological purpose. The *Vaiśeṣika*, the system apparently limited to mere explanation of finite physical data, nevertheless, introduces at the same time one, or better two, transcendental concepts. The *Vaiśeṣika* inserts within its physical statements of visible facts concepts of the 'unseen' characteristically subdivided in polar dimensions: the infinitely small, the atom, *aṇu* and the infinitely great, the *ākāśa* are dealt with — together and in opposition with the range of empirical data. In a similar way even the *Nyāya*, the so-called formal logic of India, proclaims in its programmatic teaching of *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1. 1, that all rational intricacy of logical discussion is established for gaining an irrational and extra-worldly aim:

1. Cf. ***Studien zur Eigenart indischen Denkens***, pp. 160 ff. and ***passim.***, and ***Indian and Western Philosophy***, pp. 75 ff. and ***passim.***

religious perfection and salvation (*niḥ-s'reyasa*). Even in its single logical investigations, the *Nyāya* is anxious not to overlook natural ambiguities given. In the *Nyāya* system 'terms' are not accepted as arbitrarily fixed (like the Latin *terminus*); *prasaṅga* means, for instance, logical consequence or wrong association. 'Terms' have primarily a neutral meaning. Besides, one and the same word is used, side by side, as a genuine technical term and also with other meanings of a wider and not technical import. Accordingly *Yoga-Sūtra* II. 34, and commentary deal in the very same context, with *mukta* in the technical sense of the ideal release and in the colloquial sense of a *mukta*-fire, loosened, unguarded and destructive.

As to our problem in hand, subjectivism and objectivism, too, are never in the Indian world of thought treated in isolation from each other. In the empirical sphere they are continuously changing places. What is a subject taken from the one angle, may be object with regard to others in the very same, or in any following moment. Compare also its characteristic reflection in Sanskrit grammatical syntax. The agent, the subject is equally often expressed as a mere instrumental object, e. g. *na mayā bhetavyam* 'I should not fear'. This empirical fact of relativity of object and subject seems to be also in some way retained even in our Western languages. In English, for instance, the object of investigation is called the subject-matter. A survey of the history of Western philosophy shows that in some periods of its development the term 'subject' is understood in its Latin sense of *subjectum* or Greek *hypokeimenon*, i.e. sub-stance. As such, it indicates the basis for the investigation of all data and embraces the material aspect, i.e. object, and the psychological aspect, i.e. subject, both in one.

India has, through all times, adhered to this wider concept. India's fundamental idea is that subject and object are only emanations from this productive reservoir of forces. The *Upaniṣadic* dogma of the *suṣupti*, the deep-sleep, teaches that temporarily even in this empirical stage of distinctive forms, there can be reached a moment in which subject and object merge into one. In deep-sleep when no single phenomena are any more perceived and not even any more reflected as in dream-sleep, then a stage is visualized where object and subject are re-united. This temporal stage of non-distinction is considered to be a reflection of pre- and post-empirical conditions in which subject and object are not yet, or no more, separated. In this moment of *suṣupti*, the highest bliss is experienced, bliss, which is considered not as an object and not as a subject of feeling, but as a combination of both (*akhaṇḍa*). A significant simile of this assumed highest stage, is given in *Bṛh-Up.* IV, 3, 21 ff. Here the metaphor of the union in love is used where consciousness of

separation between subject and object is lost. The same *Bṛh-Up.* describes this highest stage of no-more- or not-yet-subject and object by a simile of the drum and the drummer. In both, the potential object, the drum, and the potential agent, the drummer, are virtually contained all single sounds which are objects and subject or agent of later perception. In grasping the drum and the drummer, before, or after, their active manifestation all potential beats of the drum are implicitly grasped. Similarly, all subjects and objects can be potentially understood in a kind of 'vessel-consciousness' or 'witness-consciousness'. Both expressions are equivalent, the one, the 'witness-consciousness' is taken as a metaphor from the subjective sphere (the potential agent or perceiver), the term 'vessel-consciousness' is chosen from the objective aspect. Both together circumscribe the range of potentiality which is considered the highest, i.e. that in which both subject and object, lie already, or still, together, not being limited to a single accidental activity or passivity.

This problem of pre-actual non-distinction between potential subject and potential object leads to further questions of a characteristic Indian ambiguity, for instance, to the various Indian shades of the problem of causality. The *causa efficiens*, the agent, and the *causa materialis*, the material cause, are in Indian philosophy not strictly separated from each other. Even in systematic *Nyāya*, the process (*vyāpāra*) in itself is of greater importance than the defining act between subject and object. Besides, preferably not persons, but things, are taken to illustrate the process of causation. In the standard examples the threads are shown as the *causa efficiens* for the effect, the cloth. Persons and things are alike with regard to their qualifications as potential agents. I may recall here the *satkārya* theory of the *Sāṅkya*. All effects, both subjects and objects, are contained in an embryonal stage of existence in the great vessel of primeval *matter*, before and after actual manifestation; *prakṛti* is the common cause. A similar non-distinction between subjective and objective factors may be found in the Buddhist formula of causation. The *pratītya-samutpāda*, the twelve-fold chain of causation, represents in a way, strange to the Western mind, an intermixture of psychic (subjective) and material (objective) causes, which are equally effective to produce the texture of existential forms.

India, then, because of her fundamental sense of objectivity, and more so, because of her basic sense of polarity, has no predominantly subjective bent of thought.

The Mother-Goddess Kāmākhyā of Kāmarūpa

By

B. KAKATI, *Gauhati.*

1. It has often been said that the cult of the *Yoni* sprang up first in Assam, and then it spread over the rest of India. But the subject has not been discussed more closely. This paper purports to be a short examination into the myths and legends that clustered around the origin of the *Yoni*-goddess in Assam with notices of such parallel beliefs and practices outside of Assam as may enlarge the scope of further discussion of the topic. The two principal Sanskrit works that bear upon the subject are the *Kālikā-purāṇa* (KP.) and the *Yoginī-tantra* (YT.) both composed in or near about ancient Assam.

2. The shrine of the goddess Kāmākhyā is situated about three miles from the present town of Gauhati and about fifty miles from the range of hills inhabited by two aboriginal matriarchal tribes, the Khāsis and the Gāros — the former belonging to the Austro-Asiatic stock and the latter to the Mongolian stock.

3. The name of the hillock, where the shrine stands, is Nīlācala (blue mountain). According to KP. (Bombay ed.) the genital organ of Satī fell here when her dead body was carried hither and thither in frantic sorrow by her husband S'iva. The mountain represented the body of S'iva himself and when Satī's genital organ fell on it, the mountain turned blue (LXIV, 59). The goddess herself is called Kāmākhyā, because she came here secretly to satisfy her amour (*kāma*) with him (LXIV, 1). Thus, the derivations of KP. make the mountain both a graveyard and a secret love-tryst of the goddess.

4. Other variants of the name are Kāmā, Kāmadā etc. (LXIV, 2). The element, *-ākhyā* often appears as a pleonastic derivative after other less known names of the goddess, e. g. *S'ivākhyā, Nādākhyā, Brahmākhyā, Hansākhyā* etc., (KP. Part I, ch. XII). Thus, the goddess may be called either *Kāmākhyā* or *Kāmā.*

5. The temple is unique from other temples of the *Devī* in different parts of India, in that it enshrines no image of the goddess. Within the temple there is a cave, in a corner of which stands a block of stone on which the symbol of a *Yoni* has been sculptured. The stone is kept moist from the oozings of a natural spring within the cave. The offerings of flowers and leaves are made on the *Yoni*. In other respects the daily rites and ceremonies are those of the goddess Kālī

with sacrifices of various animals. The females of all animals are exempted from sacrifice.

6. If KP. gives an amorous interpretation of the origin of the *Yoni*-goddess, YT. takes no notice of the myth and gives a different account stressing the creative symbolism of the *Yoni*. In answer to a query by the *Devī*, as to who Kāmākhyā was, S'iva replies that Kāmākhyā is the same as Kālī, the eternal in the form of Brahmā. Then S'iva tells a story about the origin of Kāmākhyā.

7. In primeval times Brahmā after having created the universe, arrogated to himself the supreme creative force. The goddess noticed this arrogance of Brahmā and created out of her own body a demon *Keśi*. As soon as born the demon rushed towards Brahmā to swallow him up. Brahmā fled in terror in the company of Viṣṇu. The demon then built a city called Keśīpura and began to harass the three worlds. There was all around, the echo of a sound – 'Kill Brahmā'. Brahmā cast aside his vanity and in the company of Viṣṇu offered a hymn of propitiation to Kali for the relief of the worlds from the tyranny of Keśi. The goddess was satisfied and confessed that the demon was her creation for the punishment of Brahma for his ignorant arrogance. She then uttered the syllable of destruction (*hum*) and burnt up the demon to ashes. Then she gave directions to Brahma for his deliverance from the sin of ignorance and arrogance. Brahma was to create a mountain out of the ashes of the burnt demon. The mountain should not be too high nor too low. It should be corved over with edible grasses for cattle. Brahmā's sin would be diminished in proportion to the quantity of grasses consumed by cattle. She went on further to say that on the spot wherefrom they had offered her prayers for the destruction of the demon, there was springing up, in their very presence, a *Yoni*-circle out of her own creative energy and it should be regarded as source and origin of all things. In future Brahmā should create after having contemplated the *Yoni*. But just then Brahmā was debarred from seeing the *Yoni*, until by his penance and purification he had brought down a luminous light from the sky and placed it on the *Yoni*-circle. For his good as well as for the good of the world she had created the *Yoni*-circle and placed it in Kāmarūpa etc. . . . . Brahmā accordingly created a mountain by sprinkling holy water from his jug and called it *Go-vardhana* (cattle nourisher) and also planted a *tulasī* grove and called it *Vṛndā-vana* according to goddess Kālī's direction (YT. Bombay ed. Part 1. ch. 15).

8. The noticeable points in this myth are: (a) Kāmākhyā was a new goddess, unknown to the *Devī* herself. S'iva established the identity of Kālī and Kāmākhyā in the symbol of a *Yoni*; (b) the supreme creative force of Brahmā is challenged. He could, thenceforths

create only with the blessings of the *Yoni* as the sole creative principle; (c) in both the accounts of KP. and YT. there is mention of burial or cremation ground.

9. Thus the two scriptures put divergent interpretations about the *Yoni*-circle as a symbol of sex and as a symbol of creation. These may embody the views of two different sets of people who first professed the cult.

10. KP. harmonises the amorous conception of the goddess with the dread goddess Kālī by presenting the picture of a goddess in three-fold aspects, which she assumed in different moods. In her amorous mood, the goddess holds a yellow garland in her hand and stands on a red lotus placed on a white corpse. When her amour is gone, she takes up the sword and stands on a bare white corpse. In her mood of benevolence (Kāmadā), she mounts upon a lion. So she assumes one form or another according to her whims (*Kāmarūpiṇī* [KP. LX, 56 ff.])

11. The original Kāmākhyā temple was destroyed under Moslem invasion early in the sixteenth century and the present temple was rebuilt in 1565 A. D. by king Naranārāyaṇa, the Coch king of Coch Bihar and fitted with all the paraphernalia of a mediaeval Hindu temple. What the original forms and features of the temple worship were, it is difficult to say. There is a tradition amongst the local priesthood, who were imported from abroad by the Coch king, that the former worshippers of the goddess were Gāros (2) and pigs were offered as sacrifices. Brahmin widows refuse even now to partake of the food offerings to the goddess, as they are supposed to be polluted by the memory of pig sacrifices.

12. When Naraka, an adventurer from Mithilā founded a kingdom in Assam (prior to the fifth century), he established himself as a custodian of this *Yoni*-goddess, and perhaps in conformity to her name, he changed the name of the kingdom from Prāg-jyotiṣapura to Kāmarūpa. The people whom he conquered were Kirātas, strong and ferocious, ignorant and addicted to meat and drink. They had shaven heads and their skin yellow as gold (KP. XXXIX, 1o4 ff). As they were the original inhabitants, the goddess might have been in their keeping.

13. Folk imagination seems to have been haunted by the sex appeal of the goddess. There is a popular story that Naraka was captivated by the charms of the goddess and made overtures of love to her. The wily goddess agreed to accept his offer on condition that in the course of one night, he should construct a temple a tank and a masonry road from the foot of the hill. Naraka nearly completed the construction,

when, under secret inspiration from the goddess, a cock crew before it was daybreak and Naraka's love remained a dream. There is another popular story about the Coch king. It was given out that at the time of the evening prayer, the goddess danced within closed doors in the temple. The king desired to see the dancing goddess and asked the chief priest Kendu Kalāi to make a device. The king was asked to peep through a hole in the wall. As he did so, his eyes caught the eyes of the goddess. The goddess grew irate and tore off the head of the priest. The king and his future descendants were forbidden on dire penalty to cast a look even at her very hill. Whatever the fact, the prohibition is observed even now and the local descendants of the Coch kings pass by the hill under cover of umbrellas.

14. Whatever the truth, the practice of virgin-worship in the precincts of the temple seems to lend some colour to such stories about the sex appeal of the goddess. These virgins are not temple-girls (there are none such attached to this temple, they being attached only to S'aivite temples in Assam) but girls of householders. They are said to be worshipped in the Right-Hand (*dakṣiṇācāra*) manner. YT. enjoins virgin-worship as being of special merit. No caste distinction is to be made in selecting a virgin. And if in the process of worship, the devotee is stricken with amour he goes to *Vaikuṇṭha* or S'iva's region (YT. I, 17, 31-35; 54).

15. YT. seems to concede the non-indigenous source of virgin-worship in narrating the history of its origin. At first, king Vis'vambhara of Kāñci (Conjeeveram in Madras) worshipped a virgin of the prostitute class. Then, high-souled Kāmpilya worshipped a virgin in a place named after him (United Provinces). Then, a demon king, named Kolāsura, worshipped a virgin in the Himalayas (YT. I, 17, 44-50).

16. YT. raises the *Yoni* symbol to the height or something like a pantheistic conception in describing all temples and places of worship in Assam as so many *Yonis*. It characterises Kāmarūpa as a land of nine *Yonis*, which include *Vīthi* (road) : *Upa-vīthi* (branch road); *Pīṭha* (site) ; *Upa-pīṭha* ; *Siddha-pīṭha* ; *Mahā-pīṭha* ; *Brahma-pīṭha* ; *Viṣṇu-pīṭha* and *Rudra-pīṭha* (YT. I, 11,25 ; 26). Every woman in Kāmarupa is an image of the *Devī* herself (CCXVI, 150).

17. YT. has, also, recorded certain local customs prevalent in different parts of ancient Assam. It characterises the local religion as being of Kirāta origin. It prohibits asceticism, celibacy and protracted vows, and enjoins fish and flesh eating, free association with women, and sexual intercourse after puberty. The teeth of the women are not white and they are constantly addicted to betel-nut chewing. In a

place called Saumara in the east of Assam, people eat everything and sell everything. Women are well contented. In another place, called Kolāpīṭha, people follow tribal customs. In another place, called S'rīhaṭṭa, there is profusion of drink (CCXIX, 13-18).

18. According to KP. a cosmopolitan mode of worship prevailed. Foreigners could worship the goddess according to the practices current in their own localities. In other countries, conformity to local customs was enforced but in Kāmarupa, foreigners were exempted from conformity to local rites and ceremonies (LXVIII, 33-37). This freedom in the land of nine *Yonis*, inhabited by aboriginal tribes with infinite varieties of sexual relationship, – polygamy with right to inherit a dead father's widows except the mother, polyandry, pre-nuptial sexual freedom, licence festivals, — produced the kind of Saturnalia called *vāmācāra* in the *Tantras*. The ritualistic anarchy, that followed, has been taken note of by KP. (LXXXIV, 19-28). This continued down to historical times and the Coch king Naranārāyaṇa issued an edict setting aside the tract north of the Gosāin Kamalā Āli (i. e. the north bank of the Brahmaputra river) for the practice of aboriginal forms of worship. Before starting on his expedition against the Ahoms, he made special arrangements for the performance by his Kachāri soldiers of their tribal rites on the banks of the Sankosh river (Gait : *History of Assam*, 1905 ; p. 58).

19. To summarise the position thus far reached, the *Yoni* cult has been presented by the two works YT. and KP. from two different standpoints. YT. emphasises the creative aspect, and KP. the amorous aspect. These two views may respectively represent the views of the matriarchal tribes with ancestor-worship and other tribes observing licence festivals meant to please the gods. KP. in its choice and treatment of ancient myths and legends has given something like a canonical sanction to the cult of sexual licence. It opens with Brahmā's incestuous passion for his own mind-born daughter Sandhyā and ends with his illicit passion for Amoghā. In between are the stories of the sacrificial Boar's sexual commerce with goddess Earth during her menstruation, Kāpota-Muni's illicit passion for Tārāvatī, a Kāpālika's sexual commerce with Tārāvatī and of Pārvatī's careless exposure of naked beauty before Bhṛṅgī and Mahākāla.

20. About the evolution of the Mother-Goddess, it has been said that 'under one set of names there has occurred a gradual identification of many originally unconnected local *numina* and their fusion into the cult of the Great Goddess (E. A. Payne : *The S'āktas*, 1933 ; p. 116). For example, KP. (I, 12) gives *Sinīvālī* as one of the thousand names of Pārvatī. It has now been shewn that the word is

connected with Babylonian *sinn*, 'the moon-god' (Venkataramayya : *Rudra-S'iva*, 1941, p. 66). It may similarly happen that the formation *Kāmā* (¶ 4) is of extra-Aryan origin. There is a strong suggestion of its correspondence to Austric formations like the following : *kamoi*, 'demon' (old Khmer); *kamoit*, 'devil' (Cham); *komui*, 'grave' (Tareng); *kamet*, 'corpse' (Khasi) ; *kamru*, 'a god of the Santals' (B. Kakati : *Assamese, its Formation and Development*, 1941, p. 53). By analogy the name of the kingdom Kāmarupa (¶ 12) may be equated to *Kamru* + *pau*, 'a hill'. The demon Keśī (¶ 7), homonymous with the one killed by Kṛṣṇa and read in the context of word-play on *Go-vardhana* and *Vṛndā-vana* (¶ 7) may be equated to Austric-Khasi *kseh*, 'a pine tree'.

21. The formations in the *kamoi*-category suggest varied associations with the grave and its spirits (¶ ¶ 2, 8). The Kāmā-goddess might have been originally a spirit of the graveyard and represent ancestor-spirit in the form of an ancestral Mother. In this respect, whether *kāmā* has any relationship both in sound and meaning with the Japanese Shinto gods, called *kami*, is a matter for future investigation. Shinto *kami* is a wide term and includes nature-gods, god-men, ancestors (C. C. Martindale : *The Religions of the World*, 1931, p. 27).

22. In connection with the *kami*-gods, another noteworthy point is that simple Shinto temples contain no images but only symbols like a mirror, symbolic of the shining of the sun-goddess (Ibid. p. 27). The Kāmākhyā temple also contains no image (¶ 5), but a symbol, a *Yoni*, representing the procreative force of the Mother-Goddess. The *Yoni* symbol is regarded as a source of potent magic influence in Japan. The richly attired Japanese make a point of placing cowry shells with their clothes when they put them away for luck. If a cowry shell happens to be unobtainable, a pornographic picture, representing the female genital organ, serves as a substitute (Briffault : *The Mothers* Vol. III, p. 278). Near Yeddo in Japan is a grotto in which there is a colossal but realistic sculpture of *Yoni* to which pilgrims pay attention now, as they have done for ages past ; this sculpture has been worn smooth and polished from the myriads of kisses and caresses with the tongue that have been bestowed upon it by devout worshippers (O. A. Wall : *Sex and Sex-Worship*, 1922, p. 481). Again, the Japanese believe that the spirits of mothers look from the other world after the welfare of the children (Briffault : *op. cit.* Vol. I., p. 148).

23. Another common custom is the blackening of teeth by women. The non-white teeth of Assamese women have been noticed by the YT. (¶ 17). It has to be added that Assamese women, even now, blacken their teeth in the countryside. In Japan, the fashion of blackening of teeth is still common in some parts among peasant women and was practised by the Emperor himself until recently. This is a mark

of the decidedly matriarchal legend of origination of the Imperial family traced back to goddess Amaterasu (Ehrenfels : *The Mother-Right in India*, p. 197). In the Malay Archipelago, also, women blacken their teeth (Westermarck : *The History of Human Marriage*, pp. 166, 182).

24. Reference may, also, be made to the legends and facts of female predominance. There is a belief amongst the Nāgā tribes of Assam that a village in the north-east is entirely peopled by women who are visited by traders from the surrounding tribes and thus enabled to keep up their numbers (*Imperial Gazetteer of India* : Provincial Series : *Eastern Bengal and Assam*, 1909, p. 476). With reference to Japan, it has been said that it is a remarkable and unexampled fact that a very large and important part of the best literature produced by Japan was written by women. Feminine chieftains are frequently mentioned in the old histories and several even of the Mikadoes were women. Indeed the Chinese seemed to have thought that the monstrous regiment of women was the rule in Japan at this time ; at least they styled it 'The Queen Country' (W. G. Aston : *Japanese Literature*, 1907, pp. 55, 56).

25. In connection with the ethnic affiliation of the Japanese people, *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* (14th. ed.) writes as follows : 'Recent discussions tend to emphasise the importance of a Malay-Polynesian element in the Japanese language and customs'. Malayan types also are found amongst the people.

26. On the basis then of similarities in mere sound and sense in the formations, Skt. *kāmā*, Austric *kamoi*, Shinto *kami*, and also on the basis of correspondences of certain rites and customs, it may be tentatively assumed for future discussions, that the *Yoni*-goddess sprang up somewhere in south-east Asia amongst peoples with leanings towards ancestor-worship and believing in the protective powers of an Ancestral Mother, and that she migrated into India and elsewhere with the migrations of the Austric peoples. According to Dr. S. K. Chatterji, the Austric speech and the bases of Austric religion and culture appear to have been characterised in North Indo-China (*Indo-Aryan and Hindi*, 1942, p. 34).

The 24 Varieties of Viṣṇu Image[1]

By

G. H. KHARE, *Poona.*

Among the varieties of Viṣṇu image there is a group of 24 icons which is generally termed in Sanskrit as *Kes'avādi-caturviṃs'ati-mūrtayaḥ*. The caption comes from a group of 24 names of Viṣṇu generally recited at the beginning, as well as, the end of every Vedic rite for the present. The group begins with the name Kes'ava whence it is called *Kes'avādi*. Each image from this group has four hands holding the four attributes, S'aṅkha (conch), Cakra (wheel), Gadā (mace) and Padma (lotus). It is only by a systematic interchange of these attributes that the 24 varieties are formed.

According to the rules of permutations and combinations, a sum of X digits can have as many varieties of combination as the sum resulting from the mutual multiplication of the places of digits of the sum. Thus, a sum of two digits can have only two different (2, 1) combinations ; a sum of three digits can have only (3, 2, 1) six combinations. In the same way, a sum of four digits can have only twenty-four different combinations or varieties. Therefore, we get twenty-four varieties of Viṣṇu image by the interchange of the four attributes in the four hands.

I have found these varieties described in the following works : (1) *Abhilaṣitārtha-cintāmaṇi*[2] (AC), (2) *Agni-purāṇa*[3] (AP), (3) *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi*[4] (CC), (4) *Devatāmūrti-prakaraṇa*[5] (DMP), (5) *Dharma-sindhu*[6] (DS), (6) *Nirṇaya-sindhu*[7] (NS), (7) *Padma-purāṇa*[8] (PP), (8) *Rūpa-maṇḍana*[9] (RP), (9) *S'ilpa-ratna*[10] (S'R), (10) *S'rītattva-nidhi*[11] (S'TN), (11) *Tantra-sāra*[12] (TS)

1. The memoir no. 2 of the Indian archaeological department is devoted to this very subject. The late T. A. Gopinathrao has also treated this subject at some length in his monumental work : ***The Elements of Hindu Iconography*** (vol. I, p. 227). I, on my part, have devoted some pages to this very subject in my already published work : ***Mūrti-vijñāna*** (pp. 23-33). But, nowhere has the theoretical aspect of the theme been so fully treated as in this article.

2. Mysore University : Oriental Library Publications, Sanskrit Series no. 69, III, 1, 726-733.

3. Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series, no. 41, XLVIII, 1-12.

4. Bibliotheca Indica Series, vol. II, part 1, p. 114.

5. Calcutta Sanskrit Series, no. 12, V, 1-13.

6. Published by Y. G. Dikshit, Poona, 1911, p. 256.

7. Published by Sundarmalla Santuram, Bombay, 1892.

8. Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series, vol. II, LXXVIII, 17-27.


9. Calcutta Sanskrit Series, no. 12, III, 9-23.


10. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, no. 98, XXIII, 42 ff.

11. Published by the Venkates'vara Press Bombay, S'. 1823, p. 50.

12. B. I. S. Mandal (Poona) Collection, G. B. Rinapure Ms. No. 462, (I, 23-29).

and (12) *Vṛddhahārītasmṛti*[1] (VHS). I give below all the descriptions occurring in these works in a tabulated form[2]. The following facts have, however, to be noted : (1) The descriptions in AC, NS, STN, DMP, RM and TS being identical and AC being the oldest work among them, I have cited AC only in the tabulated form. (2) As SR enumaratcs only twelve varieties without any reference to their attributes, have left it altogether. (3) In the tabulated form the four block letters S, C, G and P denote the four attributes, S'aṅkha, Cakra, Gadā and Padma, respectively. (4) In some of the works the attributes have been mentioned according to the lower right hand order (*Dakṣiṇādhaḥkarakrama*). Thus, AC, AP, CC, DMP, RM and VHS maintain this order, i.e. they refer to the attribute in the lower right hand first, then to that in the upper right hand, thirdly to that in the upper left hand and lastly to that in the lower left hand. Others describe the attributes according to the upper right hand order, i.e. first the attribute in the upper right hand, secondly that in the upper left hand, thirdly that in the lower left hand and lastly that in the lower right hand. PP, DS, NS and TS have this order. I have maintained the former order in my table, and hence made the necessary changes. Thus, if the formula for a particular variety is PSCG according to the former order, it will be SCGP according to the latter order. The two orders can best be shown by the following diagrams :—





But it will be seen that though the orders may differ, the descriptions will be identical in general unless an author differs in opinion. (5) There is a difference of opinion in the order of the twenty-four names. For instance, AP and TS have 13. Vāsudeva, 14. Saṅkarṣaṇa as well as 21. Upendra, 22. Janārdana ; but AC, DS, PP, STN, VHS have 13. Saṅkarṣaṇa, 14. Vāmadeva, 21. Janārdana, 22. Upendra, while CC, DMP, NS and RM have no order in the twenty-four names at all. (6) DS states that it has

1. Ānandās'rama Sanskrit Series, no. 48, II, 79 ff. and X, 110 ff.

2. Besides the above mentioned sources, I have come across a Marathi metrical composition describing these 24 varieties together with 24 paintings drawn according to the descriptions. The style of the paintings shows that they should have been executed at the end of the 18th or the beginning of the 19th century. But as the descriptions are identical with those met with in AC, I have omitted to mention them separately. I wonder if any other Indian language possesses any composition of this type. It is also interesting to note that Rao Bahadur Radha Krishna Jalan of Patna possesses, among his very rich and varied collection, a set of 30 *tithi* paintings which are drawn according to the Marathi metrical descriptions cited below them. In essence these are identical with those given in CC and STN.

borrowed the descriptions from NS. NS mentions the following aphorism of Bopadeva as a base for the treatment of the subject in it : KEVIGOVĀDĀPUHR-UPEPRA JĀCYU KṚMAMATRINĀ, VĀDHONṚHASĀNIS'RIPA SYĀTCAGE VIGAPECAPE. In this aphorism the first VĀ evidently denotes Vāmana and the second Vāsudeva. But DS has wrongly supposed that they denote Vāsudeva and Vāmana respectively, and hence the formulae for the two varieties are interchanged. I have, therefore, corrected DS. (7) While commenting upon this aphorism, NS says that CC should be referred to for the original source (अत्र मूलं हेमाद्रौ द्रष्टव्यम्). The Chaukhamba series edition of NS, in a note added to this sentence, cites some verses describing the twenty-four varieties borrowed presumably from CC. But it is interesting to find that the verses given in CC and indicated as taken from *Siddhārthasaṃhitā* entirely differ from those cited in the above-mentioned edition of NS. (8) If Lakṣmī associates with any of the varieties, the pair goes by the name Lakṣmī-Keśava, Lakṣmī-Vāsudeva, Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa, Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha etc. as the case may be.

Bearing all these considerations in mind, if we examine the table, we find the following peculiarities: (1) There are no formulae for Upendra, Janārdana and Hari in PP as well as for Kes'ava and Kṛṣṇa in CC. (2) There are identical formulae for Mādhava and Pradyumna as well as Padmanābha and Hari in AP ; for Kes'ava and Pradyumna in PP ; for Trivikrama and Adhokṣaja in CC ; and for Kes'ava and Janārdana in VHS. Viṣṇu and S'rīdhara have each two formulae in CC and AP, respectively, according to a reading of the text, and Vāsudeva, also, has two formulae in VHS[1].

TABLE

No. and name of the variety	Formulae in AP	PP	VHS	AC	CC	DS
1. Kes'ava	PSCG	PSCG	PSCG	PSCG	—	PSCG
2. Nārāyaṇa	SPGC	SPGC	SPGC	SPGC	SPGC	SPGC
3. Mādhava	GCSP	GCSP	GCSP	GCSP	GCSP	GCSP
4. Govinda	CGPS	CGPS	CGPS	CGPS	CGPS	CGPS
5. Viṣṇu	GPSC	GPSC	GPSC	GPSC	GPSC[2]	GPSC

1. I have discussed elsewhere (MM. P. V. Kane Commemoration volume, pp. 260-263) the probable date of the introduction of these varieties into the Viṣṇu worship in general. As regards the introduction of these varieties into the Indian sculpture, I wish to write separately later. I know at least three places, where Viṣṇu images belonging to these varieties have been sculptured with their name lables.

2. The other formula is GPC.

6. Madhusūdana	SCPG	CSPG	CSPG	CSPG	CSPG	CSPG
7. Trivikrama	PGCS	PGCS	PGCS	PGCS	PGSC	PGSC
8. Vāmana	SCGP	SCGP	SCGP	SCGP	SCGP	GSCP
9. S'rīdhara	PCGS[1]	GCPS	PCGS	PCGS	PCGS	PCGS
10. Hṛṣīkeśa	GCPS	PCGS	GCPS	GCBS	GCPS	GCPS
11. Padmanābha	SPCG	CPSG	SPCG	SPCG	SPCG	SPCG
12. Dāmodara	PSGC	PSGC	PSGC	PSGC	PCGS	PSGC
13. Vāsudeva	GSCP	PCSG	GSCP[2]	GSCP	GSCP	SCGP
14. Saṅkarṣaṇa	GSPC	GSPC	GSPC	GSPC	GSPC	GSCP
15. Pradyumna	GCSG(P)	PSCG	CSGP	CSGP	CSGP	CSGP
16. Aniruddha	CGSP	CGSP	CGSP	CGSP	CGSP	CGSP
17. Puruṣottama	CPSG	CPSG	CPSG	CPSG	CPSG	CPSG
18. Adhokṣaja	PGSC	PGSC	PGSC	PGSC	PGSC	PGSC
19. Narasiṃha	CPGS	CPGS	CPGS	CPGS	CP[G*]S	CPGS
20. Acyuta	GPCS	GPCS	GPCS	GPCS	GPCS	GPCS
21. Upendra	SGCP	———	SGCP	SGCP	PGCS	SGCP
22. Janārdana	PCSG	———	PSCG	PCSG	PCSG	PCSG
23. Hari	SPCG	———	SCPG	SCPG	SCPG	SCPG
24. S'rikṛṣṇa	SGPC	SGPC	SGPC	SGPC	———	SGPC

1. A reading adds S'ārṅga (the bow of Viṣṇu).
2. Another reading gives the formula GSPC.

The Notion of Self-Evidence or Svaprakāśa

By

G. R. MALKANI, *Amalner.*

The notion of a self-evident reality is not a notion of European philosophy. There are certain self-evident truths which are intuitively certain. Such are, for example the laws of thought, and all formal truths based upon those laws and exemplifying them. No fact can be self-evidently true, but only true in the simple sense of being evident to us. We have no doubt about it practically, but it is not indubitably or intuitively certain. Our knowledge can be false; and this for the simple reason that reality transcends our knowledge and is supposed to be external to it. Knowldge is ours, and is determined by certain instruments of knowledge and the subjective interpretation we put upon what is given in sensation. Reality, on the other hand, is not ours but purely objective. There is thus a gap between the two, and absolute certainty is unavailable. A sceptical attitude in knowledge is quite natural. Even if we accept the view that reality is not external to knowledge, but internal to it, we are still far from getting at the truth. What is internal to knowledge has no objective and independent reality. It is wholly dependent for its nature and its appearance upon knowledge. This is the character of all illusions—they are nothing in themselves, but are what they are only in the knowledge of them and as false appearances to us. In any case, the distinction of truth and falsehood disappears in the case of what is internal to knowledge. There is no outside check upon knowledge, or the check which reality existing in itself and in its own right ought to exercise. The criterion of internal consistency or coherence is no criterion in the face of the possibility that a whole set of illusions can be internally coherent without being true. No fact or reality then can be self-evidently true, because of its peculiar relation to knowledge which rules out intuitive certainty or indubitability. It is mediate, not immediate, reality. We cannot distinguish reality from its conceptionalisation or idealisation in thought. We can well say that the word is an *idea.* It is *kalpita.*

We can be free from this predicament only, if we get to a higher grade of knowledge. That will be the knowledge of the self-evident. It is often thought, and naturally so, that all reality is knowable as objective, although it may not be actually so known. There is nothing that is unknowable. What is unknowable by its very nature is as

good as nothing. In a sense, experience is most concrete form of reality. Everything else which is not a part of any experience whatsoever, is an empty abstraction. However, that may be, and even if it is an extreme view, it is maintained that the real is at least knowledge; and if it is known, it is only known as object. There are no two senses of knowledge. There is no knowledge, for example, in which something can be known in a non-objective attitude. If this contention of European philosophy and of certain systems of Indian thought is correct, there can be no such thing as self-evident reality, or even reality that can be known with absolute certainty and without the possibility of error or doubt. We maintain that this contention is not true and that the analysis of the knowledge-situation reveals a higher grade of reality which is self-evidently true. Whatever then, we may happen to know outwardly, and apparently the self-evident is present there, is indubitably certain, if we could attend to it for what it is.

Any knowledge-situation reveals three different factors : (1) It reveals the object said to be known *prameya*. (2) It reveals the knower who is said to know, *pramāta*. (3) And it reveals knowledge itself, *pramiti*. What is called *pramāṇa* or the instrument of knowledge is not directly revealed. It is only inferred. We cannot, for example, see without eyes; therefore, the eyes are the instrument. The aforesaid three factors, however, are not inferred, but in some sense directly revealed. We shall first take up the object or *prameya*. The object is quite evident to us. It is *a-parokṣa*. But it is not self-evident. It is through its relation to knowledge that it is evident to us, not by itself or in itself. By itself or in itself, it is nothing to us ; and for all we know, it is nothing to itself.

That in knowledge itself it is directly revealed may, however, be denied. It is argued by the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism that the external object is only inferred from a certain mental idea and not directly known. But, evidently, we cannot infer an absolutely unknown thing. An inference is ultimately based upon the direct knowledge of the co-existence of the sign and that which is signified by it. It is never an absolutely original form of knowledge, not involving direct knowledge at any stage or in any form. It is possible to argue that we do not know any external object and that there is no such thing as external object. What we know is an idea only or something mental. It is not possible to argue that there is an external object, which we can never directly know, but which we can infer. To deny the direct knowledge of something, we must have already known that something, or at least conceived it as a possible object of knowledge, and the only original form

of knowledge is direct knowledge. While, therefore, we cannot deny the direct knowledge of the object; this directness is relative and derived. It is derived from the knowledge-relation. It is not original to the object without this relation. And, so the object is evident to us, not self-evident. We have a question-mark about the truth of our knowledge. There is, indeed, no intervening process (*vyavadhāna*) between the object and the knowledge of the object; when the object is known, it is known directly and completely and without any act on its part. But this knowledge can, nevertheless, be wholly subjective.

The second factor in the knowledge-situation is *pramiti* or the particular knowledge itself. According to Prabhākara, this knowledge is self-evidently true. It reveals the object and simultaneously reveals itself. It is like the light burning from a wick in an earthen pot. The light reveals external things as objects. Simultaneously, it reveals itself and also the earthen pot which is its support (*āśraya*). But it alone is self-evidently true.

It has been argued against this view that it does not provide any exception to the general rule that anything, that is real, is capable of being known as object. The thinkers of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school argue that there is no such thing as pure awareness. All awareness is a psychosis or a mental act. This is known, as any object is known. It is known through the mind acting as an internal sense organ. One act of knowledge knows another, which preceds it. In this way, every act of knowledge can be known. Thus knowledge itself (*pramiti*), the second factor in the knowledge-situation, is known as an object. It is known in *anu-vyavasāya*.

This argument has been refuted on the following grounds :—

(1) If one act of knowledge is known directly through another act, the latter must be simultaneous with the former. But, if it is later in time, how can it contact it directly ?

(2) There is no such thing as an internal sense organ called the mind.

(3) Granting that the first act is known by the second, is the latter itself known ? If it is in turn known, we have a vicious infinite series, in which no term can be known unless the last is known ; and there is no last known term. But, if we have to stop somewhere, and say that a particular term in the series knows but is not itself known, then that ought to be true of the very first act itself, and we ought not to have conceived a series. We gain nothing by it. We have to admit that there is knowledge, the reality of which cannot

be denied, but which is not itself known as an object. Indeed, it may be argued that it can be known as object. But even then, the knowledge, that knows it, is not an object of some other knowledge at the same time, and yet its reality cannot be denied.

(4) Even supposing that knowledge itself has a formel character by which it is known as this knowledge, what is important to note is that neither can it know itself, nor can it be known by a later knowledge. Nothing can know itself, for the simple reason that there is an absolute distinction between the object and the subject or what may be called, *kartṛ-karma-virodha*. The later cannot know the earlier because the earlier has already ceased when the later has begun. If it is known, it is only known by a higher grade of consciousness; and there it is reduced to some kind of object. It is, no longer, the knowing consciousness which is never known. The knowing consciousness cannot be denied, although it is not an object by itself. Still we only speak of it in relation to the object as the consciousness of this thing or that thing. It is *pramiti*. This particularised consciousness is not wholly unobjective to us. It has got a form which we only apprehend in the objective attitude. It is a mental act. This act arises and perishes. We are aware of its different moments. This awareness clearly is not possible to a later consciousness which, likewise, arises and perishes in its turn. It is only possible to a consciousness which runs through mental life without change and without break. It is, what we may call, an actless and pure consciousness. It does not arise and does not perish. It is never an object but always the subject. This is the true consciousness (*sākṣijñana*) behind all actual knowledge or *pramiti*. It is immediate by its own nature and not through its relation to anything else. We speak of it as the 'I' because the distinction between this pure consciousness and the true 'I' is not available. It is the only self-evident reality. It is not known, but spoken as what is immediately *ajñāte sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam*.

It may be said, that the self-evident is that which evidences itself, i.e. knows itself. *Svaprakāśa* means self-known. There is only one thing that knows itself. The self knows other things, but also knows itself. I have an intuition of myself as 'I' but this view is not correct. (1) The same thing cannot be subject and object at the same time. As we have already said, there will be *kartṛ-karma-virodha*. But granting that we have an intuition of 'I', the object 'I' is to be distinguished from the subject 'I'. The object 'I' is qualified in a way in which the subject 'I' is not qualified. The object 'I' is qualified by what it knows, feels or wills. The subject 'I' is not similarly qualified. It is in comparison with it not qualified at all. The subject does not know itself, but what it has

rendered other to itself. (2) Every knowledge is, at the moment of its occurrence, unobjective. It is only when it shifts to the past and is dead as knowledge, that it can become the object of another knowledge. This second knowledge is not in the past simultaneously. The knowing 'I' is an immediately felt 'I', if we may say so. The known 'I' is only contemplated as what is past. It is never the same 'I' that both knows and is known. (3) What we cannot deny is the consciousness of self-identity, *pratyabhijñā*. I know the table, and I know that I knew it. The self that perceives is the self that remembers and the self that remembers, knows itself to be identical with the self that preceived. But even here the preceiving self and the remembering self are not as such identical. Perception as qualifying the self and memory as qualifying the self make two different selfs. What is identical in them is the pure subject conceived as free from the mental adjuncts or *upādhis*. This self-identical self is never known in the objective attitude as this self. Accordingly, the self-identity in question cannot be empirically established. It is not the identity of the empirical self that is different at different moments in accordance with the changing functions. It lies deeper in that unchanging and permanent self that neither acts nor functions. It is the ground of the feeling of unity of one experient self. This unchanging self is always the subject and never the object. It is never known. It is the knower. Who can know the knower? But, although unknown, it is the only entity that is absolutely immediate and that we really mean when we use the term 'I'. It is the self-evident reality that we seek.

The question arises: Is the self-evident absolutely unknown and unknowable? We were in search of a knowledge, which should be self-evidently true. Unless, therefore, the self-evident can be known, no such knowledge is possible. We are not satisfied with the mere recognition that something cannot be denied and yet it cannot be known. We might very well be victims of an illusion, from which only knowledge can save us. We cannot stop with the bare recognition of unknowability. If we do, we shall be open to the assaults of those who deny that there is any permanent and unchanging self, and who contend that what we regard as 'I' is only a momentary and short-lived entity. Unless, then, we can have a more determinate knowledge of the self, we cannot have all our doubts about it resolved. Its admitted self-evidence is no proof against doubt. The self is self-evident and yet we doubt, which means that we are not free from ignorance about it; and if there is ignorance, there must be the possibility of knowledge which can dissipate the ignorance. The self-evident is, accordingly, not known, but it is not wholly unknowable. All that we claim is that

it is not knowable in the purely objective attitude, or in that mode of knowledge in which the object falls apart from the subject and is other to it. It is knowable only in the most general sence that there is a knowledge which can dissipate our ignorance about it.

The *svaprakāśa* may not be known in its own true nature. But, if there is ignorance about it, it can be known to that extent. There is, indeed, a sense in which there is no ignorance about my own self. I have no doubt of question with regard to its reality. I use the term 'I' with meaning, and never question this meaning. I understand it perfectly (and every one else does so), as though the meaning is self-evidently true to me. What appears unusual and artificial to me is to question this meaning, or to doubt the reality of what is meant by it. When I use the term 'I', the listener understands perfectly what I mean. He does not confuse me with himself, the speaker with the person spoken to. The 'I' stands, for only one single entity, and everybody understands what that entitiy is, i.e. the speaker or the speaking 'I'. Although, therefore, the term 'I' has no socialised meaning, as all other terms have, which signify merely a class of things common to all persons, and although the term 'I' stands only for an individual and not a class, its significance is never in doubt, and what it signifies is admitted to be a reality by all. There cannot be such consensus with regard to meaning and such perfect understanding between different persons of any social group on illusion only. No one ever confuses the 'I' with the 'not-I' or the 'I' with the 'you', except through an unconscious error. Consciously never. Can we say that any one is really ignorant of his own self?

Unfortunately, the matter is not so simple. We know ourself perfectly, and yet we are ignorant. Our intellect is unaccountably infected with error. When we begin to think about the self, we seem to be quite ignorant. We always think in the wrong way, before we begin to think aright. It is this predicament in which we find ourselves that the knowledge of the self-evident becomes a possibility, and even a necessity. This ignorance takes various forms — ignorance about the reality, the intelligent character, the value, etc., of the self. In general, we are ignorant about its infinitude, its non-duality and its blissfulness. We take it to be a finite entity, just one among others. This would not be an error, if we could not know the self *as* an object. We have, already, seen that this is not possible. We are accordingly in error, and suffer from ignorance. This ignorance creates a demand, the demand for knowledge. The self-evident can, then, be known. But this knowledge is not like any other knowledge which we have. There is a vital difference. In every other knowledge, knowledge deter-

mines the object in seeking to reveal it. Such knowledge is judgmental, which is another way of saying that it is subjective. We do not know the object as it is in itself; for the object is not self-revealing. The acting of knowledge is not only co-extensive with the object (*vṛtti-vyāpti*), but it also reveals the object (*phala-vyāpti*). The co-extensiveness is necessary for all knowledge. But the self-evident is never, properly speaking, revealed. It reveals itself in the act and the act does nothing to it. The self-evident reveals itself to thought for what it is, but thought does not impose its form upon it or think it in accordance with its own rules or categories. The self-evident is known as what is free from any implication to thought, and, therefore, as what is truly in itself and absolutely certain. It represents in this sense the very truth itself, the ideal of all knowledge. To know it is to know it as true. Such is the notion of self-evident reality.

It may, here, be said: 'But, is it not arbitrary to suppose self-evident reality is not finite or that it is non-dual? Each individual self may be treated as a self-evident reality in his own proper nature'. This, however, is not tenable. In order that there should be many self-evident entities, one self-evident entity must be able to know another. It is only when something is known and can be distinguished from another that it can be an element of a manifold. But an entity that is thus known or known as object ceases to be self-evident. By its very nature as the pure subject that is never known, the self-evident is bound to be, and can only be, undifferenced and so non-dual. There cannot be two entities which are both self-evidently real, for neither can know the other. The self-evident must necessarily by non-dual and so one without a second.

This self-evident reality may be called pure consciousness or it may be called the true knower. The distinction here lapses. As long as there is an act of knowledge, the knower can be distinguished from it. When I say 'I know', I mean that I did not know it before. The knower thus falls apart from the knowledge. He precedes knowledge, and claims to be present when there was ignorance of it. Having known it, he can go on to know something else without losing the consciousness of his self-identity. But, when we have gone beyond the determinate act of knowledge to pure consciousness which does not perish, the knower of what is called knowledge ceases to be distinguishable. Also, it is evident that in order to have any distinction, we must have a ground for the distinction common to both the terms. When two entities of any kind are distinguished, consciousness is the ground. The distinction of the terms is contained within it. Can we find such a common ground for the supposed distinction of consciousness

and that which has the consciousness ? Evidently, nothing can be more pervasive than consciousness itself or that can contain consciousness itself as a term. In short, a term of the distinction cannot also be the ground of the distinction. We conclude that pure consciousness is the true knower, and this is one self-evident reality. It is immediate in the speaking. By its own nature, it cannot be known. But in so far as there is ignorance about it, it can be known in a high form of knowledge which is truly unobjective.

The Grounds of Inference as classified by Dharmakirti

By

SATKARI MOOKERJEE, *Calcutta.*

Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāya-bindu* (NB.) has enumerated three types of logical ground (*hetu*), which make inference legitimate. These three are, respectively, styled *kārya* (effect), *svabhāva* (essential identity of nature), and *anupalabdhi* (non-perception). I have discussed the characteristics and grounds of validity of these logical grounds elsewhere[1]. In the present article, I propose to discuss the legitimacy of the classification under three heads. Dharmakīrti has made it clear both in NB. and in *Pramāṇa-vārtika* (PV.) which is his *magnum opus*, that the *raison d'etre* of inference lies in the ontological necessity of one datum being connected with another datum. That 'A' is the ground of inference of 'B' is due to the fact that 'A' cannot occur without 'B' and this invariable co-occurrence of the two terms is logically understood as a case of ontological determination. 'A' is determined by 'B', and this is the reason why 'B' must be present when 'A' is present. Now this relation of necessary concomitance may occur in succession or in co-existence. Smoke, for instance, invariably succeeds fire, because fire is the cause of it. It is impossible to believe that smoke, as a historical event, can occur without a cause, and the cause in question is found to be nothing but fire. The organ of the discovery of causal relation, is the joint method of concomitance in agreement and in difference. The relation of causality, being an ontologically necessary relation, enables us to determine in a necessary reference that the presence of the effect must be preceded by that of the cause. It is reasonable then, that the effect should be the legitimate ground of inference of the cause. Of relations in succession ,causality is, thus, found to be the only necessary bond of union and other cases of succession are to be dismissed, as accidental coincidences having no logical value.

But about relations involving co-existence, the necessary bond of connection between two terms is to be found in their essential identity. In a geometrical figure, for instance a triangle, the co-occurrence of three angles with three sides, or of the sum of three angles being equal to two right angles is necessary and universal. The reason of the necessity of the connection between the two sets of properties can be understood from the consideration that a triangular figure without three sides is an impossibility. That a human being is liable to death

1. Vide, *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, chh. XXIV and XXVI.

as a matter of ontological necessity is understood from the fact that the constitution of the human body embodies in it the condition of growth and decay, which will lead to its dissolution in course of time. Why should it be so? The answer to this question is, that it is its very nature to be so and if it were otherwise it should not be a human body, whatever else it might be.

Dharmakīrti accordingly sums up his findings which may be elucidated as follows[1]. That 'A' is found to be necessarily associated with 'B' is due to the fact that 'A' stands in the relation of an effect to 'B' as the cause. If the relation be one of co-existence and not chronological succession as antecedent and consequent, it can be determined as necessary and universal provided can it be proved that 'C' cannot be itself, that is, 'C' if it is not an instance of 'D'. The example of the triangle illustrates the case. A figure with three sides is possible only, if it has three angles and minus three angles it is an absurdity. The test of the necessity of the connection of two terms is furnished by *reductio ad absurdum* of the opposite possibility.

We have seen, why the types of relation are declared to be twofold. It is only the relation of causality and that of essential identity that can be regarded as necessary and universal. The fact, that these two types of relation are necessary and universal, furnishes the clue to the enumeration of the two types of logical ground as effect (*kārya*) and essential identity of being (*svabhāva*). But the problem arises regarding the third type called non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). When we are satisfied that the conditions of perception are present in full and the expected object is also amenable to perception and still we do not find it, we infer that it is non-existent in the context. Suppose I am searching for my pen on the table and after careful examination do not find it though other things are found to be present thereon; what will be my inference? Certainly that the pen is not present on the table. The relation of the non-existence of the pen on the table is called inference by Dharmakīrti. I am not going to enter into the controversy that has been raised by philosophers regarding the nature of the knowledge of the absence of the pen—whether it is perceptual or inferential or *sui generis* I have dealt with the matter elsewhere[2], and my present concern is to find out the basis of the legitimacy of this type of logical ground, taking it for granted that the **resultant** knowledge is a case of inference.

1. कार्यकारणभावाद् वा स्वभावाद् वा नियामकात् ।
अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शनान्नो न दर्शनात् ॥ PV. 33 (pp. 87-88)
2. Cf. ***Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux***, ch. XXVI.

Dharmakīrti has asserted that the determination of necessity is possible only in the two types of relation, viz. causality and essential identity of being; and other cases are unreliable coincidences, on which no inference can stand. But what is the basis of *anupalabdhi* being a legitimate ground of inference? Non-perception as the logical ground must be shown to stand in necessary relation to non-existence of the datum, otherwise it will not serve as a logical ground at all. But is the relation different from the two types enumerated by Dharmakīrti? We cannot conceive of any such relation, nor does Dharmakīrti throw any light upon it. We cannot think the relation in question to be one of causality inasmuch a non-existence of the pen is present along with non-perception. The cause is antecedent to the effect, and in the Buddhist doctrine of flux, as sponsored by Dharmakīrti and his school, the cause ceases to be when the effect comes into existence. Suppose non-perception were the effect of non-existence of the datum. But, in that case, non-existence would cease to be when non-perception occurred. But our experience is, that the pen is non-existent at the time when I fail to find it on scrutiny. This goes against the supposition that the relation in question is one of cause and effect. Let us suppose that the relation is essential identity of nature, that non-perception of the pen is only a case of non-existence of the pen. Metaphysical difficulty has led the exponents of Dharmakīrit's logic to equate non-perception with perception of co-presentable data and non-existence as the existence of the bare locus. But I am not concerned here with the metaphysical problem of the nature of negation—ontological or logical. I take for granted that non-perception and non-existence are ontological facts. But what is the nature of the relation between the two? It must be a necessary one, otherwise, non-perception cannot function as the logical ground of the inference of non-existence.

Can we suppose that the relation is a case of essential identity? There are difficulties in the way of this supposition. If the relation were an instance of essential identity like that of three angles and three sides, why should it be given a different status at all? Why should not the enumeration of the two types of logical ground, viz. effect and essential identity suffice, since *ex hypothesis* the latter would cover the present case? The problem has exercised my mind for a long period and the seriousness of the difficulty can be gauged from the fact that the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇībhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, the celebrated exponent of Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* in Bengali, asserted his opinion that the couplet which sums up the logical necessity of relation under two heads of causality and essential identity could not be the genuine statement of Dharmakīrti. The genuineness of the verse would make the specification of non-perception as a logical ground in addition to effect and essential identity illegitimate and its subsumption


under a separate relation would make the statement incomplete. Unfortunately PV. was not published during the life time of the celebrated savant. It is found now, that the couplet occurs in PV. This disposes of the question of spuriousness. But the logical difficulty of illegitimacy of *anupalabdhi* as a logical ground, and of the incompleteness of the assertion of the two-fold basis of necessity of relation, still remain. Let us see, if the problem occurred to the exponents of Dharmakīrti.


Karṇagomin, the commentator of Dharmakīrti's PV. definitely asserts that the relation of invariable concomitance is nothing but a case of determination. The effect is ontologically determined by the cause, and essential identity determines the occurrence of co-existent properties, e.g. three angles and three sides. There is no third type of relation in which one term can be said to be ontologically determined by the other[1]. But what about non-perception? Devācārya, the Jaina philosopher, writes in *Syādvādaratnākara* (SVR), that non-perception is a case of essential identity and, so, there is no need for the investigation of the basis of its necessity and universality[2]. Karṇagomin, also, states that non-perception does not presuppose an independent relation for its validity. The relation, which holds between the positive terms, determines the concomitance of the negative terms, and, so, there is no occasion for the postulation of a separate type of relation between non-perception and non-existence[3].

But, why should then non-perception be regarded as a separate logical ground? The answer has been given by Karṇagomin. The basis of classification of the legitimate ground of inference (*hetu*) is not the basis of necessity of concomitance. Inference is broadly classified under two heads—viz. affirmative and negative; the first serving to establish a positive conclusion, and the second a negative one. The first type, again, comprises two varieties, viz. the effect (*kārya*) and essential identity (*svabhāva*). The separate classification of non-perception is based on the difference of the nature of the conclusion—it being the discovery of a negative fact, as opposed to the positive finding of the other two types of logical ground. Thus the enumeration of non-perception as a logical ground is dictated by a procedural necessity and is not based upon the nature of necessary concomitance. The basis of classification of grounds of inferenee is, thus, entirely different from that of necessary concomitance; and, so the charge of incompleteness or illegitimacy does not arise. The basis of classification of logical grounds in Dharmakīrti's work is the qualitative difference of the conclusions

1. Karṇagomin's commentary on PV., p. 33
2. अनुपलब्धेः पुनः स्वभावहेतावन्तर्भावान् न तत्र पृथग् अविनाभावग्राहकप्रमाणचिन्तेति (SVR., p. 514)
3. *Or. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

recorded and has nothing to do with the basis of necessary concomitance and the charts[1] given below will make it clear :





1. तत्र द्वौ वस्तुसाधनौ, एकः प्रतिषेधहेतुः (PV., p. 12.)

so can rebirth take place without any being transmigrating at all[1]. In a cryptic way the idea already occurs in the earlier Sanskrit work, the *Abhidharma-kos'a*[2] of Vasubandhu :—

व्रीहिसंतानसाधर्म्याद् अविच्छिन्नभवोद्भवः ।
प्रतिबिम्बमसिद्धत्वाद् असाम्याच्चाऽनिदर्शनम् ॥

For a more interesting account, with a good many illustrations besides, we should go to the more popular Pāli work, the *Milinda-pañho*[3], which is probably still earlier[4], and which records the alleged dialogues between King Milinda and the Buddhist saint Nāgasena.

In the Buddhist conception, therefore, the individual is but a momentary point in the vast stream of existence, a temporary link in a long chain of cause and effect. The present is only a continuation of the past, and the future but an extension of the present. Well may the Buddhist say with Leibniz, *Le present est gros de l'avenir*[5]. The individual's *kamma* it is that prevails as 'the *matrix* as well as the *vis a tergo* of the enduring existences[6]'.

Such then is the importance accorded to *kamma* in the Buddhist doctrine that it appears that, if fatalism is at all compatible with the tenet of any religion, it is Buddhism that has the priority over every other creed. That it is wrong to come to such a conclusion is what the Buddha himself is reported to say to the wanderer Sīvaka of the Top-knot in reply to the question of the latter on this subject. While on a visit to the Buddha who had encamped himself near Rājagṛha, Sīvaka is said to have asked him whether it is right to hold as do the recluses (*samaṇa*) and the Brahmins[7] that whatever pleasure or pain a human being experiences in this world all that entirely follows from his deeds in his previous lives. The Buddha seems to have replied that, in view of the fact that certain kinds of suffering proceed also from bile and wind, from the union of bodily humours, from

1. Ibid., p. 603f.
2. III. 11.
3. Ed. by V. Trenckner (James G. Furlong Fund, Vol. V. 1928), pp. 46-48, 71.
4. Concerning its date, T. W. Rhys Davids (*Questions of King Milinda*, S. B. E., XXXV. Oxford, 1890, p. xi) says that it was written 'at or a little after the beginning of the Christian era.'
5. J. T. Merz. *Leibniz* (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, Edinburgh and London, 1884), p. 177.
6. M. Anesaki, E. R. E., XII. 229.
7. Such accusation of rival parties by attributing to them untenable views is too common a weakness with all early religions, and must always be understood in the right spirit. It is, nowhere, laid down in Hindu religion that *karman* is the all-cause of human experience.

changes of the seasons, from stress of untoward happenings, from sudden attacks from without, such a view attributing so much of sovereignty to *kamma* is untenable, which is after all only one out of the *eight* factors responsible in making a man happy or miserable. This answer seems to have convinced Sivaka so thoroughly that he forthwith accepted the Buddha as his teacher for life. I cite the entire passage from the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*[1]:—

1. एकं समयं भगवा राजगहे विहरति वेळुवने कलन्दकनिवापे ।

2. अथ खो मोलिय-सीवको परिब्बाजको येन भगवा तेनुपसङ्कमि। उपसङ्कमित्वा भगवता सद्धिं सम्मोदि सम्मोदनीयं कथं साराणीयं वीतिसारेत्वा एकम् अन्तं निसीदि ।

3. एकम् अन्तं निसिन्नो खो मोलिय-सीवको परिब्बाजको भगवन्तमेतदवोच। सन्ति भो गोतम एके समणब्राह्मणा एवंवादिनो एवंदिट्ठिनो । यं किञ्चायं पुरिसपुग्गलो पटिसंवेदेति सुखं वा दुक्खं वा अदुक्खमसुखं वा। सब्बन्तं पुब्बे कतहेतू ति । इध पन भवं गोतमो किम् आहाति ।

4. पित्तसमुट्ठानानि पि खो सीवक इधेकच्चानि वेदयितानि उप्पज्जन्ति । सामम् पि खो एतं सीवक वेदितब्बं यथा पित्तसमुट्ठानानि पि इधेकच्चानि वेदयितानि उप्पजन्ति । लोकस्स पि खो एतं सीवक सच्चसम्मतं यथा पित्तसमुट्ठानानि पि इधेकच्चानि वेदयितानि उप्पज्जन्ति । तत्र सीवक ये ते समणब्राह्मणा एवंवादिनो एवंदिट्ठिनो यं किञ्चायम् पुरिसपुग्गलो पटिसम्वेदेति सुखं वा दुक्खं वा अदुक्खम् असुखं वा सब्बन्तं तम् पुब्बे कतहेतू ति । यं च सामं ञातं तं च अतिधावन्ति । यं च लोके सच्चसम्मतं तं च अतिधावन्ति । तस्मा तेसं समणब्राह्मणानं मिच्छाति वदामि ।

5. सेम्हसमुट्ठानानि पि खो सीवक ॥ पे ॥

6. वातसमुट्ठानानि पि खो सीवक ॥ ल ॥

7. सन्निपातिकानि पि खो सीवक ॥ ल ॥

8. उतुपरिणामजानि पि खो सीवक ॥ ल ॥

9. विसमपरिहारजानि पि खो सीवक ॥ ल ॥

10. ओपक्कमिकानि पि खो सीवक ॥ ल ॥

11. कम्मविपाकजानि पि खो सीवक इधेकच्चानि वेदयितानि उप्पज्जन्ति । सामं पि खो एतम् सीवक वेदितब्बं यथा कम्मविपाकजानि पि इधेकच्चानि वेदयितानि उप्पज्जन्ति । लोकस्स पि खो एतं सीवक सच्चसम्मतं यथाकम्मविपाकजानि पि इधेकच्चानि वेदयितानि उप्पज्जन्ति । तत्र सीवक ये ते समणब्राह्मणा एवंवादिनो एवंदिट्ठिनो यं किञ्चायं पुरिसपुग्गलो पटिसंवेदेति सुखं वा दुक्खं वा अदुक्खम् असुखं वा। सब्बन् तम् पुब्बे कतहेतू ति । यं च सामं ञातं तं च अतिधावन्ति यं च लोके सच्चसम्मतं तं च अतिधावन्ति । तस्मा तेसं समणब्राह्मणानम् मिच्छाति वदामीति ॥

12. एवं वुत्ते मोलिय-सीवको परिब्बाजको भगवन्तमेतद् अवोच । अभिक्कन्तम् भो गोतम -पे- उपासकम् मम् भवं गोतमो धारेतु अज्जतग्गे पाणुपेतं सरणं गतन् ति ॥

13. पित्तं सेम्हं च वातो च, सन्निपाता उतूनि च ।
विसमं ओपक्कमिकं, कम्मविपाकेन अट्ठमी ति ॥

1 P. T. S., 1894, IV. 230 f.; I am indebted to Dr. E. W. Adikaram of Ceylon for drawing my attention to this passage.

We read here almost the Hindu view of *karman* implicit in the early texts, but more than once[1] pointedly declared in those of later times. The passage clearly proves how inaccurate it is to attribute to Buddhism the view that *karman* is the sole cause of experience. But that does not mean, as in Hinduism, also the negation of a fatalistic attitude towards life. It is not clear whether the element of human freedom comes in at all in Buddhism as one of the seven factors besides *karman*, mentioned above, whose activity results in pleasure or pain to man. All that is certain is that, in this religion, there is no individual the duration of whose life lasts for more than one moment, and that the *karman* of the previous moment brings about the becoming in the next. No definite answer can be given to the question whether even *karman* survives this momentary flux. Determinism is there[2], therefore, in so far as no emphasis is laid on individuality and empirical existence is accepted to be conditioned in character. It does not follow, however, that man has absolutely no control over his experiences in this world. In him does rest the power[3] to work ou his future, to become an *Arhat*, to achieve *Nirvāṇa*. Here, at rate, lies the Buddhist message of 'hope to the race and of responsibility to the individual', of hope, because earthly misery is not regarded as ineradicable, and of responsibility, because each a total extirpation is essentially dependent on individual effort[4].

1. H. G. Narahari : *Aryan Path*, 1940, p. 603.

2. Of A. S. Geden, *E. R. E.*, V. 781 ; M. Anesaki, *loc cit ;* and very recently O. H. de A. Wijesekera's paper : *Buddhism and the Moral Problem*, Colombo, 1945, p. 12.

3. The *Majjhima-nikaya* (I. 407) has quite a long dissertation on this subject. The equivalents for *will* in Buddhism appear to be *bala*, *viriya*, *purisaparakkamo* and *vasa*. I am not as sure as Dr. Wijesekera (*loc, cit,*) that the word *chando* is also of the same connotation. At least in its two occurrences (II. 174 ; III. 294) in the *Majjhima-nikaya*, the word seems to me to give a meaning akin to the Sanskrit *iccha*.

4. In the view of C. A. F. Rhys Davids (*op, cit.*, p. 169 f.), the Buddhistic ideal savours of neither thoroughgoing passimism nor optimism.

Plato's Conception of the Dialectic

(*And the Vedānta*)

An Interpretation

By

N. A. NIKAM, *Mysore.*

Plato's conception of the Dialectic as the true method of philosophy which is a search after truth or being, is the nearest parallel to the Vedāntic conception of the method and purpose of philosophy. Like the Vedanta, the Dialectic comes at the end of the study of the sciences, and is not a science, but science itself. It is the coping-stone of the sciences[1]. Like the Vedānta, it is a *rational* inquiry of all that exists and all that is *best* in existence : the idea of the good which is a unity of truth and existence. It is not a method *about* method, therefore, it has no 'first principles' except its own spirit of 'free inquiry'. As Plato conceived it, it is not 'demonstrative' reasoning ; therefore, it is not demonstrated truth. Between truth *as such* and 'demonstrated truth', there seems to be the same or similar distinction as there is in the Vedānta between the 'seer' and the 'seen' and the 'seer' is more important than the 'seen'. Correspondingly, there is the distinction between 'refutation' and 'conversion'. The *main* object of the Vedānta and Plato is not the refutation of the opponent, but the 'conversion' of the soul to truth. The Dialectic is not the *art* of refutation ; at any rate, the 'art of refutation' is not the whole of the Dialectic, for, Plato defines the Dialectic as the 'conversion' of the soul from darkness to light or from becoming to being.

In intellectual activity as in organic generation, there are no absolute beginnings ; likewise, there is no hard and fast dividing line between science and philosophy. Philosophy or metaphysics is not 'placed over' the sciences in the sense of being 'superimposed' upon them. But it is 'in' the sciences. The meaning of the word 'in', in this context, is the same as the word 'end'. Philosophy or metaphysics is the 'end' of the dialectical activity of reason which is already active in the sciences. So, in Plato, as in the Vedānta, the mind must be led on to metaphysics only *gradually* ; and by a process of discipline the duration of which should be, according to Plato, at least, twice as long as the year spent in the study of the sciences. The mind has to be led on, in this discipline, to the transcendental contemplation of, and occupation

1. 'Dialectic, then, as you will agree is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is placed over them ; no other can be placed higher ; the nature of knowledge can go no further', *Republic*, Bk. VII.

with, the nature of being. If there is any utilitarian purpose in these studies, it must be subordinated to their transcendental purpose.

Now, no reflexive phrase such as 'science of the sciences' will really and truly describe the peculiar character of the Dialectic and the nature of its object. To describe it in such phrases as 'a science of the sciences' is at best to indulge in a metaphor, and to make concession to popular definitions. On the other hand, such phrases are really confessions of failure. Just as the Vedānta is not a science super-added to the sciences, so the Dialectic is not a grand *name* for the totality of the hypotheses of the sciences. It is a transformation of them. Its business is to 'destroy' the special hypotheses of the special sciences. It has *no* hypothesis, assumed or explicit, unless, of course, you turn round and say, 'to have no hypothesis is *a* hypothesis'. This is verbal jugglery, precisely, what the Dialectic is not. It is a degeneration of the Dialectic.

With these introductory remarks, I proceed to the exposition, rather the interpretation, of Plato's Dialectic. I believe there is a good deal of resemblance between it and the Vedanta. I have used the word 'the nearest parallel' to Vedanta in speaking of Plato's Dialectic. Now, the phrase is misleading and unfair to the genius of Plato. It is misleading, because I am not making a comparative, i.e. a historical (but a logical) study of Plato and the Vedānta ; it is unfair to Plato to the originality of his genius. Unfair to the spirit of the Vedānta also, for by implication, at least, I suggest that it cannot be found outside what is called 'Indian' philosophy. No. The spirit of the Vedānta is universal. Wherever the human spirit has speculated upon the world and upon itself, it has lighted upon the truth which is in the Vedānta. The Vedānta is light ; it is truth : wherever it may be found, whether in Plato, or in Sufism, or in S'aṅkara.

Plato's account of the Dialectic in Book VII of the *Republic* is perhaps the earliest statement in the History of Philosophy (at any rate of the West) of the true nature and method of Metaphysics. It involves a conception of reason which seems to me to be very different from the kind of reason exhibited in Mathematics and Logic, and which, is distinguished also, in general from 'deductive' or 'demonstrative'. reasoning. I do not know whether it is identical with the 'pure' or *apriori* reason of Kant. I doubt, however, whether the Dialectic as understood by Plato is the work of *apriori* reason, for, the Kantian *apriori* is *relative* to the empirical. Plato's statement of the Dialectic is, also, a *defence* of Metaphysics (to use the language of F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*), for, it shows that the Dialectic has its origin in a kind of *necessity*, the necessity to think ; just as the state has its

origin in another kind of necessity, the necessity to live.

Plato says: the dialectician uses reason only but not sense. Does this amount to the Kantian statement that the Dialectic (as Plato understood it) is the sphere of 'pure' or *apriori* reason ? I think it is not the case. For, the *apriori*, or 'pure' reason is exhibited for Kant in the formal science of Mathematics, whereas, according to Plato the dialectician reasons in a way *different from* that of the mathematician. How does the mathematician reason then ? The mathematician reasons by the 'method of the hypothesis' as Plato puts it[1]. What he means is that not only mathematics, but no science *knows* its 'first principles'. The 'first principles' of a science are merely assumed[2].

Now, there are two points to be noted : (a) that no science knows its 'first principles', and (b) that a science is a *system*. Since the first principles, of a science are themselves unknown, the conclusion and the intermediate steps in the reasoning are *also* unknown. Therefore, no science leads to *truth*. Such is Plato's argument. Now, this must also mean, that truth and system are not (necessarily) identical. To be a system, and to be true, are different. A science is a system, but not necessarily true. Not only mathematics, but logic, also, is a system 'Mathematics is only logically developed, but it is not logic. This is the difference between logic and mathematics, but *as systems* they do not differ, says Dr. Paul Weiss, 'because they are formal sciences.' If this criticism of science in general is true, it seems to me to follow that we shall have to accept the (realist) contention that truth and system are independent conceptions. "To search for 'unity' and 'system' at the expense of truth is not, I take it, the proper business of philosophy"

1. 'Modern science makes a distinction between 'postulates' and 'hypotheses'. A postulate is an assertion whose truth is undemonstrated but not necessarily undemonstratable. It is the premiss of a tautological proposition, whose consequent is a theorem. It is to be distinguished from a hypothesis and a definition. A hypothesis is a proposition which conforms to certain methodological conditions. It is capable of experiential denail. Definitions are of two kinds : verbal and intensional : The former arbitrarily states that certein symbols are to be be used in places of others. The definitions in systems are all intended in this sense, e.g. *The Principicia Mathematcia.* Intensional definitions attempt to express the unique essence of a term, e.g. G. E. Moore's indefinable Good is indefinable because it has no parts, and because its understanding or perception does not require the intermediation of any other concepts or percepts', Paul Weiss : *The Nature of Systems*, (The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago and London), pp. 48 ff.

2. 'Mathematics is arbitrarily true, in so far as one considers the postulates or theorems separately, and apart from demonstration ; it is analytically and necessarily true in so far as one considers th theorems as following from the postulates', – *Ibid*, p. 46.

as G. E. Moore says, 'however universally it may have been the practice of philosophers'.

This seems to me to be one of the conclusions that follows from Plato's criticism of mathematics and science. This will distinguish Plato's Dialectic not only from the kind of *formal* reasoning in logic and in philosophy but also from *demonstrative* reasoning. It will distinguish Plato's Dialectic, for example, from the *deductive* metaphysics of Spinoza and Hegel, for, the object of Plato's Dialectic is not demonstration but *discovery*. The Dialectic, as Plato describes it, is a 'progress' in knowledge.

The dialectical method as expounded by Hegel in his *Science of Logic* falls short of the ideal notion of Dialectic as conceived by Plato. The Hegelian dialectic cannot be described as a 'progress' in knowledge in the strict sense. For, the type of structure which constitutes the triad of the Hegelian Dialectic, (thesis, antithesis, and synthesis), *repeats* itself throughout. If we know its structure in one instance, then, we know its *general* structure. The *deductive* 'development', (*if* it be development at all) of the categories is no 'progress' in Plato's sense. To recognise the necessity involved in thought is one thing—and this is the essence of Plato's Dialectic—but to recognise that the path of that necessity is to be found in Hegel's *list* of categories, is quite another. The *logical* deduction of the categories takes away the notion of the 'dialectical development', or 'progress' which is of the essence of the Platonic conception. Hegel's Dialectic seems to me to be yet the work of 'discursive' reason. Its object is still 'system', whereas the notion of truth is certainly more important than the notion of system. Plato's conception of the Dialectic does not admit of a 'generalisation' as the Hegelian Dialectic does. It has no *list* of categories. Therefore, it may be that Plato's Dialectic is not 'exact'; it is tentative and halting as Walter Pater says, and, has or appears to have no objective standard. Its object is not mere consistency or demonstration. Therefore, I doubt, if the law of contradiction, as it is usually understood in logic, is adequate to it. "It seems as if the philosopher of being", says Walter Pater, "or, of the verb 'to be' is, after all, afraid of saying, 'It is'." "If Platonism, from age to age, has meant, for some, ontology, a doctrine of 'being', or the nearest attainable approach to or substitute for that; for others, Platonism has been, in fact, only another name for scepticism, in a recognisable philosophic tradition" (*Plato and Platonism*, p. 194). The Dialectic, as Plato conceived it, represents a *life of free inquiry* : a free *sceptical* inquiry, as, perhaps, Bradely would add. Its nature cannot be better expressed than in the words of Socrates, 'I do not yet know myself : but, we must just go where the

argument carries us as a vessel runs before the wind'. The dialectic is neither deductive nor demonstrative reasoning, whether this is of the deductive or inductive type. It is perhaps *more* of the nature of an 'experiment': an 'experiment with truth'. No words such as 'evolution' are correctly applicable to it. For, such words cancel a distinction which we make in the same act: the distinction between becoming and being. Dialectic is thought; that it is the 'movement' of thought is but a metaphor, or the so-called 'movement' is an *appearance*. It is *not*, also, logical deduction or consistency or only this. For, the notion of 'logical deduction, or 'consisteney', arises only as a result of *retrospection*; but the essential nature of Plato's Dialetic is that it is a *vision*. The Dialectic as Plato understood it, represents the spirit of 'free inquiry', when this spirit is deed, its 'forms' will be found in logic, in mathematics, and even in philosophical systems, in so far as they are 'systems', and are no more than systems.

There are two other points to which I should like to make very brief reference. Plato says that the object of the Dialectic is to 'destroy' the special hypotheses of the special sciences. This does not mean that the special sciences will be able to do without *some* hypotheses. There is no 'destruction' of the hypotheses of the sciences in this sense. But the postulates or the 'primitive propositions' of the special sciences need to be formulated with clarity and simplicity. Progress in science means the kind of progress we make in formulating the 'postulates' of a science their *simplicity*, their *adequacy*, their *mutual independence*. How is this progress in science possible? What is it that enables this? It is the principle of dialectic which is *immanent* in thought. So we must claim the progress achieved in science as a progress in metaphysics or philosophy. If we like, we may distinguish between a *critical* and a *speculative philosophy*, as C. D. Broad does (in his *Scientific Thought*), and bring the progress of thought made possible in the clarification of the ultimate and fundamental concepts of science, under critical philosophy. But we must never forget that this is only a distinction and not a division; and that neither of them is more important than the other. For, the spirit of the Dialectic manifests itself in two ways: (a) In the analytical tendency, and (b) in another tendency which Plato names the 'comprehensive' or the 'speculative' tendency. It is very difficult to say which of these two is more important; it is difficult, also, to say whether the purely analytical tendency better represents the spirit of 'free inquiry' and, whether the speculative should give place to the analytical. The analytical tendency seeks to 'isolate' things, e.g. justice and injustice in order to see them as they are in themselves. In the earlier Books of the *Republic* it is this tendency which is mostly in evidence · in examining and criticising popular moral notions, but, it is

the speculative or the comprehensive tendency that makes the transition from one topic to another possible, connecting each with each, discovering identity of relation in what merely seemed opposed, and leads, finally, to the contemplation of 'all that is best in existence' — the idea of the good. The Dialectic is *one*, although it may have two or more distinguishable aspects.

While the Dialectic, as a method, is one, like the perfect State which is one; its corrupt forms are many, like the corrupt forms of the State, which are also many. At least two corrupted forms of the Dialectic are in evidence in the dialogues of Plato: (a) *Eristic* or the art of producing contradictions for the sake of mere amusement. If Dialectic loses its seriousness of purpose, then, it produces a 'law-lessness' of mind. It becomes an 'art'. So Plato says of those who are elected to study the Dialectic: 'They must not be allowed to taste the dear delight too early; that is one thing specially to be avoided; for young men, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them; they are like puppy-dogs, who delight to tear and pull at all who come near them' (*The Republic*, Book VII, 539). The other tendency (b) which is a corruption of the analytical aspect of the Dialectic is the verbal game of analysing language: the analysis of words as if that were an end in itself. Plato makes fun of this art in the dialogue, *Eutheydemus*. Of the 'pancratiast', as Plato calls him and of his art, he says: 'such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or false' (*Eutheydemus*, 272).

It is, probably, this same tendency that is present in logical positivism, in its logistic analysis of language, although it may not have as yet degenerated into the art of the 'pancratiast'. Although the logical posivists say that 'they pursue logical analysis, but no philosophy' (Carnap: *The Unity of Science*, p. 29), their denunciation of traditional philosophy makes their method take the place of the traditional philosophical systems, and, therefore, becomes a philosophy. Logical positivism is *a* science of the analysis of language with a view to discover a universal language as a universal symbolism; and, according to the logical positivist, that is to constitute the fundamental unity of science. Descarts also dreamt of discovering the unity of science by discovering certain 'clear and distinct' ideas, which are capable of a deductive development so as to yield the complete plan of a universal science. The same Cartesian dream is sought to be achieved by discovering, by the method of logical analysis, a universal language, which will make science a fundamental unity. The Dialectic, which Plato described as 'a coping-

stone' of the sciences, but not as *a* science, is now sought to be replaced by logical positivism, which is a logical analysis of language. The problem of truth, which is the problem of philosophy, will have receded into the back ground to give place to the positivist's problem of significance: i.e. how are propositions, which are about things etc., analysable into propositions about our immediate, direct, *sense* experience. But, how do we know that our direct sense experience is *true*?

So the problem of truth, which is the object of the Dialectic as Plato conceived it, is still there. The problem of significance, which is the problem of the logical positivist, is not the same as truth. Just as, to be a system, in science or in logic, is not the same as its being true. Truth and system, and significance and truth are not identical Logical positivism is *a* science; the Dialectic, as Plato understood it, is *not* a science, but the 'coping-stone' of the sciences. Its problem is the problem of being or truth. The Dialectic is not *a* science, but is *the* science of being. It is, perhaps, the spirit of the Dialectic, immanent in thought, which leads, as we may suppose, Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* to the kind of mysticism with which that treatise ends: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent'.

The Sākṣī — an Original Contribution of Śrī Madhvācārya to Indian Thought

By

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI S'ARMA, *Hoshiarpur.*

The conception of *Sākṣī* as an immaculate principle of validation of all correct knowledge, put forward by S'rī Madhvācārya, constitutes a distinct advance in Hindu epistemology which has its inevitable bearing upon metaphysics[1]. This new principle of thought is evolved by Madhva through a searching criticism of all shades of theories of knowledge conceived upto his time. The purpose of any properly constituted theory of knowledge is the ascertainment of validity. The nature of validity is, no doubt, an important question in epistemology. Much more so is the question of the nature and identity of the precise instrument of knowledge through which we become assured of the validity of our judgments. The question does not seem to have presented itself to other schools of Indian philosophy, in anything like an equal measure of urgency. It will be seen that the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge, as accepted in most of the schools of Indian philosophy, merely puts off the question of the instrument of infallible validity to the next round. It does not and cannot rule it out of order, much less solve it to satisfaction. If knowledge, as such, should be credited with an inherent surety of its own validity, every one of our judgments should be proof against doubts and disillusionments. But we do err or miscalculate at times! We are also right at times; probably more often than we go wrong. This dual nature of our knowledge, in general, is sufficient to show, that our commonly accepted means or instruments of knowledge are not invariably perfect and infallible, or able to overcome occasional defects and distortions. It is, precisely, at this point that Madhva raises a pertinent question — Should we then bow to circumstances and say that we are *not* furnished with an instrument of validity that may be claimed to be invariably infallible? 'Certainly not', says Madhva. He contends that the presence of such an infallible instrument of knowledge is the inevitable presupposition of a really sound theory of knowledge and that no theory of knowledge can be said to be complete without the acceptance of such an ultimate principle of validation. It is obvious that ordinary knowledge and the conditions thereof do not carry with them this trait of absolute certainty as an invariable concomitant. But no complete

1. Cf. विश्वस्य सत्यतामपि तेनैव साधयाम इत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् (*Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 210 b).

theory of knowledge can, however, afford to ignore such an ultimate principle of validation or explain the *how* and *why* of the ascertainment of validity without reference to such an ultimate principle. The doctrine of *Sākṣī* is, thus, the crowning point of a really thoroughgoing theory of knowledge, and its formulation by Madhva is an outstanding contribution to Indian philosophy. It may, therefore, interest the philosophical world to note the logico-philosophical bases upon which the doctrine of *Sākṣī* is established by the Mādhva philosophers.

2.

The most divergent views have been held by philosophers regarding the nature and limitations of 'knowledge'. Some have been utterly sceptic of the presence of any external criteria of truth or falsity by which our experiences could be measured and adjuged. Others have sworn passionately by the truth of all experience, and gone to the extent of denying that there is, or can be, any sort of erroneous knowledge so-called[1]. Yet, others have more modestly held that our judgments are neither always veridical nor always misplaced; but that they are normally true and occasionally subject to error. This last view is not only the commonsense-view but, also, contains a greater measure of philosophical satisfyingness. Absolute scepticism is as unworkable as it would be suicidal. The extreme realism, that all experience is in a sense real and valid, would be but a learned stunt practically useless and theoretically disingenuous, if not also dangerous in its consequences. The very quest for validity implies a recognition of the possibility and probability of the invalid.

It is open to us to judge our experiences on their merits and determine their validity or otherwise with reference to suitable tests or criteria. It is here, that we come to the parting of the ways among the well-known philosophers of India and the West. Various tests of validity have been adumbrated—Correspondence, Coherence, Pragmatic Utility and so forth. But the search for truth by means of tests would be but a pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp, unless there is some way in which we can be *immediately sure of the last point without recourse to further tests.* There must be some way of avoiding an infinite regress of tests, and yet attain to an absolute certainty or conviction of validity. Is there such a vantage-ground of self-validity of judgments, or not? If there is, what is it? This has been one of the most significant problems of Indian epistemology; and a substantial part, of the dialectic literature of the various systems, is devoted to a clarification of these issues. Opinion divides itself, naturally, into two camps—'External Validation' and 'Intrinsic Validity'. The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* are pragmatists, holding the view that

1. अतो यथार्थं रूप्यादिविज्ञानं शुक्तिकादिषु (*S'rī-bhaṣya*, I. 1. 1).

the validity of knowledge is made out with reference to means *other* than those that produce the cognition. The Vedantins of both the Advaita and Vis'iṣṭādvaita schools, agree with the Mīmāṃsakas in believing that the validity of knowledge is intrinsic to it; and does not depend on extrinsic factors. The most prominent defects and limitations of these opposing views have been laid bare by the contending parties themselves: (1) that the former is faced with an infinite regress[1] of tests; and (2) the latter would do away with the possibility of all doubts and error[2].

The average doctrine of 'svataḥ-pramaṇya', no doubt, explains that 'in most cases, it is not necessary to go beyond three or four steps to make sure of validity'; that doubts do not arise in all cases, but only where there is positive knowledge of conditions, which seem to contradict the knowledge we have acquired; and that if arguments are employed to test such knowledge, it is not so much for the positive task of establishing its validity, as for the negative one of clearing our doubts and eliminating the chances of contradiction. The essence of the 'svatastva' view is that knowledge carries with it its own validity, which is implicit. This is seen from the behaviour of persons who act, unquestioningly, upon their knowledge, without waiting for its truth to be tested and ratified by a validating inference. This shows that 'non-contradiction' is the only test of validity; and that this guarantee does not forsake knowledge, till it is positively disproved or doubted:—

अतोऽवबोधकत्वेन दुष्टकारणवर्जनात् ।
अबाधाच्च प्रमाणत्वं वस्तुन्यक्षादिवच्छ्रुतेः ॥

It has been rightly objected that this explanation is unsatisfactory, inasmuch as it confuses logical certainty with mere psychological belief. A belief of validity is no indubitable index of its truth, and is no substitute for certainty, though Prof. D. M. Datta argues, 'This distinction tho' apparently sound, is, in the last analysis, untenable. Certainty is nothing but a quality of knowledge. It is belief strengthened by a process of logical reasoning. It would be useful if we could ascertain the degree of strength or amount of reasoning that would be necessary to turn a mere belief into a logical certainty. But that is logically and psychologically impossible, as different persons require different degrees of certification for the validity of their knowledge, and because no objective or logical limit can be set to the degree of strength that is required to establish certainty. There is no way, hitherto, discovered of wholly eliminating risks and error' (*Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 356).

1. परतः पक्षस्य अनवस्थ दुःस्थत्वात् (Udayana).
2. प्रामाण्यं न स्वतो ग्राह्यं संशयानुपपत्तितः (*Muktavalī*).

It is precisely here, that Madhva interposes his criterion of *Saksi-pratyaksa*, backed up by *pariksa*, tests as the terminus of all tests and process of reasoning, by which a 'belief could be converted into a logical certainty':—

न परीक्षानवस्था स्यात् साक्षिसिद्धे त्वसंशयात् ।
मानसे दर्शने दोषाः स्युर्न वै साक्षिदर्शने ॥

Madhva's classical commentaor, Jayatirtha, sums up the whole case with his usual clarity of thought : "The *Saksi* is the ultimate instrument of knowledge and validation. Being, however, accustomed to truth and falsity in respect of sensory, inferential and verbal knowledge, the *Saksi* is not able to come to a decision straightway about the validity of particular piece of knowledge or experience before it'. To this end, then, it resorts to the application of tests. These tests may be further tested by other experiments till it reaches a certain level, where the knowledge issues in an intuitive perception of pleasure, pain or similar intimate reaction. Since such personal convictions of the *Saksi* have not been known to have miscarried in any instance, it is not assailed by any further misgivings about their truthfulness, and desists from the application of further tests of truth-determination, and rests ultimately satisfied in the validity of the knowledge and judgment so arrived at[1]. This may be illustrated by the following example of a thirsty man, who, acts on the report of water at some distance from him, and reaches the final satisfaction of his thirst by actually drinking it in · and is thereby convinced of the validity of his, perception :—

तथाहि—'अस्त्यत्र पुरतः पानीयम्' इति वाक्यं श्रुतवतो भवति सन्देहः—किमिदं विपर्ययादिमूलम् उत नेति पुरुषवचसामुभयथादर्शनात् । तत एवार्थे सन्दिहानः प्रत्यासीदन् रूपविशेषादिना अनुमिनोति 'पानीयमेतद्' इति । तत्रापि भवति संशयः—किमिदमनुमानम् उताभासः—इति व्याप्त्यादग्राहिणां याथार्थ्यायाथार्थ्योपलम्भात् । प्रत्यासन्नश्च उदकाभ्यवहारानन्तरं रसविशेषान् अनुमायापि पूर्ववत् सन्दिग्धे । पीतोदकस्तु उदन्यादिनिमित्तं दुःखाभावं सुखं चानुभवन् न तत्र संशेते । सुखादौ तदभावे च साक्षिसिद्धे कदाप्यन्यथाभावाद्यनुपलम्भात् । न च तत्र प्रतीतत्वसामान्येन तत्रापि संशयः, विशेषनिष्ठस्य निश्चायकस्य सद्भावात् ; अन्यथा संशयानुच्छेदेन व्यवहाराभावप्रसंगात (*Nyāya-sudhā*, p. 218 b).

3.

It would be easy to see that knowledge as an activity of the *mind* cannot be invested with any kind of self-luminosity. Judgments like 'I know this', point to the existence of a knowing self, which alone can be claimed to be self-revelatory. Even assuming that knowledge as such is capable of revealing itself **स्वप्रकाश**, it can only manifest its *form* or *content* ; but hardly

1. साक्षी हि ज्ञानस्वरूपं प्रामाण्यं च विषयीकरोति । एतावानत्र विशेषः—इन्द्रियलिङ्गशब्दजन्येषु ज्ञानेषु अनादौ संसारे द्वैधीं गतिमनुसन्दधत् साक्षी न सहसैव 'प्रमाणमेतद्' इति निश्चेतुं शक्नोति, किंतु दोषाभावनिश्चयद्वारैव। दोषाभावं च न स्वयमेवावधारयितुमीष्टे, अपि तु परीक्षासहकृत एव। परीक्षायां च परीक्षान्तरमनुसरति यावत् साक्षात् स्वविषये सुखादाववतरति । न च स्वात्मन्येव कदाप्यनेनान्यथाभावोऽवगत इति सन्देहाभावात् परीक्षानुसरणान्निवर्तते (*Nyaya-sudha*, p. 218 b).

its validity. If validity is an inherent property of knowledge, and revealed by itself, the knowledge arising from the Vedic texts (said to be self-valid) must make its validity felt by unbelievers like the Buddhists, in which case they could not possibly refute it as they do. This shows that the validity of a piece of knowledge is not revealed by the mere awareness of it; in other words, validity is not made known by the *knowledge itself even if it be self luminous in regard to its content*. The power of self-lumination, as has just been shown, can, at best, help knowledge to manifest its *essence* to itself. But it cannot confer upon it the power to *endorse the validity of that content*. Such a power can only belong to an essentially *infallible* principle of truth-determination which is not materially-constituted like the *mind* and can, therefore, be credited with the capacity of absolute infallibility and validation with reference to all *its* judgments. Indian philosophy must, forever, remain indebted to Madhva for having discovered such an ultimate and absolute principle of knowledge and validity in one, in the innata sense of the *self* of *man*, his *svarūpendriya*, called *Sākṣi*, which is the *real* interpreter of the knowledge (ज्ञानग्राहक), and also the guarantor of its validity (ज्ञानप्रामाण्यग्राहक) in every case in the last analysis.

The *raison d'etre* for attributing to *Sākṣi-pratyakṣa* absolute infallibility and self-validation, which is denied to the ordinary mental perceptions and awareness, is that the *mind* by its very constitution being material, is liable to err and is open to doubts, albeit rarely; whereas, the judgments of the *Sākṣi* could not be doubted and have never been shown to have been invalidated at any time of life :—

यत्किंचिद्व्यभिचारि स्याद्दर्शनं मानसं तु तत् ।
सुदृढो निर्णयो यत्र ज्ञेयं तत् साक्षिदर्शनम् ।
मानसे दर्शने दोषाः स्युर्न वै साक्षिदर्शने ॥

(Madhva's *Anu-vyakhyāna*, III. 4. 155b, 154a, 153b).

The best proof of the unerring precision of the *Sākṣī* is furnished, says Madhva, by some of our most intimate and poignant experiences of life, of which none of us has any occasion to entertain the least shadow of doubt :—

इच्छा ज्ञानं सुखं दुःखं भयाभयकृपादयः ।
साक्षिसिद्धा न कश्चिद्धि तत्र संशयवान् क्वचित् ॥ (l. c. 154b, 155a)

The very foundations of rational existence in the world would be undermined, if the verdict of the *Sākṣī*, as the ultimate reference and proof of all knowledge, were to be questioned or proved to be in the wrong *even in one single instance*. The entire superstructure of all religion and philosophy, science and arts, in short all intelligent and purposive activity of life as a whole, would be blown up to nothingness, the moment one dares to question the invariable validity of the verdict of *Sākṣi* and repudiate it.

भ्रमत्वमभ्रमत्वं च सर्वं वेद्यं हि साक्षिणा।
स चेत् साक्षी क्वचिद्दुष्टः कथं निर्णय ईयते ?॥
तस्मात् सर्वप्रसिद्धस्य व्यवहारस्य सिद्धये।
साक्षी निर्दोष एवैकः सदाङ्गीकार्य एव नः॥ (l.c. II, 3, 67b; 68a; 70)

It is thus incumbent upon all thinking beings to accept the primacy of the *Sākṣi* as the highest reference of all knowledge, and evaluate experience in the light of its evidence. The doctorine of *Sākṣi*, rightly understood, would thus, constitute the very foundation of a really sound and self-complete theory of knowledge. It would be the first and last word upon knowledge and life. It is the unique distinction of Madhva to have discovered its light, and brought it home to all students of philosophy with such vividness and clarity.

The Mādhva theory of knowledge thus distinguishes between ordinary knowledge through sensory channels which is termed *vṛtti-jñāna* and *Sākṣi-pratyakṣa* (perception by the *Sākṣi*) or intuitive perception of the self. This distinction helps Madhva to give a consistent account of both valid and doubtful cognitions without impugning the fundamental basis of the claims of truth and knowledge to universal acceptance. It is conceded by the Mādhva philosophers that the normal judgments of the *mind* are usually correct and valid, and certification by tests is not always necessary. Tests are, therefore, resorted to only where the validity is desired to be argumentatively established, or logically ascertained. The acceptance of the *Sākṣi*, also, simplifies the necessity to carry on verifications upto three or four stages as proposed by Kumārila (*S'loka-vārtika*, II. 61). For if truth is to be known, and judgments of validity were possible to be passed at any stage of the process; it could not be, at any level, *prior to the Sākṣi*. From the ultimate point of view, even the so-called test of non-contradiction would be helpless as a guarantor of validity ; unless the *Sākṣi* is summoned to vouch for the satisfaction of the condition of there being not only no contradiction for the present, but also no possibility of contradictton for all time! Non-contradiction, again, may be uncontradictedness so far ; or non-liability to contradiction for ever. The latter cannot be asserted on any authority *save* that of the *Sākṣi*. That is why Jayatīrtha says that स्वतः प्रामाण्य in the highest sense of the term belongs only to साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष, all other forms of knowledge are only परतः प्रमाण—cf. यदि च ग्राहकातिरिक्तस्य यथाकथमपि प्रवेशात्प्रामाण्यस्य परतस्त्वम्,—इति मतम्; तदा साक्षिण एव स्वतः प्रामाण्यम्, अन्यस्य परतः,— इत्यङ्गीकारेऽपि न कश्चिद्विरोधः। (NS. p. 218).

The metaphysical necessity for such an ultimate principle of knowledge and its validation is accepted by the Advaitins also :—

'मानानां तात्त्विकं किञ्चित् वस्त्वनाश्रित्य दुर्भणा'। आश्रित्य, साक्षित्वेन स्वीकृत्य। साक्षिणो बाधे तस्य साक्षी अन्यो वाच्यः, तस्याप्यन्यः, इत्यनवस्था (*Bhāmatī*, I, p. 438). But then,

such a principle cannot, possibly, be a mere registering machine *as in the* Advaita. The very purpose of recognising the *Sākṣi* as a validating principle would be lost, if, as in the Advaita school, the great censor of *Sākṣi* were to be put down as susceptible to both true and false knowledge alike : साक्षिज्ञानस्य भ्रमप्रमासाधारण्यात् (Brahmānanda). That is why Madhva keeps the *Sākṣi* scrupulously beyond the pale of doubts and vacillation, and makes it a principle of absolute infallibility. It is untouched by any breath of uncertainty. The reason for this is precisely the same as that given by the Advaitin : मानानां तात्त्विकं किञ्चिद्दुरस्त्वनाश्रित्य दुर्भणा. which is thus elucidated by Madhva :—

> कोऽपि ह्यर्थो न निश्चेतुं शक्यते भ्रमवादिना।
> भ्रमत्वमभ्रमत्वं च यदैवानुभवोपगम्।
> एकस्य भ्रमता तत्र परस्याभ्रता कुतः ॥ (*Anu-Vyā*. II. 3. 66-7)

(साक्षिणोऽपि) व्यभिचारश्चेत्. आगमार्थानुमानिर्दोषत्वाध्यवसाये च समः। अत उत्तरदिव ते अभेदवाक्यस्य भेदोऽर्थः स्यात् । निर्दोषानुमायाः सदोषत्वं सदोषानुमाया निर्दोषत्वम् इत्यव्यवस्था, (Jayatirtha : *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa-ṭikā*).

The Mādhva philosophers have, thus, gone far ahead of their compeers, in the other schools of Indian philosophy in having postulated a new and errefrangible principle of truth-determination in the field of epistemology, in the form of the concept of *Sākṣi*, which is to be accepted as the ultimate reference of all knowledge and validity ; and which is always infallible, intrinsically valid and self-luminous.

The *Sākṣi* is, thus, established by Madhva, (1) as the ultimate guarantor of the validity of all pramāṇas, (2) as the logical fulfilment of a really self-contained theory of knowledge, and (3) it is also posited as the only means of intuitive perception of certain supersensuous categories like time, space, the nature of the self and its attributes, the mind and its modes, all knowledge of pleasure, pain etc. It must be remembered that these experiences are regarded by Madhva as immediate experiences and not as inferential judgments as in other systems of thought like the *Nyāya-Vais'eṣika*. Take for example, the intuitive perception of bliss and the category of *time*, in the state of dreamless sleep as evidenced by the 'later recollection of the happy repose of sleep', embodied in the universal judgment : 'I have slept happily all this time (एतावन्तं कालं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्)'. This direct experience of time and bliss in the state of *suṣupti* cannot obviously be put down to the activity of the mind which is *admittedly at rest* then. We have, therefore, to attribute them to the instrumentality of a special sense organ that is active *even* during dreamless sleep, when the mind itself

1. आत्मस्वरूपं तद्धर्माः, अविद्या, मनः तद्वृत्तयः, बाह्येन्द्रियज्ञानसुखाद्याः कालोऽव्याकृताऽऽकाशश्चेत्याद्याः (साक्षिविषयाः), *Pramaṇa-paddhati* ·

is at rest, and which coordinates the inmost experiences of the *self*. It is this spiritual sense-organ of the *self* that is designated as the *Sākṣī* in Mādhva epistemology : **सुखादिविषयं स्वरूपभूतं चैतन्येन्द्रियं हि साक्षीत्युच्यते** (*Nyāya-sudhā*, II, p. 258).

Once the exsistence of such a principle of thought and instrument of intuitive perception is demorstrated, it would be easy to bring the many other intuitive experiences of life under its jurisdiction. It should *not*, however, be supposed that the *Sākṣī* as an instrument of intuition, is in any manner *different* from or other than the knowing *self* or *pramātā*. *The distinction is only one of reference and not of existence.* This is determined by the play of *vis'eṣa* another interesting and peculiar thought-category of Mādhva metaphysics, that bears a striking resemblance to the principle of *difference-in-identity.*

अभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसदं निर्वाणपदम्

निबन्धकः— गोविन्दराजानकः शास्त्री, श्रीनगरम्

पुरातनेषु पुण्यग्रन्थेषु चत्वारः पुरुषार्था धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाख्याः प्रतिपादिताः । तेषु मोक्षस्यैव सर्वातिशायि वैलक्षण्यम् ।

कथमस्य तुरीयस्य पुमर्थस्य स्वरूपनिरूपणमन्तरा सर्वातिशायिता पारयितुं शक्यते, इति तावद् दुरूहोऽयं विलक्षणः प्रश्नः । अत्र च बहवस्सामयिका बहुधैव मन्वते । तत्र तावत् प्रथमकक्ष्या-समारूढानां लौकायतिकानां चार्वाकाणां मतं संप्रदर्श्यते :— ते चैवमाचक्षते, न तावन्मोक्षो नाम कश्चिच्छरीरनाशानन्तरभावितया पदार्थो भवितुमर्हति । प्रामाणिकाः प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणं स्वीकुर्वन्ति । चक्षुःश्रोत्रजिह्वाघ्राणत्वङ्मनोभेदेन तच्च षड्विधम् । न हि चक्षुषा मोक्षः सिद्ध्यति । न खलु विस्फारितलोचनेन केनचित्सुचिरं विलोकयतापि मोक्षो नाम कश्चिद् व्यलोकि । नो वा श्रोत्रं प्रमाणं भवितुमलम्, शब्दग्राहकं हि तत् । मोक्षशब्दश्रवणश्रावणमात्रेणैव मोक्षो न सिद्ध्यति । जिह्वा तु मधुरोऽयं, तिक्तोऽयं, कटुरयमिति रसवत्पदार्थमेव गृह्णाति । नापि घ्राणं प्रमाणम्—सुगन्धः पूतिगन्धो वेति गन्धवत्पदार्थमात्रग्राहकं हि तत् । न चैव त्वगिन्द्रियेण मोक्षः सेद्धुमलम्, केवलं शीतोष्णादि-स्पर्शवत्पदार्थमात्रस्यैव तेन सिद्धिः । नो वा मनः प्रमाणम्, तस्याणुत्वात्प्रत्यक्षे च महत्त्वस्य हेतुत्वा-न्मनसि चायौगपद्याज्ज्ञानसुखादिसत्त्वे तत्प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तिः । एवं प्रत्यक्षेणानुपपत्तौ केचनानुमानो-पमानशाब्दबोधानां प्रामाण्यमङ्गीकुर्वाणाः समभिदधते—अनुमानेन तावन्मोक्षस्य सिद्धिरेव न स्यात् । महानसादौ भूयशो वह्निधूमयोरेकत्रवर्तमानत्वरूपं सामानाधिकरण्यं संविदानः कुत्रचित् पर्वतादौ धूमलेखादर्शनेनाग्निमनुमिमीते 'पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात्' इति । अत्र तु परामर्शो व्यापारः कारणं तु व्याप्तिज्ञानं भवति, अग्निं चानेतुं प्रवर्तते परं तु मोक्षः प्रत्यक्षसहकार्यनुमितिज्ञानेन न सेत्स्यति, चक्षुरादीन्द्रियैरस्याग्रहणात् । उपमितिस्तु सादृश्यमनुवर्तते । मोक्षस्त्वसादृश्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिविरुद्धव्यापार-परनिष्ठं ग्राह्यमेव नालम् । एवं शाब्दबोधेनापि मोक्षस्यासिद्धतैव स्यादिति केचनाचक्षाणा एवं मन्वते । कश्चन पुरुषः कस्यचिदात्मीयस्याऽऽप्तस्य वचनेन नदीतीरे गत्वा तत्र पचेलिमानि फलानि दृष्ट्वा पक्वफलसत्तामवगच्छन् फलाहरणाय प्रयतते । तत्र चाप्तवाक्यश्रवणात् प्राक् फलाहरणे-ऽप्रवृत्तोऽयं पुरुष आप्तवाक्यादेव नदीतीरे फलसद्भावं प्रत्येति । तथा च यत्तदाप्तवाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानं तदेव शाब्दबोधः । तद्धेतुभूतमाप्तवाक्यश्रवणं च शब्दप्रमाणं प्रकीर्त्यते । शब्देन च शरीरनाशा-नन्तरभाविनो मोक्षस्य सिद्धिर्गगनसहकारफलस्य माधुर्यप्रशंसेव । तदेतन्मोक्षविषकं ज्ञानं किं प्रत्य-क्षेण भवति ? प्रत्यक्षपक्षे बाह्यप्रत्यक्षेण तस्यासम्भव इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षजन्यज्ञानत्वेन अतीते भाविनि वा तस्याप्रवृत्त्या तादृशपदार्थयोर्व्याप्तिग्रहाभावप्रसङ्गात् । सर्वानुगताया व्याप्तेर्दुर्ज्ञेयत्वापाताच्च । नापि मानसप्रत्यक्षेण, मनसश्चक्षुरादीन्द्रियद्वारैव बाह्येऽर्थे प्रवृत्त्या तथैव दोषात् । अनुमानन्तु हेतुभूतव्याप्तिज्ञानपरतन्त्रम्, तस्यापि तथैवान्यदित्यनवस्थाप्रसक्तेः । शब्दस्त्वनुमानाधीनप्रामाण्यपर-वशान्नालं मोक्षसिद्धौ । तस्मात् स्वच्छश्वेतसुसूक्ष्मवस्त्रपरिधानसुगन्धसुखस्पर्शस्रक्चन्दनोपयोग-मधुरमधुरविविधमिष्टान्नभक्षणललिततममधुमत्तमुग्धकामिनीजनोपभोगादिजन्यं सुखमेव पुरुषार्थः ।

एतादृशविलक्षणसुखानुभव एव स्वर्गो मोक्षो वेति न सम्पद्यते । एवञ्च

'यावज्जीवं सुखं जीवेन्नास्ति मृत्योरगोचरः ।
भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः ॥'

इति । तस्माच्च चैतन्यादिविशिष्टः पृथिव्यादिभूतसंघातमको देह एव आत्मा । देहस्यैवात्मत्वे ज्ञातृत्वे चाभ्युपगम्यमाने ज्ञानस्यापि शरीरगुणतया शरीरगुणानां रूपादीनामिव तस्यापि सम्भव एव मान्यः । अतः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धशरीरविषयकतैव अहंप्रत्ययरूपा, न पुनरप्रत्यक्षाक्लृप्तात्मगोचरतेति सम्यगवधीयतामिति ।

अत्र चोच्यते--अनात्मनि शरीरादावात्माभिमानात्मकत्वम् अज्ञानमूलमेव । एवमात्मनि अनात्माभिमानात्मकत्वमपि आणवमेव मलम् ।

शरीरं चैतन्यादिगुणविशिष्टमात्मा न सम्भवति । शवशरीरेषु चेष्टैव नास्ति । मृतेषु चैतन्याभावो दृश्यते । न च चार्वाकादिसम्मतं प्राणाभावे मृतशरीरेषु ज्ञानाभावादिकमक्षतिकरं वक्तुं पार्यते, शरीराणामवयवोपचयापचयैरुत्पादविनाशशालित्वाद् बाल्ये विलोकितस्य स्थविरे स्मरणानुपपत्तेश्च शरीरमात्मा नास्ति । एवं बौद्धानां मते पूर्वशरीरोत्पन्नसंस्कारेण द्वितीयशरीरे संस्कार उत्पद्यते, इति यदुच्यते, तदपि अनन्तसंस्कारगौरवभयान्न संगच्छते। शरीरस्यात्मत्वे बालकस्य स्तनपानादौ प्रवृत्तिरेव न स्यात्, तदानीमिष्टसाधनतास्मारकाभावादुद्बोधकाभावाच्च जन्मान्तरानुभूतमपि न स्मर्यते। तस्मादहं-प्रतीतिरेव तावन्नात्मा, तस्या अपि विकल्परूपत्वादस्थैर्याच्च । मनसस्त्वणुत्वाज्ज्ञानादीनाञ्च साक्षात्कारा-दात्मत्वमेव न सिद्धयति । देहस्तु भोगायतनम् । तस्माच्छरीरं चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयमेव । आत्मा तु तद्व्यति-रिक्तश्चैतन्यगुणविशिष्टः, इन्द्रियाद्यधिष्ठाता, इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानलक्षणः । अभेदज्ञानरूपविद्या-विहीनः पशुरेव, तदुक्तं बृहदारण्यके—'योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद यथा पशुः' इति। ईदृशस्य पशोर्विद्याविहीनस्य पाशौ पिपासाशनाये भवतः। तथा च श्रूयते 'अथेतरेषां पशूना-मशनायापिपासे एवाभिज्ञानं न विज्ञातं वदन्ति न विज्ञातं पश्यन्ति न विदुः श्वस्तनं न लोकपालौ' इति। अस्य च विद्या स्वात्मरूपं ज्ञानम् । अविद्या तु चरमवृत्तियुक्तं भेदभ्रान्तिरूपम् अज्ञानमेव बन्धः, तदुक्तं लैङ्गे—'भ्रान्तिर्विद्या परं चेति शिवरूपमिदं त्रयम्। अर्थेषु भिन्नरूपेषु विज्ञानं भ्रान्तिरुच्यते। आत्माकारेण संवित्तिर्बुधैर्विद्येति कथ्यते। विकल्परहितं तत्त्वं परमित्यभिधीयत' इति। श्रुतिरपि—'विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह। अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते' इति। तस्माच् चैतन्यमात्मा। चितिरविद्यापरि-पन्थिज्ञानस्वरूपा। अत एव 'चितिः स्वतन्त्रा विश्वसिद्धिहेतुः', 'सैषा चितिरिति प्रोक्ता जीवनाज्जीवनैषिणाम्' इति महावासिष्ठे । आत्मा च स्वतन्त्रः, स एव कर्ता, तस्य 'घृणा शङ्का भयं लज्जा जुगुप्सा चेति पञ्चमी । कुलं शीलञ्च जातिश्चेत्यष्टौ पाशाः प्रकीर्तिताः' । अथवा अणुर्भेदः कर्म चेति त्रयः पाशाः । तत्राज्ञानमणुः । तच्च चैतन्यस्वरूपे आत्मन्यात्मत्वज्ञानाभावः, देहादावनात्मन्यात्मत्वज्ञानम् । आणवं द्विविधं मलम् । तदुक्तं श्रीप्रत्यभिज्ञायां—'स्वातन्त्र्यहानिर्बोधस्य स्वातन्त्र्यस्याप्यबोधता । द्विधाणवं मलमिदं स्वस्वरूपापहारतः । भिन्नवेद्यप्रथात्मैव मायीयं जन्मभोगदम् । कर्तव्यबोधे कार्मं तु मायाशक्त्यैव तत्त्रयम् ।' इति । 'ननु एवंविधविश्वस्य चैतन्यं चेद्वपुः, तदा कथं बन्धस्य संबन्धः, इति शङ्कां व्यपोहितुम् अश्लेषश्लेषपाठाभ्यां सूत्रमाह महेश्वरः—'अज्ञानं बन्धः' । अज्ञानमिति तत्राद्यं चैतन्यस्फाररूपिणि आत्मन्यनात्मताज्ञानं, ज्ञानं पुनरनात्मनि । देहादावात्ममानित्वम् । द्वयमप्येतदाणवं मलं स्वकल्पितं स्वस्मिन् । बन्धः स्वेच्छाविभावितः । किमाणवमलात्मैव बन्धोऽयम् ?

नेत्युदीर्यते—'योनिवर्गः कलाशरीरम्' । योनिर्भेदप्रथाहेतुर्मायावर्गः, तदुत्थितः कलादिक्षितिपर्यन्ततत्त्वराशिस्तदात्मकः । मायीयाख्यं मलं तत्तद्भिन्नवेद्यप्रथामयम् । 'कलेति कायमाविश्य परिच्छेदकरी नृणाम् । व्यावृत्तिः पुण्यपापात्मा शरीरं यस्य तत्पुनः । कार्मणं मलमेतस्मिन्द्वये बन्धोऽनुवर्तते ॥' अत एवेशावास्ये—'अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽविद्यामुपासते' इति । अविद्याऽस्मिता रागो द्वेषोऽभिनिवेशश्चेति पञ्च क्लेशाः । तत्र आत्माऽनात्मविवेकाभावोऽविद्या । अनात्मनि देहादावात्मत्वविपर्ययोऽस्मिता । तेन च देहोपभोगकरणे स्रक्चन्दनादावभिलाषो रागः । तत्प्राप्तिपरिपन्थिनि क्रोधो द्वेषः । तदिदमहितमिति ज्ञात्वाप्यज्ञवत्तदपरित्यागोऽभिनिवेशः । अतः क्लेशावृतः 'मलमात्रेण संबद्धः पशुर्विज्ञानकेवलः । स्वपक्कमलविज्ञानकेवलः स स्वयंप्रियः॥' इति, 'अथानादिमलापेतः सर्वकृत्सर्वदृक् शिवः । पूर्वं व्यत्यासितस्याणोः पाशजालमपोहते ॥' इति च । परन्तु 'अनादिमलसंछन्नो मायाकर्मावृतो विभुः । शरीरशिवतत्त्वज्ञो भेदैकरसिको लघुः ॥ सर्वदा कर्मकर्ता च स्वकर्मफलभोजकः । नित्य विषयसंरक्तः सकलः पशुरुच्यते ॥' इति । उक्तञ्च शिवसूत्रटीकायां—'मुक्तशिवा अपि संसारिण एव स्युः' । एतदेव ध्वनितं तत्रैव—'शरीरप्राणबुद्धिशून्यानि लौकिकचार्वाकवैदिकयोगाचारमाध्यमिकाद्युपगत आत्मा न, अपि तु यथोक्तचैतन्यमेव तस्यैव शरीरादिकल्पितप्रमातृपदेऽप्यकलिताहंविमर्शमयसत्यप्रमातृत्वेन स्फुरणात्' । तदुक्तं श्रीमृत्युजिद्भट्टारके—'परमात्मस्वरूपं तु सर्वोपाधिविवर्जितम् । चैतन्यमात्मनो रूपं सर्वशास्त्रेषु पठ्यते ॥' इति । श्रीविज्ञानभैरवेऽपि—'चिद्धर्मा सर्वदेहेषु विशेषो नास्ति कुत्रचित् । अतश्च तन्मयं सर्वं भावयन्भवजिज्जनः ॥' श्रीत्रिकहृदयेऽपि-'स्वपदा स्वशिरश्छायां यद्वल्लङ्घितुमीहते । पादोद्देशे शिरो न स्यात्तथेयं बैन्दवी कला ॥' इति । चिद्रूपो हि भगवान् शक्तत्वेन परामृष्टं स्वमेव जगद्भावेन प्रादुर्भवति जलमिव स्वं तरङ्गभावेन । 'एकोऽहं बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' इति श्रुतेः । अत एव भगवान्-'ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति । भ्रामयन् सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥ न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचिन्नायं भूत्वा भविता वा न भूयः । अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥' इति गीतासूपदिशति ॥

विश्वस्य कारणं माया, तस्या एव नामान्तरं योनिः । कलादिक्षितिपर्यन्तं तस्यास्तत्त्वसमूहोत्पत्तिर्मायामलम् । तस्याश्रयेण शुभाशुभकर्मानुष्ठानं कर्मजं मलम् । कलादितत्त्वसमूह आणवमलेन संबद्ध आत्मानमावृणोति। एवम् 'अपूर्णोऽहम्' इति ज्ञानाभास आणवं मलम् । 'कृशोऽहं स्थूलोऽहम्' इति ज्ञानाभासो मायीयं मलम् । 'अहं यज्ञादिकं करोमि' इति प्रत्ययः कार्मं मलमुच्यते । मलत्रयनाशे स्वरूपोपादानं, स्वरूपोपादाने च—'स्वं कर्तव्यं किमपि कलयँल्लोक एष प्रयत्नान्नो पारक्यं प्रति घटयते काञ्चन स्वात्मवृत्तिम् । यस्तु ध्वस्ताखिलभवमलो भैरवीभावपूर्णः कृत्यं तस्य स्फुटतरमिदं लोककर्तव्यमात्रम्' । 'तस्यानावृतरूपत्वान्न निरोधोऽस्ति कुत्रचित्' । तस्य च दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तराभावाद्दग्धबीजवदपवर्गः, स च दुःखानामत्यन्तं विमुक्तिर्जन्मनाशः कर्मक्षयः 'क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ।' 'नित्यं विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म' इति ।

'मृत्योर्माऽमृतं गमय' इति श्रुतिस्तु—आत्मा वै अविनाशी, अमृतत्वं तस्य स्वरूपम्, अमृतत्वादेव तस्य प्रेत्यभावः, अमृतत्वमेवास्य निःश्रेयसाधिगम इति प्रतिपादयति । अमृतत्वमेव परमः पुरुषार्थः, शिवशक्तिसंयोगेनाऽऽनन्दरूपोऽसौ परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि स्थितः। शिवस्तु स्वयं शक्तिमान्, सर्वं जगदेव तस्य शक्तयः । समवायिनी परिग्रहरूपा चेति ता द्विधा । अपरिणामिनी चिद्रूपा निर्विकारा स्वाभाविकी च । समवायिनी तस्य शक्तिरपि द्विधा—दृक्शक्तिर्ज्ञानशक्तिर्वैका, क्रियाशक्तिः कुण्डलिनीत्यपरा, सैव

बिन्दुर्मायायाः सर्वथा भिन्ना । मायायाः परः शिवोऽविनाभूतरूपेण शक्तिमानुच्यते । अचेतना परिणामशीला तस्य बिन्द्वाख्या परिग्रहरूपा शक्तिः सैव शुद्धाशुद्धरूपेण द्विधा । अशुद्धा तु मायोपादानाख्या, शुद्धा तु महामाया परा स्थूला सूक्ष्मा चेति त्रिगुणा। स्थूलरूपा सा प्रकृतिर्भोग्यान्विषयानुत्पादयति । तत एव सृष्टिः । इच्छाशक्तिस्तु 'सा ममेच्छा परा शक्तिः शक्तियुक्ता स्वभावजा । वह्नेरूष्मेव विज्ञेया रश्मिरूपा रवेरिव ॥ सर्वस्य जगतो वापि सा शक्तिः कारणात्मिका।' इति श्रीमृत्युञ्जयभट्टारके निर्णीता ।

सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारनिग्रहानुग्रहेण पञ्चकृत्यकारी शिवः, तस्यैव निवृत्तिप्रतिष्ठाविद्याशान्तिशान्त्यतीतात्मिकाः पञ्च कलाः । ताभ्यः स परतरः, तदुक्तम्—'भूमौ निवृत्तिरुदिता पयसि प्रतिष्ठा विद्यानले मरुति शान्तिरतीतशान्तिः । व्योम्नीति याः किल कलाः कलयन्ति विश्वं तासां विदूरतरमम्ब पदं त्वदीयम् ॥' इति। मन्त्रपदवर्णभुवनतत्त्वकलादिरूपाः षडध्वानस्तत्प्राप्तिहेतुभूता उच्यन्ते। परन्तु कला एताः पृथगवस्था यासां शान्त्यतीता कारणावस्था लयावस्था वा, न तु भोगस्थानं भवति ।

आत्मा नित्यो विभुश्चेतनश्च। सर्वज्ञानक्रियारूपा चैतन्यशक्तिः शिवस्यैव, न तु पशुपाशबद्धस्य जीवस्य । जीवस्तु धूमेनाग्निरादर्शो मलेन गर्भ उल्बेन सूर्यो मेघेनेव मलेनाऽवरुद्धः, अत एव स सकलः, प्रलयादिषु मलस्योपसंहृतत्वात्स एव प्रलयाकलः । सति च मल एव केवले स विज्ञानाकल उच्यते । वासनाच्छेदेऽपि मलाविनाशे शिवसायुज्यं नाप्नोति। अत एव 'उत्तीर्णमायाम्बुधयो भग्नकर्ममहार्गलाः । अप्राप्तशिवधामानः त्रिधा विज्ञानकेवलाः' ॥ मलनाशे पशुत्वाभावः । पशुभावे परा मुक्तिरसम्भवा । कर्मणां मलस्य च क्षये परा मुक्तिर्भवति । मायाकलाकालनियतिविद्यारागप्रकृतयः सप्त भुवनाधारभूमिकाः कर्मणां भोगहेतुरूपाः कलाकालनियतिमयेषु त्रिषु तत्त्वेष्वन्तर्भूताः । वस्तुतस्त्वात्मैव मोहितो मायया पञ्चकृत्यकारित्वं नावगच्छति ।

आणवादिमलत्रयेण संकुचितज्ञानो जीवो बन्धनमाप्नोति । सविकल्पे निर्विकल्पे वा मले तस्य परा सिद्धिर्न भवति। सत्त्वपुरुषान्यथाख्यातिर्विवेकाख्यातिर्वा सांख्यसंमता न तस्य स्वरूपावस्थितिः। स्वात्मैव जगदिति बोधो निर्वाणपदम् । शुद्धः प्रकाशोऽनुत्तरो विश्वोत्तीर्णस्तत्त्वातीतः, यस्मिन्विमर्शो निलीनः । विमर्शस्य च अम्बावामाज्येष्ठारौद्रीति प्रकाशांशाः शान्तेच्छाज्ञानक्रियारूपास्तस्यांगाः परापश्यन्तीमध्यमावैखरीरूपाः । सकलनिष्कलभेदेन द्वैतभासा द्वयात्मा तु शिवः, विश्वातीतः शून्यमयो निष्कलः सादाख्यपदवीमारूढः । तत्त्वातीतस्य तस्य शक्त्या सामरस्यम् । सैव परा शक्तिः स्वेच्छास्फुरणेन विश्वं सृजति, अनुत्तरदशायां सृष्ट्यतीता विद्यते ।

चैतन्यं जडता चेति तत्त्वद्वयात्मको जीवः । देह-मनो-बुद्ध्यादयो जडाः, तद्व्यतिरिक्तश्चेतन आत्मा त्रिविधेन दुःखेनावरुद्धः पशुः । दुःखातीतो जीवन्मुक्तः कैवल्यं पदमश्नुते । तत्पदप्राप्त्यै मार्गा अनेके, तदुक्तम्—'त्रयी सांख्यं योगः पशुपतिमतं वैष्णवमिति, प्रभिन्ने प्रस्थाने परमिदमदः पथ्यमिति च। रुचीनां वैचित्र्यादृजुकुटिलनानापथजुषां, नृणामेको गम्यस्त्वमसि पयसामर्णव इव' इति ॥

आत्मनः स्वरूपावस्थितिरेव मोक्षः । स च शक्तिपातेन प्राप्यते। शक्तिपातस्तु शान्ते मनसि विशुद्धे विज्ञाने भगवदनुग्रहेण भवति । भोगायतने शरीरे तदात्मा साक्षी द्रष्टा परमशिवरूपो रविरिव सर्पिषि द्रवत्वं कर्दमे च शुष्कतां बन्धनं मोक्षमापादयति । अद्वयोऽसौ स्वातन्त्र्यमयः परात् परतरः सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारकारी स्वच्छन्द उपाधिभेदेन मायापरवशः । अनुत्तरदशायामसक्तस्त्रिकालसिद्धः 'निर्विण्णस्य वैराग्यं विरक्तस्य मोक्षः' इति कथनाज्जीवन्मुक्त एव। तदुक्तम्—'बहिर्मुखस्य तस्यैव वृत्तयो

याः प्रकीर्तिताः । ता एवान्तर्मुखस्यास्य शक्तयः परिकीर्तिताः’इति ॥ ‘अविद्योपासितो देहो ह्यन्यजन्मसमुद्भवः । कर्मणा तेन बध्यन्ते ज्ञानिनोऽपि कलेवरे’ इति च ।

सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वकर्तृत्वस्फुरणञ्च मोक्षस्वरूपम् । अपरिच्छिन्नज्ञानदो हि शिव एवैकः । अद्वैतज्ञानमेव तत्प्राप्तिः । सा च तस्यैवानुग्रहेण । अत एव पतञ्जलिः—‘तस्यात्मानुग्रहाभावेऽपि भूतानुग्रहप्रयोजनं ज्ञानधर्मोपदेशेन कल्पप्रलयमहाप्रलयेषु संसारिण उद्धरिष्यामि’ इति । किन्तु पाशाशुद्धौ निवृत्तिरेव न जीवस्य । कलातत्त्वभुवनादिषडध्वाशुद्धौ कुतः परातत्त्वयोजना । वस्तुत आत्मैव प्रमाता मायाशक्त्या संवृतः स्वात्मानं नावबोधति, तत्तत्कर्मणां फलमनुभवन् संसरति । षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वमयोऽसौ जन्माधिगच्छति । देशः कालोऽध्वा वा प्राणे प्रतिष्ठिताः । प्राण एव पारमेश्वरी शक्तिः । शक्तिमान् सः ‘यथैधांसि समिद्धोऽग्निर्भस्मसात्कुरुतेऽर्जुन’—इतिवत् स्वानि कर्माणि भस्मसात्कृत्वा मुक्त उच्यते । चित्स्वरूपोऽसौ भावनोद्भासितो योगमद्वैतभावं समश्नुते । अत एव ‘स तया रमते नित्यं समायुक्तः सदाशिवः । पञ्चमन्त्रतनुः श्रीमान् देवः सकलनिष्कलः’ ॥ स्वातन्त्र्यहानिरेव तस्य संकोचः, स्वातन्त्र्यबोध एव तस्य मुक्तिः, स एव ज्ञानाग्निना सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते । तथा ज्ञानेनैवाज्ञाननाशः पराशक्तिस्फुरणम् अभेदावस्था च । ये तु ‘न हृष्यत्युपकारेण नापकारेण कुप्यति । यः समः सर्वभूतेषु जीवन्मुक्तः स उच्यते ॥’ इति वदन्ति, तेषां मते तु तत्तद्भुवनप्राप्तिरपि मुक्तिरेव । परन्तु न सा मुक्तिः । आभासमात्रमेव मुक्तेस्तत् , यतस्तत्रापि वासना न नश्यति । तत्र तु ‘अधिकारी च भोगी च लयी स्यादुपचारतः ॥’ तस्य तु ‘सा तु संविदविज्ञाता तैस्तैर्भावैर्विशिष्यते । मलोपरुद्धदृक्छक्तेर्नरस्येवोडुराद् पशोः ॥’ इति सदाशिवभूमिकापर्यन्तं तस्य पुनरावृत्तिः । सादाख्यपदव्यां तु मलनाशे कर्मोपशमे च स्वरूपावस्थितिरभेदरूपा निर्वाणपददायिनी ॥

तदैव ‘आग्नेयं मण्डलं भित्त्वा भित्त्वा च सूर्यमण्डलम् । शशिमण्डलमुद्धृत्य दश द्वादश षोडश । एताः कला विगाह्न्ते तथा सप्तदशी कला । अमाकलेति विख्यातं विशेत्पदमनामयम् ॥’ अत एव भगवान्—‘आ ब्रह्मभुवनाल्लोकाः पुनरावर्तिनोऽर्जुन । मामुपेत्य तु कौन्तेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥’ इत्युपदिशति । तस्मात् ‘कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे । अजडात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं वा विदधीत कः ॥’

स एव—

‘प्रक्षीणे शब्दौघे तदनु विरते बिन्दुविभवे
ततस्तत्त्वे चाष्टध्वनिभिरनुपाधिन्युपरते ।
श्रिते शाक्ते पर्वण्यनुकलितचिन्मात्रगहनां
स्वसंवित्तिं योगी रसयति शिवाख्यां परतनुम् ॥’ इति ॥



The Jain Doctrine of Syādvāda with a New Pragmatic Background

By

PRABHUDUTT SHASTRI, *Lahore.*

The doctrine of *Syādvāda* is supposed to be the most important feature of the Jain Dialectic, and the main pillar on which its theory of knowledge stands. It remains to be seen how for its claim of superiority over all other types of epistemological theory can be justified. Some writers vaguely hint at its being an anticipation of Hegel's conception of the function of negation in the development of thought, while others dicover in it a clear enunciation of pragmatism. But, so far, no writer on Jainism seems to have gone into the subject in any detail, or given any evidence of his close familiarity with pragmatism, either as a method or as a theory. It is, therefore, proposed to make a very brief analysis of this doctrine, with a view to inquire, how far a pragmatic background would fit in with the fundamental principle of *Syādvāda*.

The Jain theory of knowledge starts with the hypothesis, that Reality is a system, in which everything is related to everything else. This involves the possibility of innumerable relations; since the number of things, that could be the object of thought, is countless. These relations can, however, be studied under the three categories of affirmation, negation and indetermination (denoted by the words '*asti*', '*nāsti*' and '*avaktavya*'), and can be embodied in seven propositions forming the *Saptabhaṅgi* the analytico-synthetic standpoint incorporated in *Syādvāda*. The following are the seven simplifind forms or steps composing the *Saptabhaṅgi* :—

1. स्यादस्ति *'in a sense A is'*.
2. स्यान्नास्ति *'in a sense A is-not'*.
3. स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च *'in a sense A is and is-not'*.
4. स्यादवक्तव्यः *'in a sense A is indeterminate'*.
5. स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यश्च *'in a sense A is and is indeterminate'*.
6. स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्च *'in a sense A is-not and is indeterminate'*.
7. स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्च *'In a sense A is, is-not and is indeterminate'*.

It is argued that if we know a thing in all these aspects, we know of it as much as it is possible for us to know on purely logical grounds. Each of these statements expresses a partial truth; and

when all these are put together, we have covered all alternatives in our quest after truth. Absolute knowledge is impossible for man, so that we have to rest content with probabilities. The very existence of the prefix '*syāt*', before each of the seven propositions, is an indication of this very fact. It reduces the otherwise categorical proposition to hypotheticals. For instance, the judgment 'S is P' loses the force of categorical certainty by the prefix '*syāt*', which may be translated as '*may be*', '*in a sense*', '*from a certain standpoint*' etc. We know that 'S is P' is the highest certainty, but with the prefix '*may be*' or '*in a sense*' it becomes a hypothetical judgment, and brings in the elements of uncertainty and ignorance. In the theory of knowledge, it introduces the spirit of scepticism and agnosticism, in spite of the Jains claiming that their doctrine is a refutation of both these tendencies.

But *Syādvāda* can be defended, quite independently, on the ground that, even as idealists, we must recognise the element of the unknown, in every act of knowledge. Thought involves both elements – the known as well as the unknown. But they are not separate areas of being (as, e.g. in Herbert Spencer), and it will not be correct to say that one part of experience is reserved for knowledge and another for ignorance. Every experience is perforated by knowledge and ignorance. Our knowledge, about anything, is our knowledge interpenetrated by the consciousness that that knowledge is partial or incomplete. This would provide the context, in which the use of the word '*syāt*', in each of the seven judgments of the *Saptabhaṅgī*, could be to some extent justified.

Every student of logic knows that there are three kinds of modal judgments: (1) 'S is P' (assertoric), (2) 'S may be P' (problematic), and (3) 'S must be P' (apodictic). Strictly speaking, there is only one form, the assertoric (categorical), since the other two forms of modality do no really affect the affirmation, but its object only; and consequently there are countless ways of modifying a judgment. If we take स्यात् to mean '*in a sense*' or कथंचित् '*somehow*', we really cease to form strictly logical judgments, because they depend more on the degrees of our knowledge than on the types of affirmation. We know that '*may be*' and '*must be*' involve a supposition कल्पना, and are inferred on the basis of a condition being fulfilled, both the problematic (possible) and the apodictic (necessary) become forms of the hypothetical. 'A thing is not necessary, when it simply *is*; it is necessary, when it is because of something else' (Brodley). If the assumed conditions do not actually exist, the necessary ('S must be P') may not only fail to be actual, but even impossible.

On the one hand, we have '*syāt*' indicating the absence of certainty or the despair of knowledge on the part of the subject making the judgments; on the other, we have the additional particle '*eva*' **एव** after '*asti*', '*nāsti*' and '*a-vaktavya*' in the *Saptabhangī*. This offers a somewhat serious difficulty, as it seems to emphasise categorically the import of each of the propositions. Obviously the juxtaposition of '*syāt*' and '*eva*' involves a contradiction, but it must be presumed that the author of the *saptabhangī* must have been aware of this implication, and so he probably meant otherwise. The only way to reconcile the incongruity would be to take '*eva*' as emphasising the completeness of each proposition as a standpoint by itself, so that all these seven complete but interrelated standpoints would be organised into a wholet – the *Saptabhangīnaya*, or it may be translated as '*necessarily*'. The only other alternative would be to suggest the removal of '*eva*' from each of the propositions, and read them like **स्यादस्ति** instead of **स्यादस्त्येव** etc.

Jainism claims that an aggregate of these seven judgments gives us a much more adequate knowledge than provided in any of the other schools of philosophy, which dogmatise on the strength of one or the other aspect exclusively. But this claim cannot be substantiated. Take, for instance, the problem of the soul's existence. The Sankhya Sutra **अस्त्यात्मा नास्तित्वसाधनासम्भवात्** is, generally, condemned as an unsatisfactory mode of proof, since it merely speaks of the impossibility of such means as would demonstrate the soul's non-existence. But, it seems more helpful, as a proof, than the Jain mode **स्यादस्त्येव आत्मा, स्यान्नास्त्येव आत्मा** etc., inasmuch as the Sankhya employs merely the indirect proof, which is quite valid in logic; and in fact the only method available where application of the direct method of proof becomes impossible. The *Syādvāda*, however, would treat this problem of the existence of the soul in the following manner :—

1. **स्यादस्त्येवात्मा (सदंशकल्पना)** '*in a sense the soul necessarily exists*'.
2. **स्यान्नास्त्येवात्मा (पर्युदासकल्पना)** '*in a sense the soul does not necessarily exist*'.
3. **स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येवात्मा (क्रमेण सदंशासदंशकल्पना)** '*in a sense the soul necessarily exists, and in a sense it does not necessarily exist*'.
4. **स्यादवक्तव्य एवात्मा (समसमये विधिनिषेधयोरनिर्वचनीयकल्पना)** '*in a sense the soul is necessarily indeterminate*'.
5. **स्यादस्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्य एवात्मा (विधिप्राधान्येन युगपद्विधिनिषेधानिर्वचनीयख्यापनाकल्पना)** '*in a sense the soul necessarily exists, as well as in a sense it is necessarilly indeterminate*'.
6. **स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्य एवात्मा (निषेधप्राधान्येन युगपन्निषेधविध्यानिर्वचनीयकल्पना)** '*in a sense the soul does not necessarily exist, yet in a sense it is necessarily indeterminate*'.
7. **स्यादस्त्येव स्यान्नास्त्येव स्यादवक्तव्य एवात्मा (क्रमात् सदंशासदंशप्राधान्यकल्पनया**

युगपद्विधानिषेधानिर्वचनीयकल्पना) '*in a sense the soul necessarily exists, in a sense it does not necessarily exist, yet in a sense it is necessarily indeterminate'.*

I wonder, if we are much the wiser after submitting the problem of the soul's existence to the test of the *Saptabangi*, which, no doubt, makes a reference to several aspects, singly or in combination, resting on a supposition in each case; but nothing more than such reference. That the soul exists, or does not exist, is not proved at all. Even the categorical proposition is qualified not only by a '*somehow*' or '*may be*' or '*in a sense*', but also by '*eva*' (necessarily), which makes it doubly hypothetical, since 'S must be P' denotes a lesser certainty than 'S is P', as stated above. The result is that neither any thesis nor any antithesis is proved, and we are left groping in a chaos of scepticism, which cannot be overcome by a mere '*may be*' or '*somehow*' or '*in a sense*'.

In his Transcendental Dialectic, Kant, while discussing the 'Paralogisms' and 'Antinomies' of pure reason, adopts the use of a thesis and an antithesis; but does not leave the matter there in the form of a mere proposition. He adduces a definite proof under each, though such proof may not have a final value. For instance, under 'the fourth conflict of the transcendental ideas', Kant lays down that pure reason can prove, as well as disprove, the existence of God :—

Thesis

There exists an absolutely necessary being, which belongs to the world either as a part or as the cause of it.

Proof

The world of sense is not simply the sum-total of all phenomena, but it contains a series of changes etc. etc. etc.

Antithesis

There nowhere exists an absolutely necessary being, either in the world, or outside the world as its cause.

Proof

Assume that the world itself is a necessary being, or that a necessary being exists in it. Then either there is a beginning in the series of its changes that is absolutely necessary, and therefore without a cause, or the series itself, having no beginning, is as a whole absolutely necessary and unconditioned etc. etc. etc.

In the same way, another problem forming an antinomy of reason is taken up: the world has a beginning in time and limits in space (*thesis*) is put against the proposition that the world has no beginning in time and no limits in space, but is infinite (*antithesis*). Each of these two positions is demonstrated by a definite proof, and ultimately the conclusion is drawn that reason is incapable of solving these problems. Similarly, under 'Paralogisms'

the question, whether the simple unity of the soul is a substance, or not is treated in the same way. Proving both sides proves nothing, but creates an 'illusion', and only shows that reason is stepping beyond its legitimate sphere.

Before making any further observation on the value of the kind of analysis as we have in *Syādvāda* ; a few words on the function of negation, as expressed by the particle न or the copula नास्ति in the negative judgments of the *Saptabhaṅgī*, are called for.

Although negation is rooted in affirmation, it is as much a content of the system of reality as affirmation. The main distinction, noted by logicians, is that affirmation can exist as 'fact' ; while negation cannot so exist, it has to be *made*. 'It is true, especially in the beginning of knowledge, that affirmation is prior to negation...but it is no less true that negation has from the first its essential place in knowledge, and, as reality becomes for us an articulated system, the value of negation approaches more and more nearly to that of affirmation' (Bosanquet).

Negation has been used by Hegel as a vehicle for the evolution of thought. Thought is dialectic, because the real is also dialectic. All differences must be seen to arise necessarily from the nature of the unity within which they fall, consequently they should not be given any a *posteriori* existence. Hegel views philosophy as thought in its most consummate form, and holds that the primary function of thought is to grasp the organic unity that penetrates through all differences. Thought finds its solution in its evolution, and in fact the totality of being is movement. This is the central conception in Hegel's logic, and it must be pointed out that in the Jain Dialectic there is no such analogy with the idea of movement or evolution, and it would be a gratuitous assumption that Jainism had antici pated a good deal of Hegel's philosophy. The only point, that can be of any help in throwing some light on the doctrine of *Syādvāda*, is Hegel's emphasis on the function of negation and the conception of an organic unity pervading all differences. We can certainly derive strength from Hegel's view that in our thinking we do not actually use bare identities or differences, but identities in differences, or differences in identities. Thus in the judgment 'S is P', we are leaving behind the self-identity of S, and are passing on to its relations of identity with P, since we cannot know identity except through differences. 'A thing must be other than itself in order to be itself' (Hegel). 'Identity and difference are inseparable aspects of all that exists or can be thought' (Bosanquet).

The pragmatist would put forward his view that the affirmative judgment 'S is P' simply means that we have so selected our S, singling it out of a larger context, that P can be predicated of it and may, for our purpose

advantageously, be identified with it; while the negative form 'S is-not P' means that a purpose demands a distinction in a genus, which for a different purpose might, of course, be irrelevant. The use of the extra-logical expression 'for our purpose' is very significant in pragmatism, while the Jain Dialectic has no scope for its use. The purposiveness of our thought, which is one of the fundamental ideas of pragmatism, is never stressed in the latter, which, hardly, if ever even mentions it, but adopts a more objective point of view, only modifying such objectivity by a *'may be'* or *'in a sense'*, which, as stated above, is an indication of the sceptical attitude of mind.

As to the part played by negation in human thought, pragmatism holds that negation is the great instrument for expressing rejections for human purposes (here again 'human purposes' is emphasised). In defining 'A', negations of a finite number must always suffice, for, if the 'not-A' were conceived as infinite, negation could never fulfil its purpose of defining the 'A' we have made an object of our thought. Pragmatically, therefore, negation is a subjective device of thought. That it is definitely more subjective than affirmation would be conceded by every logician.

Besides affirmation (अस्ति) and negation (नास्ति), there is a third category denoted by the word inderminate (अवक्तव्य), which occurs in four out of the seven propositions of the *Saptabhangni*. It means 'indeterminate', 'indescribable', 'indefinable' etc. But this logical sense has been overlooked even by scholars like the late R. G. Bhandarkar, who renders 'स्यादस्त्यवक्तव्य' by *'under certain circumstances, the affirmation of existence is not possible'*. He treats the affirmation of existence implied by *'asti'* as the subject and *'avaktavya'* as the predicate. This interpretation is definitely erroneous. The correct translation would be : *'under certain circumstances (in a sense) thing may exist and yet may be indeterminate'*. If it is objected that the 'is-ness' of an object is incompatible with its 'indeterminateness', we might reply that on the basis of 'anekāntavāda' no such incompatibility exists ; and all kinds of relations may exist, which may appear mutually contradictory, yet compatible from different standpoints. Even on any other basis, seeming contradictions disappear, when words are interpreted in different senses.

Can *Syādvāda* be accepted as the pragmatic testing of a truth-claim ? I think not. The reason is that unlike pragmatism this doctrine does not make even the remotest reference to *relevancy* as the test of truth. It nowhere says that 'only the relevant can be true', and that the relevant must always be *relative to a purpose.* By a mere shuffling of standpoints, it cannot arrive at any *real* truth. It has no theory of 'truths' and 'errors' to offer. It lays down no such criterion ot truth as 'workability', 'utility', 'relevancy to a purpose', etc. Pragmatism, however, has a simple and clear-cut definition of 'truths' and 'errors', Truth-cliams, which work well, are 'truths', those,

which work badly, are 'errors'. In *Syādvāda* we find nothing to that effect, neither is there anything corresponding to the basic theory of pragmatism that the distinction between truths and errors cannot be made intellectualistically but only pragmatically, viz. by their several consequences. This point deserves careful consideration by all scholars, who are eager to prove a close similarity between the Jain doctrine of *Syādvāda* and the modern pragmatic theory of truth.

S'aṅkara's criticism of *Syadvada* embodied in his comments on the sutra '**नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात्**' has often been condemned by Jain writers on the ground, that he misunderstood this doctrine, especially because he appeared to be ignorant of the part played by negation in our knowledge. Sankara says:— '**न ह्येकस्मिन्धर्मिणि युगपत्सदसत्त्वादिविरुद्धधर्मसमावेशः संभवति शीतोष्णवत् । य एते सप्त पदार्था निर्धारिता एतावन्त एवंरूपाश्चेति ते तथैव वा स्युर्नैव वा तथा स्युः। इतरथा हि तथा वा स्युरतथा वेत्यनिर्धारितरूपं ज्ञानं संशयज्ञानवद् अप्रमाणमेव स्यात्**'' ... ...'. The general sense is that a substance cannot possess contradictory qualities at the same time: a body cannot be hot and cold at the same time to the touch of the same person. The seven categories of Jainism may not, necessarily, be seven, or may not, necessarily, possess the attributes they are supposed to have or may behave differently. Similarly, one cannot be sure of the *astikayas* as well. How can one be certain of anything ? In fact, the position will, like scepticism, lead to uncertainty and chaos. The arguments supporting *Syadvāda* may be easily turned over against it in the same spirit of scepticism, since with a mere '*syāt*' any assertion (affirmative or negative) could be made. In this way, S'aṅkara goes on with his polemic against *Syadvāda.*

It is preposterous to suggest that S'aṅkara did not understand the spirit of the doctrine or was even ignorant of the legitimate function of negation in the elaboration of our knowledge. His acute criticism of the various philosophical systems, especially his refutation of the theory of the Vaināsʹikas (that being is evolved out of non-being), and the other Buddhistic schools, shows, not only the vast range of his knowledge, but also a highly developed critical acumen, whereby he successfully handled the subtleties of dialectic.

The doctrine of *Syādvāda* has certainly its own value. It is not a piece of mere sophistry. It can be, successfully, used against all dogmatism, and it, rightly, emphasises the function of negation in our thought. It, rightly, emphasises the truth that nothing can be known except in relation to other things ; but it does, by no means, stand as a precursor of Hegel's conception of 'thought', and 'being' as movement. But, by itself, *Syādvāda* does lead to scepticism and fails to yield any certain knowledge. It is closely allied to the doctrine of relativity of knowledge, though it does not

work it out in its psychological setting. It has a distinct pragmatic touch in the *Saptabhangi* method, but it is far removed from the extra-logical consequences and applications of the pragmatic theory. Though it indicates a recognition of a truth-claim in each of the seven propositions composing the *Saptabhangi* ; it, nowhere, teaches that truth is what satisfies, and error what thwarts a human purpose in cognitive activity. This idea of relevancy to human purpose is the basic test of truth according to pragmatism (otherwise known as 'humanism'). We miss it in Jain Dialectic.

But it must not be supposed that there is nothing beyond *Syādvāda* in the Jain theory of knowledge. The greatness of Jainism lies more in the spirit of analytical inquiry, in which it dicusses various problems of the theory of knowledge, rather than in any concrete results. Pragmatism is all right from the empirical point of view. Each one of us can have his own standpoint, his own purposes, whose fulfilment he seeks. Reconciliation of various conflicting ideas is welcome in a pragmatic spirit. As to value of positive religions, that religion is best which satisfies the craving of one's spirit. There is no absolute religion in that sense, every religion is true so long as it works for the satisfaction of its adherent. This kind of settlement between conflicting theories and ideas is justified on pragmatic grounds. But, so far as the general theory of knowledge is concerned, pragmatism merely 'transforms knowledge into a mere means and instrument of human well-being'. But the irresistible power of our deep-rooted and innate spirituality refuses to be satisfied with this position that necessarily involves the abandonment of ametaphysics. As Eucken aptly remarks : 'That we are not a mere consituent in a web of relations of things is sufficiently proved by the very fact that we are able to consider our relationship to our environment, apprehend it as a whole, and recognise the relations as relations. But, as soon as, we convince ourselves that behind the sphere of our knowledge there still lies an unattainable world, we cannot help feeling that what we have attained is unsatisfying as belonging to the mere surface of things' (cf. Eucken : *The Life of the Spirit*, p. 323). If we are pragmatists, we must give up metaphysics, but as Hegel very aptly observed, a highly educated people without ametaphysics resembles a temple without a holy of holies. Jainism is not wanting in a recognition of the higher spiritual life, the life of a Yogin, the life of realisation of a complete unity of existence in the consciousness of Kevalin, who is no other than God in Jainism. He transcends the sphere of the phenomenal, and can, by his pure insight and intuition, view things *sub specie aeternitatis*. The Kevalin is in possession of absolute truth, which transcends the realm of provisional truths. At the highest pitch of its thought, Jainism approaches the Vedanta, and puts the highest value on the mystical experience of a Kevalin. Bergson has, also, told us that the highest and truest knowledge can never be obtained by the method of analysis, which is

the function of the intellect, but by the method of intuition, which demands a plunge into reality to become completely one with it. When we tune ourselves to the rhythm of reality, we are *jīvanmukta*, and live in eternity; the past, present and future is an Eternal Now to us. Relativity of knowledge works on a lower plane, and keeps us out of touch with eternal truth. The impotence of our speculative reason (cf. 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्') can be overcome in pure perception, the immediate grasping of reality, 'samyak-darśana' or intuition that transcends all reasoned discourse (cf. 'यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह').

Further Light on Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa

By

V. A. RAMSWAMI SASTRI, *Trivandrum*

The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-s'āstra*, generally known as *Dvādas'alakṣaṇa*, has a genuine supplement called *Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa* (SK) in four adhyayas, which thus testifies to the significance of the appellation, *Viṃs'atilakṣaṇam* to the *Pūrva-* and *Uttara Mīmāṃsas* (PM & UM) together[1]. Some scholars[2] have expressed their doubt as to the genuineness of SK as such a supplement, on the main ground that authoritative writers on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* like S'abarasvāmin and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa have not commented on it. It has already been indicated elsewhere[3], by the present writer, that the genuineness of SK has been borne out by the *Vedanta-sūtra* . प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम् (III.3.43), if the commentary on this sutra by Saṅkara and Rāmānuja and others can be relied on[4]. It is worthy of notice that Bādarāyaṇa takes for granted many principles of interpretation in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* by expressions like तदुक्तम्. Thus the sutras : अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्याम् औपसदवत् तदुक्तम् (III. 3. 33) and हानौ तूपायनं शब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्दःस्तुत्युपगानवत् तदुक्तम् (III. 3. 26) evidently refer to the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa-sūtras* : गुणमुख्यव्यतिक्रमे तदर्थत्वान्मुख्येन वेदसंयोगः (III. 3. 8) and अपि तु वाक्यशेषः स्यादन्याय्यत्वाद् विकल्पस्य विधीनामेकदेशः स्यात् (X. 8. 4). It is believed[5] that vṛttikāras like Bodhāyana and Upavarṣa have written vṛttis on the twenty

1. PM. 12+SK. 4+UM. 4=20.

2. *Vide* M. L. Sandal's Introduction to his English Translation of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa-sūtras*, Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. I, pp. x-xii.

3. *Vide* my paper 'The *Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa* – A genuine supplement to the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa-s'astra*, published in MM. Haraprasad Shastri Commemoration Number, and also my edition of *Tattva-bindu*, Introduction, pp. 12-13.

4. S'aṅkara explains *Vedanta-sutra*, III. 3. 43, as follows :–

तस्मात्पृथगेवोपगमनं प्रदानवत्—यथा, 'इन्द्राय राज्ञे पुरोडाशमेकादशकपालम्। इन्द्रायाधिराजाय, इन्द्राय स्वराज्ञे', इत्यस्यां त्रिपुरोडाशिन्यामिष्टौ, 'सर्वेषामभिगमयन्नवद्यत्यछम्बट्कारम्' इति । अतो वचनादिन्द्राभेदाच्च सहप्रदानाशङ्कायां, राजादिगुणभेदाद् याज्यानुवाक्याव्यत्यासविधानाच्च, यथान्यासमेव देवतापृथक्त्वात् प्रदानपृथक्त्वं भवति । एवं तत्त्वाभेदेऽपि आध्येयांशपृथक्त्वाद् आध्यानपृथक्त्वमित्यर्थः । तदुक्तं सङ्कर्षे—'नाना वा देवता पृथग्ज्ञानात्' इति । तत्र तु द्रव्यदेवताभेदाद् यागभेदो विद्यते । नैवमिह विद्याभेदोऽस्ति ॥ Ramanuja in his *S'rī-bhāṣya* explains : प्रदानवदेव प्रदानवदावर्तनीयमित्यर्थः। तदुक्तं सङ्कर्षणे—नाना वा देवता पृथग्ज्ञानात्' इति । S'rīkaṇṭha has the following explanation : 'इन्द्रप्रदानवद् यथा इन्द्राय राज्ञे पुरोडाशमेकादशकपालं······स्वराज्ञे इति गुणभेदात् पृथक् पुरोडाशप्रदानम् । नाना वा देवता पृथग्ज्ञानादिति सङ्कर्षे तथोक्तत्वात् ॥'

5. *Vide Prapañcahṛdaya*, T. S. S. ed., p. 39.

chapters of the PM. and UM. Though S'abarasvāmin, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and other prominent writers have not written commentaries on SK., other writers like Bhavadāsa and Devasvāmin[1] have written vṛttis or bhāṣyas on it. Bhavadāsa's vṛtti is lost to us, but Devasvāmin's bhāṣya is fortunately available in manuscript form. It refers to Bhavadāsa's commentary[2] and is a source of help to reconstruct the sutras of SK. Most of the manuscripts of SK. do not contain the sutras in full form and in their proper places. The *Bhaṭṭacandrikā* of Bhāskararāva[3] contains only the pratīkas of the sutras beginning with each adhikaraṇa. But some full sutras can be traced from Appayya Dīkṣita's *Parimala* and Vāsudeva Dīkṣita's *Adhvaramīmāṃsā-kutūhala-vṛtti*[4]. In this short paper an attempt is made to give some more full sutras as based on the manuscripts of Devasvamin's bhāṣya available in Travancore University Mss. Library[5].

At the outset Devasvāmin explains the term **सङ्कर्षकाण्ड** by a verse quoted from an old work : **तथा चाहु:—**

सिद्धैस्तु लक्षणैरेतै: श्रुतियोगं प्रदर्शयन् ।
लक्षणानि श्रुतीश्चैव सङ्कृष्याऽधिजगे मुनि: ॥

SK. contains rules of interpretation, just like tantra and prasaṅga, adhyāyas, in reference to both upadeśa and atideśa and as such, the entire kāṇḍa has not been explained in *Dvadaśalakṣaṇī*. It, however, aims at the further application of the rules of interpretation already found in the previous chapters in reference to certain texts of the Vedas, which are somewhat ambiguous and require further elucidation (**विशेषाऽऽशङ्कापारिहारका:**)[6].

The first adhikaraṇa contains two sutras : (1) **अनुयजतीत्यनुवषट्कारश्चोद्यते**. (2) **वाक्यशेषाच्च**. There is no sutra for explaining the *prima facie* view **पूर्वपक्ष** as is the case in some of the other adhikaraṇas. In the text relating to Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, there occurs the passage : **सोमस्याग्ने वीहीत्यनुयजति**. The question is whether this passage enjoins the mantra beginning with **सोमस्याग्ने** as an accessory of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, or it enjoins the the **ऐन्द्रवायवानुमन्त्रण**, or a new karman called **अनुवषट्कारयाग**. The first two are the purva-pakṣas and are discarded in that the

1 *Vide* The S'aṅkarṣakāṇḍa – A genuine supplement to the PM, *ibid*, p. 294 and fn.

2. *Vide* Devasvamin's *bhaṣya* on XV. 2. 1 : अस्मिन् पादे 'अपूर्वात्तथा सोम:' इत्यारभ्याऽऽपादपरिसमाप्त: भावदासमेव भाष्यमिति' and *Prapañcahṛdaya, ibid*, p. 39.

3. Published in the *Pandit* (New Series), Benares, Vols. XIV, XV, XVI.

4. *Vide* SK. *ibid*, appendix, pp. 297-99.

5. Mss. : C. O. 1029, C. O. 1080, Transcript Nos. 564 and 1170.

6. About the scope and contents of *Saṅkarṣakaṇḍa vide* Appayya Dikṣita's *Parimala* (N. S. Press edn., pp. 50 and 838) and Bhāskararāya's *Bhaṭṭa-candrika, ibid*.

first involves the fallacy of vikalpa[1] along with other mantras, and the second necessitates the adoption of lakṣanā[2] in the word अनुयजति in the sense of अनुमन्त्रण. So the conclusion is अनुयजतीत्यनुवषट्कारश्चोद्यते, i.e. that the passage enjoins the अनुवषट्कारयाग which in an accessory of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. In support of this runs the vākyas'eṣa:—'तद्धिष्ण्यानुपर्यास्ते तत्सोमदीथ आभजति भागिनमेवैनं करोति; अथो यथा विवासतीभिराहरंस्त विहृत्य तर्पयति, एवमेव देवतास्तर्पयति तदनुवषट्कारेण तस्मादनुवषट्कृत्यं देवतानां तृप्त्यै' इति। This is indicated by the guṇasūtra: वाक्यशेषाच्च in the sense that this वाक्यशेष supports the view that the passage in question enjoins a new sacrifice called अनुवषट्कारयाग. In his *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*[3], (III. 2, 38) Khaṇḍadevamis'ra, however, observes, that the *Anuvaṣaṭkārayāga* is enjoined by the vākya: अग्नयेऽनुयजति as given in *Tantrasāra* (probably of Bhaṭṭasomes'vara) and not by the vakya: सोमस्याग्ने वीहीत्यनुयजति If the latter enjoins the yāga and the former enjoins both the Agni-devatā and the Uttarakāla expressed by the particle अनु in reference to the yāga, there arises the fallacy of *vakyabheda*, i.e. sentence-split (प्राप्ते कर्मणि नानेको विधातुं शक्यते गुणः). So the passage: सोमस्याग्ने enjoins only the mantra as the accessory of the Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga; and since this mantra expressly mentions Soma, it can be taken as the हविर्द्रव्य of the yaga. The other accessories necessary for it may be got by atides'a from the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice itself since Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga, though the accessory of Jyotiṣṭoma, is also its vikṛti on the basis of the similarity of having one and the same *dravya*, viz. Soma, just as Vaimṛdha an accessory of the Pūrṇamāsa sacrifice, is also its vikṛti and gets all its accessories by चोदनालिङ्गातिदेश.

The second adhikaraṇa has three sutras dealing with further details of this अनुवषट्कारयाग:— (1) सद्रोणकलशादिज्येत सर्वार्थत्वाद् याथाज्यं ध्रुवायाः (पूर्वपक्षः), (2) विभक्तानि हवींषि तथाकार्यसंयोगात् पुनरिज्या (सि.). (3) लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च (गुणसूत्रम्).

It is questioned whether the Soma juice required for the Anuvaṣaṭkārayāga is to be taken from droṇakalaṣa, which is a reservoir to supply the havis for all Soma sacrifices (just like dhruva containing ghee for all Iṣṭi sacrifices), or from the remaining part of juice of the Aindravāyava and other Somayāgābhyāsas. The *prima facie* view is that it is to be taken from droṇa-kalas'a which is intended to supply havis for those sacrifices which do not possess havis as their own. The remaining part of the juice of the Aindravāyavābhyāsas may be better utilised in the havis's'eṣa-bhakṣana by the priests. The siddhānta is that the remaining part of the

1. Vikalpa is considered a fallacy since its acceptance involves eight defects अष्टदोषदुष्टो विकल्पः।

2. Lakṣaṇā or the adoption of the secondary significative potency in a word is not to be made if it can be interpreted in the primary sense.

3. Published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, edited by MM. A. Chinnaswami Sastri, p. 295.

Aindravāyavādi sacrifices is to be utilised in view of the fact that the Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga is a pratipatti-karma[1] and an accessory of the Vaṣaṭkārayāgābhyāsa. Each yāga has its separate havis and its pratipatti is generally to be accomplished by the remaining portion of its havis. So the dravya in the droṇa-kalaśa, though common to all, cannot belong to Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga. The vākya-śeṣa : यद्वहति तेन शेषेण संयोजयति, speaks of the remaining part of the havis to be utilised in the pratipatti karmas like Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga.

The third adhikaraṇa also deals with some details of this Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga. It has five sutras.—

(1) तन्त्रं प्रदानमेकदैवतत्वात् (पूर्वपक्ष:)
(2) एककालं तु न भवत्येवेदं कालपृथक्त्वात् (सिद्धान्त:)
(3) सवनभेदाच्च
(4) अनुशब्दार्थवत्त्वाच्च (गुणसूत्राणि)
(5) आवृत्तिं च दर्शयति

This adhikaraṇa discusses whether the Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga is to be performed only *once* (तन्त्रेण) or it is to be repeated in every instance of the pradhāna-yāga. The *prima facie* view is that it is known as sviṣṭakṛt and so need not be repeated in every instance of pradhāna, since sviṣṭakṛt being a pratipatti-karma is not repeated in every instance of pradhāna sacrifice of the Darśa-purṇamāsa. Moreover, the Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga has one and the same devatā, i.e. Agni and this favours तन्त्रानुष्ठान. The siddhāntin observes that the Soma-yaga has various abhyāsas and each abhyāsa has its own time of performace in different savanas. So the Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga to be repeated at every instance of the pradhāna-yāga. The savana-bheda and the particle अनु also favour the repetition of the Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga. The prohibition : न द्विदेवत्यान् अनु वषट्करोति न गृहान् न पात्नीवतम् implies the probability (प्रसक्ति) of the performance of the Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga in every pradhāna-yāga, and this prohibition can be justified only when there is a chance of its performance in the sacrifices of two deities in the grahābhyāsas and in the पात्नीवत sacrifice. So this also favours the siddhānta that the Anuvaṣaṭkāra-yāga is to be repeated at every instance of pradhāna-yāga. This adhikaraṇa has been referred to by Khaṇḍadeva in his *Mīmāṃsākaustubha* on III. 2.38

'यद्वा सोमस्याग्ने वीहीत्यनुवषट्करोति, तेनैव संस्थितान् सोमान् भक्षयन्ति । स एव सोमस्य स्विष्टकृत' इति द्रव्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थस्विष्टकृद्यागरूपत्वसंम्तवादपि च तन्निश्चयावगते:, सङ्कर्षे च स्विष्टकृद्वत् तन्त्रानुष्ठानम् अनुवषट्कारयागस्य पूर्वपक्षयित्वा वषट्कारयागानन्तर्यरूपक्रमपृथक्त्वाद् द्विदैवत्येष्वनुवषट्कारनिषेधरूपलिङ्गाच्च वक्ष्यमाणाया आवृत्तेरर्थकर्मत्वे तन्त्रानुष्ठानप्रसङ्गेनानुपपत्ते: प्रतिपत्तिकर्मद्योतकत्वात् प्रतिपत्तिकर्मत्वं तावद् अविवादम् ॥'

1. A pratipattikarma is defined as : उपयुक्तस्याकीर्णकरस्य विहितदेशे प्रक्षेप: (that which produces a saṃskāra on the dravya or any other thing which is used in a sacrifice).

तिलकोपज्ञा आर्या

लेखकः—उदयवीरः शास्त्री, नाहान

ईश्वरकृष्णरचितायाम् आर्यासप्तत्यां सांख्यकारिकापराभिधानायामधुना द्विसप्ततिरार्याः समुपलभ्यन्ते। परं तत्र गौडपादीयं भाष्यमेकोनसप्ततिमितास्वेवार्यासु परिसमाप्यते। अतोऽनुमीयते—शास्त्रीयार्थप्रतिपादिकाः सप्ततिरेवार्या ग्रन्थेऽस्मिन्नासन्। तत्रैका आर्या कथञ्चिल्लुप्ताः तिस्रश्चावशिष्टाः साम्प्रतं समुपलभ्यमानाः कारिकाः केनचिदत्र, परं गौडपादभाष्यनिर्माणकालात्, प्रक्षिप्ताः इति सगौडपादभाष्यायाः सांख्यकारिकायाः सम्पादनावसरे विल्सनः प्रत्यपादयत्।

अनन्तरं विल्सनलेखानुरोधेन लुप्तामार्यामन्वेषमाणः तिलकोपाह्वो बालगङ्गाधरः 'सांख्यसप्तत्या एकषष्टितमकारिकाया अधस्तात् समुपलभ्यमानं गौडपादीयं भाष्यं कारिकाद्वयस्य वर्त्तते' इति निर्धार्य ततः प्रतीकभूतान् पदसमूहान् विचित्याऽनुविचित्य निम्नाङ्किताम् आर्यामयोजयत्—

कारणमीश्वरमेके ब्रुवते कालं परे स्वभावं वा।
प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणतो व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च॥[1]

इयमार्या ईश्वरास्तित्वं निराकरोतीति कृत्वा कश्चिदीश्वरपक्षपाती ग्रन्थादस्मादिमां व्यलोपयत्। परमस्माकं भाग्यवशाद् भाष्यं गौडपादीयमवशिष्टम्। कारिकाकृद् ईश्वरकृष्णश्चासीन्नितरां निरीश्वरवादीति प्रस्तुतकारिकातः स्पष्टमेवेति लोकमान्यस्तिलकः स्वमतं प्राकाशयत्। विल्सनमतानुसारं सोऽपि—सांख्यीयार्थप्रतिपादिका एकोनसप्ततिरेवार्याः—इति मन्यते, शिष्टास्तिस्रश्चार्या विषयोपसंहारात्मिका एव। परं न तास्तिस्रोऽपि प्रक्षिप्ता इति तिलकमते विशेषः।

वयन्तु 'एकोनसप्ततिसंख्यापरिमितास्वेवार्यासु सांख्यीयमूलविषयप्रतिपादकत्वम्' इति मतस्वीकार एव विल्सनतिलकप्रभृतयो भ्रान्ताः—इति मन्यामहे। सांख्यीयार्थतत्त्वं तु वस्तुतोऽष्टषष्टिमितास्वेवार्यासु परिसमाप्यते। अवशिष्टाश्चतस्र आर्याः प्रस्तुतग्रन्थस्योपसंहारभूता एव। विल्सनप्रभृतीनामुक्तभ्रान्तेः किं कारणमिति न जानीमः। कदाचिदेकोनसप्ततिमितास्वेवार्यासु गौडपादीयं भाष्यमवलोक्य विल्सनस्तथा बभ्राम इति संभावयामः। आर्याणां सप्ततिसंख्यापूरणाय चैकामार्यां लुप्तां प्राह। अनन्तरं तिलकपरिकल्पिता सेयमार्या स्थूणानिखननन्यायेन तां भ्रान्तिं दृढामकरोत्। तिलकोऽपि विल्सनकथनमन्धपरम्परयाऽङ्गीकृतवानिति महदाश्चर्यम्। आर्याणामेकोनसप्तत्या प्रतिपाद्यं विषयं ह्यसौ नालोचयत्। केवलं कारिकाकल्पनाप्रमादप्रभावितान्तःकरणो मूलविषयपराणामार्याणां सप्ततिसंख्यापूर्तिमभिमन्यमानः कृतकृत्योऽभवदिति मन्ये। तथाप्यार्याणामेकोनसप्तत्या मूलविषयपरत्वाभावाद् मूलविषयपराणामार्याणां सप्ततिसंख्यापूर्त्तिर्न जायत एवेति 'भक्षितेऽपि लशुने न शान्तो व्याधिः' इति न्यायं चरितार्थयतीव। वस्तुतस्तूपसंहारात्मिकाश्चतस्र एवार्या अन्त्यभूताः। मूलविषयश्चावशिष्टास्वष्टषष्टिमितास्वेवार्यासु परिसमाप्यते। सांख्याकारिकायामेवं द्विसप्ततिरार्याः साम्प्रतं समुपलभ्यन्ते।

1. **गीतारहस्य**— आद्य हिन्दी संस्करण- पृ. १२६.

द्विसप्तत्यार्यात्मके ग्रन्थे सप्ततिव्यवहारस्तु समीपगतपूर्णसंख्यानुरोधादेव बोध्यः। भारतीय-साहित्यपरम्पराप्रसिद्धाया तत्तद्ग्रन्थीयपदार्थादिसंख्याभिस्तत्तद्ग्रन्थीयनामनिर्देशप्रक्रियायां संनि-हितपूर्णसंख्याव्यवहारस्य बहून्युदाहरणानि शक्यन्ते समुपस्थापयितुम्। तेषु कानिचिद्यथा—

(१) अभिनवगुप्ताचार्यप्रणीते 'परमार्थसार' नाम्नि ग्रन्थे पञ्चाधिकशतमार्याणां वर्त्तते। परं ग्रन्थकारः स्वयमन्त्यायामार्यायां, ग्रन्थस्य 'आर्याशतकम्' इति नाम निर्दिशति। एवं हि तत्रान्त्या आर्या—

आर्याशतेन तदिदं संक्षिप्तसारमतिगूढम्।
अभिनवगुप्तेन मया·········॥१०५॥ इति।

(२) क्षेमेन्द्राचार्यविरचिते 'पुरुषार्थशतके' पञ्चाधिकशतश्लोकः सन्ति। तत्र मुख्यविषयपराणां श्लोकानां संख्या-द्व्यधिकशतम्। श्लोकद्वयं मङ्गलाचरणरूपम्, एकश्लोपसंहारात्मकः। तथापि 'शतक'-नाम्नैव ग्रन्थव्यवहारः।

(३) गोवर्धनाचार्यप्रणीते 'आर्यासप्तशती'-नाम्नि ग्रन्थे षट्पञ्चाशदुत्तरसप्तशतानि [७५६] श्लोकाः। तत्र ग्रन्थारम्भे भूमिकारूपेणोपनिबद्धा 'ग्रन्थारम्भोचितव्रज्या'-ऽभिधया प्रसिद्धाश्चतुःपञ्चा-शत् श्लोकाः। षट्श्लोकाश्चोपसंहारभूताः। मुख्यविषये च षण्णवत्युत्तरषट्शतान्येव [६९६] श्लोकाः सन्ति। तथापि 'आर्यासप्तशती'-नाम्नैव ग्रन्थव्यवहारे नास्वारस्यं नानौचित्यं केनाप्युद्भाव्यते।

(४) सातवाहनोपाह्वेन हालनृपेण प्रणीतायां गाथासप्तशत्यामपि त्र्यधिकसप्तशतानि [७०३] श्लोकाः। यत्र षट् श्लोका उपक्रमोपसंहारात्मकाः, अवशिष्टाः सप्तनवत्युत्तरषट्शतानि [६९७] श्लोकाः केवलं मुख्यविषयपराः; तथापि 'सप्तशती' इत्येव ग्रन्थस्य नाम सर्वत्रापि व्यवह्रियते।

एवं 'सांख्यसप्ततिः' इत्यपि नाम—सत्यामप्यार्याणां द्विसप्ततिसंख्यायां—सर्वथाप्युचितमेव। अत्रापि मुख्यविषयेऽष्टषष्टिरेवार्याः, अवशिष्टाश्चतस्रश्चार्या उपसंहारभूताः। एवञ्च गौडपादभाष्यमा-श्रित्य—मूलग्रन्थस्यैकोनसप्ततिरेवार्याः साम्प्रतं समुपलभ्यन्ते, तत्रैव च गौडपादभाष्यम्, तत एका आर्या कथञ्चिल्लुप्ता, सा चोक्तभाष्यानुसारमेव तिलकेनोद्धृता—इत्यादि कथनं निरर्थकमेव। शास्त्र-दृष्ट्यापि विचार्यमाणा, तिलककल्पनाविनिःसृतेयमार्या न कथञ्चिन्मूलग्रन्थभागतां भजते। तद्यथा—

(क) अस्यां हि कारिकायामीश्वर-काल-स्वभावानां जगन्मूलकारणता निषिध्यते। यद् गौड-पादभाष्यमाश्रित्य कारिकेयं कल्प्यते, तत्रेश्वरादीनां कारणतानिषेधपरम्परायां पुरुषस्यापि निर्देशो दृश्यते। परं तिलकः स्वकल्पितकारिकायां 'पुरुषं' नाग्रथत्। हरदत्तशर्मा गौडपादभाष्यसंस्कर-णावसरे एकषष्टितमकारिकाभाष्यटिप्पण्यां तिलककल्पितकारिकातः 'ब्रुवते'-पदं प्रच्याव्य 'पुरुष-पदञ्च तत्र विनिवेश्य तिलकन्यूनतामपूरयत्। वस्तुतस्तिलको निजनिर्मितकारिकायामीश्वरकृष्णस्य निरीश्वरवादित्वं विशदीकर्त्तुमनास्तत्रेश्वरपदमेवाग्रथत्, गौडपादभाष्ये वर्ण्यमानमपि पुरुषपदमुपे-क्षितवांश्च। यद्यपि तत्र भाष्ये ईश्वरस्येव पुरुषस्यापि जगन्मूलकारणता निषिध्यते, तथापि कारि-कायां पुरुषपदोपन्यासे हि पुनरीश्वरकृष्णस्य निरीश्वरवादित्वमिवाऽपुरुषवादित्वमप्यापद्येत। एवञ्च सूक्ष्मेक्षिकया निभालयता तिलकेन कारिकायां 'पुरुष-' पदविन्यास उपेक्षितः। हरदत्तशर्मा तिलकस्य तादृशीं सूक्ष्मेक्षिकामपर्यालोचयन्नेव 'ब्रुवते'-पदस्थाने 'पुरुष-' पदोपन्यासाय मुधा प्रायतत।

(ख) अत्र 'पुरुष-' पदविन्यासोपेक्षा तिलकस्यानुचितैव। विन्यासे त्वीश्वरकृष्णस्यापुरुष-वादित्वमप्यापद्येत इत्युभयतःपाशा रज्जुः। वस्तुतस्तु यद्गौडपादभाष्यमाश्रित्येयम् आर्या कल्प्यते, तत्र

भाष्ये सत्त्वरजस्तमोमयस्य प्रधानस्य जगन्मूलकारणतां जगदुपादानकारणतां वा स्थूणानिखनन-न्यायेन द्रढयितुमीश्वरादीनां जगदुपादानकारणत्वं निषिध्यते—यथा नेश्वरो जगदुपादानकारणं तथा पुरुषोऽपि । नैतावता कस्याप्यनीश्वरवादित्वमनात्मवादित्वं वा शक्यत आपादयितुम् । तथा सत्या-धुनिकवेदान्तमतवादिनमपहाय सर्वेऽप्यन्ये दार्शनिका निरीश्वरवादिनः स्युः । न च केवलं गौडपाद-भाष्ये, अपितु ततोऽतिप्राचीनायां माठरवृत्तौ, परमार्थकृते चीनानुवादे चापीयमेकषष्टितमकारिका तथैव व्याख्याता । परं तत्रापि तिलककल्पिताया आर्यायाः समुल्लेखोंऽशतोऽपि नोपलभ्यते । किं सर्वेभ्योऽपि व्याख्याग्रन्थेभ्यः केनचिदीश्वरपक्षपातिना सेयमार्या विलोपिता ? एकोऽपि प्रतिलिपि-भूतस्तादृशो ग्रन्थः किं नावशिष्टो यत्र सार्या निर्दिष्टा स्यात् ? एवञ्च तत्सर्वमेकषष्टितमार्याया उपरिष्टा-न्मुद्रितं सम्प्रत्युपलभ्यमानं गौडपादभाष्य, व्याख्याश्चान्या माठरवृत्त्याद्या अप्येकस्या एवार्यायाः, नार्या-द्वयस्य । आर्याद्वयस्यैवेदं व्याख्यानमिति भ्रान्तिरेव तिलकं दूरमपजहार ।

(ग) एकषष्टितमकारिकायां प्रकृतेर्जगन्मूलकारणताद्रढीकरणप्रयोजनञ्च तस्याः सुकुमार-तरताप्रतिपादनम् । तदेव विस्तरशो व्याख्यातृभिर्वर्ण्यते । ईश्वरादीनां जगदुपादानकारणत्वे तु प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरत्वं हीयेत । प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरता पुनः—पुरुषेणोपलक्षिता स्वैरिणीव, प्रकृति-पुरुषविवेकज्ञाने सति, तत्पुरुषसङ्गान्निवर्त्तते प्रकृतिरियम्—इत्येवंरूपा, सा चेश्वरादीनां जगदुपा-दानकारणत्वे न घटते । तस्मात्तदुपपादनायैव व्याख्यातृभिरनेकैः प्रसंगवशादीश्वरादीना जगदुपादान-कारणत्वं प्रतिषिध्य प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरत्वं प्रतिष्ठापितम् । एवञ्च सर्वाण्यपीश्वरादीनां जगदुपादान-कारणत्वप्रतिषेधपराणि व्याख्यानानि कारिकास्थ- **'सुकुमारतर-'** पदविवरणभूतान्येव । तस्मादेतद्-व्याख्यानमालम्ब्य कारिकान्तरकल्पनं मूलार्थानभिज्ञतामेव विशदीकरोति । तथा च कारिका-विलोपनकारणम्—ईश्वरास्तित्वनिराकणम्—अपि तिलकप्रदर्शितं न सगच्छते । यतस्तत्र प्रस्तुतेषु व्याख्यानेषु सर्वैरपि व्याख्यातृभिरीश्वरस्य जगदुपादानकारणत्वमेव प्रतिषिध्यते, न तदस्तित्वम् । तस्मात् कथं नामेयमार्या मूलग्रन्थभागतां भजताम् ?

अथ तिलककल्पिताया आर्यायाश्छन्दोरचनापि शिथिला भवति । तथाहि । छन्दःशास्त्रानु-सारमार्याया विषमगणेषु जगणस्य प्रयोगः सर्वथापि निषिद्धः । तथा चोक्तं वृत्तरत्नाकरे—

'लक्ष्मैतत् सप्तगणा गोपेता भवति नेह विषमे जः' इत्यादि । एवं विषमेषु प्रथमतृतीय-पञ्चमादिगणेषु जगणप्रयोग. प्रतिषिध्यत आर्याच्छन्दसि । परमत्र तिलकोपज्ञायामार्यायां तृतीय-चरणस्य प्रथमगणे विषमे जगणप्रयोगो वर्तते । आर्यायां चतुर्मात्रात्मको गण इष्यते । तथा च तृतीयचरणस्य प्रथमो गणः 'प्रजाःक' इत्यात्मकः मध्यगुरुर्जगणो भवतीति नियमादयं जगणप्रयोगः । स च छन्दःशास्त्रविरुद्धः । साख्यकारिकाया ईश्वरकृष्णरचिताया द्विसप्ततिपरिमितास्वार्यासु क्वाप्यन्यत्रैवंभूतश्छन्दःशास्त्रविरुद्धः प्रयोगो न दृश्यते । यदीयमप्यार्या ईश्वरकृष्णरचितैव स्यात्, तदाऽत्राप्ययं छन्दःशास्त्रविरुद्धः प्रयोगो न भवेत् । एतेन निश्चीयते— नेय रचना कथमपीश्वरकृष्णस्य भवितुमर्हतीति ।

एवञ्चोपसंहारभूतानामार्याणा गौडपादीयं भाष्यमनुपलभमानेन तिसृणां चार्याणां मिथोऽर्थ-सामर्थ्यमविचार्यैव तासां प्रक्षिप्तताञ्चोद्घोषयता विल्सनेनोद्भाविताम् आर्यासंख्यामूला भ्रान्तिमाश्रित्य तिलक एकषष्टितमार्याया गौडपादीयं भाष्यमार्याद्वयस्य मन्यमानस्तत एतामार्यामयोजयत् । तस्मात् तिलकोपज्ञैवेयमार्या भ्रान्त्याश्रिता नेश्वरकृष्णग्रथिता न केनचिल्लोपितेति निश्चितम् इति दिक् ।

The Philosophy of Yādavaprakāśa.

By

K. C. VARADACHARI, *Tirupati*.

Yādavaprakās'a is known to the philosophical world as the first Vedāntic teacher of S'rī Ramanuja. Due to certain amount of independent thinking on his part, S'rī Rāmānuja underwent persecution at the hands of his teacher and left him, seeking to formulate his own system on the lines of interpretation of Dramida, Tanka and Yamunacarya. It is stated that Yadavaprakās'a became, in later days, a disciple of S'rī Rāmānuja. Yādavaprakās'a's philosophical writings had not the good fortune to survive long after him[1], and all that we know of his system is to be gleaned from the remarks made by S'rī Ramanuja in his *S'rībhaṣya* and *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* and from the *S'rutaprakāśikā*-commentary of Sudars'ana Bhaṭṭa, and from the writings of S'rī Venkaṭanātha[2]. Prof. P. N. S'rīnivāsacārya has shown that Yādavaprakāśa's *bhedābheda* had great similarities with the S'ākta system, though it leaned more towards the difference-aspect rather than the identity-aspect[3]. It is definitely idealistic in the sense that it accepts the reality to be spiritual at bottom, but it is realistic and not illusionistic.

In this system the supreme category is Brahman. It possesses self-luminosity and all-power. It is the aggregate *(samaṣṭi)* of all the categories. Though partless, it, through its omnipotence, becomes triple or of many parts. Thus, there are three eternal portions, namely, Īs'vara, Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Pure Being or Brahman is present in all these portions though It remains

1. Of his works, *Yatidharma-samuccaya* only is now available.

2. In his *Paramata-bhaṅga*, (cf. my forthcoming annotated English Translation of it in S'ri Venkates'vara Oriental Series) from which the present account is taken, Venkaṭa-natha does not mention the name of Yadavaprakas'a at all. On the other hand, he refers these doctrines to Brahmadatta, a writer far earlier than even S'rī S'aṅkara and certainly to earlier to Bhaskara. In his *Tattvamuktākalāpa* and *Sarvarthasiddhia* also he mentions Brahmadatta and not Yādavaprakās'a. That these ideas belong to Yadavaprakās'a is to be gleaned, however, from Sudars'ana to Bhaṭṭa's commentaries, *S'rutaprakas'ika* to *Sri Bhaṣya* and *Tatparyadīpika* to *Vedarthasaṅgraha*. He considers that Yadavaprakas'a followed the view of Ās'varathya as expressed under *Vedantasutra* I. 4. 20 (cf. *S'rutaprakas'ika* II. 1. 26-31 and 32-36). Thus, we could say that Yadavaprakās'a was not the founder of a new school of *Upaniṣadic* interpretation; rather he was a ***bhedabhedavadin*** of the earlier variety than that of Bhaskara, whose philosophy Sri Veṅkaṭanatha stigmatizes as *pracchanna Jaina*, because it follows the ***anaikantika*** view of the Jaina school.

3. P. N. S'rīnivāsācarya: ***Philosophy of Bhedabheda***, (Srinivasavaradachar and Co, Madras) pp. 170ff. and p. 192, and S. N. Das Gupta: ***History of Indian Philosophy***, Vol. III pp. 301-2.

distinct from them even like the waveless ocean is different from the foam and billows and waves that are in different portions of it. During the periods of pralaya, these three portions get absorbed in the Pure Being in Its unending portion, and at the time of creation, they come back to birth. These, however, are eternal in the sense that they come back constantly and form Its eternal portion.

Īs'vara is a portion of Brahman. He shares the powers of unexceedable knowledge, rulership and others of Brahman. *Manomaya*, *vāṅmaya* and *prāṇamaya* are the three divisions or portions of Īs'vara's nature. These are due to the three functions that Īs'vra performs as *manas*, *vak* and *prāṇa*, and the lords of these three are Āditya, Agni and Candra. These differentiations could be likened to the fourfold selfdifferentiations of Narayaṇa as Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha in the Pāñcarātra system. *Manas*, *vāk* and *prāṇa* correspond to the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* of prakṛti (matter) These three, *manomaya*, *vāṅmaya* and *praṇamaya* become the presiding principles of mind, sound and breath in all creatures. These are the instruments *(karaṇas)* of both the freed souls and Īs'vara himself according to the three kinds of activities that they perform. Because of this, these are the *devas*[1] who are the modes *(prakaras)* of the freed souls and Īs'vara.

Prāṇamaya is the *antaryāmin*-function of Īs'vara in relation to the souls and matter. Because of this, Īs'vara, along with the other categories and their respective *devatas*, becomes the agent *(kartā)*. The *manomaya* of the Īs'vara residing in the sentient soul *(puruṣa)* who is the outer agent, is also the impellor *(kārayitā)*. The *vāṇmaya*-aspect or function of Īs'vara is the cause of all process in all creatures *(pariṇāmayitā)*.

The Puruṣa-category (*cit*) is the second portion of Brahman. Puruṣa is One and He has the power of being the enjoyer *(bhoktā)*. From this one soul-category issue many emanations or fulgurations which are individual souls, monadic in size, eternal, and infinite in number. These get established in material bodies. These emanations or fulgurations are of two kinds, *baddhas* and *siddhas*. *Siddhas* are the perfected or attained souls. These again are of two kinds, namely, *ājana-siddha* and *yogasiddha* The former are eternal instruments or servants of Īs'vara, the latter are those who possess the eight attainments such as *aṇimā*, *laghimā*, *garimā* etc., that arise from the practice of direct contemplation of Brahman. *Baddhas* (bond-souls) suffer from three kinds of bondages: (1) bondages due to identification with their bodies and thus with the categories of matter and desire for them *(prakṛti-bandhana)*, (2) desire for the pleasures of the senses such as sound, taste

1. The senses are called *devas* in the *Upaniṣads*.

etc., leads to the second kind of bondage *(vaikārika-bandha)*, and (3) the third bondage arises from activities, *(daksiṇa-bandha)*. These three prevent Brahman from manifesting its attributes in the soul. Thus, we find that only some of Brahman's qualities such as self-luminosity get manifested generally in the soul-category unlike as in the case of Īs'vara, in whom all the qualities get manifested. Other attributes get veiled or hidden. Even, here, we find that there is a possibility of the individual soul manifesting the *Brahma-guṇas* when it gets rid of the veils or bondages of the body, senses and activity and contemplates on Brahman or the Īs'vara. The freed souls are those in whom the seven attributes of Brahman manifest themselves. The freed soul can either be separate or united with Īs'vara as it desires or wills. Realisation consists in identifying oneself with Īs'vara or Brahman so as to be able to manifest the attributes of Īs'vara or Brahman in Itself. The eternity of the individual does not get lost, nor its personality annulled ; but it becomes more and more capable of revealing Brahman within itself. Thus, there is realisation of *bhedabheda* (consciousness of identity in difference). The souls may be considered to be many and eternal, but they are all one in their collective aspect.

Prakṛti is the inconscient portion of Brahman. It is of three kinds: *kāla*, *paramākas'a* and *avyakta*. *kala* (time) is divided into creative, sustentive and dissolutive periods. *Paramakās'a* is the pure aether or space, not identifiable with the *akās'a* that is a category under the *avayakta* (matter). It, in conjunction with Īs'vara, manifests three radiances, namely, *jñana-prabha*, *ānanda-prabhā* and *kriyā-prabhā*. *Paramakāsá* is also known as *vāk* and *akṣara* (imperishable). *Ananda-prabhā* grants sense-delight to the soul in respect of the objects. *Kriya-prabhā* is breath (*prāṇa*). A mixture or combination of these three *prabhās* is called *para-prakṛti*, which is the higher or unmanifest matter, the source of the lower matter. Thus, *paramākāsa*, in cojunction with Īśvara, forms the *para-prakṛti*. *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* form the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti* as *manomaya*, *vāṅmaya* and *prāṇamaya* functions of Īs'vara sustain these *guṇas*. In actual order of creation it is sometimes seen that *tamas* originates first and then the others, though it is, logically to be considered that out of *sattva rajas* comes into being, and out of *rajas tamas* comes into being. From these the other categories proceed to manifest themselves.

It could be seen from the above summary of the teachings of this school of *bhedābheda*, that the *bheda*-aspect is real and *svābhāvika*, being grounded in the nature of Brahman Itself and not, as in the *bhedābheda* of Bhāskara, *aupādhika* or accidental and due to external limitations. The differetiates of one category are not capable of passing into the differentiates of the other categories. Thus, the *cit*-category, though it does co-exist with *acit* and Īs'vara categories, continues to evolve within itself so as to remove

the veils or bondages that only bind it and do not determine its being as finite, conscient nature (*cit-sthiti*). And, the removal of the bondages does not entail its becoming either Brahman or Īs'vara. What it does attain is the *siddha*-hood of being either the pure instrument of Īs'vara, manifesting more and more through its translucency being the powers and plenitude of Brahman through the Will of Īs'vara, or else, of being a locus of perfect manifestation of the *siddhis* that accrue through the realization of the unity with Brahman directly as the ground and source of its own differentiation. Brahman is realised as the One ground of all phenomenal manifestation (or the triple manifestation), as the One in the many, and this experience of Oneness with Brahman in one's own being, links up the individual, that is distinct from It, with the other forms of manifestations of Brahman in its Īs'vara and Prakṛti aspects. The realisation consists in perceiving together the difference and oneness as One or as Unity. The Divine is one and many, one and triple; and it is the business of *cit*, finitised or monadic to recover the consciousness of its Oneness with Brahman directly or through the higher category, namely, Īs'vara. Thus, Reality or Brahman is dynamic, and its apparent staticism as Ground of all is not contradictory to its dynamic being or manifestation.

The first criticism, levelled against this school[1], is, that it does not explain the fact as to how the parts of a homogeneous substance will fail to share the qualities of the whole. For, not only Īs'vara but cit and *acit* will have to manifest to the full the attributes of the substance. Secondly, the conception of indentity and difference, characterising a thing simultaneously, is impossible, because, though it is correct to affirm that A could be 'identical with B' and 'different from C' at the same time, it cannot also be stated that A is both identical with, and different from B at the same time. Contradictory attributes cannot characterise or qualify the same object. The third criticism is that if it be held that identity and difference is on a par with the relation between universal and particular (*jati* and *vyakti*), the relationship between *cit* and Brahman, *cit* and *acit*, *cit* and Īs'vara, and *acit* and Īs'vara are not of this kind. The relationships are of part and whole, or between part and part. Fourthly, the view that Divine Omnipotence can explain the divisibility of spiritual substance so as to yield the Īs'vara, soul and inconscient matter, which are of different kinds and are stated to be eternal, must either accept the involutionary process of gradual projection or emanation which is followed by gradual grossening and apparent self-veiling of Brahman-consciousness (luminosity) by means of its own consciousness-force or will (*māyā*) or else it must uphold this view in an arbitrary manner. The theory of degradation of consciousness of luminosity so as to appear inconscient may not be impossible to an

1. Of course, the main points of the orthodox schools against this view are based on theological and textual criticism.

omnipotent power as a delightful play, though it is an extraordinary conception because luminosity is liberation ; and none, so far as we know, seeks bondage. But there is just the possibility that Brahman may seek to manifest Its supreme fullness in and through Its own most inconscient formation. If this view be accepted, it must be possible for *acit* to evolve into *cit*, and *cit* to evolve into Īs'vara, and that would entail the non-eternity of these three partitions. But, if the partitioning of the seamless Brahman is merely a case of general creation of permanent or eternal planes of possibility of manifestation, then Īs'vara, cit and acit become planes of Experience.

In this system the evolution or involution, by means of the omnipotence of Brahman or Its *māyā* or *upādhis*, is not postulated[1]. Accordingly, any kind of progressive spiral evolution or ascent of Being from the inconscient is impossible[2]. Realisation, according to this school, consists in apprehending the Oneness of Brahman beyond or above all the many and in and through every one and the multiple. The abstraction of identity as well as the abstraction of difference, from the concrete identity-in-difference of experience, due to the preoccupation of the theoretical interest or the pragmatic claims, are extremes (*anta*-s) which must be reconciled in the experience of identity or eternal Oneness in manyness and eternal manyness in Oneness. The practical statement of the system leans towards emphasizing the differences as aspects of Oneness, and the *sādhana*-aspect or the *nisus* of freedom emphasizes the fact that differences must grow in the consciousness of oneness which is their truth and being and source—a consciousness that many are to recover their pristine purity of manifestation of the attributes of divine luminosity in and through their monadic structure (*aṇutva*). But it was realised by Yādavaprakāśa that the eternal reality of the three categories of Īs'vara, souls and Nature could not be considered to be such as to be a static process, and it is only by a dynamic synthesis of these three that reality could be granted a real status. Such a conception was the organistic thesis of S'rī Rāmānuja, who shewed that in the concept of organism, Īs'vara, soul and body fall into a pattern of unity. Īs'vara becomes the self (*antaryāmin*) of the souls as well as of the Nature. Both form His body and exist for Him and His delight. God is the *sarvaśarīrin*. Once this is perceived, then the whole being and its manifestations become sacramental in character ; the Divine universe

1. Cf. *Philosophy of Bhedabheda*, p. 171 '*Acit* is the object which can develop into the subject'—thus writes Prof. P. N. S'rīnivāsācārya. But this seems to be unsupported by the texts.

2. Cf. *Life Divine*, wherein its author S'rī Aurobindo, develops a *bhedabheda* view, that is truly dynamic, and escapes from the limitations of Yādavaprakās'a.

results. This is the reason why it appears that Yādavaprakāśa accepted the philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja as the logical sequence of his own. The perfect realisation of the individual (his true *siddha*-hood) lies in becoming a perfect instrument of God, Īśvara, and in being free from his earlier limitations and bondages due to ignorance arising from identification with the lower form or plane of being.

An Aspect of Upaniṣadic Ātman And Buddhist 'Ānatta'.

By

O. H. DE A. WIJESEKERA, *Colombo.*

The doctrine of *Ātman* along with that of Brahman constitutes the most important topic of Upaniṣadic philosophy, and, in view of the fact that Buddhism, as recorded in the earliest Pāli Nikāyas[1], is generally held to refute the doctrine by its *anatta-vāda* or the theory of 'soul-lessness', the problem posed here may appear to be of such magnitude that its solution within the scope of this discussion must be considered utterly impossible. The aim of the writer, however, is the much more modest one of attempting to outline the principal macrocosmic connotations of the term *Ātman* as found in the early Upaniṣadic texts[2], and to discover the attitude of Early Buddhism towards these several implications. Thus it is not intended even to discuss the microcosmic applications of the term as occurring in the Upaniṣads, for that would involve a much longer discussion than is permissible here. It may, however, be conceded that the ultimate solution[3] of this vast problem as envisaged by the concepts of *Ātman* and *Anatta*, must necessarily depend on the clear ascertainment of the several meanings of these terms and their historical relationship to be gleaned from a comparative study of the two literatures.

That in the early Upaniṣadic texts the term *Ātman* is used in several distinct senses such as the metaphysical, psychological, biological, physical and so on, becomes increasingly clear to careful students of these texts, and most of the evident discrepancies in their interpretation can be directly traced to the lack of appreciation of this important fact. It is well known that the Upaniṣads, in their main doctrines, presuppose a fairly long development of thought, and, thus it is not surprising to find that concepts like the *Ātman* are already found even in the *Ṛgveda* in a somewhat developed form[4]. The word occurs several times in the

1. Such texts as *Dīgha-nikāya* (DN.) and *Majjhima-nikāya* (MN.), the *Sutta-nipata,* (SN.), *Udāna* etc.

2. Only those that are regarded as 'pre-Buddhistic' are discussed here. See Belvalkar and Ranade : *History of Indian Philosophy,* Vol. II., pp. 135. ff.

3. I intend to deal with the whole problem in a book on *Ātman and Anatta* to be the published shortly.

4. See Keith : *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda,* pp. 450 etc.; also Narahari : *Ātman in pre-Upaniṣadic Vedic Literature,* pp. 43 etc. The latter's attempt to see too much of the Upaniṣadic philosophy in the *Ṛgveda* on the plea of unbroken continuity of the Vedic tradition is, however, difficult to commend. Cf. the form '*Tman*' also, as discussed by them.

Ṛgveda, and generally denotes an immaterial principle ascribed to various phenomena of nature and living beings, if the purely physical and grammatical uses be left aside. That in most philosophical contexts it denotes some aspect of what is popularly understood by the word 'soul' cannot be seriously doubted[1]. Whatever the original meaning of the term might have been[2], it is clear that in the Ṛgveda it is primarily used in the sense of 'breath' (e. g. at X. 16. 3)[3] held to be the *life-principle* in man and beast, along with an appreciation of the fact that Wind (Vāta, Vāyu) is its macrocosmic parallel.

Thus it is interesting to observe that, even in the earliest parts of the Ṛgveda[4], the word (*Ātman*) had already acquired the sense of 'self' or 'soul', whether signifying the 'breath' or the vital spirit as the life-principle in living creatures or denoting, in a metaphysical sense, the 'intrinsic nature' *(svarūpa)* or the 'essence' *(sāra)* of persons and things, as interpreted by Sāyaṇa in some contexts[5]. Furthermore, it is clear that macrocosmic considerations—no doubt the result of the incipient and perhaps unconscious feeling for *bandhuta* or the tendency to correlate the microcosm with the macrocosm[6]—had already begun to influence the development of the notion of '*Ātman*'. Thus in one place in the Ṛgveda the Sun is described as the 'Soul' *(Ātmā)* of that which stands and moves, that is to say, of all existence (I. 115. 1); similar macrocosmic associations are found for the term in reference to Parjanya (VII. 101. 6) and Soma (IX. 2. 10; 6. 8). But, as pointed out by Keith *(loc. cit)*, it is probably in the *Atharvaveda* that the macrocosmic sense proper of *Ātman* is clearly recognized, for there (X. 8. 43-44) the word is distinctly used to denote the macrocosmic Yakṣa (i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha)[7] which is no other than the Primeval Soul or empirical Brahman in its incipient stage. The latter idea is foreshadowed, however dimly, at Ṛgveda X. 168. 4 where reference is made to : 'the Soul of the deities, the germ of the universe' (*ātmā devānām bhuvanasya garbhaḥ*)'. In view of the embryonic analogy that is implied here, it is not unreasonable to interpret the concept of the

1. Whether the meanings given to it by Sāyaṇa such as '*svarūpa*', '*cetana*' '*dhārayitṛ*' are all admissible is extremely doubtful ; contrast, however, Narahari, *loc. cit.*

2. See Keith, *loc. cit.*, for a good summary of views ; also Narahari, *loc. cit.* and Belvalkar and Ranade, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

3. Grassmann in his *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda* (s. v.) takes 'breath' (Hauch) as its primary sense.

4. See Grassmann, *loc. cit*, for references from Maṇḍalas II-VIII and IX.

5. See Narahari, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

6. See my article on 'Vedic Gandharva and Pali Gandhabba' in the *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. III. No. 1, p. 77 (and fn. 48)

7. See my article on 'Vedic Yakṣa and Pali Yakkha' in the *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. I. No. 2, pp. 27-29.

Primeval Male (Man) as occurring in the famous Puruṣa-sūkta as the macrocosmic, anthropomorphic representation of the same *Ātman*.

Hence the important term evolves throughout the succeeding centuries into one of the most pregnant philosophical concepts, coming very early to be identified with the other important concept of Brahman which was gradually gaining the position of the 'World-ground'[1]. This identification is, at least partly, but consciously, made for the first time in the *Taittirīya—Brāhmaṇa* (III. 12. 9) where the further idea is expressed that the self of man is the sure key to the knowledge of this 'World-ground' (*Ātman* = Brahman), a belief from which it may be inferred that already the individual self was coming to be regarded as an aspect of, if not identical with, the Universal *Ātman*. As it has been pointed out by Keith (*loc cit.*), this passage and the parallels at *Pañcaviṃs'a-Brāhmaṇa* XXV. 18. 5, *S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa* X. 6. 3, *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* III. 2. 1 etc. are clearly transitional to the period of the early Upaniṣadic texts, where the term *Ātman* is seen to develop its most weighty connotations and is also subjected to considerable analysis.

The earliest Upaniṣadic texts, however, show very little change as compared with the pre-Upaniṣadic literature in the evolution of the concept. In the majority of contexts the term seems to imply nothing very different from the idea of 'World-Soul' as adumbrated in the *Atharva-veda*. Thus the *Aitareya-Upaniṣad* (1. 1. 1), speaking of the primeval *Ātman* as the prime cause of all existence, says: 'In the beginning, verily, this (universe) was *Ātman*, one only—no other winking thing whatever. He bethought himself: 'Let me now create the worlds'. He created these worlds.' An equally old passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* (1. 4. 1. 17) identifies this *Ātman* with the (cosmic) Person who is no other than the mythical Giant whose immolation is said to have brought about the production of all existents in the already cited Puruṣa-sukta. It is significant that the *Ait-Up.* in one passage (I. 3. 13-14) cryptically designates this same *Ātman* by the mythical name 'Indra' (*idaṃ-dra*), and, at another place, clearly refers to the intelligential aspect of the *Ātman*, i. e. the Prajñātman, with such mythical terms as 'Indra', 'Prajāpati' and 'Brahma' (V. 3). These mythical associations persist even in more developed texts: for instance, the *Kauṣītaki-Up.* (III. 8) identifies the cosmic *Ātman* in its intelligential aspect with Prāṇa regarded as 'World-ruler' and the 'Lord' (*īśa*) of all things.

It is necessary to bear in mind for the purpose of this discussion that the above mentioned *theistic* (*īśa*, *īśāna*,*īśvara*) sense of *Ātman* is emphatically asserted in several passages. Thus *Bṛh-Up.* (II. 5. 15) calls this *Ātman* 'the overlord (*adhipati*) of all things, the king (*rājā*) of all

1. See Hume · *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads* (Trans.), pp. 13 ff.

things, who holds together all world, all gods, all living beings and selves...'. The same Upaniṣad describes Him as the 'Lord (*īs'āna)* of what has been and what is to be, the *Ātman* (who is) clearly God (*deva*)...' (IV. 4. 15; cp. 22; V. 6. 1; VI. 3. 5). Thus He is all-perceiving (*sarvānubhū*) Puruṣa (*Bṛh-Up*. II. 5. 18-19). He is also the Maker (*kartā*) of everything and is consequently given the appellation *vis'vakṛt* or Cosmic Creator (*ibid*., IV. 4. 13). The conception is seen in a more developed form when the *Kau. -Up*. (IV. 19) regards Him as 'the Maker (*kartā*) of all *puruṣas*'. *Bṛh-Up*. (IV. 4. 24) points to a still more advanced idea in characterizing the *Ātman* as 'the eater of food (*annāda*)', that is to say, the Enjoyer (*bhoktā*). It must be added, however, that this *theistic* sense is not found entirely free from pantheistic associations which too seem to emerge concurrently.

Thus a very early passage of the *Bṛh-Up*.(I. 6. 1-3) represents the entire, actual (*satya*) world as a three-fold (*nāma*, *rūpa karma*) appearance of the unitary, immortal Soul (*Ātman*). He is found in all beings (*Is'ā-Up*.6-7). One should worship the World (*loka*) as the *Ātman* (*Bṛh-Up*. I. 4. 15; cp. 16, 17; IV, 4. 22), and recognize (*dṛs'*) this World (*loka*), the *Ātman*, as his own (*sva*). Thus this whole Universe (*idaṃ sarvam*) is the *Ātman* (*Bṛh-Up*. II. 4. 6; IV. 5. 7; *Chānd-Up*. VII. 25. 2), the ontological *prius* of everything (*ātmata evedaṃ sarvam*, *Chānd.-Up*. VII. 26. 1). *Ātman* pervades the whole Universe and is, therefore, the immanent Soul of the World (*sarvāntaraḥ*, *Bṛh-Up*. III. 4. 1 ; *antaryāmi* III. 7. 3). In a section of the *Bṛh-Up*. II 5) the statement is made fourteen times that 'He, indeed, is just this Soul (*Ātman*), this Immortal, this Brahma, this All', being applied to such categories as the elements, the Sun, Moon etc. Pantheism, in fact, could go no further, but, however high it soared, the Highest Reality was still Soul or *Ātman*. The Upaniṣadic conception of the Absolute as expressed by the neuter Brahman could never dissociate itself from this all-embracing notion of the *Ātman*. No doubt the two principles are identified: *the Ātman* is *the Brahman* *Bṛh-Up*. II. 5. 19; IV. 4. 5). In fact, the *Bṛh-Up*. itself asserts that 'Apart from the *Ātman*, there is no Brahman' (II. 4. 6, *et. seq*.), and the *Chānd-Up*. goes to the very limit of this identification and declares: 'That is Brahman, that is Immortality (*amṛtam*)[1], that is the *Ātman*', in a passage extolling Ākās'a as the Highest Principle (VIII. 14). The Universal Soul (Vais'vānara Ātman) is said to have been identified by various philosophers with various categories like Heaven, Sun, Wind etc. (*Chānd-Up*. V. 11-18), and is pantheistically conceived as a thread (*sūtra*) running through the whole Cosmos (*Bṛh-Up*. III. 7. 23; cp. IV. 2).

1. From the time of the *Ṛgveda* the term *amṛtam* was used for the highest ideal; Buddhist '*amatam*' also denotes the same.

In the identification of the Ātman with Immortality (*amṛtam*), an important fact emerges in the development of this concept, viz. its approximation to the notion of the Absolute. This is significant inasmuch as the same epithet (Pāli *amataṃ*) is applied to the Absolute in early Buddhism. In the Upaniṣads the idealization of the Ātman concept can be inferred from several passages of great importance implying its perfection, timelessness etc. The Ātman is called the Great (*mahān*), Unborn (*aja*) in the *Bṛh.-Up.* several times (IV. 4. 20, 22, 24, 25) and in the first context is clearly characterized as constant (*dhruva*). It is also ageless (*vijara*) and deathless (*vimṛtyu*), among other things (*Chānd-Up.* VIII. 7. 1-13; cp. VIII. 1. 5). Again, it is Imperishable (*avināśi*) and of indestructible quality (*anucchittidharmā*)—epithets which idealize it unmistakably (*Bṛh-Up.* IV. 5. 14). In fact, it is clearly asserted in the *Chānd-Up.* (VIII. 5. 3) that 'the Ātman does not perish (*na naśyati*)'. But it must not be forgotten that even in such idealistic sections as those ascribed to Yājñavalkya the self-same pantheistic and absolutist Ātman is referred to in crudely myhtical and theistic terms as 'Īśvara' and Puruṣa' (e.g. IV. 4. 22; III. 9. 26).

That Early Buddhism as found in the Pāli Nikāyas directly refutes all *theistic* conceptions of a cosmic Soul (Ātman) as prime cause, agent, creator, or enjoyer of the universe is seen from several authentic passages. The idea of an Iśvara (*issaro*) as Maker (*kattā*) or Creator (*nimmātā*) is clearly denounced as a fallacy (*Dīgha-nikāya* ⌊DN.⌋, I. 18; *Majjhima-nikāya* ⌊MN.⌋ I. 327), and the cosmos (*loko*) is said to be '*anissara*' or 'without any theistic agency' (MN. II. 68). It is certainly not the playful work (*kutta*)[1] of an Īśvara or Brahmā or any other God (DN. III. 28). Agency as such is here denied not only to the macrocosmic Ātman but even to the individually reflected *attā* or the microcosmic soul (MN. III. 19). Thus it is clear that for Early Buddhism there is neither a capricious or interfering God as the creator and sustainer of the universe, nor is there in reality any Ātman who may be described in the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan as 'an eternal self-sustaining spirit, the active mind of the universe'[2]. It is unnecessary to emphasize this *atheistic* nature of Early Buddhism which is evident to any careful student of the Nikāyas.

Not only is the *Atman* in any *theistic* sense clearly denied in the Nikāyas, but even its *pantheistic* implications, as seen in the Upaniṣads, are consistently refuted. It is plainly declared (MN. II. 68) that the cosmos or the world (*loko*) is totally lacking (*ūna*) in any metaphysical substance

1. See *P. T. T. Pali Eng. Dict.* (s. v.) where it is correctly pointed out that the word *kutta* in *'Issara-kutta'* and *'Brahma-kutta'* implies the Divine play, the term being used in Pali very much like 'līlā', a word sometimes found synonymous with *kutta* (q. v.)

2. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol, I. p. 460, where he argues for the existence of such a Spirit according to Buddhism.

and that the world cannot be held to be permanent (*dhuva*, cp. *dhruva*), thus making it impossible to regard it as one's own (*saka*, contrast *sva* above), or as a haven of security (*tāṇa*, cp. *Chānd.-Up.* VIII. 5. 2 '*sata ātmanas trāṇam vindati*). Pantheism in the sense that everything (*sabba*), or this All (*sarvam idam*), as the Upaniṣads put it, is identical with any essential Being as Ātman is attacked (MN. I. 329). The famous *skandha* analysis of the Early Nikāyas (e.g. DN. II. 297) refutes the notion of an Ātman both in the external world (*bahiddhā rūpa*) and in the individual (*ajjhattarūpa*, *vedanā*. *saññā*, *saṅkhara*, *viññāna*), asserting that there is no *attā* in the eye, ear etc. (DN. I. 29; MN. III. 282) in direct contradiction of the Upaniṣadic notion of the Unseen Seer, the Unheard Hearer, etc., the Ātman residing in the individual as ultimate agent of all actions, perceptions etc. (*Bṛh-Up.* III. 7. 15-23). In both philosophies, the concept of the empirical world is denoted by the term '*idam*', but while the Upaniṣads declare its *fulness* (*pūrṇam idam*) the Early Nikāyas characterize it as *void* (*suñña*). Thus MN. says in more than one place: 'This is *void* of a Soul or anything derived from a Soul (*suññam idam attena vā attaniyena va*, I. 297; II. 263)', and objects to the identification of the microcosm with the Soul or its derivative (*na hi no etam attā vā attaniyam vā*, I. 141). It is indeed a fallacy to identify the cosmos with any Ātman (*so loko so atta*, MN. I. 135, 138; II. 338; III. 265, 271), and to view[1] the external world of matter (or the personality) in terms of the Ātman (*attato samanupassanā*) or to so characterize it (MN. I. 300; III. 18; *Udāna* 32, *attato vadati*). The contemplation of this 'voidness' is recommended as one of the best meditations (MN. III. 294, *suññatāvihāra*), and the ethical superiority of this attitude to the worship (*upāsanā*) of the pantheistic Ātman (Brahman) as inculcated in the Upaniṣads (*Bṛh-Up.* I. 4. 15-17) is clearly brought out in the famous philosophical text of the *Sutta nipāta* (SN). A young Brāhmaṇa named Mogharāja asks the Buddha what his view (*diṭṭhi*) is with regard to the nature of the World and when viewed in what way it leads to Immortality. Buddha replies:

> '*Suññato lokam avekkhassu Mogharāja sadā sato,*
> *Attānudiṭṭhim ūhacca, evaṃ Maccutaro siyā* ... ' (1117, 1119).

'O Mogharāja, always mindful and self-possessed, view this world as *void*, having eradicated the notion of an Ātman (underlying it); thus would one reach Immortality (*lit.* cross over death)'. The previous citations from MN. should dispel any doubts regarding the interpretation

1. This *viewing* is the same as the *recognizing* (*sañjanana*) of the Ātman in terms of or by the individual self (⌊*attana*⌋ MN. I. 18; SN. 477). Just as in Pali *samanupassati* (*attato*) so in the Upaniṣadic use of the verb *paśyati* for this viewing (Bṛh.Up. VI. 4. 15, 23) with the prefix '*anu*' one may see the same tradition. Cp. *manye* (Bṛh-Up. IV. 4. 17) with the philosophical use of *maññati* (e. g. First Sutta of MN.) in contexts objecting to such viewing of the world as *atta*.

of the term *'atta-'* here, which, as the old commentary Niddesa points out, must refer to the macrocosmic *Ātman* as held in Brahmanic philosophy and its several manifestations or derivatives (*attaniyena vā*). It is in view of this radical *anti-pantheism* that Early Buddhism regards as futile all such questions as whether the World (*loka*) is finite (*antavā*) or infinite (*ananto*) DN. I. 22, 23; MN. II. 228-233). Furthermore, in view of the absolutist tendencies of the *Ātman* as seen in some Upaniṣadic texts, it is of great significance to observe that the state of Brahmā or the highest Reality (*idam*) definitely declared to be neither permanent (*niccam*, contrast *Bṛh-Up.* IV. 4. 23), nor constant (*dhuvam*, i. e. *dhruvam*), nor eternal (*sassatam*, contrast *anucchittidharmā*, *Bṛh-Up.* IV. 5. 14, i. e., 'having no *uccheda* or annihilation', the very word that is used in the Nikāyas in opposition to *sassata*), nor absolute (*kevalam*, contrast *S'vet-Up.* VI. 11)—epithets which are generally applied to the Soul as the Absolute—(MN. I, 326). Apart from any notion of pantheism, Buddhism regards all empirical existence as being impermanent (*anicca*), and sorrowful (*dukkha* contrast *ānanda*, *Bṛh-Up.* III. 9. 28; *Tait-Up.* II. 4. 1), and hence *anatta* or void of any *Ātman* (DN. III. 243). That the real meaning of the epithet *'anatta'* here is that the whole cosmos and the individual are in a costant process of *change* is seen from the parallel characterization of everything as *anicca*, *dukkha* and *vipariṇāmadhamma* (MN. III. 217, 271, 278); and *change* is clearly denied for the *Ātman* (Brahman) in the Upaniṣads by such epithets as *avināśi* and *dhruva*. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the earliest portions of the Buddhist canon refuted the reality of a World-Soul or macrocosmic *Ātman* or of a World-Ground or empirical Brahman in the most unequivocal terms. These two aspects of the Cosmic Self are, of course, identical according to the Upaniṣads (*ayam ātmā brahma* ... *Bṛh-Up.* II. 5. 19) and the denial or the assertion of the one must necessarily imply the denial or the assertion of the other. To regard the *Ātman* (Brahman) as *eternal* (*sassata*) was condemned as a false view (*asassata-diṭṭhi*), as false as the opposite view of annihilation (*uccheda*) and this criticism is developed in full in the first sutta of DN. It is this *śāsvata-vada* that is attacked by the words *'atta nicco dhuvo sassato aviparināmadhammo* (DN.I. 21)' and *'sassatam attānam paññāpenti* (*ibid.* 13)' ocurring in that sutta.

The above discussion shows that the Early Buddhist Nikāyas are quite outspoken on the question of an *Ātman* conceived either theistically or pantheistically, that is to say, as Creator or Immanent Soul. There is no question of 'silence'[1] on these issues. Nor is the Buddha reported to have maintained any silence on the question of a *transcendental* (as opposed to pantheistic, immanent) Absolute. The Udāna makes it very clear that

1. See Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, pp. 676 etc.

Buddha was positive on the reality of a transcendental state which is describable as unborn (*ajāta*), un-become (*abhūta*), unmade (*akata*) and uncompounded (*asaṅkhata* Ud. VIII. 3. 10). Thus a transcendental Brahman (neuter) seems to have had no antagonism to the Buddhist view of ultimate Reality and thus Buddha calls himself '*Brahma-bhūta*' i.e. 'one who has become Brahman' (SN. 561). As it was mentioned at the beginning, this paper has not touched upon the problem of individual personality ; and as I have shown elsewhere[1], Buddha's 'silence' was actually concerned with that complex issue.

1. See my Article on 'The Buddha and Metaphysics' in *The Ceylon Daily News*, Vesak Number, 1941.

The Historical Basis of Saivism

By
YADU VANSHI, *New Delhi.*

A study of S'aivism is a study of Indian civilisation. More than any other faith in the world, perhaps, it reflects the thought and culture of the people among whom it arose. Its growth depicts the growth of Indian civilisation, and its roots are buried as deeply and widely in the soil of the country as those of the culture of its people. For the proper understanding of S'aivism, therefore, a proper study of the civilisation of India, particularly in its earlier phases, is a *sina que non*; and in the light of such a study several aspects of this exceedingly intricate complex of religious and philosophic thought, ritual and mythology, which had for long puzzled devotee and scholar alike, become clear and fall into their proper places.

It is a well established fact now that the classical civilisation of India arose as a result of the fusion of several different races and peoples, each with its own distinctive culture, systems of thought, and religious beliefs and practices. The struggle for supremacy among these different races went on for a long time. It is seen to have been going on in the time of the *Ṛgveda*, and probably began much earlier. In this struggle the Aryan race, no doubt, came out on top, but the peoples it subjugated did not completely go under. On the other hand, they influenced the culture of the Aryans in many ways; and in the evolution of the final pattern of the civilisation of India, their share is not inconsiderable. The advance of the Aryans, from the plains of the Panjab over the whole of India, was not so much a matter of political or racial extermination as a gradual process of assimilation, in which there was a considerable amount of give and take on both sides. This process of assimilation or absorption of the conquered by the conquerors, appears to have been the general rule in the ancient world, and numerous examples of it can be cited from practically all countries of the ancient civilised world.

Now, the belief in a divine agency, guiding and controlling the actions of men, was very strong among the ancient peoples. The victors attributed their success to power of the god they worshipped. The vanquished also saw and believed this, and perforce their gods had to pay homage to the superior deity of the victors. But, as the fusion between the two progressed, the contradiction between the old belief and new practice was removed by merging the identity of the gods of the vanquished into those of victors. Such identification not only marked the cultural unification of the two peoples, but also reconciled the vanquished to their

new position. In all ancient mythologies, we constantly come across such examples of identifications and assimilations, and the case of India is no different. Our knowledge of the non-Aryan peoples of India is still very fragmentary ; yet what little we do know about them has compelled us to revise our ideas considerably regarding the origin and development of Indian culture, and the growth of Indian religious thought and practice cannot be understood unless viewed in the light of the culture of these non-Aryan peoples of India. The S'aiva faith is a very good illustration of this truth.

The origin of the S'aiva faith is rightly traced to the worship of the god Rudra in Ṛgvedic times. Yet from the Rudra of the *Ṛgveda* to the S'iva of post-Vedic S'aivism is a very far cry indeed, and the numerous efforts so far made to explain the vast changes that took place in the cult during the intervening period as developments of the Vedic religion only, have all failed to account for them satisfactorily. But all of them are completely and satisfactorily explained if we bear in mind the probable influence of other non-Aryan cultures upon the Vedic culture ; and also remember that in the course of the fusion of the cultures, the process of assimilation referred to above was as much at work in India, as elsewhere in the ancient civilised world.

Rudra in the older portions of the *Ṛgveda* appears as a personification of lightning issuing from a dark cloud and accompanied by peals of thunder and showers of rain. This, probably, accounts for his name and also, for such epithets of his as *kapardin* 'having dusky matted hair'. It also explains why the colour of Rudra is said to have been red, tawny or white. The same personification also accounts for his dual character which is apparent from the beginning. He was at once a dreaded deity, because his darts (i. e. flashes of lightning) destroyed men and beasts ; and was, also, a gentle and benevolent god bestowing upon mankind the life-giving rain and prayed to for fertility of animals and crops. This last characteristic made him a kind of a popular fertility-deity worshipped predominently by the generality of the people, the farmers and the herdsmen, who stood to gain or lose most by his benevolence or malevolence. The hymns of the *Atharvaveda* make this still clearer, for, in them, he is found to be associated with popular superstition besides possessing his old characteristics, and is invoked against goblings and other evil spirits, while the aid of charms and herbs was sought to ward off his own death-and disease-inflicting darts.

But, in one late hymn of the *Ṛgveda*, Rudra is associated with some mysterious beings called the Kes'ins, while the latter themselve are in the same hymn associated with the 'Munis'. As the word 'muni' is of non-Indo-

European stock, and in the Ṛgveda has the same meaning as in the Kanarese language *viz.* 'one excited, inspired or maddened', it can safely be inferred that the word was borrowed in the Vedic language from the language of one of the non-Aryan peoples with whom the Aryans had come into contact. The Kesins too were perhaps some non-Aryan people, because in the *Kāṭhaka-Saṃhitā* of the *Yajurveda* they appear as a tribe, and one Keśin Dālbhya is even mentioned by name (XXX.2) Now these Keśins, when inspired, are described as merging their essential selves in the wind—just as the Munis did—so that only their outward corporeal forms are visible to mere mortals. All this is strangely reminiscent of the later Yogic samādhi and of the conception of the *sūkṣma* as opposed to the *sthūla* body of man, and is quite foreign to the spirit of the Vedic religion. Here, therefore, is a very early example of the influence of some non-Vedic culture upon the Aryan culture of that time ; and in Rudra's association with the *muni*-like Keśins, we may discern the germs of the later special association of Śiva with Yoga and of his conception as a *mahāyogin*. We shall have occasion to treat this point a little more in detail later on.

In the *Yajurveda* we come upon even more startling changes in Rudra's character, which can never be explained as normal developments of his character as seen in the other *Saṃhitas*. In the Tryambaka-homa ceremonial he appears as *kṛttivāsāḥ* 'skin clad', has a rat for his vehicle, is associated with a female deity, Ambikā, described as his sister, and at the end of the ceremony is requested to depart beyond the Mujavat mountain[1]. Nowhere in the other *Saṃhitas* is there even the slightest suggestion that the Vedic Rudra ever had any or all of these characteristics, and the conclusion is forced upon us that, during the intervening period, Rudra had assimilated to himself a deity worshipped by some people inhabiting the lower regions of the Himalayas who worshipped a deity possessing the the above-mentioned characteristics. The assumption is strengthened by the fact that that Tryambaka-homa was a special ritual which was outside regular ritual of the *Yajurveda*. On the basis of this assumption, the later association of S'iva with Himalayan mountains and with the Kirātas—the skin-clad denizens of the lower Himalayan slopes—as seen in the *Mahābhārata*, can be easily and satisfactorily explained.

That Rudra had in fact assimilated some deity or deities worshipped by the indigenous tribes, who had by this time been taken into the Aryan fold, is shown, also, by the evidence of the *S'atarudriya*, a hymn of 66 verses (*Yajurveda* XVI), which may be called a sort of an apotheosis of Rudra in the Vedic times. For, in addition to enumerating all the old characteristics of the Vedic Rudra, this hymn also associates him with the mountains, calling him *giritra*, *giris'a* and *giricara* ; and includes among his so-called

1. YV. III, 57.63 ; TS , 8, 6; MS. I, 10, 20.

hosts, *niṣadas*, *punjiṣṭhas*, keepers of dogs, hunters, carpenters and chariot-makers—all or most of whom were evidently indigenous peoples, the identity of whose old deities had been merged in that of Rudra.

The reason why Rudra alone, out of the numerous pantheon of the old Vedic gods, thus assimilated other deities into himself, is, also, not far to seek. It has been noticed above that Rudra was originally a fertility-deity of the common people, and this character of his emphasised more and more as we pass to from the hymns of the *Ṛgveda* to those of the *Atharva-* and the *Yajur Vedas*. He was, thus, so to speak, from the very beginning, rather outside the holy circle of the Vedic gods round whom the Vedic priests early started to build up an elaborate sacrificial ritual. His sanctity was consequently not as jealously guarded by the priests as that of the other gods. As the Aryans advanced and brought the non-Aryan peoples under the pale of their culture—the common people of both the races naturally coming into the closest contact with one another—it was the popular god Rudra into whom the identities of the gods of the vanquished peoples were merged. The fact that these deities were, most probably, fertility-deities like Rudra himself was, perhaps, another very important reason why it was Rudra only who thus remained, so to speak, in the van of Aryan advance, and with his unlimited capacity for absorption assimilated everything foreign into him. It is this historical fact, which, perhaps, gives the right clue to the mythological legends of later times, wherein, practically every major combat with the demons, the gods could only be successful when led or aided by S'iva.

Though many non-Aryan peoples were incorporated into the Aryan fold in the manner described above, yet it seems that quite a few of the old rites and customs of these peoples continued to flourish even after such an incorporation, presumably because in those times the Aryans had not the means whereby to enforce among the subjugated peoples a radical change in their ways of life. It is these rites and customs—which persisted even after the god, with whom they were connected, was supposed to be Rudra—which are responsible for the development of the multifarious aspects of S'iva's character and the great wealth of myths which grew out of them. The different facets—of the character of S'iva, later on as a bacchic reveller, as a *naṭaraja*, as a deity of death and destruction, and as a frequenter of the cremation grounds with a garland of skulls round his neck and a skull as his drinking vessel—are all to be explained in this way.

Much more striking, however, are two other features of S'aivism, a satisfactory explanation of the origin of which was not found till the archaeological discoveries of the past few decades brought to light the existence of a great civilisation in the valley of the Indus. These are the worship of S'iva in the *linga* form and his close association with S'*akti*

who, also, had a developed and an independent cult of her own. Neither of these can be traced to anything in the Vedic religion. The Vedic people had, no doubt, their own fertility rites (a glorified version of which is seen in the Aśvamedha sacrifice) ; but there is nothing to show that phallic emblems, as such, were ever worshipped by them. Nor is there any Female diety in the Vedic pantheon, who can be considered as the prototype of the later S'*akti*. For, none of them had either a cult of her own, or was, in any way, specially associated with Rudra, or was connected with fertility, as S'*akti* of late Saktism most certainly was. But in the Indus Valley we find that there was just such a goddess widely worshipped, who was most probably the same as the great Earth-goddess of the Sumerian peoples of Mesopotamia, and who, like the latter, was also associated with a less important male deity. Numerous phalli discovered at various sites also prove the prevalence of the phallic cult in this region which was, as in Asia Minor, connected with the worship of the goddess and her male consort.

Now, the date usually assigned to this civilisation, about 3,000 B. C., makes it contemporaneous with the older phases of the Ṛgvedic culture in the Panjab, while—mention in the *Ṛgveda* of numerous enemy forts and cities such as the Indus Valley people are known to have possessed, two references to the 'S'iśnadevāḥ (RV. VII. 21. 5, X. 99.3)' or phallic worshippers which the Indus Valley people are known to have been, and above all the occurrence of the Sumerian word *nana* in its original sense of mother in one *Ṛgveda* passage (X, 112, 3), are further indications that the two peoples had come into contact probably hostile. The final outcome of this contact was, there as elsewhere, the fusion of the two, and as a result of this the Indus Valley male god was identified with the Vedic Rudra with whom, as a fertility-deity, he had several things in common. This god, however, brought with him the worship of the *linga*, a practice which though abhorrent to the Aryans was probably tolerated by them because of the numerical strength of its original adherents. This is how *linga* worship became a part of the cult of the Rudra. But, in course of time, the custom was divested of its original significance ; and though the phallic emblem was retained, it was conventionalised beyond recognition ; and with the development of the philosophical side of S'aivism, the *S'ivaliṅga* was even invested with an esoteric significance as symbolising the *nirākāra* aspect of S'iva.

With the identification of the Indus Valley male god with Rudra, the worship of the Indus Valley goddess was, also, introduced into the Aryan religion, the introduction being probably facilitated by the identification of the goddess with the other associates of Rudra, Ambikā whose

name also means mother and who was, therefore, also, some kind of a mother goddess originally. This goddess was, henceforth, looked upon as the consort of Rudra. That this actually happened is proved by the fact that on some Kushan coins Rudra is associated with a female deity who is styled *NANA*, a name, which we have already noticed, was borne by the Indus Valley goddess. The original cult of this goddess being in this manner introduced into the Aryan religion was developed into S'āktism, and the goddess came to be worshipped both as a consort of S'iva and also by herself, as before, when she was looked upon as the Supreme Divinity.

This brief sketch of the historical basis of S'aivism will not be complete without a reference to another important feature of this creed—its philosophical development. It has been mentioned above, that Rudra had early come to be rather dissociated from the regular Vedic pantheon and the sacrificial ritualism, and his gradual assimilation of foreign deities and cults probably carried this dissociation further. But, it was this very fact, which made possible the later development of S'aivism as one of the leading creeds of Indian religion. With the development of the Vedic sacrificial ritual, as seen in the *Brāhmaṇa* literature, most of the old Vedic gods degenerated into more or less colourless entities at the beck and call of the priest armed with the all-powerful sacrificial *mantra*. But not so Rudra. He had steadily risen in importance with the increase in the numbers of his worshippers. In addition, his old association with the Kes'ins, as seen in the *Ṛgveda*, probably suggested that in some way he had come to be associated with the practices of these Kes'ins and *Munis*. When, therefore, some of the advanced thinkers, among the Vedic Aryans, realising the futility of the Brāhmaṇic sacrificial system as a means of spiritual advancement, strove to find a better means to this end ; and, thus, started a revolutionary movement in the world of Indian religion, probably impressed by the practices of these very *Munis* and Kes'ins which they imitated and improved upon—Rudra provided a bridge for passing from the old to the new, and became the symbol round which the new movement centred. Thus were laid the foundations of the philosophical evolution of S'aivism. The divine duality established by the association of Rudra with the Indus Valley goddess probably canalised this evolution, and thus arose the concepts of the philosophical *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* as expounded in the *Sāṅkhya* system and as first seen in the *S'vetās'vatara-Upaniṣad*. Rudra's identification with the philosophical *Puruṣa* here and his specific association with *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are both pointers to this. It was from these basic concepts that the philosophical systems of later *S'aivism*, *S'āktism*, the *S'aiva-siddhānta* of the South and the Kashmirian school of *Pratyabhijñā* were, in course of time, developed.

The Ethics of Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti

By

M. YAMUNACHARYA, *Mysore.*

A certain school of modern psychologists following Prof. Carl Jung distinguishes the types of human character into extroverts and introverts or the active and the contemplative types. The extrovert is said to usually exhibit a tendency to lose himself in external activity of one kind or another whilst the introvert shows an inclination to retire into himself as much as the business of life would allow him to do. These tendencies have normal as well as abnormal manifestations. Here we are concerned with the normal types. No man, however, is wholly extrovert or wholly introvert. Consequently an admixture of the two elements is found normally in all human beings except those who are decidedly pronounced as pathological. In persons, with a highly evolved ethical personality, the extrovert and introvert tendencies find a beautiful blend.

An insight into this subject is afforded in Indian Ethics and Religion by the distinction that is drawn between two ways of life known as *pravṛtti mārga* and *nivṛtti mārga*. A man, who plunges himself into the current of the world's life and spends his time wholly absorbed in it, is said to follow the *pravṛtti mārga*, whilst one, who incessantly struggles to wean himself away from the current to discover the secret of happiness within the core of his own being, is said to tread the *nivṛtti mārga*. On the religious side, the one who follows the *pravṛtti mārga*, becomes a ritualist revelling in the punctilious performance of the external rituals of the creed to which he belongs. He, who follows the *nivṛtti mārga* becomes a lover of solitude and tranquillity finding happiness and serenity in leading the life of a recluse spending most of his time in solitary communion with the god of his conception. The way of the one is *dhyāna* and the way of the other is *karman*. The *pravṛtta* and the *nivṛtta* thus seem to go apart. Which is the best path to choose, one is bound to ask. Neither to the exclusion of the other, is the answer of *Bhagavad-gītā* (BG.). To the uninstructed, *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* seem to be wholly incompatible. Further reflection reveals that the incompatibility lies but on the surface. The opposites are reconciled in a perfectly balanced personality. This has been pointed out by BG. and its commentators. The reconciliation between the two ways of life attempted by BG. has a message for our distracted times.

From the point of view of Vedic religion the *pravṛtti* or the forthgoing way is taught by the *karma-kāṇḍa* of our scriptures on which the *pūrva*

Mimāṃsā system is based. *Athāto dharma-jijñāsā*—the inquiry into the significance of ritualism is the chief topic here. It is concerned with the efficacy of the external rites and ceremonies connected with the creed and the purposes they are sought to fulfil. The *nivṛtti* or the in-drawing way is taught by the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* or *Uttara Mimāṃsā*, portion of the Vedic religion. *Athātho brahma-jijñāsā*—the inquiry into the nature of Ultimate Reality constitutes its essence. It leads to the realisation of the highest goal of man, perfection of his personality, which involves the turning away from the pursuit of ephemeral objectives like wealth, fame, power and so on, chased after by most men in the world. As he turns away naturally from them, he is called a *nivṛtta*. The *pravṛtti mārga* and the *nivṛtti mārga* are obviously intended for persons of different levels of spiritual development. It is also stated that *pravṛtti* as taught in the *Purva Mimāṃsā* is a stepping stone to *nivṛtti*. It leads to *sattva-śuddhi*, the inner purity which is a condition precedent to the investigation of Ultimate Reality. When once *pravṛtti mārga* is regarded in this light, it ceases to be antagonistic to *nivṛtti*. On the other hand, *nivṛtti* becomes complementary to it. *Karmānuṣṭhana* becomes preparatory to *naiṣkarmya-siddhi* to use the language of the Vedic teachers.

Spiritual endeavour demands that there must be harmony between the outer act and the inner aspiration, the outer conduct and the inner character, between the psychical and the physical. Our personality is neither all body nor all mind—embodied beings that we are. In the language of Modern Philosophy we are body-minds or mind-bodies. Through the physical do we attain the spiritual as was recognized by the poet Kālidāsa, when he said : *śarīram ādyam khalu dharmasādhanam.* So what is done externally cannot be dismissed as of no consequence to the inner life. The inner life, again, would remain infructuous if it does not issue itself in external activity. What is thus true of the ethical living is true of the life of piety also. Any outward rite or ceremony, therefore, if it is to be a sacrament or *saṃskāra* must be the outward or the visible sign of an inward spiritual grace. No religion can thrive, if it is either purely personal or purely institutional. Only the institution must be the spontaneous and natural expression of personal inspiration and endeavour after perfection. From this point of view all sacraments are of tremendous spiritual significance. At the same time, without the inner sap of fresh religious inspiration, the outward observance of the formalities of religion becomes mere show and farce to which the social person, insincerely or as a mere matter of habit, submits. *BG.* condemns religious practice of such a kind as *tāmasika* in character.

Nivṛtti may be called the 'Ethic of Renunciation'. The word 'renounce' is misleading. It has been falsely interpreted as a turning away

from the responsibilities of domestic or social life, a kind of escape from unpleasant realities, to face which we lack the requisite courage. To adopt the terms made familiar by Sigmund Freud, it is the escape from the Reality Principle to the primitive pleasure principle. This involves an introversion which is sickly and which is not a sign of robust mental health. It is 'the sick soul', as William James terms it in his *'The Varieties of Religious Experience'*. It is attended with such regressive psychical characteristics as infantile regression, atavism, narcissism and such other marks of mental sickness. Often this kind of dubious renunciation is preached by the Upaniṣads and *BG*. Renunciation, in this context, never meant a permanent withdrawal from the world but only a withdrawal into the inner recesses of one's own consciousness with a view to drawing from thence strength and sustenance to fight the tough battle of life. Great teachers are said to have thus temporarily withdrawn from the fray of life only to return to it fully armed with the necessary strength and moral courage. They are the salt of the earth. The greatest of our religious teachers have been the most active workers for the world's welfare *'loka-saṅgraha'*. The secret of their lives lay in realising action in inaction and inaction in action as *BG*. paradoxically puts it. Selfless action is really *nivṛtti* in *pravṛtti*. To attain *nivṛtti* in *pravṛtti* is the final goal of ethical striving. At this stage ethics ripens into religion.

Hence, the ethic of renunciation or *nivṛtti* is the ethic of creative self sacrifice, creative because it is the sacrifice of the lower self in order to actively pursue the higher. It is not self-annihilation but self-realization. The message of *BG*. in this respect has been beautifully summed up by Prof. M. Hiriyanna when he says in his *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* : '*BG*. teaching stands not for renunciation *of* action, but for renunciation *in* action.' This is but an echo of the Upaniṣadic dictum '*tyaktena bhuñjithāḥ*—Enjoy life by renouncing it'. Therein lies the secret of the most successful and worthy life that has ever been conceived by the mind of man.

SECTION V

Studies in Literary History

Pre-Pāṇinian Technical Terms

By

VASUDEVA S. AGRAWALA, *Delhi.*

The technical terms have an important place in the history of the grammatical science in ancient India. A comparative study of the technical devices and terms used in the several *Prātiśākhyas*, phonetical treatises and in the remaining *Lakṣaṇa* works from the *Pārṣada* literature, would provide a good basis for throwing light on their relative chronology.

The grammatical technique in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* was partly Pāṇini's own creation and partly borrowed by him from earlier authors. The tradition of the technical terms evolved by Pāṇini's predecessors survived for a long time in the writings of authors of the Pāṇianian school. We find many of them preserved in the *vārttikas* of Kātyāyana. A list of such *termini technici* as are not explained and for the most part not used in P. is given below[1] :—

1. **अद्यतनी** = **लुङ्** (cf. Vā. II. 4. 3, III. 2. 102).

2. **अभिनिष्टान** = **विसर्जनीय** (cf. P. VIII. 3. 36. ⌊cf. Surya Kanta : *The Panjab Oriental Research Journal* Vol. I. pp. 13–18 ⌋).

3. **आत्मनेभाषा** = **आत्मनेपद** (cf. M. VI. 3. 7–8).

4, **आर्धधातुका** = **आर्धधातुक** (cf. M. I. 484).

5. **आङ्** = **टा** (cf. M. III. 343, 387; P. VII. 3. 120).

6. **उपग्रह** = **आत्मनेपद** (cf. Kaiyaṭa ⌊Vā. III. 2. 125⌋).

7. **उपचार** = the **स्** in place of **विसर्ग** in such words as **अयस्कुम्भ** etc. (cf. Nāgeśa ⌊Vā. IV. 1. 1⌋). The term is known to the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya* and also the *Atharva-Prātiśākhya* (cf. Vishva Bandhu Shastri ⌊III. 1. 7. ⌋).

8. **उपस्थित** = (**अनार्ष**) **इति** , i. e. the **इति** of the *Pada-pāṭha* (cf. M. VI. 1. 29). This appears to be a peculiar term of the *Ṛk-Prātiśākhya*, where it is defined (cf. X. 12).

9. ?**घु** = **उत्तरपद** (M. III. 229, 247, 318). Kielhorn perhaps rightly thought that **घु** should be amended as **घु** ⌊*The Indian Antiquary* (*IA.*) XVI. p. 106⌋). Pāṇini adopts **घु** as the symbol of roots having the forms of **दा** and **धा** (cf. P. I. 1. 20).

10. **कल्म** = **अपरिसमाप्त कर्म** (cf. M. I. 336).

1. The abbreviations used here are : P. = Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī ; Vā. = Vārtika on P. ; M. = Mahābhāṣya, in some cases, referred to by Volume and page of Kielhorn's edn.

11. चर्करीत =यङ्लुगन्त (cf. M. and Haradatta VI. I. 6; VII. 4. 92). See, also, *Nirukta* (II. 28) and *Dhātupāṭha* (at the end of the अदादिगण) for the use of this term.

12. चेक्रीयित = यङ् (cf. Kaiyaṭa ⌞M. II. 232 ⌟).

13. डु =षट् संज्ञा (Vā. 43 on I. 4. 1 ; M. I. 304).

14. ताणी = संज्ञा-छन्दसो: (cf. M. II. 99.), i. e. तण् was the symbol both for the classical and the Vedic idiom. Pāṇini prefers to use the bigger term संज्ञा-छन्दस् (cf. P. VI. 3. 63).

15. ध्रौव्यार्थ and ध्रुवयुक्ति= अकर्मक (cf. P. III. 4. 76 and Kaiyaṭa ⌞Vā. I. 4, 50 ⌟).

16. नाम = प्रातिपदिक. It was an old popular term used in the *Nirukta* (I. 1) and in P. itself, IV. 3. 72, where it is referred to as the subject of a treatise called नामिक, besides another called आख्यातिक .

17. न्याय्य = उत्सर्ग (cf. Kaiyaṭa ⌞M. I. 439⌟). The *Ṛk-Prātiśakhya* also uses it, and is explained by Uvaṭa as उत्सर्ग.

18. परोक्षा = लिट् (cf. Kaiyaṭa ⌞Vā. I, 2, 18⌟).

19. प्रक्रम = स्थान, i. e. the triple source of sound (cf. M. ⌞Vā, I. 2. 30⌟).

20. प्रतिकण्ठ = निपातन, i. e. an irregular-word formation (*Ṛk-Prāti.* I, 54). Pāṇini has used it in connection with a *taddhita* suffix, प्रतिकण्ठं गृह्णाति प्रातिकण्ठिक: (IV. 4. 40), where it is juxtaposed with पौर्वपदिक and औत्तरपदिक and may denote a grammarian or his work dealing with the subject of *nipātana*, i. e. words of irregular formation, such as पृषोदरादि, which Pāṇini styles यथोपदिष्ट , i e. valid as current in the usage of the people (VI. 3. 109).

21. प्रत्यङ्ग = अन्तरङ्ग (cf. M. VI. 3. 138 ; Kielhorn [IA. XVI. p. 102]).

22. प्रसव पुमान् i. e. masculine gender (cf. M., I. 245).

23. प्रसारण = संप्रसारण (cf. M. ⌞Vā. I. 1. 3[14] ⌟).

24. ल = लुक् (cf. M. ⌞and Haradatta⌟ V. 2. 37).

25. ल : = लकारा : Pāṇini uses the term in III. 4. 69. The system of naming the tenses and moods with initial ल् appears to be Pāṇini's own invention. The older terms for them were :—
भवन्ती = लट् ; परोक्षा = लिट् ; श्वस्तनी = लुट् ; भविष्यन्ती = लृट् (cf. Vā. III. 3. 15). नैगमी = लेट् (*Atharva-Prāti.* II. 3. 2) ; प्रेषणी = लोट् (*Atharva-Prāti.* II. 1. 11 , 3. 21) ; ह्यस्तनी = लङ् (*Atharv-Prāti.* III. 2. 5) ; अद्यतनी = लुङ् (Vā. II. 4. 3 ; III. 2. 102 and VI. 4. 114 ; *Atharva-Prāti.* II. 2. 6).

26. व्यक्ति = लिङ्ग . Pāṇini uses it in his basic sutra (I. 2. 51), but does not explain. The sutra is itself subsequently declared superfluous (cf. I. 2. 53).

27. विनाम = णत्व (cf. Vā. शिवसूत्र 3 ; 4; M. I. 25).

28. वृद्ध = गोत्र. Patañjali definitely points out that Pāṇini has borrowed this term from an earlier grammar (I. 2. 68). The *Kāśikā* (I. 2. 65) even cites an old *sūtra*—अपत्यमन्तर्हितं वृद्धम्. Kātyāyana also employs the term (IV. 1. 90), and his definition of *gotra* (IV. 1. 163) appears to be a rule cited from an earlier system.

29. संक्रम = कित् and ङित् suffixes which prevent the operation of गुण and वृद्धि (cf. Nāgeśa ⌊M. I. 48 on I. 1. 3⌋). The word is not found elsewhere (cf. Kielhorn ⌊IA. XVI. 102⌋).

30. सन्ध्यक्षर = ए, ओ, ऐ, औ (cf. Śiva-sūtras 3, 4 ⌊and P. I. 2. 4 where the other term समानाक्षर for the simple vowels अ, इ, उ, ऋ, ऌ is also used⌋).

31. सस्थान = जिह्वामूलीय (cf. Kaiyaṭa ⌊Vā. II. 4. 54[8]⌋).

32. ह्राद = अनुरणन-घोष, i. e. sound vibrations following the utterance of a sound (ह्रादविरामः संहिता ⌊P. I. 4. 109⌋).

Udayanācārya and Śrīharṣa

By

DINESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA, *Chinsura.*

The type of a proud dialectician is aptly visualised in the character of Mr. Pride (*Ahankāra)* found in the *Prabodhacandrodaya*. Mr. Pride hailed, curiously, from *Dakṣiṇa-Rāḍhā* in Bengal, which was apparently one of the centres of advanced literary culture in Eastern India. In the magnificent bravado that the poet puts in his mouth at Benares :—

अहो मूर्खबहुलं जगत् !
नैवाश्रावि गुरोर्मतं न विदितं तौतातितं दर्शनम् ,
तत्त्वं ज्ञातमहो न शालिकगिरां वाचस्पतेः का कथा ।
सूक्तं नैव महोदधेरधिगतं माहाव्रती नेक्षिता ,
सूक्ष्मा वस्तुविचारणा नृपशुभिः स्वस्थैः कथं स्थीयते ॥

we have a striking reference to the books actually studied in the advanced scholastic seminaries of the times, which reveals the important fact that dialectics in Bengal and Mithila were still fostered by a healthy rivalry between the *Prābhākara* and *Bhāṭṭa* schools of the *Mīmaṃsā*—with the former possibly getting the upper hand, as the exact sequence of the above enumeration seems to convey. The disparaging remarks, that follow about the *S'aivas*, *Pās'upatas* and others with their defective knowledge of the views of Akṣapāda, piont to the inevitable conclusion that the author, Kṛṣṇamis'ra, who was a protege of Cāndella Kirtivarman, late in the 11th century A.D., was yet free from the influence of the great works of Udayanācārya, which heralded a new age in *Nyāya-Vais'eṣika* studies. The question naturally arises here as to when Udayana actually came to be regarded as a leading dialectician, and we shall attempt to answer it by discovering the names of the earliest writers who referred to Udayana.

1) S'rīvallabha author of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* was probably the first scholar to refer to Udayana. We cite the passages below (Chowkh. edn. 1934, pp. 864) : (a) p. 38 '*atra ca ṭīkā, yathāntya upāntyena iti*' (cf. *Kiraṇāvalī* [*Kir.*], Benares edn., p. 184 '*upāntyas'abdavad-upapadyate*'); (b) p. 39 '*tathā ca ṭīkā, nimeṣasya caturtho bhāgaḥ kṣaṇaḥ*' (*Kir.*, p. 90) ; (c) pp. 399-400 '*yathā bheryākās'a-saṃyogasya ubhayās'rayatve nabhasi s'abdajananiyamaḥ iti Kiraṇāvalīkāraḥ*' (*Kir.*, pp. 249-50) ; (d) p. 445 '*ityādi Tātparyas'uddhav Udayanaḥ*' ; (e) p. 533 '*Kiraṇāvalīkārastu...*' (on *upamāna* : *Kir.*, p. 322-23); (f) p. 823 '*iti Kiraṇāvalīkāraḥ*'. The views of Udayana under (c) and (e) are refuted by S'rīvallabha. The

Nyāyalīlāvatī was regarded as a standard work in the *Navya-Nyāya* schools of Mithila and Bengal, and was commented upon by Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, son of Gaṅges'a. It is presumed, therefore, that he belonged to Mithila. The following interesting passage gives, in our opinion, a clue to his probable age and his connection with a Royal court : *yadi ca gaganam ātmā (va) anyadharmeṇānyam avacchindyāt, Kashmīravartinā kuṅkumarāgeṇa Karṇāṭa-cakravarti (lalanā-)-karakamalam avacchindyāt* (p. 290). The readings within brackets are taken from the *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, a commentary on Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvalī* (p. 41). Coming from the pen of a Maithila scholar, this can only refer to the founder of the '*Karṇāṭa*' dynasty of Mithila, Nānyadeva (*circa* 1097-1147 A.D.); and the date of composition of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* can be confidently placed in the first quarter of the 12th century (1100-25) A.D. S'rīvallabha also refers incidentally to a king named S'ālivāhana with his queen Līlāvatī (p. 629), who may be an unknown local chief of the same period. It should be noted that when S'rīvallabha wrote, Udayana had not yet attained the flattering epithet ' *Ācārya* ' by which he was universally known afterwards ; and Vācaspati Mis'ra was still with him the reigning ' *Ācārya* ' (p. 533 , *Tattvakaumudyām ācārya eva* and *Parama-nyāyācārya* p. 762).

2) Deva Suri (1086-1169 A. D.), the celebrated Jaina logician, thus refers to Udayana and Jayanta in the *Syādvādaratnākara* :—

यदत्र शक्तिसांसिद्धौ मज्जत्युदयन-द्विपः ।
जयन्त हन्त का तत्र गणना त्वयि कीटके ॥[1]

Deva Suri belonged to Gujrat and became a '*Sūri*' in 1174 V. S. (1117-18 A.D). He must have written the book about 1125 A.D.

3) Guṇaratna (*circa* 1409 A.D.) in his *Ṣaddars'ana-samuccaya-vṛtti*, chronologically enumerated the works of the Nyāya (B. I. edn., p. 94) ; S'rikaṇṭha's *Nyāyālaṅkāra* is mentioned immediately after Udayana in this list. We have traced a rare quotation from this long-lost work. S'rīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādya* (Chowkh. edn., p. 129) states, at some length, the arguments of a scholar against the theory of *anirvacanīyatā*, and refutes them. Vidyāsāgara, in his commentary, definitely identifies the passage thus : *Nyāyālaṇkāra-granthe anirvacanīya-dūṣaṇaṃ yad abhāṇi tad anuvadati nanviti.* At the end of the passage itself the well-known line of Udayana's *Kusumāñjali* : *paraspara-virodhe hi na prakārāntara-sthitiḥ* is cited by the author in support of his agruments. Guṇaratna was, thus, exactly correct, when he placed the name of S'rīkaṇṭha after Udayana. We can tentatively place S'rīkaṇṭha in the first quarter of the 12th century A.D.

From the above evidence it is clear that, at the present state of our knowledge, Udayana has not been cited by any scholar who can be

1. Vidyabhūṣaṇa's *Indian Logic*, ch. II, p. 14.

confidently placed in the 11th century A.D. His works made their mark, and began to push earlier works out only from the 12th century A.D., i.e. almost a century and a half after the date of composition of the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* (908 S'aka —984-85 A.D.) This is on the face of it improbable and lends support to suspicion about the genuineness of the latter date, which we have expressed elsewhere. Udayana and his great opponent S'rīharṣa, the author of the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādya*, are the two towering figures that dominated dialectics in Eastern India for about three centuries before the epoch-making works of Gaṅgeśa came to the fore-front in about 1400 A.D. An examination, of the problem of S'rīharṣa's date and his exact chronological relationship with Udayana, is attempted below for new light on the subject.

The date of S'rīharṣa can be fixed within narrow limits from the following evidence. Towards the end of the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādya* (*op. cit.* p. 1327), he, respectfully, mentions the name of the rhetorician Mahimabhaṭṭa in the following verse :

दोषं व्यक्तिविवेकेऽमुं कविलोकविलोचने ।
काव्यमीमांसिषु प्राप्त-महिमा महिमाऽऽदृत ॥

Mahimabhaṭṭa, who came after Abhinavagupta (1015 A.D.) and before Mammaṭa (c. 1100 A.D.), must have been living about 1050 A. D., and was probably a native of Kashmir. The earliest date that can, therefore, be assigned to S'rīharṣa is 1075 A. D. This dismisses any attempt (cf. IA. 1913, p. 83) to place S'rīharṣa earlier. On the other hand, the earliest author, who quoted from S'rīharṣa's *Naiṣadhacarita*, is Mahendra Suri, a disciple of the famous Jaina polymath Hemacandra (1088-1172 A. D.). In his commentary on the *Anekārthasaṅgraha* of Hemacandra, he quoted many passages of the *Naiṣadha* as illustrations, e.g. under II. 18 (p. 8 of extracts from the commentary in Zachariae's edn., 1893), II. 56 (p. 13), II. 274 (p. 43), II. 299 (p. 47), II. 303 (*ibid.*), II. 527 (p. 77), IV. 155 (p. 173) and IV. 339 (p. 184). This commentary, which was published in the name of the author's teacher Hemacandra, was written ' soon after ' the latter's death (*ibid.* Preface p. XIII). S'rīharṣa, as a native of Bengal and a protege of the king of *Kānyakubja*, could not be supposed to have commanded the respects of foremost scholars of Western India unless he was at least an exact contemporary of Mahendra's guru, Hemacandra, or slightly senior to him. None of the authorities, cited by Mahendra, as far as can be ascertained, belong to the latter half of the 12th century A. D. S'rīharṣa must, therefore, have written his works in the second quarter (1125-50 A.D.) of the century during the reign of Govindacandra of Kannauj (1104-54 A.D.), whose patronage

of the poet is definitely stated by a commentator named Gadādhara[1]. S'rīharṣa, probably, started his literary career with small tracts like *Amara-khaṇḍanam* (Madras Ms. No. R 1595) and *Dvirūpakoṣa* (*ibid.* R 1607) with a view to enrich his vocabulary. Kṣīrasvamin, in his commentary on the *Amarkoṣa*[2], quotes a line from S'rīharṣa *saṅghata-mṛtyur-marako marir-mārī ca devatā* (II. 6. 58). This is evidently from the *Dvirūpakoṣa* or a similar work of the poet. Kṣīrasvamin was quoted by Vardhamāna in the *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* (Eggeling's edn., pp. 306 and 430), which was composed in 1140 A.D. These early tracts of S'rīharṣa will have, therefore, to be assigned to the first decade of the century in the very biginning of reign of Govindacandra. It is possible that the poet in his very old age enjoyed the patronage of Vijayacandra (to 1169 A. D.) and Jayacandra, the son and grandson of Govindacandra[3]. But the statement of Rājas'ekhara Suri that the poet wrote in the reign of the latter prince need not be taken as literally true ; Rājas'ekhara could not correctly record the name and relation of Jayacandra in the *Prabandhakoṣa*. It is probable that the *Naiṣadha* was commented upon already in the reign of Govindacandra. The late MM. V. P. Dube of the Government Sanskrit College, Benares, was well-known for claiming certain startling discovries. One of them relates to a commentary on the *Naiṣadha* said to have been composed in 972 S'aka (1050 A. D.). The verse recording this date is actually cited by him thus[4] :—

युग्माश्वाङ्कैर्निरुक्ते शकनृपतिसमे कान्यकुब्जेश्वरस्य ,
आदेशं प्राप्य यत्नान् नलचरितमहाकाव्यटीकां व्यधत्त ।
सूरिर्भूदेवसंज्ञो दिनमणि-तनयः कूर्मपूर्वाग्रजन्मा ,
तुष्यात् तेनान्तरात्मा त्रिभुवनजनकोमापतिश्रीमहेशः ॥

The source of this verse, like some other statements of the late Pandit, remains untraceable. It is not likely that the Pandit himself fabricated the verse. If it is regarded as genuine, we have to take the word 'aṅka' as a numerical symbol for 10 instead of 9, and read the date as equivalent to 1150 A. D. It is not unlikely, moreover, for the king of

1. S.R. Bhandarkar : Rep. of a Second Tour in search of Skt. MSS., 1907, pp. 43 and 87-8).

2. Oka's edn., p. 101 ; Trivandrum edn., Part II, p. 316.

3. The activities of a man normally cover more than half a century, and in exceptional cases may extend to full three quarters of a century. We refer here to two authentic cases. Mādhava Tarkasiddhānta, a leading scholar of *Nyāy* at Navadvipa in Bengal, had a seminary in 1817 (Ward : *A view of the Hist. And C. of the Hindoos,* 3rd edn., 1820, Vol. IV, p. 494) and was still going strong in 1864 (Proc. ASB, 1867, p. 91). Jagannātha Tarkapañcānana, author of *Vivādabhaṅgārṇava* (1792 A. D.) died in 1807 'at the age of more than 100 years' ((*Modern Review,* September, 1929, pp. 261-62).

4. Introduction to the *Nyāyavārtika*, Chowkh., 1916, p. 160 .

Kānyakubja to ask a scholar of his court to write a commentary on the greatest poem of the century[1].

We have stated above that S'rīharṣa refuted the views of S'rīkaṇṭha, author of the *Nyayālankāra*, in the *Khaṇḍana*. In the passage of S'rīkaṇṭha, a line of Udayana is cited, and evidently the former was a follower of the latter. S'rīharṣa, directly, criticised Udayana in several places (*Khaṇḍana*, pp. 705, 747, 1326 etc.). The most interesting passage is the one, where S'rīharṣa answers Udayana with a twist of the latter's own words in the *Kusumāñjali* (III. 7) :—

तस्मादस्माभिरप्यास्मिन्नर्थे न खलु दुष्पठा ।
त्वद्-गाथैवान्यथाकारमक्षराणि कियन्त्यपि ॥
व्याघातो यदि शङ्कास्ति न चेच्छङ्का ततस्तराम् ।
व्याघातावधिराशङ्का तर्कः शङ्कावधिः कुतः ॥ (*Khaṇḍana, op. cit.* p. 693)

We refer to two other typical passages. On p. 1018 a long passage of Udayana's *Tātparya-paris'uddhi* is cited and subsequently refuted at length. On pp. 1170-76 a very long passage from Udayana's *Bauddhādhikāra* is reproduced and subjected to a detailed criticism later on. All these undoubtedly place Udayana in the position of the greatest opponent, whom S'rīharṣa wanted to meet by arguments.

1. We should state here a puzzle regarding the sequence of S'rīharṣa's works. The *Dvirūpa-koṣa*, mentioned above, refers in the concluding verse to the *Naiṣadha*. The latter at the end of Canto VI refers to the *Khaṇḍana*, which again quotes the *Naiṣadha* (*op. cit.* p. 226). S'rīvatsa, a commentator of the *Naiṣadha*, clearly records a tradition that the two works were composed by the poet simultaneously—*ekadaiva granthadvayaṃ kavinā kṛtam-iti prasiddhiḥ* (end of Canto VI : an old palm-leaf Ms. preserved at V. R. Museum, Rajshahi). Most of the other commentators, specially Gadadhara mentioned above and Cāṇḍū Paṇḍita, are of opinion that the *Khaṇḍana* was composed before the *Naiṣadha*. We may hazard a conjecture here. In those days of difficult communication, authors had to wait for convenience and proper opportunities for circulation of their works. When an opportunity arises, sometimes long after the date of composition of each work, the books are apparently revised and given a final shape, and the concluding verses are added as a sort of advertisement of the numerous works of the same author. It cannot, therefore, be argued that the *Naiṣadha* was composed by the poet last of all, after the numerous works mentioned at the ends of Cantos. At the end of Canto V, S'rīharṣa mentions a work of his named *Vijaya-Pras'asti*. According to one commentator Gopinātha (L. 1639), it was a panegyric on the Gauḍes'vara Vijayasena. Though this will corroborate the date of S'rīharṣa we have arrived at above; the mention of a separate panegyric of the family of the king of *Gauḍa* at the end of Canto VII, seems to go against this interpretation. S'rīvatsa gives the full name of the king concerned as 'Vijayacandra' and adds the note — *tatra rājño jīvitatvād vā gauravād vā s'rī-s'abdaḥ prayujyate*. This is more in keeping with the poet's professed connection with the court of Kānyakubja. The poet might have written this on the occasion of Vijayacandra's becoming the Crown Prince or on the occasion of his coronation. In any case we need not argue that the *Naiṣadha* was composed as late as the third quarter of the century.

Here we are confronted with the question — what length of time intervened between the two eminent scholars? A definite answer to the question is provided by Cāṇḍu Paṇḍita, the most learned commentator of the *Naiṣadha*. At the very beginning of the commentary, which was written in 1353 V.S. (1296-97 A. D.), it was categorically stated that Udayana challenged and defeated S'rīharṣa's father (S'rīhīra) in a debate ; and S'rīharṣa, as a faithfu son, avenged the defeat by meeting Udayana's arguments in the *Khaṇḍana* : प्रथमं तावत् कविर्विजिगीषुकथायां स्वपितुः परिभावकम् उदयनम् अत्यमर्षणतया कटाक्षयन् तद्ग्रन्थ-ग्रन्थीन् उ(द्) ग्रन्थयितुं खण्डनं प्रारिप्सु.······मानसम् एकताननताम् आनिनाय[1]. This clear statement of Cāṇḍu Paṇḍita cannot be lightly brushed aside. It is supported, in our opinion, by the fact that S'rīharṣa, nowhere, refers to Udayana by name, though the name of Vācaspati occurs in his work (*Khaṇḍana*, p. 656). It can, therefore, be reasonably surmised that Udayana was removed only by a generation from the times of S'rīharṣa. The direct and pungent retort cited above, points to the same conclusion. The date of composition of Udayana's *Lakṣaṇāvali* (906 S'aka) should consequently be rejected, and Udayana's period of activity might be placed in the second half (1050-1100 A. D.) of the 11th century A. D. S'rīharṣa's birth-date may be surmised to be about 1075 A. D., a decade before Hemacandra, whose disciple Mahendra first quoted from his work. The debate between Udayana and S'rīhīra (the father of S'rīharṣa) might have taken place about 1070–1080 A.D. We are not aware of any evidence worth the name, which goes against this scheme of chronology.

1. Des. Cat. of Govt. Mss., B. O. R. I., Poona, Vol. XIII. Pt. i, p. 481.

Pāṇini's Vocabulary and His Date[1]

By

S. P. CHATURVEDI, *Amraoti.*

Dr. A.B. Keith, in his contribution to the *Bhārata-Kaumudī*[2], discusses my paper on 'Pāṇini's Vocabulary — its bearing on his date', which was published in the Woolner Commemoration Volume (pp.46-50), and shows his disagreement with the view put forth therein. It is a matter of great sorrow that Dr. Keith did not live long to see the publication of his article referred to above. As my previous article was written to commemorate the sacred memory of Dr. A.C. Woolner, famous Indologist of the Punjab, it is only proper that this reply also to the criticism of that article should appear in a Collection of Papers intended for honouring another famous Indologist of the same region, Dr. Siddheshvara Varma.

In my article, a consideration of linguistic development was put forward in support of the view that P. flourished in pre-Buddhistic age. Attention of scholars was drawn to the rich and vast vocabulary of P., wherein, a good variety of words of contemporary language dealing with almost all conceivable topics of the world, is met with. Technical words of sacrificial science and religious literature ; literary and scientific words ; words indicating various relations and things of domestic use ; botanical words indicating trees, creepers, flowers and medicines, words of geographical and historical importance, such as rivers, villages, countries, royal dynasties, races, castes, tribes etc., and words indicating different professions — in short, words of almost all subjects figure in P.'s vocabulary. It is but natural, therefore, to expect that these words must have been in use in P.'s contemporary language, for, P. wrote his grammar, not for its own sake, but for regularising the then prevailing language. Pat.'s date, more or less definitely fixed, we are fortunately in a position to start back from a fixed date (150 B.C.) to that of P., and arrive at tentative conclusions by comparing the contemporary languages of the three great grammarians—P., K. and Pat. The *Mahābhāṣya* of Pat. is a comprehensive commentary on K.'s *vārtikas.* In many places Pat., having no certain knowledge of K.'s intended meaning, interprets them in more than one way. This fact, taken together with the consideration of K.'s probable authorship of the *Vājasaneya-Prātiśākhya,* will necessitate a longer interval between K. and Pat. than fifty

1. The abbreviations used here are : K. = Kātyāyana. P. = Pāṇini, Pat. = Patañjali.
2. The *Radha-kumuda Mookerjee Comm.* Vol. I. 345.

years as Keith thinks[1]. According to Belvelkar[2], the date of K. should, approximately, be not later than 350 B.C. Thus, a minimum interval of 200 years between K. and Pat. appears to be a reasonable hypothesis. We know that the difference in time between the periods of P. and K. is much greater than that between K. and Pat. On K.'s own evidence[3], we know that many conjugational forms, sanctioned by P. had become non-current in his days. As established studiously by Goldstücker[4], many words assumed meanings in K.'s time, which they did not possess in the days of P.; and many grammatical forms, which were current in the days of P., had become obsolete, antiquated or even incorrect. So a long interval between K. and P. can be easily imagined. It is true that a spoken language changes more rapidly than a literary language, still taking into consideration the very slow process of change which the Vedic Sanskrit underwent from the time of the *Ṛgveda* to the beginning of the classical Sanskrit, an interval of 200 years (as supposed by Keith) is not sufficient. To explain satisfactorily such a marked change in linguistic phenomenon, we have to assume a fairly long period of interval between K. and P. According to Bhandarkar[5], the basis of P.'s language is the language of the pre-*Mahābhārata* period; and to a great extent, the Brāhmaṇas were written in that language. So, if we believe, as we must, that P. in his grammar treated the language of his times, his age should not be later than the 8th century B. C. To corroborate this view of an early date for P., a list[6] of popular words occurring in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* was given in the article under reference.

Keith rejects the above conclusion, and regards *circa* 350 B.C. as a probable date for P. He thinks that the obscure words given in the list might have been used in about 350 B.C. and yet have evaded occurring in contemporary literature. Here lies the difference in the viewpoints

1. *Bhārata-Kaumudī, op. cit.* p., 345.
2. *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 29.
3. *Mahābhāṣya*, I. 1. 1.
4. *Paṇini and his Place* etc., p. 94.
5. *Wilson Philological Lectures*, ch. I.

6. We, purposely, avoided the inclusion of the technical terms and of the words, enumerated in the Gaṇapāṭha of P., for, the Gaṇapāṭha has not remained uncontaminated. There are many words added in the list in post-Pāṇinian times. So, only such words, as are directly mentioned in the sūtras, were listed there. Keith says ' Some of the references are inaccurate and the meanings assigned to them are occasionally doubtful'. While we are sorry for slight inaccuracies in the printing of 3 numerical figures, we remain unconvinced about the latter part of the remark. The meanings assigned are those as given in the comm. (Kāśikā). Unless shown to be wrong, there is no reason to doubt these meanings.

of approach to the problem. the words did not occur in the contemporary literature or speech, how they came to be treated in P.'s grammar ? Instead of giving the natural answer that they were used in the then current literature which, on account of its great antiquity, has not come down to us in entirity, he gives an evasive reply that the words evaded occurring in the same. The reluctance of Western Orientalists to accept an early date for Sanskrit works is the real reason behind such evasive replies. Keith says 'It is possible to place the date further back, but it cannot be said to be at all necessary'. This remark clearly betrays the feeling of reluctance referred to above.

The use of the word *Yavana* in P. IV. 1. 49 should give no trouble. A close study of P. IV. 1. 49 and IV. 1. 175 and the vārtika thereon clearly shows that while P. knew the Yavana people, K. knew their script and also their rulers. We know that there was a colony of Greeks (Ionions) settled long before in Afghanistan. Being cut off from their mainland, they were not as advanced people as those who came to the frontiers of India in later times (325 B.C.). P. knew the former only. Hence he could have no knowledge of the Greek script and the Greek rulers that came to be known in the days of K. Thus, the word *Yavanānī*, sanctioned by P. for 'a Yavana woman', is in favour of an early date for P. rather than a late one, as Keith thinks.

Incidentally, we my point here other reasons[1] for locating P. in an early age. To P. the word *Āraṇyaka* meant a forest man (cf. P. IV. 2. 129), but K.'s vārtika extends its meaning to 'a book of study' (written in a forest) and 'a forest vihāra'. This clearly indicates that P. flourished in the pre-Buddhistic period before the Āraṇyaka texts and monks' cells came into vogue, and K. in the post-Buddhistic period. The mention of *Parsus* (Persians) as mercenary soldiers (P. V. 3. 117) refers to a period before they founded their Empire in 550 B.C. The word *S'aka*, in the sense of 'a S'aka ruler', is known to K. and not to P. (cf. P. IV, 1, 175 and the vartika thereon). We infer, therefore, that P. flourished before Deioces established the Shaka kingdom about 700 B.C. A similar evidence is given by the addition of the word *Vṛjigārhapata* by K. in P. VI. 2. 42. The Vṛjis, therefore, came to be admitted to Vedic religion, and began having *Gārhapatya* fire after P., but before K. It is well-known that the Vṛjis figure in Buddhistic history.

A highly significant proof for the pre-Buddhistic period of P. is the use of the word *Bhāṣā* by him for the current language of his period. We know that this *Bhāṣā* of P. is the basis of his grammar, and represents a stage preceding the rise of Prākṛtas. This Sanskrit was

1. For details see the *History of Indian Literature* by C. V. Vaidya, Vol. I. Section III.

the current language of the people in P.'s times. But, in the days of Buddha, Pālī (a form of Prākṛita) was in currency, as he used it as a language for his preaching. The interval of time between Buddha and P. must be sufficiently long to account for the changes which took place in Sanskrit and softened and modified it to the Prākṛta form. If in spite of such clear indications[1] about the pre-Buddhistic date for P. Western scholars cling to the post-Buddhistic date, the reason lies not in the lack of cogent evidence, but in their reluctance to accept an early date for Sanskrit works. There can be no argument to convince one who believes that P.'s *Bhāṣā* was not a current language, and that his grammar deals with an artificial language mostly confined to the Brahmanical classes[2].

1. These indications, taken severally, may not appear to have much force; but viewed collectively they provide sufficient data. The application of the argument of silence should not be objected to in view of the vast panorama of linguistic facts presented by P.

2. By way of explanation and to remove an apparent contradiction, it is necessary to add that we regard that P.'s *Bhāṣā* was the language of the people, and he dealt with the same in his grammar. But, in Buddha's time, this language had changed, and its place was taken by a form of Prākṛta. P.'s *Bhāṣa*, however, continued to be the language of the learned, and whatever changes crept therein were accounted for by K. See my paper on 'Development of Sanskrit Grammar in the Vikrama Era', ***Nagarī Pracariṇī Patrika***, Vol. 49, pp. 301-320 (1944).

A Note on Rādhā-māna-taraṅgiṇī

By

J. B. CHAUDHURI, *Calcutta.*

Recently I had an occasion to hunt for a certain MS. in the Collections of the Vaṅgīya Sāhitya Pariṣad in course of which, I came across a MS. of the above-mentioned work of Nandakumāra Deva S'armā Vidyābhuṣaṇa. The devotional nature of the work was manifest from the title itself, but I was simply overjoyed when I found that the work was really a Sanskrit version of our *Pālā-kīrtana-māna-bhañjana,* i.e. a series of songs interspersed with prose interpretations etc. on the appeasement of Rādhā by Kṛṣṇa. From this point of view, this work is unique, particularly because, this will help all non-Bengali Sanskrit scholars to have a peep, at least, into the real nature of our saṅkīrtana that forms the backbone of the cultural revival brought about by S'rī-kṛṣṇa Caitanya Mahāprabhu in Bengal. The Kṛṣṇa cult, as propagated in Bengal, may be best understood from such standard works as the *Bhaktirasāmṛta-sindhu*, *Ujjvala-nīlamaṇi*, *Uddhava-mādhava*, *Vidagdha-mādhava*, *Haribhakti-vilāsa* etc. ; but the niceties and subtleties working on Bengali minds, as a result of the saṅkīrtana, can hardly be guessed from a mere study of these works. In this respect, the MS. at hand will be of some help, and more so, if its Sanskrit verses could be attuned after the kīrtana style.

In his Notices, Vol. III, pp. 123-124, MS. No. 170, Rajendralal Mitra describes a MS. of the abovementioned work. The first four verses, which he has quoted from this MS., are not found in the MS. at hand. These two MSS. are, as a matter of fact, widely different in contents as well as readings. Rajendralal's MS. records only 73 verses, whereas the MS. at hand consists of 88 (excluding the one giving the date of composition). There are many other discrepancies between the two MSS.

I reproduce the *Rādhā-māna-bhañjana* narrative here with some quotations from the MS. The verses cited will, at the same time, testify to the real merit of the work. As prearranged, Rādhā goes to visit Kṛṣṇa on the banks of the Jumna; but failing to find him there, becomes very angry, and promises that if Kṛṣṇa does not see her in her residence at once, she would have recourse to violent wrath, and not see Kṛṣṇa any more :—

नायातो यदि मञ्जुकुञ्जभवने कृष्णोऽद्य वृन्देऽधुना ।
न द्रक्ष्यामि तमंश्वरं विरसकं गोपालकं नायकम् ॥

भूत्वाऽहं चिरमानिनी निजगृहे स्थास्यामि शून्यालये ।
सत्यं ते कथयामि सूर्यतनया स्यात् साक्षिणी मानतः ॥

As Kṛṣṇa fails to arrive there as desired, Rādhā laments bitterly :—

कालरात्रिर्महारात्रिर्मोहरात्रिश्च दारुणा ।
नाथे विनेयं रात्रिश्च चन्द्रश्चण्डकरोऽभवत् ॥१३॥
कुञ्जं कुजन-संकाशं यमुनाऽपि यमानुजा ।
जगत्प्राणो हरेत् प्राणान् जीवनं हन्ति जीवनम् ॥१४॥

It occurs to her that Kṛṣṇa was possibly enticed away by Candrāvalī or, who knows, he might have lost his way in darkness. Vṛndā, however, could see into the real nature of the trouble, and assured Rādhā as to that. As ill-luck would have it, Candrāvalī would not let Kṛṣṇa go, and therefore, he much against his own wishes, is compelled to pass the night there. In the morning he comes to meet Rādhā when Vṛndā, the confidante of Rādhā, rebuffs him :—

दन्तक्षतं कथमहो रजनीविरामे
संदृश्यते रतिभवं किल गण्डदेशे ।
निद्रालसानययुतं नयनं तवाद्य
त्वं याहि याहि भवनं नव प्रेम यस्याम् ॥४०॥

On Kṛṣṇa's further solicitations to meet Rādhā, Vṛndā further retorts :—

रे रे लम्पट धूर्तराज सहसा राधा(?प्र-)कुञ्जाद् व्रज ,
राधा ते भविता पुनर्हि तपसा जन्मान्तरे योगतः ।
इत्युक्त्वा वृषभानुराजतनया निद्रान्विता संप्रति ,
तां मा बोधय मानिनीं विरहिणीं स्थानान्तरे गम्यताम् ॥

Vṛndā then reports to Rādhā about Kṛṣṇa's arrival and returns with despair. Rādhā now bewails relentlessly for her decision and earnestly prays to Vṛndā for bringing Kṛṣṇa back to her. Vṛndā again goes out in search of Kṛṣṇa and comes back disappointed. Verging on a total collapse, Rādhā cries out :—

योगी चेन्नन्दसूनुर्दिशि विदिशि गतो मानभङ्गे त्रिभङ्गो ,
भक्ष्याभावात् कृशाङ्गो मम प्रियमनु यो व्याघ्रचर्माम्बरः किम् ।
भस्माच्छन्नः कथं स्यान्नवघनरुचिरस्तीर्थसेवी जटावान् ,
हा हा दासीकृते किं मम हृदयमणिः स्वेच्छया त्यक्त एषः ॥४३॥
नाथे योगिनि योगिनी विरहिणी हा दुःखिनी दुःखिनि ,
मत्ता वा विरहात् प्रियस्य सखि हे स्थानान्तरे गामिनी ।
किं वा सूर्यसुताजले प्रियकृते दीना मरिष्येऽधुना ,
संधानं कुरु कानने प्रियतमे प्राणेश्वरस्यापि च ॥४४॥

Kṛṣṇa in the meantime approaches Vis'ākhā, a friend of Rādhā, for help but for which he is determined to commit suicide. She, however, advises him to worship S'iva and wear the robes of a mendicant offered by her. Kṛṣṇa does accordingly and proceeds the next morning, as a mendicant to appease Rādhā. Reaching Jaṭilā's house, he says that he would not accept any alms if the same be not offered by a chaste lady of the type of Rādhā. She is consequently sent for. Now, Kṛṣṇa apologises to her and prays for her favour :—

मद्योगिवेशमपरं परिपश्य राधे,
मानं स्वदासविषये त्यज सुन्दरि त्वम् ।
नो चेत् प्रिये रविसुतासलिले मरिष्ये,
मानं भविष्यति वृथा मयि राजकन्ये ॥७६॥

Then both of them proceed towards their beloved bower, Rādhā's eyes feasting on the beauty of Kṛṣṇa's eyes. The consequent pleasure of Rādhā and her solicitations at once remind one of the *Bhāva-sammelana* songs of Vidyāpati.

The date of the work as given in both the MSS. is as follows : शैलचन्द्ररसरसशाके मानतरंगिणी। श्रीनन्देन कृता माघे श्रीनन्दानन्ददायिनो ॥ As 6617 S'aka year does not mean anything, probably 1766 S'aka i.e. 1834 A.D. is to be acceptecd as the date of composition of the work. The reading 'रसरस' seems to be wrong[1].

The work reveals that the author was a resident of Navadvīpa and pupil of one Gaṅgādhara. It is not an ancient work ; its devotional fervour and simple style are nevertheless striking. The readings of the MS. at hand present some difficulties, which are evidently due to the carelessness of the scribe. As mentioned before, the value of the MS. remains in its presentation of the *Rādhāmāna-bhañjana* as known in Bengal to Sanskrit scholars everywhere. Unfortunately, no other work by the author has yet come to light.

1. The original reading might have been शैलरसरसचन्द्रशाके etc., i.e. 1697 S'aka, the first रस having a reference to the nine sentiments in literature and the second रस indicating the six flavours—ED.

Authorship and Date of Bhagavadgītā

By

P. C. DIVANJI, Bombay.

1. *Bhagavadgītā* is looked upon in India as a work of special importance from a time prior to the time of S'aṅkarācārya because in his bhāṣya (III. 2) there is a reference to an earlier commentary thereon establishing the view that it advocates the doctrine that freedom from transmigration can be achieved by following the path of knowledge combined with that of action (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*). In the West it was unknown till Charles Wilkins translated it into English in 1785 at the instance of the East India Company. Still it was not until Schlegel, a German scholar, edited it critically with a Latin translation that it attracted the attention of the Western scholars. It has been since translated into all the European languages and even into the Japanese[1]. Telang, who translated it into English (S.B.E. Series, No. VIII), has, in the Introduction, considered the question of the probable date of the composition of the work and recorded his conclusion that the said date must be earlier than that of the *Dharmasūtra of Āpastamba*, which Bühler had, in his Introduction to the translation of that work (S. B. E. Series, No. XIV), placed it in the 4th or 5th century B.C. Holtzmann, propounded the view that the work contained clear evidence of its being a work of two authors, one of whom expounded the philosophical doctrine of the *Sāṅkhyas* and the other, the bhakti doctrine of the *Bhāgavatas*; and that whereas the original *Gītā* had been composed for the former purpose only, the present one is a revised edition thereof with the doctrine of the Bhāgavata cult loosely grafted on it. Garbe embodied the result of his examination of this question in his Introduction to his German translation of the work, split up into two groups, the first of which he postulated as the original *Gītā*. The stanzas translated in the first group are those which hold forth devotion to Vāsudeva as the means for the attainment of freedom from the bondage of saṃsāra and of the highest bliss and peace of mind; while those translated in the second one are those in which knowledge and meditation have been held forth as the means for the attainment of the same end. He supported his view by tracing the history of the Bhāgavata religion, which, according to him, originated earlier than the *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Vedānta* and *Karmamīmāṃsā* doctrines, which were drawn upon by the

1. M. Winternitz : *The History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I. pp. 426-27.

reviser for establishing a synthesis between them. Agreeable to this view, he put down the work in its present form in the 2nd century A. D., and in its original form in the 2nd century B.C[1]. Bhandarkar, though agreeing with the view that the *Gītā* had been originally composed for providing a canonical work to the followers of the Bhāgavata or Sātvata religion, does not agree in looking upon the work in its present form as a revised edition of an original shorter work and treats it as a work which had remained in the same form in which it had been originally composed and fixes for it a date that could not be later than the beginning of the 4th century B. C[2]. Winternitz has expressed his agreement with Edgerton's vaguest view that the *Gītā* might have been composed before the Christion Era, but not much before it[3].

2. It is strange that none of these scholars has discussed the authorship of the work. In my view that question is intimately connected with that of the date of the work. It would not be reasonable to hold forth a date as correct which it may not be possible to support by a reference to the existence about that time of a person who can probaly have been its author. The *Gītā*, according to our tradition, is a work of the sage Vyāsa. A merely general doubt as to the authorship of all the works of the pre-classical period would not be entitled to much weight in the case of the *Gītā* at least, because even those who look upon it in its present form as revised edition of an older work, have come to the conclusion that the original *Gītā* must have formed part of the original *Bhārata*[4]. Therefore, we can confidently say that it, in its original form, whatever that might have been, was composed by Vyāsa. The questions that now remain for investigation are (1) the indentity of Vyāsa and (2) the time when he can be reasonably believed to have lived. As regards the first, the Ādiparvan of the *Mahābhārata* leaves very little room for a doubt, because besides stating the name 'Vyāsa', it also gives his personal name as 'Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana' or simple 'Dvaipāyana'. He was none other than Vyāsa (literally meaning the *arranger*) who collected together the Vedic hymns and arranged them in the form of the Saṃhitā. The Epic too calls itself Saṃhitā of the *Bhārata-Itihāsa*[5]. In another *Parvan* of the same Epic[6], he is spoken of as have been born of Satyavatī by

1. Introduction to *The Bhagavadgīta* by Garbe, translated into English by N. B. Udgikar of Poona, pp. 30-33.
2. *The Vaiṣṇavism, S'aivism and Other minor Sects* p. 18.
3. *op. cit.* p. 438, fn. 1.
4. Garbe, *ibid.* pp. 4, 12-13.
5. Critical edition, Poona, I. 1. 15-29.
6. S'āntiparvan III. 177. 2-5.

the sage Parāśara of the Vasiṣṭha Gotra. Even though it is true that there had been several Vyāsas[1] and that the Saṃhitās of the first three Vedas had been compiled by other Brāhmaṇas also[2], there should be no difficulty in identifying the author of the *Bhārata* epic and, therefore, also of the *Bhagavadgītā* in their original forms.

3. The question of the identity of Vyāsa of *Bhārata* epic has become somewhat confounding only because the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* treats the said sage as identical with Bādarāyaṇa and calls his son S'uka, Bādarāyaṇi[3]. The basis of this identification seems to be that the former had, according to that Purāṇa itself, been living in a hermitage situated in the midst of badara or badarī (jujube) trees situated on the bank of the river Sarasvatī[4]. The clearest proof of their being two distinct personalities living in two ages separated from each other by a long distance of time is, however, afforded by the fact that the *Smṛti* referred to in *Brahmasūtra* I. 2. 6; 3. 22; II. 3. 45; III. 2. 17 and IV 1. 10 is, according to S'aṅkara, the *Bhagavadgītā*. He has supported this identification by actually quoting the relevant stanzas from the *Gītā* (i. e. XVIII. 61, XIII. 2, XV. 6, 12; XV. 7; XIII. 12 and VI. 11, respectively). He has also made it clear that the word *Brahma-sūtra* (G. XIII. 4) does not refer to the *S'ārīrakasūtra* but to the Upaniṣads[5]. And, he seems to be right because the said sūtra work could not have been composed earlier than *Bhagavadgītā*. That this must have been in his mind is clear from the fact that he refers, in his bhāṣya on the sūtra, to the two writers by different appellations. Thus, in his bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra* I. 3. 29, 33; II. 1. 1; 3. 29, 47 and III 3. 32 he speaks of the author of the Great epic as the *sage*—Veda Vyāsa, Vyāsa, Dvaipāyana, while in that on I. 1. 2; II. 1. 14, 37, 42; III. 1. 1; 3. 28, 57; 4. 1, 19; IV. 1. 12, 17; 2. 1, 3. 14; 4. 7 he speaks of the author of the *Brahmasūtra* as 'Bhagavān Sutrakāra' and 'Ācārya', never even once as a Ṛṣi (*sage*). The sūtra too refers to its author's views as distinguished from those of the other thinkers of the Mīmāṃsā schools by the name 'Bādarāyaṇa' in I. 3. 26, 33. III. 2. 41, 4. 1, 8, 19, IV. 3. 15, 4. 7, 12, and not even once as Dvaipāyana Vyāsa whose *Smṛti* has been twice drawn upon in sūtra for supporting the author's view[5]. According to a well-established tradition again, Veda Vyāsa had, after compiling the Saṃhitās of the Veda and the Aitihāsika tradition taught those of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* and the *Bhārata-itihāsa*

1. *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* III. 3; *Yogavasiṣṭha*, II. 3. 21-31.
2. Pargiter : *Indian Historical Tradition*, p. 316.
3. *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, I. 1. 7; 4. 14-25; XII. 6. 8-80.
4. *Op. cit.*, I. 7. 1-2.
5. Cf. Br. Su. II. 3. 47, III. 1. 14 and S'aṅkara's bhāṣya thereon (N. S. P. edition, pp. 624, 673).

to Vais'ampāyana just as he taught the others to the other pupils of his[1]. This Vais'ampāyana taught the *Saṃhitā* of the said Veda to his nephew and pupil, Yājñavalkya Daivarāti who afterwards quarrelled with him and vomitted out the *Saṃhitā*. He, then propitiated the Sun and was able to compile his own *S'ukla Yajurveda-Saṃhitā*. That being so, Dvaipāyana must have lived at least 50 years earlier than Yājñavalkya and his *Bhārata-Saṃhitā*, of which the *Gītā* formed a part, must be of an earlier date than Yājñavalkya's *Yajurveda-Saṃhitā* and also than the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Īs'a Upaniṣads*, in the former of which Yājñavalkya is chief exponent of the nature of the *Ātman* and *Brahman* and the latter of which forms the 40th Adhyāya of the said *Saṃhitā*.

4. On the other hand, Bādarāyaṇa has, in his *Brahmasūtra*, tried to establish his *Vedānta* system by bringing about a reconciliation of the apparently divergent statements contained in the texts of not only the said *Upaniṣads* but also of other later ones which show an influence of the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine, renunciation. Not only that but even the theories of the S'ūnyavādins and Kṣaṇikavijñānavādins, established in their Sanskrit works only, were known to and refuted by Bādarāyaṇa[2]. These vādas had come into existence considerably later than the division of the Buddhists into the followers of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna schools and that division had again taken place after several previous schools had arisen and been extinguished[3]. The author of the *Brahmasūtra* must, therefore, have lived considerably later than not only the age in which the said Upaniṣads were compiled but also that in which the later Buddhist vādas established in Sanskrit works had originated.

5. Further, the fact that Bādarāyaṇa refers at several places in his *sūtra* the views of one, Jaimini, on several topics[4] is an eloquent proof of his being either of a later or of the same date as Jaimini. Most probably the latter was the case, because his views there referred to are such as presuppose a knowledge on his part of almost all the texts of the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads known to Bādarāyaṇa. That being so and the earliest sage of that name known to Sanskrit literature being only the pupil of Veda Vyāsa whom he had taught the *Sāmaveda*[5], this Jaimini must have lived in an age considerably later than that in which Veda Vyāsa could have lived; and consequently Bādarāyaṇa must not only be distinct from the latter, but must also have lived in a very later age than him.

1. *Bha.-Pu.* XII. 6. 52 ; Pargiter, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-25.
2. *Br.-Sū.* II. 2. 18-22 ...... and S'aṅkara's bhāṣya thereon.
3. Divanji : Introduction to the *Siddhantabindu* (G. O. Series No. 64) pp. 22-25.
4. *Br.-Sū.* I. 2. 28, 31 ; 3. 31 ; 4. 18 ; III. 2. 40 ; 4. 2, 18, 40 ; IV. 3. 12 ; 4. 5.
5. Pargiter, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-25.

6. Veda Vyāsa, the compiler of the Vedic Saṃhitās and the author of the *Bhārata* epic in its original form being thus clearly distinguishable from Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa, the author of the *Brahmasūtra*, and there being no other Vyāsa during the period intervening between them, the date of *Bhagavadgītā* must necessarily be the same as that of the former sage and that of the said compilations and the Epic. The date of the Epic again must necessarily be very near that of the Bhārata war itself because Veda Vyāsa was the father by niyogavidhi of Pāṇḍu, Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Vidura and one of the elders who consoled Yudhiṣṭhira when he fell dejected after he was installed on the throne of Hastinapur on the termination of the war. Various attempts have been made to fix the date of the said war. Mr. Vaidya concluded that it must be 3102 B. C[1]. That must be the date also according to the Yudhiṣṭhira era which is still current in some parts of India as in Kāśmīra. This is, however, based on astronomical grounds only which are not free from errors. According to literary traditional evidence recorded in the Paurāṇic works, Pargiter has come to the conclusion that it must be about 950 B. C[2]. This is, however, due to his having allowed 18 to 20 years to each monarch intervening between Pārīkṣiti II, the successor of Yudhiṣṭhira and Mahāpadma Nanda. Sitanath Pradhan having considered the same question from several view-points, including the lists of Vedic teachers, has arrived at the conclusion that the Bhārata war must have occurred in about 1150 B. C[3]. If the period for each reign of the 26 kings of Magadha from Senajit, a contemporary of Adhisīmakṛṣṇa is taken to be 25 years, which, in my view, is the only proper period, and the total period of 650 years thus arrived at, is added to the 382 years prior to the Christian era when Mahāpadma can be believed to have ascended the throne, the total comes to 1032 B. C. And if to this 100 more years are added on account of the four predecessors of Adhisīma upto Parīkṣita II, the date of his accession comes to 1132 B. C. Adding 36 years of the reign of Yudhiṣṭhira himself we arrive at 1168 B. C. as the approximate date of the Bhārata war. This is very near the date arrived at, by Sitanath Pradhan and roughly accords with the interpretation of the chronological data, as given in the Purāṇas so as to point to an interval of 1050 years between Parīkṣita and Mahāpadma. Dr. Altekar of Benares, has,

1. M. Winternitz, *op. cit.*, p. 473.

2. *Op. cit.* pp. 179-83. H.C. Roy Chaudhari (*Political History of India* 4th edn. pp. 27-29.) relying on the *vaṃśa* lists given in the *Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka* and *Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhya Sūtra* has fixed 850 B. C. as the probable date of the said war.

3. *Chronology of Ancient India* (Cal. 1927) pp. 169-75, 268-69. See also Triveda: The *Intervening Age between Parīkṣita and Nanda.* (*Journal of Indian History* Vol. XIX. pt. I pp. 1-16).

while accepting this interpretation pushed back this date by 232 years, i. e. he takes 1400 B. C. to be the probable date of the war, for reasons which are not clear from his address[1] at the Historical Congress, 1939. The collection of the epic ballads into the *Bhārata-Saṃhitā* can, therefore, reasonably be deemed to have been made about 1150 B. C. and that would also be the approximate date of the *Bhagavadgītā* which formed part of that *Saṃhitā*. This date is, in my opinion, quite consistent with the work being of the authorship of Veda Vyāsa, the post-Vedic sage, who collected together the Vedic hymns and formulas. A detailed critical and comparative examination of the linguistic, literary, philosophic and other varied contents of the *Bhagavadgītā*, is absolutely necessary with a view to show that there is nothing at all in the work which is inconsistent with its being a work of the 12th century B. C. Obviously, this detailed examination cannot be attempted within the space at our disposal here and has, therefore, to be left for being taken up on some other occasion.

1. Presidential Address, Archaic Section, Indian History Congress, Calcutta, 1939.

Modern Hindi Literature : A Critical Survey

By

GAURISHANKAR, *Hoshiarpur.*

All literature represents the spirit of the age in which it is written, and one need not be a Marxist to believe that there exists a profound relationship between the socio-political environment and the personality of the author. Modern Indian thought has been, profoundly, influenced by the scientific, utilitarian and individualistic outlook of the West, and the strong nationalistic trend in our politics is itself the direct product of Western liberalism. Besides, the growing industrialisation of the country has created a host of social and economic problems demanding the attention of writers. Modern Hindi literature during the last sixty years of its development has, as may be expected, reflected the reactions of our poets, play-wrights, novelists and short story writers to these altered conditions, and no interpretation of this literature, which fails to take this vital fact into consideration, can be correct and comprehensive.

Poetry

In poetry the immediate reaction against Westernism has resulted in a number of tendencies and movements. To view these from the proper perspective, one must understand the social and cultural changes that have taken place in the life of the people. Four main currents may be discerned. Nationalism, mysticism, and Vaiṣṇavism which are old and have found expression in a variety of forms, and pessimism. The heroic poetry of the past, for instance, is an old expression of the spirit of nationalism. It contributed to the regeneration of the people by arousing martial sentiments among warriors of the feudal order of society. *Khumān Rāso, Pṛthvīrāja Rāso* and other minor creations wheel round the characters of kings and their queens, their victories and defeats, and, also, their love and romance. They brim with heroic sentiments, which vitalised the life of the people in a period of conflict with foreign invaders.

In the ninth and tenth centuries, the conflict between the Indian chiefs and Muslim invaders grew and spread, and it continued to the end of the thirteenth century. In this stage of feudal social development and an atmosphere of war, the birth of poetry characterised by heroic and nationalistic sentiments was inevitable to arouse the common man against foreign invasions. This was the first cycle of heroic and nationa-

listic poetry. Its second cycle coincided with the reign of Aurangzeb. Bhūṣaṇa wrote heroic verses, glorifying the victories and exploits of Shivajee who embodied the spirit of revolt and rebellion, and who became the champion of the Hindu community. He deplored the disruptive tendencies which had disintegrated the community, and became its national poet; but his was not a cosmopolitan nationalism. The third phase of nationalistic poetry began with the year 1885, land mark in the political history of this country. The Indian National Congress met for the first time to voice the national consciousness of upper middle classes. The Aryan culture, which was intimately associated with nationalism, reasserted itself in the minds of the people. Svāmī Dayānanda was the leader of protestant Hinduism, Svāmī Vivekānanda of Neo—Hinduism, and a host of other leaders stood for the revival of ancient culture. Lokamānya Tilak in the beginning of the present century saved orthodox culture by an aggressive national spirit and political action. His was a unique blend of political radicalism and social reaction, which shaped the nationalistic poetry of the third cycle. *Bhārata Bhārati* (1913) was a symbolic expression of this type of nationalistic poetry. Maithilīṣaraṇa Gupta, the apostle of protestant Hinduism in poetry, described in his works the glorious culture of ancient India and the contemporary urge for freedom. The fourth phase began in 1921 and round about it—an extraordinary period for the country. There was a strange mixture of nationalism and religion and mysticism. Mahātmā Gāndhi seemed to cast a spell on all classes and groups of people, and drew them into one motley crowd struggling forward in one direction. The poetry of this period began to reflect the nationalistic aspirations of the people. The Pratap school of poetry encouraged the use of new metres and themes tinged with the new spirit of nationalism. Makhanlal Chaturvedi, Siyaramsharan Gupta, Rāmnaresh Tripāthi and many other poets were inspired by the Congress ideology of non-violence. They wrote inspiring songs of patriotism, of sacrifice, of love for the motherland, of freedom from bondage, and thus stirred the people to action. They awakened new hopes and new desires among them. Nationalism in the fourth phase ceased to be sectarian, and became cosmopolitan by embracing all sections and groups of the Indian population. The non-violent ideology was characteristic of the latest phase of nationalistic poetry, but it does not remain the last phase of this tendency in modern Hindi poetry. The final phase is yet in a germinal form, but it gravitates towards a people's poetry with its emphasis on the exploitation of the poor peasant and worker who must rise up to build a new world free from want and fear.

Mysticism, which is another dominant tendency in modern Hindi poetry, was expressed as early as the 15th century. Kabīra was a powerful

personality who revived it as a reaction against the increasing formalism of the orthodox cult. It was also meant to bring about a cultural synthesis, between the two warring religious communities, by stressing on their common and essential articles of faith. Jayasi, later on, reinforced this tendency by striking a softer and more delicate note in his poetry to achieve the same object. Rabīndra Nātha Tagore is the modern mystic poet who has exercised a far-reaching influence on contemporary Hindi poets. Prasād, Pant, Mahādevi Varmā, Nirālā, and other poets are driven to mysticism as an escape from harsh reality. They stressed and are stressing on the idealisation of the past and love of nature. Vaiṣṇav-ism is an off-shoot of this mystic tendency in poetry, and so also romance. The aesthetic revival, therefore, has mostly turned to the past ages in religious and devotional poetry. Bhāratendu Harishchandra, for instance, has revived the poetry of devotional writers who once dominated the poetry of all the Indian languages. He has contributed about 1500 songs, anticipating lyrical tendency with its hopes and fears, its loves and regrets, its joys and sorrows, its ideas and ideals, in a mood of feminine abandonment. The human note has come to dominate the religious, while the spiritual has been intimately woven into the human. Maithilī Sharaṇa Gupta (*Saketa*) and Ayodhyā Singh Upādhyāya (*Priya Pravāsa*) have reinforced this tendency by modernising the epic tales of Rāma and Kṛiṣṇa in modern poetry. Prasād, who is a pioneer of mysticism, has voiced his protest against the mechanistic materialism of the age. His art is inwardly mystical and philosophical. *Kāmāyanī* is the consummation of his mystical attitude to the problems of life.

Pant is responsible, to some extent, for the growing tendency to describe human emotions in isolation, away from the city and its civilisation. Mahādevī Varmā, also, avoids everyday reality to find a higher reality in the midst of natural environment. There has been an increase in the imaginative content of poetry. Patriotic poetry at its best is written around cheap sentiment. It may be described as kettle-drum poetry.

The only genuine note is struck by the pessimists. A note of despair and frustration is perhaps inevitable in the poetry of people who have been suppressed for ages. Chakori, Tārā Pāndeya, Mahādevī, Hṛdayesha, Bacchan and a host of others have contributed their share to the pessimistic tendency in poetry. The modern poets have tried new experiments in verse, and they have also modified the old forms of verse to satisfy their claims to be free artists, to be guided by their own poetic conscience rather than by the rigid and artificial moulds in which all thoughts and emotions had to be expressed. Modern Hindi poetry may be fine, elegant, dainty, but it does not reach those heights which are its legitimate inheritance—Tulsī, Sūra, Jāyasī and Kabīra.

The modern poets have yet to discover the true secret of great poetry, although they have made immense advances in the technique of expression.

Drama

The dramatic literature is comparatively poor in its range and quality. The absence of a regular stage, the popularity of the screen, and the increasing demand for broadcasting plays have hindered the growth of stage plays. The movement for a people's theatre has not yet captured the imagination of writers and spectators. The social customs do not encourage women to participate in the production of plays on the stage. Moreover, it does not pay to establish theatres even in large cities. All these factors have hindered the growth of dramatic literature, except for a few farces, melodramas, historical and problem plays which have been written either as textbooks for students or as experiments in the realm of drama. Three main influences have been at work in fashioning the modern Hindi play : (i) the theory and practice of classical drama, (ii) the mediaeval performances in villages and (iii) the Western plays. In the beginning of Indian Renaissance the playwrights were stirred by Western dramatists.

Attempts were made at translations of foreign plays (Shakespeare's plays), and also at original plays with themes from mythology far removed from the exigencies of real life. Romantic tendency predominated for three main reasons : (i) a yearning for the remote past as a purely cultural revival, (ii) a reactionary force symbolising the spirit of protest and revenge against the domination of Western civilisation and (iii) the psychology of escape from the present day civilisation. Bhāratendu Harish Chandra, Prasāda, Sudarshana and a few others belonged to the romantic school of writers. A reaction against the material civilisation of the West has been expressed in the form of crude farces and satires. Badrī Nātha Bhatta and G. P. Shrīvāstava are the main exponents of the satirical tendency in dramatic literature. Their works are characterised by episodic plots, inconsistent characterisation and cheap satire. It has been a negative attempt on the part of these writers to fight against the onslaughts of capitalist civilisation which was bound to disintegrate the feudal attitude to life. A positive reaction has manifested itself in the revival of India's glorious history. The popularity of historical themes can be attributed to those dramatists who have sought to interpret history in the light of altered conditions, and, thereby, satisfy the increasing demand for nationalism. Dvijendra Lal Ray, the Bengali dramatist, exercised a deep influence in shaping the form and content of historical plays in Hindi. Jayashankara Prasāda in 1921, a

significant year, entered the field and wrote plays in which characterisation was always subordinated to incident and plot. He was so completely lost in the maze of historical facts that he sacrificed the more valuable features of plot-construction, characterisation and naturalness of dialogue. Jagannātha Prasada, Harikṛshṇa Premi and Udaya Shankara Bhatta have contributed their share to the historical tendency in dramatic literature, but the documentation of historical events is less real than the actual observations of contemporary life. The writers have turned their attention to a world susceptible of a realistic treatment. A spirit of inquiry has compelled them to analyse the existing social order. Lakshmi Nārāyan Mishra, Govinda Dāsa Seth and a few others, who have contributed problem-plays, have been profoundly influenced by Ibsen, Shaw, Galworthy and the naturalistic school of play-wrights. All the modern Hindi plays are not of a high literary order. A sad dearth of great dramatic creations has already been referred to.

Fiction

The modern Hindi literature can justly be proud of the range and quality of its fiction. The novel and the short story, as distinct form of literature, are almost a foreign product. In the earliest stages of its growth, fiction has been chiefly romantic in its contents. Devakīnandana Khatri was one of the earliest novelists, who set the ball rolling by writing the serial romantic novel. *Candrakāntā* (1891) shows how a romantic prince falls in love with a beautiful princess and how obstacles are placed in the way of their love which eventually result in their marriage. The novel is full of plots and counterplots, tricks and countertricks, complicated locks, magical doors, mysterious chambers. It is a world of wonders, miracles, magic and romance. Characterisation is slight. It is the plot which predominates in romantic Hindi fiction. Khatri, Kishori Lal Goswāmī and Gahmari belong to the period of thrillers and detective fiction. They seek to satisfy the craving of the lower middle classes for crude sensation, advanture and wonder.

The historical phase in Hindi fiction is not so rich in variety and content as in drama. It only serves as a gap between the realistic and romantic fiction. It is the Rājapūt period of history which has mostly been exploited for treatment in the historical novel, Vṛndāvan Lāl being the chief writer of historical fiction who has contributed about half a dozen novels. These novels are lacking in historical imagination which is an essential feature of historical art. The author has not been able to reconstruct the past or reproduce the atmosphere to carry conviction. He has experimented with this type of fiction, anticipating the possibilities and potentialities of

interpreting history in the light of altered conditions. The future of the historical novel is full of promise. Only a genius is needed to reconstruct the critical period in the history of India's past. Rāhula has made promising attempts in his novels and short stories, but he is so preoccupied with his pet doctrines, that he sacrifices art to achieve propaganda.

The realistic fiction generally portrays the new middle class with all its characteristics. The characters of this class enjoy greater individual liberty in social and religious matters. Nationalism is the dominant note of their life; compromise and reform are the essential characteristics of their mind. As a consequence of the rationalistic outlook, realism has become a dominant tendency of middle class literature, and specially, of modern Hindi fiction which is a typical art-form of this class. Prem Chand and his contemporaries who belong to the middle classes, espouse a particular standard of morals and use the novel to express their social purpose and social criticism. In doing so, they have departed much from the ideals of objective realism. Prem Chand, who is the pioneer of realistic fiction, represents the idealistic reaction by the spirit which animates his works. He is also progressive in his attitude to the problems of life. A conflict between reaction and revolution characterises his art. He is the first Hindi novelist who has treated the peasants and the lower middle classes in an earnest and sincere manner. He studies them from the sentimental angle of a middle class writer. Prem Chand's attitude towards the peasant has been one of pity or idealisation. He belongs to the school of sentimental realism. His novels can easily be divided into two distinct groups, one which deals exclusively with middle-class life, the other which deals predominantly with the peasant in the midst of *bourgeois* environment. *Sevāsadana*, *Pratijñā*, *Nirmalā*, *Godāna* are agrarian epics in which the peasant marks the central situation. *Kāyākalpa* is a class by itself. It is a hotchpotch of many themes, and the fundamental is one which seeks to explore the philosophical and spiritual basis of life. *Sevāsadana* deals with the problem of prostitution and the evil consequences of the dowry system which spells disaster for a family and which finally compels the heroine in the novel to adopt a life of sin and shame. *Pratijñā* and *Nirmalā* deal with the problem of marriage which proves a failure under unhealthy circumstances. *Gabana* is essentially a novel of characterisation. It describes the love of a married couple whose happiness is threatened by an excessive love of ornaments on the part of the wife and an excessive sense of false vanity on the part of the husband. The agrarian epics are devoted to the study of agrarian problems. The peasant invariably occupies the centre of the stage. *Premāśrama* treats the peasant as a victim of exploitation by the land-

lord and his agents. *Raṅgabhūmi* deals with the exploitation of the poor man by the agents of industrialism; *Godāna* describes the story of ruthless exploitation of the peasant by the moneylender; *Karmabhūmi* relates the poverty and misery of the untouchables who, are the worst victims of social injustice and oppression. Prem Chand has painted for us, with superb skill, the life of peasants and lower middle class people. His novels are a crusade against all forms of feudal and *bourgeois* exploitation of the peasants and workers. The author feels the woes of the peasants and of the poor so acutely that he seems to tremble at the injustices of the rich. His socialism is based on a deep respect for human personality and dignity. He believes in equal opportunities for all. As he has seen the stark realities, the iron has entered his soul. It lends his novels a high emotional tone. His fundamental aim is not characterisation but essentially reformation. The range of his characters is no doubt wide, but he is seldom successful with his upper middle classes. He is a great novelist of the lower middle classes and the peasants, but his fiction retains the ideology of the middle class because he treats the peasants with feelings of pity which is characteristic of this class. As already remarked he belongs to the school of sentimental realism.

Kaus'ika (V.N.), Pratāpa Nārāyaṇa Shrīvāstava, Sarvadānanda Varmā, Pahāri, Bhagawatī Charaṇa Varmā, Jinendra Kumāra, Rādhikāramaṇa and many others have continued the realistic tendency in fiction and improved upon its technique and expression. Kaus'ika has a firmer hold on life because he is interested more in the portrayal of life than in its reformation. Pratāpa Nārāyaṇa Shrīvāstava confines himself to the portrayal of the upper strata of the middle class, its intelligensia. Sarvadānanda Varmā invariably emphasises on the sexual relationships of characters in his novels. Pahāri and Bhagawatī Charaṇa are essentially story-tellers, giving psychological touches to motivation and characterisation. Jinendra is an individualistic anarchist, who is so preoccupied with the inner world of emotions that he loses touch with the outside world. He is difficult and obscure as a result of this tendency in his fiction. Rādhikāramaṇa relishes the poetic and rhythmic expression in portraying the problems of middle class life. Almost all realistic fiction centres round the treatment of love in its slightly different forms.

The short story, as a distinct literary art-form of recent growth, is also preoccupied with the same theme and the same class on a shortened canvas. The rush of mordern life, the enormous development of periodical literature, the newness of the literary form and its claim to replace the novel, have made it greatly popular. It has a great future because Indian social life, with all its restrictions of

social contact and conflict, is more easily represented on a shortened canvas. A regular flood of short stories can be witnessed in journals, magazines, and books. It is difficult to assess the merit of all these stories, but they bear the stamp of journalism, which has moulded their technique and determined their form and theme. They are usually cast in the moulds already fixed by the editors and publishers. Prem Chand and Kaus'ika began with the social short story, which has been enriched and impoverished by a large number of story writers. As regards the potrayal of the middle class life in fiction, its potentialities are limited and they are soon being exhausted. A section of writers, therefore, is discovering the possibilities of treating the destinies of the new working class and the old peasant in the novels and the short story. Attempts are also being made to interpret the past not in the spirit of idealisation, but in the light of revolutionary realism which seeks to portray life from the angle of the worker and the peasant. Rāhula and Yashapāla have anticipated the nature of its growth in fiction. The new heroes of fiction are determined fighters, creative labourers, and progressive thinkers who have made up their mind to build up a new world based on equal opportunities for all. They struggle for economic democracy in their own social context and environment. It is a historical necessity in the march of social development, and it will considerably enrich Hindi fiction, provided the writers try to be creative artists rather than abstract doctrinaires. The past and the present have to be depicted from the new angle of socialist realism. Prem Chand was gravitating towards this progressive literature, which is the latest brand in Hindi letters. As yet the possibilities of critical realism, which is typical of middle class literature, have not been completely exhausted; but with the emergency of new social forces and a new social consciousness, the writers are tending more and more towards progressive literature.

Further Light on the Date of Kālidāsa

By

M. V. KIBE, *Indore.*

Scholars have uprooted the sheet anchor of Indian History, fixed by Sir William Jones, in the year 1795, viz. the contemporaneousness of Alexander the Great and Chandra Gupta Maurya[1]. In another place[2], I have tried to show that Skanda Gupta, whose age has been fixed in the 1st century B. C., was the founder of the Vikrama Era. C. V. Vaidya mentions[3] that according to different scholars the date of Kālidāsa is fixed from 50 B. C. to 500 A. D. Thus, there is a vast interval between the two dates, which make Kālidāsa a contemporary of the founder of the Vikramaditya and of the Gupta period, respectively. Since there had existed uncertainty about even the existence of Vikramāditya in the 1st century B. C., the greater number of scholars held the latter view. My paper referred to above reconciles both the facts. In another paper[4], I have based my argument on the statement of Prof. V.S. Agrawala, that the particularly shaped *kuṇḍalas* known as **प्राकारवप्र** are to be found in the ears of images of 200 B. C. upto the Shunga period only. These are mentioned in *Mahābhārata* (**विराटपर्व**). But in his *Kumārasambhava* (IX. 23) : **रथस्य कर्णाविभिसंमुखस्य ताटंकचक्र** etc., Kālidāsa refers to **ताटंकचक्र** '*kuṇḍalas*', which were not in existence before the Gupta period. This leads me to support the view that Kālidāsa's age must be 1st century B. C.

There is a piece of internal evidence which, more than all those that have gone before, fixes the date of Kālidāsa in the above period. As quoted by Prof. V. S. Agrawala[5], 'Patañjali (on p. III. 2. 108) tells us that Kautsa waited upon Pāṇini as a disciple'; further 'The Kās'ikā supplements the information by adding that Kautsa resided with Pāṇini'. In the course of the same paper Prof. Agrawala says, 'Patañjali was a contemporary of Pushya Mitra Shunga (c. 180 B. C.). Kālidāsa in the 1st stanza of the 5th Sarga of *Raghuvaṃśa* refers to this Kautsa as a

1. Dr. Triveda : Sheet Anchor of Indian History (A. B. O. R. I. Jubilee Number, pp. 581-592).

2. 'Who was the founder of the Vikrama Era' *the Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute,* Allahabad, Vol. I. pp. 417-422 (1944).

3. *The History of Sanskrit Literature,* Poona, p. 19.

4. Vikrama, Ujjain, p. 32.

5. *The Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute,* Vol. II. P. 111 (1945.)

disciple of Varatantu (कौत्सः प्रपेदे वरतन्तुशिष्यः). C. V. Vaidya[1] says that Varatantu's name is not found in *Caraṇavyūha* and that, therefore, he is not a मंत्रद्रष्टा. This apparently contradicts the positive statement of Kālidāsa, who refers to Varatantu as अप्यग्रणीर्मन्त्रकृता-मृषीणाम् 'the foremost Ṛṣi among those who made the *mantras*'. But Kālidāsa lived in times in which *mantras*, if meaning Vedic Ṛks, were दृष्ट '*seen*' and not कृत '*made*'. Therefore, when he uses the expression मंत्रकृत् in respect of Varatantu, the meaning must be taken to be something else. If Kautsa was a disciple of Pāṇini, then the word *mantra* here is equivalent to *sūtra*, the nature of both of which is the same, viz. brevity. Varatantu may or may not be identified with Pāṇini on other grounds; but if Patañjali is to be literally taken to mean that Kautsa was a disciple of Pāṇini, then the two may be identified[2]. Anyhow, Patañjali's mention of Kautsa, as a prominent figure, may be taken to imply that Kālidāsa mentioned this name as in relation to a recent reference to a previous occurence. If Patañjali was in 180 B.C[3]. or 150 B.C[4]. Kālidāsa may not be later than him by more than a century, i.e. 58 B. C.

1. *supra cit*,. III. page 134.

2. But Patañjali and Kālidāsa may have in mind two entirely different persons with the same patronymic Kautsa, in which case these forced indentifications will lose all point E. F.

3. V. S. Agrawala, *supra cit.*

4. C. V. Vaidya, *supra cit.*

The Chronological Position of a Ceylon Chronicle

By

B. C. LAW, *Calcutta*.

The *Dīpavaṃsa*, which is the earliest chronicle of Ceylon, is no doubt an important work, which requires a very close study. In the following pages an attempt has been made to discuss its chronology.

The main reason, advanced for regarding this Pali chronicle of Ceylon as a work of antiquity, is that it stand—as distinguished from the rest which are chronologically later—as the literary production of a school or community, and not as the composition of an individual author. It is considered to be the outcome of a fairly large number of previous works, none of which had any special author.

According to Oldenberg, the *Dīpavaṃsa* cannot have been written before 302 A. D[1]. The important question, which arises at the outset, is what was the exact form of this chronicle, when king Dhātusena caused it to be recited in public, year after year, during the Mahinda festival ? To put it in other words, did the narrative of the *Dīpavaṃsa*, as it was then known, extend beyond the advent of Mahinda in the island and the establishment of the Good Faith through his efforts ? Evidently it did not extend beyond this great event in the early history of Ceylon. It is also not quite correct to say that this chronicle is not the work of any individual author. Let us see what light its opening verses throw on its contents and author.

The enumeration of the themes of the *Dīpavaṃsa* in its earlier form is equally important for the reason that it does not take us beyond the establishment of the Buddhist Order in the island by Mahinda and Saṃghamittā. This chronicle in its present form closes, like Mahānāma's great work, with the reign of Mahāsena. The subject-matters of its earlier form go only to suggest that the chronicle grew up into its present form by stages. Even it seems possible that the *Dīpavaṃsa* in its first stage closed with Ch. VIII of which the concluding verse reads :—

लङ्कादीपवरं गन्त्वा महिन्दो अत्तपञ्चमो ।
सासनं थावरम् कत्वा मोचेसि बन्धना बहु ॥

This verse would seem sufficient for the subject of *sāsanapatiṭṭhā* dealt with in the chronicle in its first stage, the description being quite in keeping with those of other Buddhist missions. That which follows and

1. Oldenberg : *Dīpavaṃsa*, Intro., pp. 8-9.

fills as many as nine *bhāṇavāras*, Chh. IX-XVII, is just a later elaboration of the matter. The recitation of the chronicle concluded with an account of the death of Mahinda, and its sequel would be enough and appropriate for the Mahinda festival in Dhātusena's time :—

कतं सरीरनिक्खेपं महिन्दं दीपजोतकं ।
इसिभूमी ति तं नामं समञ्ञा पठमं अहू ॥

The themes mentioned in the prologue leave out of account the Mahārājavaṃsa contained in Ch. III. This at once appears to have been a separate entity, the absence of which would not cause any break in the historical narration of the events, rather its presence interferes with the continuity.

A version of the *Dīpavaṃsa*, as known to the Theras of the Mahāvihāra, is presupposed by the general introduction to the Vinaya-Commentary called the *Samantapāsādikā*. It is interesting to find that the history of Buddhism given in it is closed precisely with the account of the foundation of the Buddhist Holy Order in the island by Mahinda and his sister Saṃghamittā.

There are two other lines of argument by which one may arrive at the conclusion that the *Dīpavaṃsa* history had not extended beyond the reign of Asoka and his Ceylon contemporary, Devānampiya Tissa, even in the second stage of its growth. These are :—

1. That the *Dīpavaṃsa* account of the Buddhist sects is completely silent on the rise of the later sects in Ceylon[1].

2. That there is a great disparity between the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvaṃsa* as regards the rivalry between the monks of the Mahāvihāra and the Abhayagiri monastery, especially the mischievous activity of the wicked Soṇa and the wicked Mitta.

Another important fact, which has bearing upon the question of date of the *Dīpavaṃsa*, is its account of the early Buddhist sects. It is said that each sect with its rise made certain textual changes and adopted certain new rules of discipline.

The details about the various Buddhist sects go to connect even the earlier form of the *Dīpavaṃsa* with an age which is posterior to the *Parivāra* written by Dīpa who was evidently a Thera of Ceylon. The date of composition of the *Parivāra* itself cannot be placed earlier than the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi during whose rule the Pali canonical texts, as handed down

1. *Dīpavaṃsa*, V, 54 ; B. C. Law : *Debates Commentary*, p. 5 ; Barua, *Ceylon Letcures*, p. 84.

by an oral tradition were first caused to be committed to writing[1]. The *Parivāra* embodies a tradition in verse regarding the succession of the Vinaya teachers in Ceylon from the days of Mahinda and his Indian companions. The succession of the leading Theras in Ceylon from the time of Mahinda and that of the leading Therīs from the time of Saṃghamittā given in the *Dīpavaṃsa*, must have been based upon a cherished tradition. This fact may lead us to think that in an earlier stage the *Dīpavaṃsa* was closed with the first half of Ch. XVIII and with the verse 44 which reads :—

इदानि अत्थि अञ्ञायो थेरिका मज्झिमा नवा।
बहुस्सुता सीलसम्पन्ना ओभासेन्ति दीपं इमं ति॥

Here the word *idāni* 'now', which occurs also as the first word of the first verse in Ch. XVIII, is significant. By it the author must have referred to a contemporary state of things.

The mention of the six later Buddhist sects, viz. Hemavatikā, Rājagirikā, Siddhatthā, Pubbaseliyā, Aparaseliyā and Apara Rajagirikā[2], is also important from the chronological point of view. The Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas do not find mention in any Indian inscription earlier than those of Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa. The earlier eighteen and these later sects and schools of thought existed also in the time of Buddhaghoṣa, the author of the *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*.

The author of the *Samantapāsādikā* quotes verbatim the traditional verses from the *Parivāra* concerning the succession of the Vinaya teachers from Mahinda's time. These are sadly missed in the *Dīpavaṃsa* edited by Oldenberg. But the occurrence of such verses regarding the succession of the Vinaya teachers among the Therīs from Saṃghamittā's time suggests that there were similar verses also regarding the succession of the Vinaya teachers among the Theras from Mahinda's time, and it seems quite probable that the verses were quoted in the *Parivāra* from the *Dīpavaṃsa* itself, in which case we have to assume that these were later interpolation in the Vinaya text. If so, the *Dīpavaṃsa*, as presupposed by the general introduction to the Vinaya commentary, must have been concluded with the first half of the Ch. XVIII. The fact, as it stands, may be made clear by a comparison of the succession of the Vinaya Therīs in the *Dīpavaṃsa* with that of the Vinaya Therīs incorporated into the *Parivāra*.

The *Dīpavaṃsa* contains three slightly different traditions regarding Saṃghamittā and the Therīs who accompanied her. According to one[3], Saṃghamittā, Rucānandā, Kanakadattā and Sudhammā were the nuns who carried each a Bo-branch to the island of Ceylon :—

1. Law : *History of Pali Literature*, I., pp. 11 and 13.
2. *Dīpavaṃsa*, V. p. 54.
3. *Ibid.* XVII., pp. 21-22.

रुचानन्दा कनकदत्ता सुधम्मा च महिद्धिका।
बहुस्सुता संघमित्ता छळभिञ्ञा विचक्खणा।
चतस्सो हि भिक्खुनियो सब्बा च बोधिं आहरं।

According to another[1], the Therī Saṃghamittā was accompanied by ten other young nuns, viz. Uttarā, Hemā, Pasādapālā, Aggimittā, Dāsikā, Pheggu, Pabbatā, Mattā, Mallā and Dhammadāsiyā[2]. According to the third[3], the leading Therīs, Mahādevī, Padumā, Hemāsā, Unnalā, Añjali and Sumā accompanied Saṃghamittā together with sixteen thousand nuns. It would seem that the third tradition was really about the nuns who flourished not during the reign of king Devanampiya Tissa, the Ceylon contemporary of As'oka, but during that of some other king of Ceylon who came into power after king Duṭṭhagāmaṇi Abhaya and before Kuṭikaṇṇa Tissa. The three traditions may be reconciled only on the ground that the first of them is concerned with the five Therīs including Saṃghamittā who were placed in charge of the five Bo-branches, the second with eleven young nuns of importance including Saṃghamittā, and the third with the six leading Therīs among the many companions of Saṃghamittā.

The *Dīpavaṃsa* while giving an account of the Therīs, first of all, speaks of the well-known Therīs headed by Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī, who became adepts in Vinaya (*Vinayaññū*) in the Master's life-time. In the second stage it mentions the Therīs, headed by Saṃghamittā, who went to the island of Ceylon in Devānampiya Tissa's time, and recited the five Vinaya books and the seven Abhidhamma treatises in Anurādhapura[4]. Immediately after this, it offers a list of the eminent Therīs of the island who were ordained by the Therīs from India and who became noted for their special attainments. The Therīs of Ceylon are connected with the reign of Kākavaṇṇa Tissa, and those of the next stage with that of his son and successor Duṭṭhagāmaṇi Abhaya. The Therīs of the next are assigned to a period which elapsed after the death of Duṭṭhagāmaṇi, while those of the sixth stage are referred to the time of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya. It lists the leading Viraya Therīs of the island, those connected with the reign of Kuṭikaṇṇa and those with the reign of his son and successor Bhātika Abhaya. It should be noted that the last mentioned king finds a respectful mention in the *Samantapāsādikā*, in connection with a meeting of the monks called by him for the decision of a Vinaya point then in dispute.

1. *Dīpavaṃsa*, XVIII., pp. 11-12.
2. Again, the list in *Dīpavaṃsa*, XV., pp. 77-78, has Māsagalla for Pasādapālā, Tappa for Pheggu, and Mitāvadā for Dāsikā.
3. *Dīpavaṃsa*, XVIII., pp. 24-25.
4. *Ibid*, XVIII., pp. 11-13.

The succession of the Vinaya teachers in the island is traced in the general introduction to the *Samantapāsādikā* from Mahinda and Arittha to the date of composition of the Vinaya commentary, while that cited from the *Parivāra*, and presumably also from the *Dīpavaṃsa*, leads us to think of nineteen eminent successors of Mahinda. The latter may be taken to bring us as far down as the 1st or 2nd century A.D.

Thus there is an earlier form of the *Dīpavaṃsa* which was concluded with the reign of Bhātika Abhaya. It is evident from the prose account in the general introduction to the *Samantapāsādikā* that *Dīpavaṃsa* presupposed by it contained Ch. XVII giving us an account of the visits of Kakusandha and other previous Buddhas to the island when it was known by other names in succession. The *Mahārājavaṃsa*, giving a genealogy of the Ikṣvāku rulers of the Solar race of Khattiyas from Mahāsammata to Suddhodana, which is now contained in Ch. III, appears to have been a separate chronicle by itself, bodily taken into the *Dīpavaṃsa*. In what stage of growth of the *Dīpavaṃsa* it came to be included in, it we cannot say. The introduction to the *Samantapāsādikā* throws no light on this point.

The traditional succession of the Vinaya teachers in the island of Ceylon, as presented in the *Parivāra*, speaks of twentynine generations traced from Mahinda. Unfortunately, the later teachers are not connected with the reign of any kings. Allowing twenty years for the interval between any two successive generations, it is possible to think that the list brings us down to the first quarter of the fourth century of the Christian era. The kings of Ceylon, who find incidental mention in the writings of the great Buddhaghoṣa and in the *Samantapāsādikā*, are none later than Mahānāga or Coranāga, Bhātika, Vāsabha and Sirināga. The career of an eminent Thera called Deva is connected in the *Dīpavaṃsa* with the reign of Tissa, the second son of Sirināga I. If this Thera be no other than the leading Vinaya teacher who figures as the last but one in the above list, it may be concluded that the *Dīpavaṃsa* as known to Buddhaghoṣa closed with the reign of Sirināga I and his two successors. Its final form, concluded with the reign of Mahāsena, was probably reached in the reign of Dhātusena during whose rule it was caused to be publicly recited.

Let us now see what becomes the position of the *Dīpavaṃsa* when it is judged by the introductory verses of the *Mahāvaṃsa* which read:—

नमस्सित्वान सम्बुद्धं सद्धुद्धं बुद्धवंसजम् ।

महावंसं पवक्खामि नानानूनाधिकारिकं ॥
पोराणेहि कतो पे'सो अतिवित्थारितो क्वचि ।
अतीव क्वचि संखित्तो अनेकपुनरुत्तको ॥
विज्जितं तेहि दोसेहि सुखग्गहणधारनं ।
पसादसंवेगकरं सुतीतो च उपागतं ॥

'Saluting the Supremely Englightened One, the Pure One and the Pure-born one, I am narrating the great Chronicle which is not deficient in its many and various themes. This, as composed by the ancients, is in some places very elaborate, in some places very concise, and contains many repetitions. I am narrating the Chronicle, which is come down by tradition (making it) free from these faults, easy of reading and understanding, delightful and interesting'.

Here the important question is—Does it or does it not mean the Pali *Dīpavaṃsa* by the previous *Mahāvaṃsa* composed by the ancients ? The author of the *Mahāvaṃsa-Ṭīkā* has been at pains to clear up the allusion, and to establish the fact that here the reference is made to the *Aṭṭhakathā Mahāvaṃsa* written in Sinhalese and cherished in the school of Mahāvihāra[1]. But the verses, which he quotes in support of his thesis, are all from the prologue to the Pali *Dīpavaṃsa*, as we now have it[2] ? The defects pointed out are all applicable to the same work. Whenever the traditional sayings are quoted in the writings of Buddhaghoṣa and other Pali commentaries, they are all found to be in Pali verse. From the language of the introductory verses of the *Mahāvaṃsa*, it is not at all clear that the allusion is to an earlier form of the Chronicle in a Sinhalese commentary. The work is not claimed to have been a translation from a Sinhalese original.

1. *Vamsatthappakasinī*, I., pp. 35-36.

2. *Ibid.*, I., p. 48 : एसो सीहलट्ठकथा–महावंसो पोराणेहि सीहलाय निरुत्तिया कतो.

The Date of Gāthāsaptaśatī

By

V. V. MIRASHI, *Nagpur*.

The *Gāthāsaptaśatī* (also called *Saptaśatī* or *Sattasaï*) is unanimously regarded as the oldest and most important anthology in Mahārāṣṭrī Prākṛta. It is traditionally ascribed to Hāla who, according to the account in the Purāṇas, seems to have flourished in the first century A. D. (see below). Some of the gāthās included in this work contain references to deities, historical and legendary characters and other matters. Their evidence is consequently cited to prove that these deities, persons etc. were well known before the beginning of the Christian era. To mention only one instance, the gāthā[1] No. 464 mentions Vikramāditya and refers to his munificence. This gāthā is often cited to prove the traditional view that a king named Vikramāditya flourished before the beginning of the Christian era and founded the era which is still current under his name[2]. The gāthā has also a bearing on the date of the great Sanskrit poet Kālidāsa who is popularly believed to have flourished at the court of Vikramāditya. Some other scholars, however, do not subscribe to the traditional view about the date of *Saptaśatī* and assign the work to the third century A. D. or some later age[3]. It is, therefore, proposed to discuss this question here in the light of recent researches.

As its name indicates, the *Gāthāsaptaśatī* consists of 700 gāthās or Prākṛta verses. Tradition ascribes this work to Hāla, and this is corroborated by a gāthā (No. 3) included in this anthology which says that Hāla, who was beloved of poets, selected seven hundred out of a crore of embellished gāthās. Several Sanskrit and Prākṛta poets[4], who have eulogised Hāla, describe him as a king who had extended liberal patronage to poets. The *Vajjālaggam*, another Prākṛta anthology,

1. The numbers of gāthās quoted in this article refer to the Nirṇayasāgara ed. of the *Gathasaptaśatī*. They vary in the commentaries of Pītāmbara and Bhuvanapāla.

2. See, Haraprasad Shastri's remarks in *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XII., p. 320.

3. Weber : *Das Saptaśatakam des Hala*, Intro. p. xxiii ; Winternitz : *Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, Vol. III., p. 103 ; Keith : *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 224 etc.

4. See Abhinanda's *Ramacarita*, VI, 93 ; XXII, 100 ; Indrasūri's *Kuvalayamala*, (verses cited in the *Kavyamīmaṃsa*, ed. ⌊1916⌋ by Dalal, notes, p. 12) ; Soḍḍhala : *Udayasundarī*, p. 2 etc.

contains a gāthā which says that Hāla ruled at Pratishṭhāna (modern Paiṭhan) on the Godāvarī[1]. Hemacandra, the famous lexicographer, identifies Hāla with the king Sātavāhana or Sālāhaṇa[2]. Bāṇa also mentions Sātavāhana as the author of a Kos'a of subhāṣitas which must be none other than the *Gāthāsaptas'atī*. Sātavāhana was, however, a family name and occurs as such in two Nāsik cave inscriptions[3]. It was plainly derived from that of the progenitor of the family, but nothing was known about this Sātavāhana till recently. Only last year, a copper coin of this king was brought to light, which I am publishing in the *Journal of the Numismatic Society of India*. Hāla was called Sātavāhana, evidently, because he was descended from this Sātavāhana. This family is called Āndhra in the Purāṇas, probably, because it was ruling in the Āndhra country when the Purāṇas assumed their present shape. The Purāṇas give a list of thirty kings of this dynasty, among whom Hāla's name occurs as the seventeenth[4]. According to the Purāṇas this dynasty ruled for a total period of 456 or 460 years. It must have risen to power soon after the death As'oka in *circa* B.C. 237. S'imuka the first king of this dynasty mentioned in the Purāṇas, may have come to the throne in *circa* B.C. .220. The Purāṇas give the reign-period of each king, according to which Hāla had a brief reign of only five years. He may have ruled from A.D. 61, to A.D. 66. If he was the author of the *Saptas'atī*, the work must be referred to the first century A.D.

This date of the work has, however, been assailed on several grounds. Keith[5], drawing attention to the weakening of the consonants in the gāthās of the *Saptas'ati*, places it in the period A.D. 200-450. Weber[6] referred it to the 3rd century A.D. at the earliest, in any case to some period before the 7th century A.D. D. R. Bhandarkar has pointed out that the internal evidence afforded by the work shows that it could not have been composed in the first century A.D.; for it refers to Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā in v. 89, mentions the week-day Tuesday in v. 261, and glorifies Vikramāditya in v. 464. All these references, according to Dr. Bhandarkar, point to a much later date than the first century A.D.; for

1. *Vajjalaggam*, v. 468.

2. Hemacandra : *Abhidhanacintamaṇi*, III, 376. ; *Desīnamamāla*, VIII, 66.

3. Kṛṣṇa, the second king mentioned in the Purāṇas, is described as belonging to the Sātavāhana family. Similarly, Gautamīputra, another illustrious king of this family, who defeated Nahapāna is described as one who had established the fame of the Sātavahana family. See *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. VIII., pp. 93 ; 61f.

4. Pargiter : *Dynasties of the Kali Age*, pp. 38f.

5. *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 224.

6. *Das Saptas'atakam* etc., (1881), Intro., p. xxiii.

the earliest mention of Rādhikā occurs in the *Pañcatantra* which was compiled in the 5th century A.D. ; the earliest instance of the use of the week-day occurs in the Eraṇ inscription of Buddhagupta, dated A.D. 484, but the practice of citing week-days did not come into general vogue till the 9th century A.D. ; Vikramāditya whose liberality is eulogised in v. 464 must be either the famous Gupta king Chandragupta II or his grandson Skandagupta, both of whom are known to have assumed that title, for no earlier king of this name is known to history. In view of these references, Bhandarkar would refer Hāla of the *Gāthāsaptas'atī* to the 6th century A.D[1].

All these dates are more or less conjectural. They are based on the supposition that the anthology was compiled by a single person and that it has come down to us in its original form. Bhandarkar, who seems to have subscribed to this view, called in question, the tradition that Hāla, the author of the *Gāthāsaptas'atī*, was a Sātavāhana. As for Bāṇa's eulogy of Sātavāhana who composed a *Kos'a* of songs, Bhandarkar says that there are no grounds for identifying this *Kos'a* with Hāla's *Saptas'atī*[2]. We need not, however, be so sceptic about this matter. There must have been some basis for the tradition which has been vouched for by several Sanskrit and Prākṛta poets and lexicographers, viz. that Hāla of the Sātavāhana dynasty was the author of the *Saptas'atī*. As a matter of fact the ancient name of this work was *Kos'a* or *Gāthākos'a* (Prākṛta, *Gāhākoso*). This appears clear from the concluding verse, preserved in some of the recensions, which describes it as a *Kos'a* of seven hundred *gāthās* marked with the names of poets, which was compiled by Sātavāhana[3]. Another verse in the *Kuvalayamālā* of Indrasūri, who flourished in the 8th century A. D., also calls it *Kos'a* and compares it with the *kos'a* (bud) of a lotus[4]. Indrasuri ascribes this *Kos'a* to Hāla. This will make it plain that the *Kos'a* of *subhāṣitas* compiled

1. *R. G. Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, p. 189.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 188-89.

3. Weber : *Das Saptas'atakam* etc., v. 709 - एसो कइणामंकिअगाहापडिबद्धवड्ढिआमोओ । सत्तसअओ समत्तो सालाहणविरइओ कोसो (Skt. = एष कविनामाङ्कितगाथाप्रतिबद्धवर्धितामोदः । सप्तशतकः समाप्तः सातवाहनविरचितः कोशः). This verse is given in a fn. at the end of p. 207 of the Nirṇayasāgara ed. (1911) of the *Saptas'atī*. This work is also called *Kos'a* in the concluding verses of some *s'atakas* cited by Pītāmbara. See pp. 54 and 79.

4. See *Kuvalayamala* quoted by Dalal in the Notes (p. 12) to Rājas'ekhara's *Kavyamīmaṃsa*—पणईहिं कइयणेण य भमरेहिं व जस्स जायपणएहिं । कमलायरोव्व कोसो विलुप्पमाणो वि हु न झीणो (Skt. = प्रणयिभिः कविजनेन च भ्रमरैरिव यस्य जातप्रणयैः । कमलाकर इव कोशो विलुप्यमाणोपि न खलु क्षीणः). This is said in praise of Hāla. *Kos'a* in Sanskrit means a treasure, a bud of a flower, as well as an anthology. Bāṇa and Indrasūri have used the word with a *double entendre* while describing the work of Hāla-Sātavāhana.

by Sātavāhana and eulogised by Bāṇa was not different from the *Gāthā-saptas'atī* of Hāla.

We need not, however, suppose that all the verses now included in the several recensions of the *Saptas'atī* date from the time of Hāla. There must have been interpolations in it from time to time. This can be easily shown from the internal evidence of the work.

The *Saptas'atī* has come down to us in as many as seven recensions as shown by Weber[1]. There are only 430 stanzas common to all the recensions which may have formed the orginal kernel of the work. Tradition says that the gāthās were composed by several poets, and that they were only collected and perhaps refashioned by Hāla. Originally, every stanza had the poet's name attached to it, but, in course of time, several names were lost owing perhaps to the carelessness of the scribes. As many as thirteen commentaries on this anthology are still extant, and many of them mention names of poets in connection with individual stanzas. Bhuvanapāla, one of the ancient commentators of this work, mentions as many as 384 names of poets who contributed to the *Saptas'atī*.

The gāthās of the *Saptas'atī* were composed in the Mahārāṣṭrī Prākṛta. Some of them contain references to the Vindhya mountain and the Revā, Tāpī and Godāvarī rivers. The Godāvarī is very frequently referred to, which is but natural as several poets must have been attached to the court of Hāla. No country, river or mountain of North India find mention in any gāthā, which shows that the work had its origin in South India in general and Mahārāṣṭra in particular.

According to tradition[2], Pādalipta or Pālitta was the foremost among the poets at the court of Hāla and received liberal patronage from him. The *Saptas'atī* contains several gāthās ascribed to him. Many other poets were, however, living in the country for their gāthās contain realistic pictures of village life. Most of these poets must have been ordinary persons unknown to fame. Some of them were women. The commentators mention the names of some of them such as Revā, Mādhavī, Anulakṣmī, Andhralakṣmī etc[3]. Some of the poets were, however, distinguished personages who, though ruling over extensive kingdoms, were not loth to serve the Muse of poetry. A careful consideration of the age in which they flourished is likely to shed interesting light on the date of the *Saptas'atī*.

1. *Das Saptas'atakam* etc., p. xxviii and *Indische Studien*, Vol. XVI., pp. 9f.

2. See verses cited in the Notes, p. 12 to Dalal's ed. of the *Kavyamīmaṃsa*.

3. See Index of gathās in the Nirṇayasāgara ed. and that in *Ind. Stud.* Vol. XVI., pp. 19f.

Hāla :— The foremost of these royal poets was, of course, Hāla himself, the compiler of the anthology. Nearly forty gāthās are ascribed to him in the Nirṇayasāgara edition of the *Saptas'atī*. Some of these are attributed to S'ālavāhana in the recently published commentary of Pītāmbara[1]. This is not surprising as S'ālavāhana or Sālāhaṇa was a Prākṛta form of Sātavāhana, which, as we have seen, was the family name of Hāla. Some of the verses ascribed by Pītāmbara to S'ālavāhana are not, however, given under the name of Hāla by the Nirṇayasāgara edition, but they may have been composed by him ; for the tradition in respect of attribution of verses is discrepant.

Karṇa :— Karṇa, another member of the Sātavāhana dynasty, seems to have contributed gāthās to the *Saptas'atī*. Commentators ascribe two gāthās, viz. 55 and 454 to Karṇa or Karṇarāja. That a king named Karṇa belonged to the Sātavāhana family and ruled in the Deccan is shown by some potin coins recently found at Tarhāḷā in the Akola District of Berar[2]. These coins are of the same type and fabric as other Sātavāhana coins found there and in other places in Mahārāṣṭra and have the legend Kaṇa-sātakaṇisa. This Karṇa was one of the later kings of the dynasty and may be identical with S'āntikarṇa[3] (also called Caṇḍas'rī in the Purāṇas) who was the 12th descendant of Hāla. He may have reigned from *circa* A.D. 229 to 238.

Pravarasena :— The Nirṇayasāgara ed. ascribes five verses, viz. 45, 64, 202, 208 and 216 to Pravarasena, and Pītāmbara adds two more (vv. 481 and 565) to them. Further, Bhuvanapāla mentions Pravara, Pravararāja or Pravarasena as the author of the *gāthās* 126, 46, 153, 158, 203, 209, 321, 341, 506, 567 and 724. This Pravarasena is probably identical with the homonymous author of the Prākṛta kāvya *Setubandha* or *Rāvaṇavaho*. This work has evoked high praise from several Sanskrit authors and rhetoricians such as Daṇḍin, Bāṇa and Ānandavardhana[4]. The author must, therefore, have flourished before the 7th century A.D. As stated before, he must have been a native of Mahārāṣṭra. Tradition says that the *Setubandha* was actually composed by the famous Sanskrit author Kālidāsa and ascribed to Pravarasena by the order of Vikramāditya[5]. This tradition can be satisfactorily explained only if we identify this Pravarasena with Pravarasena II of the Vākāṭaka dynasty, for the latter was the daughter's son of Chandragupta II Vikramāditya. Most scholars —

1. Jagdish Lal : *Gathasaptas'atīprakās'ika* (1942).

2. See my article entitled 'A New Hoard of Sātavāhana coins from Tarhāḷā' in *J. N. S. I.*, Vol. II, pp. 83f.

3. Pargiter · *Dynasties* etc., p. 43, n. 20.

4. See my article entitled, 'Royal Poets of the Vākāṭaka Age' in *Ind. His. Quart.*, Vol. XXI, pp. 193f.

5. See the statement of Rāmadāsa in his comm. on *Setubandha*, I. 1.

Indian as well as European—now hold the view that Kālidāsa flourished at the court of the Gupta Emperor Chandragupta II. It should not, therefore, be surprising if the poet was asked by his royal patron to compose or revise a work for his daughter's son, Pravarasena II, who was ruling over Vidarbha. This Pravarasena may have also composed stray Prākṛta verses, some of which seem to have found a place in the *Saptaśatī*. Pravarasena II flourished from *circa* A.D. 420 to 450.

Sarvasena :— Pītāmbara's commentary on the *Saptaśatī* ascribes gāthās 502 and 503 to Sarvasena. Bhuvanapāla mentions this poet's name in connection with two more gāthās, viz. 217 and 234. This Sarvasena must be identical with the homonymous poet who has long been known as the author of a Prākṛta kāvya called *Harivijaya*. This work also has received unstinted praise from several Sanskrit authors and rhetoricians[1]. Daṇḍin mentions in his *Avantisundarīkathā* that Sarvasena, the author of the *Harivijaya*[2], as a king. Only one king of this name is known to history, viz. he who was one of the younger sons of the great Vākāṭaka Emperor Pravarasena I and founded the Vatsagulma branch of the Vākāṭaka dynasty. His name has been mentioned in the Basim plates[3] of his son Vindhyaśakti II recently edited by me. I have also shown that he is mentioned in the inscription[4] in Cave XVI at Ajaṇṭā. Sarvasena flourished in *circa* A.D. 330-355.

Pravarasena II and Sarvasena belonged to two different branches of the Vākāṭaka family—one ruling at Nandivardhana near Nagpur and the other at Vatsagulma, modern Basim in the Akola district of Berar. There were two other branches of the great Vākāṭaka family which, though referred to in the Purāṇas[5], are still in oblivion as none of their records have yet been found. I have elsewhere[6] put forward the conjecture that they were ruling over Kuntala (now southern Mahārāṣṭra and Northern Karṇaṭaka) which lay to the south of the Godāvarī. These branches seem to have flourished in Kuntala till the rise of the Early Raṣṭrakūṭas in *circa* A.D. 375. No members of these branches are yet known by name, but since the names of the princes of both the Nandivardhana and Vatsagulma branches are found to end *invariably* in *sena*, the names of these other Vākāṭaka rulers, also, may in all probability, have ended in *sena*. The

1. *Ind. Hist. Quart.* Vol. XXI, pp. 197f.
2. See *Avantisundarīkatha*, p. 2 : राज्ञा श्रीसर्वसेने [न] ····················विजयं हरेः ॥
3. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXVI, pp. 151f.
4. Mirashi : *Vakāṭaka Inscription in Cave XVI at Ajaṇṭa*, (Hyderabad Arch. Series, No. 14), p. 10.
5. Pargiter : *op. cit.*, p. 50.
6. *Ind. Cult.*, Vol. XI, p. 233 ; *Ind. Hist. Quart.*, Vol. XXI, p. 200.

commentators of the *Saptas'atī* mention several such names[1], viz. Jayasena (v. 170), Makarandasena (vv. 6, 80, 98, 429 and 599), Mallasena (vv. 237 and 238), Mahāsena (v. 328), Vasantasena (v. 323), Vis'vasena (v. 340) and Satyasena (vv. 233 and 298). It may not be wrong to conjecture that all these or at least some of them belonged to the other two branches of the Vākāṭaka dynasty which were ruling to the south of the Godavarī.

Māna:— As stated before, the aforementioned two Vākāṭaka branches were wiped out in *circa* A.D. 375 by the Rāṣṭrakuṭas, who rose to power in Kuntala. The founder of this latter dynasty was Mānāṅka who founded the city of Mānapura (modern Māṇ in the Satara district of the Bombay Presidency), which he made his capital[2]. It would seem, therefore, that this king was also known by the name of Māna or Mānarāja[3]. In that case the four verses 101-104, which some commentators[4] ascribe to Māna, may have been composed by him.

Devarāja:— Two copper-plate grants of this Early Rāṣṭrakūṭa family mention Devarāja, the son of Mānāṅka. I have shown elsewhare[5] that this Devarāja was probably the Kuntales'vara to whose court the great Sanskrit poet Kālidāsa was sent as an ambassador by Chandragupta II Vikramāditya. If the tradition recorded in the *Kuntales'varadautya* is correct, this Devarāja was a man of easy-going nature and spent his days in the company of beautiful ladies. He may, also, have been fond of literature and arts. He may be identical with the poet Devarāja, to whom two gāthās of the *Saptas'atī* (viz. 138 and 239) have been ascribed. Whether this Devarāja composed any Prākṛta kāvya is not known, but he seems to have composed a lexicon of Deśī words which has been cited in some places in Hemacandra's *Des'īnāmamāla*[6]. As I have shown elsewhere, this Devarāja must have flourished in *circa* A.D. 400-425.

Āḍhyarāja:— The name of this author has long been known from the praise lavished on him by Bāṇa in an introductory verse of his *Harṣacarita*[7]. The tenor of description in Bāṇa's verse suggests that Āḍhyarāja wrote an Ākhyāyikā which was considered superb in Bāṇa's age. The

1. See Indexes to gāthās in the Nirṇayasāgara ed. of the *Saptas'atī* and in Bhuvanapala's Commentary, *Ind. Stud.*, Vol. XVI, p.19.

2. See my article : The Rāṣṭrakūṭas of Manapura, published in *A. B. O. R. I.*, Vol. XXV, pp. 36 f.

3. In ancient times *aṅka* was optionally added to personal names. Compare Vimala or Vimalāṅka, the names of the author of *Paumachariya*.

4. Weber : *Das Saptas'atakam*, pp. 36f.

5 *A. B. O. R. I.*, Vol. XXV, p. 45.

6. M. Banerjee ; *Des'īnamamala*, p. xxxix.

7. *Harṣacarita*. v. 18, : आढ्यराजकृतोत्साहैर्हृदयस्थैः स्मृतैरपि । जिह्वान्तः कृष्यमाणेव न कवित्वे प्रवर्तते ॥

Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa of Bhoja (11th century A. D.) gives the further information that in the time of Āḍhyarāja every person spoke in Prākṛta. According to the commentator Ratnes'vara, Āḍhyarāja was identical with S'ālivāhana, but the name is not met with in the list of Sātavāhana kings given by the Purāṇas. It is not known whether Bhoja had reliable tradition about Āḍhyarāja or whether he was misled by the name. The suggestion that he was identical with Harṣa is untenable. Whoever Āḍhyarāja may have been, there is no doubt that he was a Prākrta poet, for Bhuvanapāla ascribes four gāthās, viz. 66, 169, 219 and 235 to him. The Nirṇayasāgara ed. gives three more verses under his name, viz. 26, 218 and 234. This seems to suggest that the ākhyāyikā of Āḍhyarāja, eulogised by Bāṇa, was in Prākṛta. We have, however, no further information about the country and the age in which he flourished.

Vākpatirāja :—The Nirṇayasāgara ed. of the *Saptas'atī* ascribes only one verse (95) to Vākpatirāja, but Pītāmbara gives three more verses viz. 616, 617 and 618 under his name[1]. Like Pravarasena and Sarvasena, Vākpatirāja also is famous as the author of Prākṛta works. Two kāvyas written in Mahārāṣṭrī, namely *Madhumathanavijaya*[2] and *Gaüḍavaho* were composed by him. Of these the first is not now extant, but it is mentioned by the well-known critic Ānandavardhana[3] and one of its verses has been cited by Abhinavagupta[4] and Hemacandra[5] from which it seems that it treated of some incident in Kṛṣṇa's life. The other work *Gaüḍavaho* is well known for its beautiful diction and graphic descriptions. Vākpatirāja was a junior contemporary of Bhavabhuti to whom he pays a respectful homage in one[6] of his verses in the *Gaüḍavaho*. Like Bhavabhūti, he received patronage at the court of Yas'ovarman of Kannauj for whose glorification he has composed his Prākṛta kāvya. We have no reliable information about the native province of Vākpatirāja; but in view of his association with Bhavabhūti, it may be conjectured that he also, like the latter, belonged to Vidarbha and went to far-off Kannauj to seek royal patronage, because in the beginning of the 8th century A. D., when these great poets flourished, there was no great king ruling in Vidarbha. The aforementioned gāthās ascribed to Vākpatirāja do not occur in the *Gaüḍavaho*. It has, therefore, been

1. Bhuvanapala ascribes v. 32 also to him, but this is given under the name of Bhogika by other commentators.

2. See *Gaüḍavaho*, v. 69.

3. *Dhvanyāloka* (Nirṇayasāgara ed. 1911), p. 152.

4. *Loc. cit.*

5. See Hemacandra : *Alaṅkāracūḍāmaṇi* (ed. by Rasik Lal), Vol. I, p. 81.

6. *Gaüḍavaho*, v. 799.

conjectured that they must have been taken from his lost work *Madhumathanavijaya*[1]. The gāthās are, however, of the *muktaka* or *subhāṣita* type and seem to have been stray verses, not taken from any particular kāvya. Vākpatirāja, who was a court poet of Yas'ovarman, probably flourished in the second quarter of the 8th century A. D.

The foregoing discussion must have made it plain that Karṇa (c. A. D. 229-238), Sarvasena (c. A. D. 330-355), Pravarasena II (c. A. D. 420-455), Mānāṅka (c. A. D. 375-400), Devarāja (c. A. D. 400-425) and Vākpatirāja (c. A. D. 725-750) have all contributed their gāthās to the *Saptas'atī*. The work was thus receiving additions from time to time down to the 8th century A. D. As the *Saptas'atī* was only a collection of stray verses, it was quite easy to interpolate one or more verses into it. We can not consequently adduce the evidence of any particular verse of the *Saptas'atī* for determinig the limits for the date of any person or work unless we are sure about its existence in the anthology in a particular age.

Let us take the case of the oft-quoted verse (No. 464) which refers to the munificence of Vikramāditya. It runs as follows :—

संवाहणसुहरसतोसिएण देंतेण तुह करे लक्खं ।
चलणेण विक्कमाइच्चचरिअं अनुसिक्खिअं तिस्सा ॥

The verse, which is evidently addressed by a woman to her lover, and which refers to the latter's secret shampooing of another woman's foot, says : 'Her foot, which being delighted by your shampooing imprinted its lac-dye marks on your hand, has imitated the action of Vikramāditya (who also being pleased with the victories of his men, places a lakh of coins on their hands)'.

This verse is given anonymously[2] in the Nirṇayasāgara ed. of the *Saptas'atī*, but we can not be sure about its existence in the days of Hāla. As no king of the name of Vikramāditya is known to have flourished before the first century A.D[3]., it is not unlikely that the

1. Pischel : *Gammatik der Prākrit Sprachen*, p. 11.

2. Bhuvanapāla ascribes it to Saṃvararājya (? Saṁvararāja) about whom, however, nothing is known (*Ind. Stud.*, Vol. XVI, p. 15).

3. It is now well known that the era now current under the name of Vikramāditya was called Kṛta down to the fifth century A. D. (*Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXIII, p. 49). It is seen associated with the name of Vikramāditya for the first time in the tenth century A. D., the earliest record of this kind being the Ekalingji stone inscription of the Guhila prince Naravāhana incised in V. S. 1028 (*J. B. B. R. A. S.*, Vol. XXII, pp. 166f.)

gāthā refers to the liberality of a later Vikramāditya. And curious as it may appear, there was a similar tradition about the famous Gupta king Chandragupta II Vikramāditya which is recorded in an inscription of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas. The Sanjan plates of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Amoghavarṣa I contain the following verse[1]:—

हत्वा भ्रातरमेव राज्यमहरद्देवीं च दीनस्तथा
लक्षं कोटिमलेखयत्किल कलौ दाता स गुप्तान्वयः ।
येनात्याजि तनुः स्वराज्यमसकृद् बाह्यार्थकैः का कथा
ह्रीस्तस्योन्नतराष्ट्रकूटतिलको दातेति कीर्त्यामपि ॥

'That wretch of the Gupta lineage (viz. Chandragupta II) who, having killed his own brother (Rāmagupta) usurped his kingdom and also his queen (Dhruvadevī), was, they say, a (great) donor in (this) Kali age, (because) he caused (his Bhāṇḍāgārika) to record (donations of) of a lakh (*or*) a crore. (In view of this) Amoghavarṣa, who sacrificed his body and (also) relinquished his kingdom more than once, not to speak of other external things, feels ashamed when his fame spreads that he, the ornament of the exalted Rāṣṭrakūṭas, is a donor'[2].

In this verse Amoghavarṣa I, who had cut off and offered a finger of his left hand to Mahālakṣmī[3] to avert a public calamity and abdicated the throne more than once in order to devote himself to religious practices[4], is said to excel the Gupta king Chandrapupta II in righteousness and liberality; for Chandragupta II had caused the murder of his own brother Rāmagupta and remarried his wife Dhruvadevī. Further, he did not actually confer gifts of a lakh or a crore, but only caused them to be recorded to make a show of his liberality. We are not concerned here with the correctness of the statements of Amoghavarṣa's panegyrist about Chandragupta's liberality, but the description clearly shows that stories about the fabulous munificence of Chandragupta II Vikramādity were current among the people as late as the 9th century A.D. A similar tradition about Barkamaris (Vikramāditya) has also been recorded by the Muslim author of *Majm-ul-tavārikh*[5] which also may refer to the liberality of the same Gupta king. And it is not surprising that such a gāthā should have been composed in Vidarbha about Chandragupta II, and should have found a place in the anthology of Mahārāṣṭra ; for the influence of that

1. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XVIII, p. 248.

2. It will be noticed that the translation given here differs in many places from that given by D. R. Bhandarkar in *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XVIII, p. 255.

3. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XVIII, p. 248.

4. Altekar : *Raṣṭrakuṭas and their Times*, pp. 88f.

5. Eliot and Dowson : *History of India*, Vol. I.

illustrious and mighty Gupta Emperor was very great at the courts of both the Vākāṭakas and the Early Rāṣṭrakūṭas[1], who ruled to the north and the south of the Godāvarī where the gāthās of the *Saptaśatī* were mainly composed. This gāthā, therefore, in no way goes against, but rather corroborates the view that Vikramāditya and his protege Kālidāsa flourished in the last quarter of the fourth century A.D.

1. Mirashi : The Rāṣṭrakūṭas of Mānapura, *A. B. O. R. I.*, Vol. XXV, pp. 36f. The verses 227 and 439 which Bhuvanapāla ascribes to Vikrama and Vikramāditya, respectively, may have been composed by Chandragupta II Vikramāditya.

The Culture of Vedas

By

N. K. VENKATESAM PANTULU, *Anantapur.*

1. *The Content and Goal* :— The Veda, classified by Veda-Vyāsa, is divided into four main branches, the *Ṛk*, the *Yajus*, the *Sāman* and the *Atharvan.* The *Yajus* is the Head, the *Atharvan* the Base, the *Ṛk*—the Right Side and the *Sāman* the Left Side (*Tait.-Up.* II. 3). The literature of the Veda is given in *Tait-Ār.* (II. 9-10) as embodied in the four Vedas, the *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Itihāsas*, the *Purāṇas*, the *Kalpas*, the *Gāthās* and the *Nārās'aṃsas.* According to the *S'vetopaniṣad* of the *Atharvaveda*, the *Ṛgveda* has 21 divisions, the *Yajus* 109, the *Sāman* 1,000 and the *Atharvan* 5. The Upaniṣad mentions the *Vedāṅgas*, viz. *Kalpa*. *Vyākaraṇa*, *S'ikṣā*, *Nirukta*, *Jyotiṣa* and *chandas*. It also mentions *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya*. All these are intended to enable one to maintain *dharma* according to *samaya* and *ācāra.* The Upaniṣad mentions *Dharma-s'āstrā*, *Itihāsā*, *Purāṇa*, *Vāstu-veda*, *Dhanurveda*, *Gāndharvaveda*, *Āyurveda*, etc. In the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (of the *Sāmaveda*, VII. 1) Nārada complains that, with all his erudition, he does not know how to get *mukti* from the bondage of recurring births. He has a mastery of all the culture of the Veda, and knowledge even of *Deva-vidya*, *Brahma-vidya*, *Bhūta-vidyā*, *Kṣatra-vidyā*, *Nakṣatra-vidyā*, *Sarpa-deva-jana-vidyā*, etc. Sanat-kumāra teaches Nārada the greatness of meditation on *Nāma*, the name or the sound that indicates God-head. The *Pras'na* then deals with the seven intellectual, the eight physical, and the eleven moral requisites for such meditation. In the *Kali-santaraṇa - Up.* of the *Yajur-veda*, Nārada declares that for this age of ours, presided over by Kali, the lord of *Adharma*, meditation on the names of Rāma and Kṛṣṇa gives *mukti*. The literature of the Veda is based on the original Sound of the Veda, *Aum*, and the aim is to give one *mukti* from births through meditation on the Name or the Sound. Name and Form are the manifestations of *Brahman* in the Universe. *Upāsanā* is *saguṇa* if the name and the form are used, and it becomes *nirguṇa* when one can get rid of the two aids. This subject is discussed by Vyāsa in the fourth chapter of his *Brahma-sūtras.* In the times that followed, this literature was grouped under 18 *vidyās* and 64 *kalās*. The former were used for the intellectual equipment and the latter for vocation in practical life. A glance at the list of the *kalās* would convince one that the educational system according to the

culture of the Veda provided side by side for full intellectual and spiritual development and full physical and vocational growth of the individual, the nation and the State. From the Veda grew the *Vedānta*, the *śiras* or the Head of the Veda. From the plane of Vedic life through *Brahma-yajña*, we passed on to a higher plane of combining theory with practice by evolving the philosophical systems of *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, the analytical and the synthetic views of the basis and the goal of life. From the manifold forms we developed the end of the Oneness of Existence. The culture of Veda starts from the Veda, goes through its manifold variations in theory and practice, and takes man to the twofold path of *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*. The sound *Aum* is the starting point of Existence and is the culminating point of Existence. *Aum* is All (*Tait.-Up.* I. 8). The four Vedas find their flowering in the three bases of *Vedānta*, the *Prasthāna-traya*, made up of the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Brahma-sūtras*. From the Vedas, through the ramified culture of the Veda, we proceed to the Vedānta. That is the right course of the culture of the Veda. We start from the soul and train the body. Immortality is at birth. The mortal elements take hold of the soul and the body, and the endeavour of the Vedic culture is to bring together again the soul and the body which follow diverse courses under the influence of the surroundings just after the body leaves the mother's womb (*Garbhopaniṣad*).

2. *Its Material Aspect* :— At the very outset, Vedic culture is divided broadly into two main sections, the *aparā* — for material welfare of the individual and the nation, and the *parā* — for the intellectual equipment of the individual, leading him to *mukti*. According to the Upaniṣads, there are eighteen or twenty one *Vidyas* or steps in the cultural equipment of an individual. They consist of the four Vedas—*Ṛk*, *Yajus*, *Sāman* and *Atharvan*, the six *Aṅgas*—intended to interpret and expound the Vedas—*Śikṣā*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nirukta*, *Chandas*, *Jyotiṣa*, and *Kalpa*, four *Upāṅgas*—further aids to study—*Mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāya*, *Dharma-śāstra*, *Purāṇa* with *Itihāsa*, *Artha-śāstra* and *Daṇḍanīti*, and four *Upa-Vedas*—supplemental to the Vedas—*Vāstu-veda*, *Dhanur-veda*, *Gāndharva-veda* and *Āyur-veda*. For several centuries, we have been harping upon the Vedas and the *Vedāṅgas*, with the *Vedānta*, as if the Vedic culture is all for the performance of *yajñas* and for studying the *prasthāna-traya* and practising meditation and worship of God, be it through the path of *Sāṅkhya* or the path of *Yoga*, as if the highest goal of *mukti* could be got only through this preparation. It has brought us the stigma that we are theorists and dreamers, and our literature and rituals are all formalities with no significance or practical value for our existence

from day to day in this world. The reason for this misunderstanding of the basis and the spirit of Vedic culture was that we gradually lost our power of initiative in all the material aspects of our lives following the loss of our political and economic independence. A glance at our literature dealing with our *kalās* or arts to make life happy and self-sufficient is enough to convince one of the true material basis of our culture. Engineering, warfare, music and medicine are spoken of not as *kalās* or arts but as *Upa*-*Vedas* in the Upaniṣad. The *Aṅgas* and the *Upāṅgas* are merely for the intellectual appreciation of the Vedas. These four *Upa*-*Vedas* are the very corner-stones of our material existence. All the *kalās*, sixty-four in number, and even more according to some writers, are variation and expansions of the tenents of these four *Upa*-*Vedas*. Medicine keeps the body up, engineering keeps the country in a good state, military science keeps the State efficient and strong and music, which includes dancing and many allied arts, keeps up the social welfare of the Nation. While Vātsyāyana places stress upon the social arts, S'ukra lays stress upon arts like surgery, ship-building, manufacture of machines and knowledge of mining, metallurgy, warfare, locomotion by land, water and air, etc.

Among the four Vedas, *Atharvaveda* is intended purely for the material well-being of the individual and the nation. Our independence has been lost through the disuse of the *Atharvaveda* in daily life, and our being made to think and say that this great and first Veda is all black magic and witchcraft. Without the knowledge and the practice of the *Atharvaveda*, no *Yajña* in accordance with the *Trayī* or the three Vedas, *Ṛk*, *Yajus* and *Sāman* could be conducted at all. The *Hotā* invokes the Deities with the hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, the *Adhvaryu* offers oblation to the Dieties and the *Udgātā* sings the *Sāmans* in honour of the Deities assembled at the Altar; it is the *Brahmā* or the fourth *Ṛtvik*, who is the superintendent of the ritual from the beginning to the end, that protects all people and the ritual with his wariness and authority. He should be the master of the *Atharvan* or the *Brahmaveda*. With the rituals of this basic Veda, he maintains the welfare of the people taking part in the *Yajñas*, through the rites known as *S'āntika*, *Pauṣṭika*, *Bhaiṣaja*, *Adbhuta*, *Ābhicārika*. All our social, economic and political arts flow from the rites of this Veda. Our material welfare, individually and nationally, is the consequence of our practice of this Veda. It has the clue to all science and culture of all ages. A revival of the practice of this Veda as a Veda and a revival of the arts of life contained in the sixty-four *kalās*, added to any new things, that we may think of now, will enable India to get

back her lost glory. Our four *puruṣārthas* or aims in life, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* flow from this sort of ordered existence. We must build our future on our own foundations. We must use our culture for our nationhood and our civilisation. Our great Ācāryas, S'rī S'aṅkarācārya, S'rī Rāmānuja and S'rī Madhva have maintained the Flame of God through their interpretation of Vedic culture on the spiritual plane. They have all taught us to live and work in the world and not to run away from it. S'rī S'aṅkarācārya insists on the *karma-mārga* as essential for our perfection, for, he always says that *jñāna* based on *karma*, *upāsanā* and *bhakti*, alone leads to *mukti* at the end of the whole course.

3. *Its Spiritual Aspect* :— In every part of the Veda, we hear of the importance of the knowledge and the appreciation of the rituals we perform according to the Vedas. This knowledge forms the basis for our knowledge that is highest, that is called *Brahma-jñāna*. *Brahma* is both Veda and the Final Spirit of all existence. *Mokṣa* is got, through discipline that makes us live for virtue in private and public life, earning and using wealth and leading useful lives through the practice of the arts we pursue for our material welfare as individuals in the body—social and the body-politic. The Vedic rituals are meant for discipline and the daily building up of the fabric of the State on all planes, individual, social, economic, industrial and political. They are not formal but national. Material life is based on four principles. *Dharma* is the basis and *mokṣa* the goal of life. *Artha* and *kāma* are the politico-economic and the socio-religious means, respectively, for bringing together *dharma* and *mokṣa* as the realistic ideals of life from day to day. The four *puruṣārthas* run concurrently in life at all stages and in all grades of society. The current of life is made up of two parallel streams, material and spiritual and the two never become separate or separable at any stage, according to the structure of Vedic society and culture. In material life, we work with names and forms, both in men and things. In the spiritual preparation in life, we concentrate on the names and forms of the Spirit that enlivens and moves matter, the S'*akti* that works with *puruṣa*. Power, wealth, and the good things of life are the stock of life and the attainment of perfection is the goal aimed at. The sixty-four *kalās* are the means for our attaining material welfare and happiness. *Kalā* comes from √*kal* 'to learn' (Tamil, *kalvi* means learning). The *kalās* are the arts of life and the *vidyās*, eighteen or twenty-one are the sciences of learning. While we are practising the arts and leading our lives from day to day in the different fields of our activities in accordance with our opportunities, we lead our souls into the path of rising from the material to the spiritual plane, in accordance with our equipment and capacity. The two planes go

side by side and are not taken up separately in the scheme of life according to the culture of the Veda. We base our spiritual growth on four great and fundamental principles, which we gradually but surely, realise day after day through practical conduct in life. The highest wisdom consists in our realising that Spirit which underlies existence, viz. *Brahman* is not away from us but is ever with us and in us. 'I and Thou'—the dual personalities, that actually act together in the world, are only One in Two Forms and with Two Names. Each individual is only That One and the microcasm is in the macrocasm and vice-versa. *Atman* or Soul is just the spark of the mighty Flame of *Brahman*, the *Tejas* of Life which shines in all inwardly amidst divided forms and acts. As all waters of rivers and streams reach the ocean and merge under the one name of ocean, all *Ātmans* become merged in *Brahman*, when names and forms are got rid of through *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*. Until that stage arrives, Names and Forms persist in social life and religious practice. We cannot get rid of them; they must get rid of us. The process is reciprocal and all *karma*, *bhakti* and *upāsanā* are aids to *jñāna* which leads one to *mukti*. It is this great truth that is taught in all the texts pertaining to Vedic culture, and that underlies the rigid performance of all Vedic rituals.

We lay great stress on the *prasthāna-traya*, as they contain the highest teaching on the philosophical side. But really there are, besides the ten *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagvadgītā* and the *Brahmasūtras*, many texts which all have to be read through and made use of.

The great *Āchāryas* have written their commentaries on the ten *Upaniṣads*, the *Gītā* and the *Vyāsa-sūtras*; and developed the *advaitic*, the *viśiṣṭādvaitic* and the *dvaitic* aspects of the One as manifested in the many in the universe, but they base all their doctrines on the practice of the four *puruṣārthas* and build on the foundations of *karma*, *bhakti* and *upāsanā* as promulgated in the Upaniṣadic literature as a whole. Of the one hundred and eight *Upaniṣads*, ten are taken up under the *prasthāna-traya* which develops the *Vedānta*. Of them, three belong to the *Atharvaveda*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka* and *Māṇḍūkya*. To the *S'ukla Yajus* belong *Īśa* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. To the *Kṛṣṇa Yajus* belong *Kaṭha* and *Taittirīya*. To the *Sāmaveda* belong *Kena* and *Chāndogya*. To the *Ṛgveda* belongs *Aitareya*. Of the hundred and eight Upaniṣads, 31 belong to the *Atharvaveda*, 32 to the *Yajur veda*, 19 to the *S'ukla Yajurveda*, 16 to the *Sāmaveda* and 10 to the *Ṛgveda*. Taking the subject matter into consideration, *Brahmavidyā* is dealt with in 6 Upaniṣads of the *Atharvaveda*, 4 of *the Sāmaveda*, 9 of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, 5 of the *S'ukla Yajurveda*, and 4

of the Ṛgveda. *Sanyāsa* is dealt with in 3 of the *Atharvaveda*, 2 of the *Sāmaveda*, 1 of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, 5 of the *S'ukla Yajurveda*, and none of the Ṛgveda. *Mantra S'āstra* is dealt with in 1 Upaniṣad of the *Atharvaveda* and 3 of the *Ṛgveda*. *Yoga* is dealt with in 1 Upaniṣad of the *Atharvaveda*, 2 of the *Sāmaveda*, 8 of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, 3 of the *S'ukla Yajurveda* and none of the *Ṛgveda*. Leaving 2 *Upaniṣdas* of the *Atharvaveda*, 4 of the *Sāmaveda* and 1 of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* which deal with miscellaneous topics, there are 44 Upaniṣads which deal with *upāsanā* and *karma*. The *Atharvaveda* counts 20 of them, the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* 13, while the *Sāmaveda* has 2, the *S'ukla Yajurveda* 6, and the Ṛgveda 3. This analysis shows at a glance how the *Atharvaveda* and the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* lay special stress on *karma* and *upāsanā*. *Bhakti* goes with *karma* and *upāsanā*. I have dealt in full with the contents and the subject matter of the Upaniṣads and the *prasthāna-traya* in my two papers — The *Upaniṣads* of the *Atharvaveda* and *The Triple Basis of the Vedānta*, published in the *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society*, Bangalore, in Vol. XXVI. No. 1, and Vol. XXXI, No. 2, respectively. After reading these texts of Vedic literature, one cannot escape the conclusion that the culture of the Veda lays primary stress on *karma*, *bhakti* and *upāsanā*, and then upon *yoga* and *sanyasa* with *jñāna* leading to *mokṣa*.

Vāsudeva's Bhṛṅgasandeśa : A Historical Study[1]

By

K. R. PISHAROTI, *Benares*.

Malayali writers always evinced a partiality for the lyric type of literature ; and since the appearance of the *Meghasandeśa*, our poets have followed that prince of poets with their own love-lyrics, both in Sanskrit and in Malayalam[2], which form no insignificant part of our contribution to the Indian literature and which, therefore, deserve to be more widely known than at present.

Among Sanskrit Sandeśas produced by Malayalis the *Bhṛṅgasandeśa* is one of the latest and has been published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series[3]. The editor has appended the names of kings, poets, and places glorified in the Sandeśa ; but the information presented there is confusing and serves no useful purpose[4]. Earlier this text formed a subject of study at the hands of Mahākavi U.S.P. Iyer, and his essay in Malayalam has been published in more places than one[5]. Unfortunately, like his other historico-literary writings, it, also, suffers from a confusion, arising, probably, from a plethora of materials which that distinguished poet and scholar has always been able to command[6]. Hence, a fresh study of the *Sandeśa* is not out of place.

1. *Bibliographical Abbreviations* :— AC.=K. R. Pisharoti : *Ancient Cochin* ; CSM. = C.A. Menon *Cochin State Mannual* ; CH. = Hough : *Christianity* ; DM. = Galletti : *Dutch in Malabar* ; PK. = K. A. N. Sastri : *Pandyan Kingdom* ; RG. = *Record Granthavari* (C G P); VD. = N. S. P. Iyer : *Vijñāna-dīpikā* (Malayale); PP. = *Pariṣat Patrikā* (a Malayale Quarterly) ; S. = *Sahṛdaya* (a Malayale monthly) ; K. = *Kairali* (a Malayale Monthly) ; IHQ. = *Indian Historical Quarterly* ; JOR. = *Journal of Oriental Reseach.*

2. Among the former, mention may be made of *Śukasandeśa*, *Kokilasandeśa*, *Mayūrasandeśa* etc., and among the latter may be mentioned *Unninilisandeśa*, *Kokasandesa* etc.

3. TSS. No. 128, published in 1937.

4. Vide his Introduction, the editor has appended the names of kings, poets and places glorified in the Sandeśa and at the same time included in the list names of rivers tanks and lakes as well without differentiating them (vide p. 4). Again king Rajaraja (v. 61) and Keralendra (v.68) are treated as different kings through a lack of historical knowledge. And lastly the expression *kurumbadhinathe* is interpreted to mean the *king of Kurumba*. It refers to the Goddess at Cranganore.

5. Compare, for instance, VD. and the pp, of PP.

6. This may appear to be very unfair criticism, but the truth of this statement we have, elsewhere, elaborated in connection with the dating of certain authors on which we differed from him ; and this, be it noted, is the only conclusion that any dispassionate

The *Sandeśa* is sent from the flower garden attached to the Padmanābhasvāmi temple at Trivandrum, where a *Yakṣi* dropped the hero after having snatched him from the bedside of his beloved[1]. The bereaved lover, then, sees a bee and so requests him to convey a message of love to his beloved, residing at S'vetadurga, on the northern bank of the Bhāratapula at Kottakkal, one of the family seats of the Zamorin of Calicut. The route of the bee is then described. After worshipping the dome of the Padmanābhasvāmi temple[2], he is to proceed nothwards, where he would see king Ravi Varma[3], and then the capital of the kingdom of the *Kūpakas*, i. e., Quilon[4]. Crossing the river Sulalita[5], he would first reach Vallabhagrāma[6] and the Vaiṣṇava temple of Tiruvalla[7], then, in order, Dakṣiṇabimbalīs'a or Tekkenkur[8], under its brilliant ruler Udayamārtāṇḍa, its temple dedicated to S'rī Kṛṣṇa and its capital situated on the bank of the Kauṇar[9], bristling with crocodiles ; Kumāramanglam[10] with its hosts of *Vaidikas* and the shrine of the goddess[11] ; Vaṭakkankur, ruled by Goda Varma[12] and the golden ramparts of his capital ; the city of Devanārāyaṇa at Ambalapula[13] ; then, passing through the kingdom of Ravi Varmā[14], *via* Karappuram, Vaikkam[15], Trippunithura[16], Cochin[17], Tiruvañcikkulam[18], Kurumbokkavu[19], Matilakam[20], Irinjalakuda[21], Urakam and Trichur[22], Guruvayur[23], Paramban Tali[24], Mukkola[25], Nāvākṣetra[26], then the kingdom of Kuṇḍageha[27], and of Vallabhakonatiri[28], he should, ultimately, reach S'vetadurga[29], the abode of his lady-love.

student to history can come to. Compare, for instance, the papers on the chronology of Nīlakaṇṭha, published in the PP., the complete untenability of which the present writer has exposed in the pages of the K. Also compare the writer's book., *Vanji-birudu*, written in reply to Mr. Iyer's article published in the S. At the same time we must, in fairness, add that the presence of certain historical solecisms does not take away from the value of his contributions which have undoubtedly enriched our poetry, our prose, our literary criticism and even our historical writings.

1. Compare verses 2, 3, 4 etc. Also v. 17 where S'vetadurga is mentioned.
2. *Vide Pūrvabhāga* (P.), v, 23 : *datveti.*
3. *Vide* P., v. 24 : *rajyamiti.*
4. *Vide*, P., v. 25.
5. *Ibid.*, 28
6. *Ibid.*, 29.
7. *Ibid.*, 29.
8. *Ibid.*, 30.
9. *Ibid.*, 31 and 32.
10. *Ibid.*, 34.
11. *Ibid.*, 35.
12. *Ibid.*, 38.
13. *Ibid.*, 48.
14. *Ibid.*, 45.
15. *Ibid.*, 51.
16. *Ibid.*, 60.
17. *Ibid.*, 61 and 62.
18. *Ibid.*, 63.
19. *Ibid.*, 65.
20. *Ibid.*, 66.
21. *Ibid.*, 70.
22. *Ibid.*, 73.
23. *Ibid.*, 76.
24. *Ibid.*, 79.
25. *Ibid.*, 82.
26. *Ibid.*, 86.
27. *Ibid.*, 89.
28. *Ibid.*, 92.
29. *Ibid.*, 93.

The first of the kingdoms that the bee would enter after leaving Trivandrum is the kingdom of Ravi Varma who is described as being rich in horses[1]. Mr. Iyer identifies him with a king of Travancore[2]. If by this term the writer means modern Travancore, he is *certainly* wrong, since there was *then* no Travancore, as we know it today, for this kingdom came into existence only in the middle of the eighteenth century through the conquests of Rāja Mārtāṇḍa Varma[3], who is, therefore, styled the maker of the modern kingdom of Travancore. If, however, he means the ancient kingdom of Venad, then he should at least have made his position clear; and, in that case, it is at best only a very doubtful identification. For, we have no definite historical information that the ancient kingdom of Venad extended northwards of Trivandrum[4], and it is very doubtful if it embraced even Trivandrum[5]. As far as we know anything of the history of that part of Kerala, the reference must be to a Ravi Varma, not of Venad, but of a kingdom lying between Venad and Quilon, and such kingdoms there were at the time more than one, such, for instance, as Koṭṭārakkara, Āttingal etc. From a *prima facie* point of view, we shall not be far wrong, if we find in this Ravi Varma a king of Quilon. The kings of Quilon were very powerful at the time, and they had subdued many of the petty potentates in the south[6] and this probably accounts for the absence of the mention of the other States there[7]. The city of Quilon is described as a great centre of trade, in the streets thereof one finds sea pearls for sale[8], suggesting that pearl fishery was carried on there at the period. It is interesting to point out that the king of Quilon offered stout resistance even a century and a half later than the period of this author, when Rāja Mārtāṇḍa Varma conquered his kingdom[9]. Another interesting feature of the town is the flourishing silk industry[10]. This reference makes the

1. *Vide* P., v. 24.

2. Vide VD. : Essay on this *Sandes'a.*

3. Vide TSM : the conquests of Rāja Mārtāṇḍa Varmā who is styled the maker of modern Travancore.

4. As a matter of fact, the kingdom of Venad is said to lie south of Trivandrum.

5. References would show that it did not.

6. Vide the closing section of this paper.

7. It is interesting to point out here that despite his importance, the name of the king of Quilon is not mentioned later, while the names of other minor kingdoms are mentioned; and this, certainly, is an indication that Ravi Varma mentioned here must be the king of Quilon.

8. Vide P., v. 25,

9. Vide TSM. Rāja Mārtāṇḍa Varmā's conquests of Quilon in 907 M.E. (1731-32 A.D.)

10. Vide P. v. 27. Also PK. refers to a migration of silk weavers to Quilon.

identification of the king Ravi Varma as the king of Quilon more feasible[1].

Beyond Quilon lay in front the river Sulalita[2], which is indentified with Aṣṭamuṭikāyal[3]. Thence he is to reach Tiruvalla[4], an important Vaiṣṇavite centre. This temple was under the control of the kings of Cochin[5] even as late as the eighteenth century[6]. Then after crossing a forest and river he would reach Tekkankur under its brilliant ruler Udaya Mārtāṇḍa Varma[7]. This kingdom with Vaṭakkankur is described as having been of the four pillars of the Perumpaṭappu Svarūpam—the Cochin Royal Family—the others being Campakas'ś'eri, Āl̄aṅgad and Parūr[8]. There, on the southern banks of the river, he would see the palace of the Chief[9], which may be identified with palace at Cenganās'ś'ri. From thence he would go to Kumaramangalam[10], where he could visualise S'iva and Pārvatī enshrined. Beyond that lay the kingdom of Vaṭakkankur under its mighty warrior king Goda Varma[11]. Thence the messenger is to proceed Cempakas'ś'eri, the kingdom of Devanārāyaṇa[12]. Note here the messenger has to turn back and go in a Westerly direction, thus suggesting the author's partiality for the kingdom of Vaṭakkankur. Could he have been a subject of that kingdom or was he patronised by Goda Varma ? The capital of Cempakas'ś'eri is described as an elegant town, graced by a number of fair ladies[13].

Passing northwards along the coast, the bee would enter the kingdom resplendant with the prowess of Ravi Varma[14]. This kingdom is none other than Karappuram, and king Ravi Varma is none other

1. Here is again an implied reference to Ravi Varma, who taxed the silk weavers which was a source of income for the king. We see no reason why this Ravi Varma may not be identified with Ravi Varma mentioned in verse 24.

2. Vide P.v. 28.

3. Vide VD. cited *ante*.

4. Vide 29.

5. Vide CH. The king of Cochin was present at Tiruvalla in connection with the renovation work of the temple (vide RG.). This king is reported to have died there in the middle of the seventh century.

6. The Raja of Cochin gave up his rights (vide the treaty between Cochin and Travancore of the year 941 M. E. 1766 A. D.)

7. Vide P v. 30.

8. Vide DM.

9. Vide P. v. 32.

10. *Ibid.*, 34.

11. *Ibid.*, 38.

12. *Ibid.*, 42.

13. *Ibid.*, 43.

14. *Ibid.*, 45,

the reigning monarch of the Perumpaṭappu Svarūpam[1]. After Karappuram, he would reach Vaikkam[2], the seat of a well known S'aivite shrine. This temple, then, belonged, presumably, to the king of Cochin[3]. The poet devotes nine verses to the glorification of this shrine[4]. After Vaikkam comes Pūrṇatrayi, where was a poet singing hymns in praise of S'iva[5]. This seems to be the temple at Erūr, not, as some would have it, that at Trippunithura[6]. The Bhakta poet[7] mentioned here probably belonged to the premier Tāntric family of Puliyannūr, and, according to a family tradition, there was a bhakta ancestor of theirs who spent his whole time in the temple, singing songs of devotion or teaching s'iṣyas. After Pūrṇatrayi, the bee would reach Cochin[8], the capital of the kings of Cochin, who is styled king of kings[9] and who is described as being fierce in battles, while the city itself is described as being rich and prosperous[10]. After Cochin, the bee would pass Tiruvañcikulam[11] where he would hear the din of the battle between the king of Cochin and the Zamorin of Calicut[12], then the shrine of Cranganore, known as Kurumbekkāvu[13], and then Guṇavayilkotta[14], where a reference to artillery is found[15]. Here the messenger is told that he might visualise the person of the Lord of Kerala[16] which indicates that the king himself was leading his forces[17]. Here we have the

1. Vide VD. Ravi Varma is held to be a member of the Vaṭakkankur royal house. This is incorrect; he was the Cochin king of the latter half of the sixteenth century.

2. Vide P. v. 51.

3. Vide the term of the treaty of 941 M. E. cited *ante*.

4. Vide P. v. 58. 5. *Ibid.*, 60.

6. This is the view of Mr. U. S. P. Iyer (vide VD).

7. Vide P. v. 60 latter half. The hymns of praise sung by the poet earned the approbation of the lord and so he shook his head, as a result of which the crescent moon waved on his head.

8. Vide P. v. 61. 9. *Ibid.*, 60-62.

10. *Ibid.*, 62. 11. *Ibid.*, 63.

12. *Ibid.*, 64.

13. *Ibid.*, 65, It is stranger that the editor should have characterised it as king of *Kurumbas* (vide *Introduction*, p. 4).

14. *Ibid.*, 66. 15. *Ibid.*, 67. 16. *Ibid.*, 68.

17. We may here point out that the king of Cochin is referred to under various titles and they are *Rajarajakṣitīndu*, *Maṭakṣmabhṛtvara*, *Maṭakṣitiramaṇa*, *Maṭadhātrindra*, *Keralendra* etc. The first of these cannot certainly bear an interpretation different from the rest and, naturally, therefore, the first of these cannot be taken as the name of the reigning king of the period, as Mr. Iyer has done. These varied designations only indicate the position which the king of Cochin occupied in the then Kerala politics. And the king of the day, as we have, repeatedly, pointed out in course of several papers, was Ravi Varma.

traditional conception that visualising the person of the sovereign is visualising Viṣṇu himself.

Thence the messenger proceeds to Irinjalakuda[1], called *Saṅgama-grāma*—an identity borne out by the reference to *Kulīpinītīrtha*—which is not a river, as the editor has made out, but a tank[2]. It is curious that the deity enshrined here should be described as *Kṛṣṇa-Mukunda*[3], though, at present, popular conception treats it as Bharata[4], a reference also made by Vedānta Deśika[5]. Then passing through Ūrakam and Trichur[6], where he is to worship the god enshrined[7], he reaches Guruvayur[8], a shrine which had, already, become famous for its cures[9], and then pass on to *Netranārāyaṇa*[10], which is the Paraban Tali temple, belonging to *Ālvancery Tamprākkal*[11], and thence the well-known Bhagavatī shrine of Mukkola[12], famous even as early as the ninth century, as literary references indicate. Here he is to cross the *Nila* river[13] to *Nāvākṣetra*[14], where the Zamorin used to conduct his Māmāmkam festival and from where he would visualise eastwards Kuṇḍageha[15] *alias* Tṛkkaṇḍiyūr, famous for its S'iva temple and its scholar Acyuta

1. *Ibid.*, 70. To the north of the shrine stands the wellknown *tīrtha*, called *Kulīpini*. It is funny that Dr. Raja should have said that he does not know of the existence of this *tīrtha* (vide M. W., June 30th).

2. Vide Introduction, p. 4.

3. The God enshrined there is referred to as Kaṃsāntaka :

ततः सङ्गमग्रामनामक्षेत्रं गच्छ प्रचुरदुरितध्वंसि कंसान्तकस्य ।

4. That is the tradition popularly believed in by worshippers.

5. Vide the opening verses of the *Uttejini*, his commentary on the Kāvyaprakāśa, written at the instance of Vīra Kerala Varma. Vide also the writer's paper contributed to the 5th All-India Conference and published in the *Proceedings*.

6. Vide P. v. 83. 7. *Ibid.*, 74 and 75. 8. *Ibid.*, 76.

9. Here the god is described as being the holiest of the holy and the curer of all diseases. *Ātaṅka* means that arises from disease, sorrow or fear. The expression here could not be understood to mean diseases brought about by *Vayukopa*, i. e. rheumatism, as some people have interpreted it and thus associated *Nārāyaṇa* with this temple even then.

10. Vide P. v. 79.

11. VD already cited. Mr. Iyer identifies *Netranārāyaṇa* with *Alvancery Tamprakkal*, this is not correct. It is better taken as referring to the temple of Paranban Tali owned by *Tamprakkal*.

12. Vide P. v. 82. Here lie the mortal remains of Meppattur Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiripād.

13. *Ibid.*, 82.

14. *Ibid.*, 86. The temple is situated on the northern bank of the river Nila.

15. *Ibid.*, 89.

Pisharoti[1]. The messenger would also notice the preparations that where being made by the Zamorin for the ensuing Māmāmkam festival[2]. Thence he is to proceed to Candanakkāvu, where he would hear the s'āstric discussion of Nārāyaṇa's father Mātṛdatta and the elegant poems of Nārāyaṇa[3], who is praised for his poetic gifts[4] and not for his s'āstric equipment or his *bhakti*. From Candanakkāvu, the bee passes through the dominion of Valluvakonātiri[5] and reaches S'veta-durga[6], which is identified with Kottakkal.

We have in the preceding description summed up the geographical and historical information contained in the *Sandes'a* , and on the basis of the historical references, we shall fix up the date of the author.

Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri, one of the greatest of Malayale Sanskrit poets, is mentioned, merely, as a sweet poet and not as a *s'āstrakāra* or a *bhakta* philosopher[7], nor is there any specific mention of his contact with Acyuta Pisharoti or with the Guruvāyur temple[8]. This would, necessarily, indicate that the *Sandes'a* was written before Nārāyaṇa wrote his *Nārāyaṇiya*, which bespeaks his contact with Pisharoti and the shrine at Guruvāyur. This work was written sometime about[9] 1581. This, then, gives the forward limit of the author. We know that a nāmāmkam ceremony was performed in 1599, and working backwards, a ceremony must have been performed in 1587 and then in 1575, for this function was conducted only once in twelve years. Since the forward limit has already been fixed up, the Māmakam ceremony, mentioned in the text, must be the function celebrated in

1. Vide P. v. 89. It is a poetic description. Compare for instance :—

   एकस्तावद्वहति शिरसि ज्योतिषामेकमिन्दुम् ।
   ज्योतिश्चक्रं निखिलमपरो धारयत्यन्तरङ्गे ॥

   This is a fulsome tribute paid to the great scholar Acyuta Pisharoti.

2. *Ibid.*, 90. 3. *Ibid.*, 91.

4. *Ibid.*, 92. This verse tells us that Narayaṇa was still a disciple undergoing his study under his father. There is no indication that he had begun his studies under Achyuta Pisharoti.

5. *Ibid.*, 92. 6. *Ibid.*, 17. 7. *Ibid.*, 94-96.

8. According to popular tradition, Narāyaṇa gets his rheumatism as a result of his taking it off from his Guru (cf. for instance Babar's taking on his son Humayun's disease). It was this that forced him to go to Guruvāyur and do ***Bhajana*** which resulted in his writing the well-known *Narayaṇīya* (vide the writer's paper on this author in IHQ.).

9. This dating is based on a *Kalivacaka* occurring in the work.

Feburary - March, 1575. And this means the date of the *Sandes'a* may be put down to January, 1575.

This dating is not inconsistent with the reference to the ruler of *Vaṭakkankur*. Hough, in his *Christianity*, tells us that in the year 1578 *Vaṭakkankur* was ruled by a Queen and that she continued to rule for 24 years and that she was ruling in 1599 A. D., and also, when Archibishop Menezes visited the kingdom[1]. Therefore, if Goda Varma was ruling over the kingdom, it could be only either earlier than 1578 or after at least 1602. Since, however, the forward limit has been fixed up, the former alternative alone is feasible; that means that the *Sandes'a* was written during the last days of Goda Varma who must have passed away after 1575 but before 1578.

This dating is also in consonance with the writer's view that the king who ruled over Cochin from 1563-1602 was a Ravi Varma[2]. The text of the *Sandeśa* categorically states that Karappuram was resplendant with the prowess of Ravi Varma. Mr. Iyer's suggestion that this Ravi Varma, was a *Tāvali* head of a branch of *Vaṭakkankur* cannot be sustained at all[3]. Again, Mr. Iyer identifies the first Ravi Varma, mentioned in the text, with a king of Venad and then identifies him with king Ravi Varma who reigned from 786 M. E. to 836 M. E. (i. e., from 1601 to 1651 A. D.). This identification also is untenable and simply for the reason it has been advanced, it cannot command acceptance. The contradictory nature of the records relied upon by Mr. Iyer invalidates his view, and the textual reference to Goda Varma of *Vaṭakkankur* and Meppattur Nārayaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri disprove it. And, therefore, the dating of the work based upon this identification cannot be accepted.

Henee, we conclude that the *Sandeśa* must have been written very early in the year 1575 and not in the earlier year of the next century, as Mr. Iyer would have it. During this period there was fight going on between the king of Cochin and the Zamorin of Calicut[4]. And this dating of the *Sandeśa*, once again, sets at rest the controversy which the present writer had with Mr. Iyer[5], regarding the

1. Vide HC.   2. Vide JOR. Vol. V.

3. Vide VD. already cited. Mr. Iyer was forced to go in for a *Tavali* chief of Vaṭakkankur, because from his point of view the king of Cochin during the period was not a Ravi Varma. He is thus the victim of his own theory.

4. Vide CSM.

5. This subject is set forth first in the paper published in JOR., already cited, then again in the papers contributed to PP., and the K.

king who ruled over Cochin[1] between 1563-1602.

1. We shall not better conclude this note than with a reference to the position that Cochin held in the Kerala politics of the day. Judging from the use of certain terms, found in the text, we may conclude that the king of Cochin was the Rājarāja among Kerala potentates, i.e. king of kings, elsewhere, also, styled Keralenduḥ. The Zamorin of Calicut was contesting his all-Kerala sovereignty and this led to the numerous wars between the king of Cochin and the Zamorin. We also learn from the text that the king of Cochin was the suzerain lord of the territories from the Bharatapula in the north to at least Tiruvalla in the South. Hence, it may be assumed that even in the sixteenth century the king of Cochin was exercising some sort of overlordship through Kerala, though, of course, in a dwindled form, an aspect fully set forth in AC.

Prākṛta Works known from Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa

By

V. RAGHAVAN, *Madras.*

Extensive as the extant classic Sanskrit literature is, it is well known that it is but a part of the vast literature that once was. While a number of works have come to be known through citations in available literature, many have been completely lost to us. This is true of Prākṛta literature as well. Bhoja's *S'ṛṅgāra-prakās'a*, an encyclopaedic work of criticism, gives us an idea of this vast literature that has been lost. In this paper, I shall place before scholars some material furnished by Bhoja regarding works on Prākṛta grammar and literature[1].

Grammar.

1. Pāṇini's *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa*:— Bhoja in considering *mis'ra-prabandhas*, works in prose and verse, in Ch. III of his *S'ṛṅgāra-prakās'a*, classifies *mis'ra* and illustrates its varieties. A mixed composition may be dominated by verse or by prose or may have the two in an equal measure (*padyapradhāna*, *gadyapradhāna* and *tulyarūpa*). Illustrating the *gadyapradhāna* he says: **गद्यप्रधानमपि तद्वदेव त्रिधा । तत्र सजातीयेन पञ्चतन्त्र-चेटकादौ । विजातीयेन कात्यायनीय-पाणिनीय-प्राकृतलक्षणादौ.** This shows that Pāṇini, the greatest Sanskrit grammarian, holds an equally eminent position with respect to Prākṛta grammar too; that Pāṇini wrote a Prākṛta grammar called *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa*, that Kātyāyana too wrote a Prākṛta grammar of the same name, and that these two works were written in prose and verse of a varied nature.

Pischel has discussed the issue of a *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa* by Pāṇini in his treatise on the grammar of Prākṛta language (p. 33 : 31). He says that Mārkaṇḍeya, the Prākṛta grammarian of the 17th century A. D. refers to old writers on the subject, such as, S'ākalya, Kohala and Kapila, that more of these is not known and that similar is the case of the *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa*, attributed to Pāṇini by Kedārabhaṭṭa and Malayagiri. Pischel opines that it is likely that Pāṇini wrote a Prākṛta grammar also, perhaps as a supplement to his Sanskrit grammar, but he confesses that one cannot, unreservedly, affirm this. Dr. T. K. Laddu, in his Intro. to *Trivikrama's Prākṛta Grammar*, is inclined to believe in the tradition that Pāṇini wrote a Prākṛta grammar. He says 'Pāṇini is also said to have composed a Prākṛta grammar, as a supplement to his Sanskrit grammar, a noteworthy tradition as it confirms the view set

1. I have dealt with this subject, in full, in my Bhoja's *S'ṛṅgara-prakās'a.*

forth above that the Prākṛta dialects are not derived from the Pāṇinian Sanskrit but from earlier dialects of the Vedic time (p. 182)[1]. But there are also scholars who attach little value to this tradition of a *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa* by Pāṇini. Keith says in his *Sanskrit literature* (p. 453) : ‘The tradition which ascribes to Pāṇini a Prākrit grammar is doubtless a mere invention to honour Prākṛta’. This view follows that of Hoernle who says in his Intro. to Caṇḍa's *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa* that Kedārabhaṭṭa and Malayagiri were all the time quoting from Caṇḍa the oldest Prākṛta grammar, and ignorantly ascribing the text to Pāṇini. He says ‘It is a curious circumstance that a grammar bearing the same name (*Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa*) is ascribed by two old writers, Kedārabhaṭṭa and Malayagiri, to Pāṇini, the famous Sanskrit grammarian. The remark of the former, as quoted by d' Alwis in his Intro. to *Kaccāyana's Grammar* (p. xxv) is the following : “ पाणिनिर्भगवान् प्राकृतलक्षणमपि वक्ति संस्कृतादन्यत् ‘ दीर्घाक्षरं च कुत्रचिद् एकां मात्रामुपैति ’ इति ” That is, ‘the blessed Pāṇini also enunciates a Prākṛta rule, different from Sanskrit, that a long vowel becomes short’. He compares this rule with Caṇḍa II. 3, and says that the passage does not necessarily imply that Pāṇini was the author of a Prākṛta grammar named *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa*. He, however, accepts that Malayagiri's language is explicit ; it runs as follows : “ ‘चत्वारि’ इति सूत्रे नपुंसकत्वनिर्देशः प्राकृतत्वात्। प्राकृते हि लिङ्गं व्यभिचारि। यदाह पाणिनिः स्वप्राकृतलक्षणे ‘ लिङ्गं व्यभिचार्यपि ’ ” Still Hoernle concludes that there is no Prākṛta grammar by Pāṇini and that it is Caṇḍa's *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa* that these writers quote, attributing the citations wrongly to Pāṇini, the cause of such wrong ascription being the antiquity of Caṇḍa's original work itself. He says, ‘The fact that both Kedārabhaṭṭa and Malayagiri ascribe the *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa* to Pāṇini is, of course, of no weight. It merely shows that they had only a traditional acquaintance with the work. Still its traditional ascription to Pāṇini is so far important, as it shows that the grammar was considered to be ancient and authoritative. This character well agrees with Caṇḍa's *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa*’. It will be pertinent here to give the opening verse of Caṇḍa's work which mentions ‘ancients’ who preceded him, प्रणम्य शिरसा वीरं स्वल्पैर्व्यापिभिरक्षरैः। लक्षणं प्राकृतं वक्ष्ये किञ्चिद् वृद्धमतादिह. Who are these *vṛddhas* ? It is not improbable that Pāṇini was one of them, some of the rest being mentioned by Mārkaṇḍeya. But Hoernle would dismiss this verse as a later accretion, as introduced by later writers who revised Caṇḍa's original, and according to him there is an original Caṇḍa earlier than Vararuci and a later Caṇḍa, later than Vararuci.

1. Cf. Translation from German into English by P. V. Ramanuja Swami, in the A. B. O. I. Vol. X. pp. 177-218.

On the question of a *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa* by Pāṇini, we have now the additional evidence of Bhoja's *S'ṛṅgāra-prakās'a.* That such a text was available in Bhoja's time is borne out by Bhoja's observation that the work was in prose and verse, that the prose portion was in greater proportion, and that both the prose and the verse were in several varieties. Before closing this note on Pāṇini's *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa,* I may also add one more quotation from this work, which, so far as I know, has not been noted till now. It is Malayagiri again who makes the citation, this time in his gloss on the *Nandīsūtra* (*Āgamodaya Samiti Series* edn. p. 85) :— "अत्र सव्वायप्प एसेसु, इत्यत्र तृतीयार्थे सप्तमी। भवति च तृतीयार्थे सप्तमी। यदाह पाणिनिः स्वप्राकृतलक्षणे 'व्यत्ययोऽप्यासाम्' इत्यत्र सूत्रे। तृतीयार्थे सप्तमी यथा 'तिसु तेसु अलंकिया पुहवि (त्रिभिस्तैः अलंकृता पृथ्वी)' इति".

2. Kātyāyana's *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa* :— According to tradition, Kātyāyana and Vararuci are identical, but modern scholars do not accept this identity. We have the Sanskrit grammarian Kātyāyana, author of the vārtikas on Pāṇini's sūtras, and we have the Prākṛta grammarian Vararuci, author of the *Prākṛta-prakās'a.* Keith says that the two are different, Kātyāyana being a southerner and Vararuci an easterner, that the further contention that Kātyāyana produced the *Prākṛta-prakās'a* of Vararuci is equally absurd, and that Vararuci's identity with the author of the *Prākṛta-prakās'a* is most implausible, as the Prākṛta of that work is very late in character (cf. Skt. Lit. pp. 427, 433). The issue has been made more clouded by Bhoja's attribution of a *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa* to Kātyāyana. Whether Kātyāyana and Vararuci are identical or not, whether the Sanskrit grammarian himself is the author of the *Prākṛta-prakās'a* or not ; it is very clear that Bhoja is not referring to the available and well known *Prākṛta-prakās'a* attributed to Vararuci, but to a totally different work written in prose and verse of a varied nature. The reference to the style of the composition proves the existence of such a work in Bhoja's time ; perhaps, as distinct from the text known as *Prākṛta-prakās'a* of Vararuci, this text in prose and verse mentioned by Bhoja was known as the work of Kātyāyana.

Literature.

1. Bhoja's *S'ṛṅgāra-prakās'a* mentions a number of specimens of Prākṛta literature. Among the varieties of non-dramatic poetic composition, Bhoja mentions the *Kathā, Parikathā, Khaṇḍakathā, Upakathā* and the *Bṛhatkathā.* The last is, at once, a common name and a proper name in one, the reference being to Guṇāḍhya's work, a type by itself. The longest passage of Pais'ācī Prākṛta, and that identifiable as a quotation from Guṇāḍhya's work, is found in Bhoja's *S'ṛṅgāra-prakās'a* (cf. my paper on it in the *Rādhā Kumud Mukerjee Commemoration Vol.,* Pt. II).

2. *Kathā* is illustrated by the *Kādambarī* and the *Līlāvatī,* the former

in prose and Sanskrit, and the latter in verse and Prākṛta, as Hemacandra who draws upon the *S'ṛṅgāra-prakāśa* extensively puts it definitely: काचित् (कथा) पद्यमयी यथा लीलावती (*Kāvyānuśāsana*, K. M. edn. p. 338). In Ch. 28 on dūtas and dūtakarman, Bhoja illustrates the accomplice who is one's friend from childhood days with a character in the *Lilāvatī*: सह-पांसु-क्रीडा कुवलयावली महानु (?) वत्या लीलावत्याम् (*S'ṛ.-Pra.*, Madras Ms., Vol. IV. p. 481).

The *Nyāya-līlāvatī* of Vallabhācārya refers under ārṣajñāna, to the hero and the heroine of this *Līlāvatī-katha*: यथा वा स्वेच्छास्मृत-पदार्थ-सार्थे भवति शालिवाहनो नृपतिर् इदानीं शृङ्गार-सरसीतीरे देव्या लीलावत्या सह ललितमधुरं सङ्गीतकमनुतिष्ठतीति ज्ञानम् (N. S. Press edn. p. 69). We have the following reference in the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana bearing on the story of the work: ननु नागलोकगमनादयः सातवाहनप्रभृतीनां श्रूयन्ते (*Uddyota*, III, p. 145, K. M. edn.). To some of the details of the story on which the *Lilāvatī* is based, there appears to be a reference in Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita* (Ch. VIII. pp. 281-2, N. S. press edn. 1892), where Nāgārjuna's going to the Nāgaloka, getting a neklace there, and, later, presenting it to his friend, king Sātavāhana are mentioned. Fortunately, three manuscripts of this *kathā* are available, one in the Jain Bhandars at Jesalmere, another in the Patan Bhandars, and a third with commentary in the Anup Sanskrit Library, Bikaner. The first two manuscripts are described, with extracts, in the catalogues of the Jesalmere and Patan Bhandars (cf. Gaek. Or. Series, XXI ⌞ Intro, p. 55; Ex. p. 28 ⌟ and LXXVI ⌞ Intro. p. 57; Ex. pp. 193 f. ⌟). According to the references given above, and the description and notes in the two catalogues mentioned above, the work is in Mahārāṣṭrī Prākṛta and deals with the story of the marriage of king S'āli(Sāta)vāhana with the Siṃhala princess *Lilāvatī*; Nāgārjuna figures as a character in it and there is a sub-plot having a heroine named Mahānuvatī (?) assisted by a friend of hers named Kuvalayāvatī. Some more *gāthās* from the opening part of the work are quoted in the introduction to the *Apabhraṃśakāvyatrayī* (Gaek. Or. Series. XXXVII, pp. 77-8). From the *gāthās* extracted in the Jesalmere and Patan catalogues, we learn that the author's father was known as Bhūṣaṇa Bhaṭṭa, and grandfather, Bahulāditya; we do not know whether the word 'कोऊहलेण' in *gāthā* 23 is to be taken as giving the author's name or not; the two catalogues themselves do not seem to understand the word as referring to the author. My friend Dr. A. N. Upadhye, Kolhapur, is now engaged in editing this *Kathā* for the Singhī Jain Series. There have appeared also some articles on the story of this *Lilāvati-kathā* (cf. *J. of the Andhra His. Res. Society*, II. p. 66; IV. Parts 1 & 3, pp. 25-32; the Telugu monthly, *Bhāratī*, Madras, III, ii, pp. 3-13). Quite a large number of the *Līlāvatī gāthās* appears

to be quoted in the *S'ṛṅgāra-prakāśa*.

3. A *S'ūdraka-kathā* is quoted by Bhoja in Ch. 28th of his *S'ṛṅgāra-prakās'a* ; an episode called *Harimati-vṛttānta* and a parrot, called Jaratkīra, acting as a love messenger in this work, are referred to. From the obscure Prākṛta passage that is quoted, all that we can make out is that this *S'ūdraka-kathā* is a Prākṛta work : **शुको (दूत:) जरत्कीर: , शूद्रकसभायां हरिमतीवृत्तान्ते—जं वदन रवइविणओ प भास इते दव्वद कीरुरणि राटिओ भासइ··· हारिलक्खजण जुत्त होदिज्ज इसव्ख अत्तवणि अत्तहो** (Vol. IV, pp. 479 f). When mentioning and illustrating the varietis of *Kathā* , Bhoja gives the *S'ūdraka-kathā* as an example of the *Parikathā* (*S'ṛ.-Pra.* II, p. 428 Madras MS.), and according to Ratnes'vara, commentator on Bhoja's *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhā-bharaṇa* (p 125, K. M. edn.) the *Parikathā* is to be in Prākṛta, though, according to Abhinavagupta (*Locana* p. 141), it may be in Sanskrit or Prākṛta.

4. Another kathā-variety is the *Khaṇḍakathā*, a small story forming part of a bigger one, retold separately, and Bhoja illustrates it with a work called *Indumatī* : **ग्रन्थान्तरप्रसिद्धं यस्याम् इतिवृत्तमुच्यते विबुधैः। मध्यादुपान्ततो वा सा खण्डकथा यथेन्दुमती** (Vol. II, p. 423). It is very likely that the romance of Aja and Indumatī in the *Raghuvaṃs'a* (Cantos V-VIII) is retold in this *Khaṇḍakathā*. From the following statement of Ānanda-vardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka* (*Uddyota* III), we can make out that this *Khaṇḍakathā* is in Prākṛta and in verse : **खण्डकथा-सकलकथयोः प्राकृतप्रसिद्धयोः कुलकादिनिबन्धनभूयस्त्वाद् दीर्घसमासायामपि न विरोधः.**

5 and 6. Among the twenty four varieties of the *S'ravyakāvya*, Bhoja defines a variety of *Kṣudrakathā* called *Manthullī*, which is written in Mahārāṣṭrī Prākṛta : **क्षुद्रकथा-मन्थुल्ली येह महाराष्ट्रभाषया भवति। गोरोचनेव कार्या साऽनङ्गवती वा कविभिः** (Vol. II. p. 428). Two examples of this type, referred to by Bhoja, are *Gorocanā* and *Anaṅgavatī*. From a reference in Ch. III of the *S'ṛṅgāra-prakās'a*, we learn that the *Manthullī* is a work in prose. Bhoja says : **तदेतद् (गद्यं) त्रिविधमपि आख्यायिकासु कथासु मन्थुल्लिकासु च दृश्यते** (Vol. I, p. 231).

7. Another variety of *S'ravyakāvya*, described by Bhoja, is *Pravahlikā*, showing two persons in dispute over an important thing in the midst of an assembly. It is said to be written partly in Prākṛta : **यत्र द्वयोर्विवादः प्रधानमधिकृत्य जायते सदसि। सार्धप्राकृतरचिता प्रवह्लिका चेटकप्रभृति** (Vol. II, p. 428). In illustration of this type composed partly in Prākṛta, Bhoja mentions a work called *Ceṭaka* ; and, as we have seen already in Ch. III (Vol. I, p. 232,), Bhoja refers to *Ceṭaka*, along with the *Pañcatantra*, as a work in prose and verse, the prose being in greater

1. Hemacandra, K. A. (K. M. edn. p. 339) - *Matallika* and *Preta-Maharāṣṭra* - are wrong readings.

proportion, and the prose and verse varieties being *sajātīya* i. e. homogeneous.

8. While dealing with the different ways in which poets open their poems, Bhoja cites a Prākṛta kāvya called *Mārīca-vadha*[1] for illustrating *vastūpakṣepa* (Ch. xi) : **वस्तूपक्षेपो यथा मारीचवधे** —'**मअपहणिमित्तं णिग्ग अमं इसुणं गुणं गुह ण्णिाए। ऊण लद्धा बसरोगहि ऊण मोत्ति आइंग ओ वाह**' ॥

9. Similar to the *Mārīca-vadha* mentioned above is a *Rāvaṇa-vijaya* which is, however, more frequently referred to by Bhoja. Vādijaṅghāla on Daṇḍin (I. 34) mentions it as a poem in the Mahārāṣṭrī Prākṛta. Bhoja refers to it (*S'ṛ.-Pra.* II. p. 436) along with the *Setu-bandha* and the *Hari-vijaya*, as an Ās'vāsakabandha, a poem divided into *Ās'vāsas* and composed in the *Skandhaka* metre. Bhoja makes a further observation, here, bearing on all these three poems, that they contain non-*Skandha* verses too, of an alliterative type, which are really later interpolations according to some critics[2]. Bhoja quotes the *kavi-pras'aṃsā* from the introductory portion of *Rāvaṇa-vijaya* : **कविप्रशंमा यथा रावणविजये** —'**सुअलं चेणि अदबद्धं दोहिव एहि कलुसं पसण्णं पठिअं। जणंति कइण कई सुन्द्ध महावेहिलो अणे हि वहिअ-अम्**' (cf. *S'ṛ.-Pra.* II. p. 434). The poem is also mentioned as containing **नायकवर्णन** and **वाहनवर्णन** (*ibid.*, p. 439)[3].

10. Next to the *Setu-bandha*, the *Hari-vijaya* of Sarvasena seems to have been the most important Prākṛta poem; and at present, we have to satisfy ourselves with only quotations from and references to this work. The earliest critic to mention is Ānandavardhana. We find it stated in *Uddyota* III of the *Dhvanyāloka* that, for the sake of *rasa*, Sarvasena deviated from the original : **इतिवृत्तवशायातां कथञ्चिद् रसाननुगुणां स्थितिं त्यक्त्वा पुनरुत्प्रेक्ष्यापि अभीष्टरसोचितकथोन्नयो विधेयः — यथा कालिदासप्रबन्धेषु यथा च सर्वसेनविरचिते हरिविजये** (p. 148). Abhinavagupta, in explaining this reference to the poem, gives us some idea of the subject-matter : **हरिविजये कान्तानुनयनाङ्गत्वेन पारिजातहरणादि निरूपितम् इतिहासेषु अदृष्टमपि** (*ibid.*). Kuntaka mentions Sarvasena along with Kālidāsa as a poet of the graceful, natural, genius-dominated style of composition : **एवं सहजसौकुमार्यसुभगानि कालिदास-सर्वसेनादीनां काव्यानि दृश्यन्ते.** Vādijaṅghāla on Daṇḍin (I. 34) mentions the *Hari-vijaya* as a poem in the Mahārāṣṭrī Prākṛta. Hemacandra says that the *Hari-vijaya* errs in taste once in giving a disproportionately

1. Abhinavagupta mentions in his *Abhinava-bhāratī* a *Rāga-kāvya*, a poem to be sung, although in the single *kakubhagrāmarāga*, called *Mārīcavadha*, but as the *Rāga-kāvya*, which Bhoja too gives with the name *Kāvya* comes under *Uparūpakas*, we have to distinguish between the two *Mārīcavadhas*.

2. See also Hemacandra, K. A., p. 337.

3. The Prakṛta passages are all corrupt in the MS. See also Hemacandra, K. A., p. 334.

lengthy description of the sea in alliterating verses and that in a situation of *vipralambha rasa* : अङ्गस्य अप्रधानस्य अतिविस्तरेण वर्णनं यथा-······तथा हरिविजये—ईर्ष्याकुपितसत्यभामानुनयनप्रवृत्तस्य हरेः पारिजातहरणव्यापारेण उपक्रान्तविप्रलम्भस्य वर्णनप्रस्तावे गलितकनिबन्धनरसिकतया कविना समुद्रवर्णनमन्तरा गडुस्थानीयं विस्तृतम् (K. A. p. 121). But Bhoja tells us (*S'ṛ.-Pra* II, p. 436) that some critics hold these alliterative *galitakas* in the three poems, *Rāvaṇa-vijaya*, *Setu-bandha* and *Hari-vijaya* as interpolations made by self-styled savants : तथा हि रावणविजय—हरिविजय—सेतुबन्धेषु आदितः समाप्तिपर्यन्तमेकमेव च्छन्दो भवति । गलितकानि तु व्यासकष्टवत् कैरपि विदग्धमानिभिरुपक्षिप्तानीति तद्विदो भाषन्ते. Hemacandra, also, reproduces this view from Bhoja on p. 357 of his *K. A.* From the high compliment paid to Sarvasena by Kuntaka, we will be safer to accept the view that these alliterative verses are interpolations. Bhoja says (*S'ṛ.-Pra* II. p. 437) that the poem is marked by the poet's favourite idea and word *utsāha* in the last verse of each *Ās'vāsa* : तेष्वभिप्रायाङ्कता यथा धैर्यमाढ्यराज्यस्य, उत्साहः सर्वसेनस्य, अनुरागः प्रवरसेनस्येति. In the same Chapter Bhoja refers to the poem as having descriptions of city, mountain, sea, seasons, sunset, hero, his vehicle (*vāhana*), drinking party (*pānagoṣṭhī*), the conquest over an enemy who submits of himself (शत्रुप्रणतिरूपेण अरिविजयः), and the removal of Satyabhāmā's anger by effort, i. e. by Kṛṣṇa bringing for her the *pārijāta* tree. On p. 439, Bhoja says that one Satyaka figures as a *nisṛṣṭārtha-dūta* in the *Hari-vijaya* : दूतस्त्रिधा—निसृष्टार्थः, परिमितार्थः, शासनहरश्च । तेषु निसृष्टार्थो यथा उद्योगपर्वणि वासुदेवः, हरिविजये सत्यकः. From a verse quoted on p. 470 of Bhoja's *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*, we see that Satyaka goes as duta from Kṛṣṇa to Indra, the custodian and owner of the *pārijāta*. The *vṛtti* of Bhoja here says : अत्र मायाविनो महेन्द्रस्य अभिप्रायः सत्यकेन व्यक्तमेवोद्भिन्नः इति व्यक्तोऽयमुद्भेदः. According to the commentary here, Satyaka is Kṛṣṇa's charioteer. In the same *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhabharaṇa*, Bhoja quotes four more verses, which are distinguishable as from the *Hari-vijaya* on pp. 567, 583 and two on p. 588. Many more must be found among the numerous anonymous quotations in the *S'ṛṅgāra-prakāśa.* On p. 127 of the *Dhvanyāloka*, Ānandavardhana quotes a verse describing spring, mentioning its source as *Hari-vijaya.* One of the introductory verses in the *Avanti-sundarī*, published in the *Dakṣiṇa Bhāratī Series*, Madras, refers to the author Sarvasena as a king : राज्ञा श्रीसर्वसेने(न)··· ··· विजयं हरेः (s'loka 2).

11. One of the varieties of Prākṛta kāvya is called *Avaskandhaka-bandha*, its cantos called *Avaskandhaka.* Bhoja describes this type as written in a low variety of *Apabhraṃs'a* : य इह द्विचारिका वाग (?) ग्राम्यगिरा गीयते गभीरोक्तः । सोऽवस्कन्धकबन्धोऽभिधीयते भीमकुलया-(काव्या)दि [*S'ṛ.-Pra* II, p. 429. (Also cf. ग्राम्यापभ्रंशभाषानिबद्धावस्कन्धकबन्धं भीमकाव्यादि ⌊ Hemacandra K. A., p. 337 ⌋)]. The example given is a work called *Bhīma-kāvya.* The *Alaṅkāra-tilaka* of Vāgbhaṭa

too, is said to mention the *Bhīma-kāvya* composed in *grāmyabhāṣā*.

12. The *Abdhi-mathana* of Caturmukha is an Apabhraṃśa poem which Bhoja mentions twice. It belongs to the *S'ravya-kāvya* class called *Sandhi-bandha*, its cantos being called *sandhis*: **योऽपभ्रंशनिबद्धो मात्राछन्दोभिरभिमतोऽल्पधियाम्। वाच्यस्य सन्धिबन्धश्चतुर्मुखोक्तमब्धिमथनादि** (II, p. 429). While speaking of the habit of poets marking the final verses in each of the cantos of their work with a favourite word of theirs ; Bhoja informs us that the poet named Caturmukha has the '*aṅka*' or 'mark' of his own name (*svanāmāṅka*) which serves by *s'leṣa* as the *aṅka* of his favourite deity, *Brahmā* also : **स्वनामाङ्कता यथा स्वप्रबन्धेषु गोविन्दचतुर्मुखादीनाम् । चतुर्मुख-गोविन्द-चन्द्रशेखर-इष्टदेवतानामाङ्कता च पूर्वोक्तेषु पूर्वोक्तानाम्** . (II, P. 437 ; see, also, Hemacandra, K. A. p. 337). Vāgbhaṭṭa's *Alaṅkāra-tilaka* is, also, said to mention *Abdhi-mathana* as an *Apabhraṃśa-kāvya*. The story of the poem is the well known churning of the milk ocean.

13. We hear of an Āḍhyarāja for the first time in the introductory verse in Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita* : **आढ्यराजकृतोत्साहैर्हृदयस्थैः स्मृतैरपि । जिह्वान्तःकृष्यमाणेव न कवित्वे प्रवर्तते** (18). Under his first *S'abdālaṅkāra* called *Jāti* which is the proper choice of language, Bhoja says that everybody in Āḍhyarāja's kingdom talked Prākṛta, even as everybody in Sāhasāṅka's time spoke Sanskrit : **केऽभूवन् नाढ्यराजस्य राज्ये प्राकृतभाषिणः। काले श्रीसाहसाङ्कस्य के न संस्कृतवादिनः.** (*Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*, p. 123). This verse of Bhoja is based on the following remarks of Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* p. 50 : **श्रूयते च कुन्तलेषु सातवाहनो नाम राजा, तेन प्राकृतभाषात्मकम् अन्तःपुर एवेति समानं पूर्वेण.** Therefore, we have to take Āḍhyarāja as another name of Sātavāhana. Ratneśvara, also, says in his comment on the above verse in the *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa* : **आढ्यराजः शालिवाहनः साहसांको विक्रमादित्यः.** The above references show Āḍhyarāja as a great Prākṛta enthusiast. Bāṇa's reference to him as an author is further confirmed by another information given by Bhoja that Āḍhyarāja has used the word '*dhairya*' as a distinguishing mark in his work : **तेषु अभिप्रायाङ्कता यथा धैर्यमाढ्यराजस्य.** (*S'r.-Pra* II, p. 437, See, also, Hemacandra, p. 335, where this text is reproduced corruptly).

Kulaśekhara, The Royal Dramatist of Kerala

By

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA, *Madras*.

What we know definitely about the Royal Dramatist Kulaśekhara, author of the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa* and the *Subhadrā-dhanañjaya*[1], is only very little. From the prologue to his *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa*, it is clear that he was the Emperor of Kerala, that he had his capital at Mahodayapura, the modern Tiruvañcikkulam in Cochin State, and that, prior to his dramatic works, he had already composed a prose work called *Āścaryamañjarī-kathā*[2]. Again he tells us in the prologue to *Subhadrā-dhanañjaya* that that drama was composed later than the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa*[3]. A short description of the poet is given in the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa* itself[4].

To this may be added the information given by a Brahmin contemporary of Kulaśekhara in his *Vyaṅgya-vyākhyā* commentaries on the two dramas. There is a long introductory portion to the commentary on the *Subhadrā-dhanañjaya*, where he gives a detailed description of the circumstances that led to his writing the commentaries[5]. The house of the commentator was situated on the banks of the river Cūrṇī (Periyār). One morning a messenger from the Emperor came to his house and informed him that the Emperor wanted to see him. A boat, with all conveniences, was ready for his journey. The Brahmin scholar reached Mahodayapura and met Kulaśekhara sitting on a

1. *Trivandrum Sanskrit Series* (TSS.) Nos. 11 and 13 respectively.

2. 'यस्य·· वसुधाविबुधधनायान्धकारमिहिरायमाणकरकमलस्य मुखकमलाद् गलदाश्चर्यमञ्जरीकथामधुद्रवः । ···तस्य राज्ञः केरलकुलचूडामणेः महोदयपुरपरमेश्वरस्य श्रीकुलशेखरवर्मणः कृतिरियमधुना प्रयोगविषयमवतरति ।' TSS. No. 11.

3. 'तपतीसंवरणसंघटनापटुतरस्य···तस्य राज्ञः कलमराशिपेशलकेदारिककेरलाधिनाथस्य श्रीकुलशेखरवर्मणो निजनिबन्धनमद्य बध्नाति बुधहृदयम् ।' TSS. No. 13.

4. 'उत्तुङ्गघोणमुरुकन्धरमुन्नतांसमंसावलम्बिमणिकर्णिककर्णपाशम् ।
आजानुलम्बिभुजमञ्चितकाञ्चनाभमायामि यस्य वपुरार्तिहरं प्रजानाम् ॥'

5. Travancore Palace Library, No. 1604. Passages from this introductory portion are quoted in the preface to the *Tapatī samvaraṇa*, and in the Malayalam book *Vijñānadīpika*, Part I, by Ulloor S. Paramesvara Iyer.

throne in the court hall. He gives a long description of the Emperor[1], which may be compared with the description given in the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa* by the poet himself. Kulaśekhara welcomed him warmly, and taking him to his private chamber, told him that he had composed two dramas, the *Saṃvaraṇa* and the *Dhanañjaya*, following the Dhvani school. He wanted to know whether the Brahmin scholar approved of them or not. If they were good the poet would himself show him how they were to be represented, and later get them staged by actors. The Brahmin scholar wrote the commentaries on the basis of the explanation given by the author himself. In the commentary on the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa*, also, he says[2] that he has been able to give the author's own ideas, since the king himself has taken the role of each character and explained to him how the representation ought to be done.

According to the popular traditions in Kerala, this Kulaśekhara is said to have reformed the Kerala stage, and adapted many of the the well-known Sanskrit dramas to this reformed theatre. In this work he was, considerably, assisted by a Brahmin, named Tolah, who

1. अथ तत्र तथा गच्छन् अपश्यं केरलाधिपम् ।
समासीनं विराजन्तं मध्ये-नागारिविष्टरम् ॥
किरीटमुकुटप्रोद्यन्मणिश्रीलिप्तवर्णकम् ।
उन्नम्रभालघोणांसबाहुमूलोदरान्वितम् ॥
दूरदीर्घाक्षिदोर्जङ्घायुगलाञ्चितविग्रहम् ।
रागरञ्जितदोःपादपद्मयुग्मैधितश्रियम् ॥
अम्भोजाक्षाद्रिगङ्गादिराजचिह्नात्तदोःपदम् ।
कुण्डलोद्यन्मणिश्रेणीविद्योतितमुखाम्बुजम् ॥
कण्ठभूध्वनिसौन्दर्यगर्हयत्कम्बुजश्रियम् ।
हेमकुङ्कुमकर्पूरचन्दनालिप्तवक्षसम् ॥
नीलकौशेयवासस्त्विडाहरञ्जनचक्षुषम् ।
परं पुरुषनामोद्यत्सल्लापकथयत्कथम् ॥
सङ्कोचयन्तमन्येन वामबाहुस्थमम्बुजम् ।
अङ्कविक्षिप्तनखरं सर्वलोकप्रियं नृपम् ॥

2. Govt. Oriental MSS. Library, Madras, R. 3048 :—
अथाहं केरलभूभृत्कृतेऽस्मिन् नाटके स्थायिभावप्रयोगमार्गं च तत्सहृदयः प्रदर्शयामि । कथमिति चेत्,

भूभृत्स्वयं भूमिकया निरेत्य निजामलङ्कृत्य तनुं मनस्वी ।
यं दर्शयित्वेति विनिश्चितात्मा प्रयोगमार्गं.........॥

composed several humorous verses in Malayālam to be used by the *Vidūṣaka* in the representation of Sanskrit dramas. Many stray verses, both in Sanskrit and in Malayālam, attributed to Tolan, have come down to us. The late Kuññikuṭṭan Tampurān of Koḍuṅṅallūr (Cranganore) has identified this Tolan with the author of the *Vyaṅgya-vyākhya*[1].

Tradition also identifies the dramatist Kulaśekhara with the patron of Vāsudeva Bhaṭṭatiri, the author of the yamaka poem *Yudhiṣṭhira-vijaya*[2]; and it is said that Tolan has composed the following verse as a parody on the yamaka poem of Vāsudeva :

थप्रथ नन्दानन्दं पदद्वयं नात्र जनितनन्दानन्दम् ।
तनयं वन्दे वक्या निरर्थकं दलितदानवं देवक्याः ॥

No substantial evidence can be adduced to support this tradition; but still there is nothing against such an identification.

Ulloor S. Paramesvara Iyer says[3] that Vāsudeva's patron, Kulaśekhara, is the same as Rājas'ekhara mentioned in the *Tripura-dahana* verse[4] :

स्वपदपयोजनते यं सदैव सम्पादकं श्रियो जनतेयम् ।
भूतिधरं व्यालपतिस्फुरत्करं राजशेखरं व्यालपति ॥

and that he is to be identified with the dramatist Rājaśekhara of Kerala, who was a contemporary of S'aṅkara, according to the *S'aṅkara-vijaya* of Vidyāraṇya[5]. He also states that the three dramas mentioned by Vidyāraṇya are the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa*, the *Subhadrā-dhanañjaya* and the *Vicchinnābhiṣeka*[6]. The *S'aṅkara-vijaya* was written centuries after the great S'aṅkara, and has not much historical value, being based on legends and traditions. A story, similar to the one narrated here between S'aṅkara and the three dramas of Rājas'ekhara, is popular about S'aṅkara and the

1. Preface to the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa*, p. iii. fn.
2. Being Kavyamālā Series, No. 60.
3. *Vijñana-dīpika*, Part I, pp. 17-52.
4. *Ās'vāsa* 1, verse 8. *Tripura-dahana* is also a yamaka poem attributed to Vasudeva.
5. कविताकुशलोऽथ केरलक्ष्माकमनः कश्चन राजशेखराख्यः ।
मुनिवर्यममुं मुदा वितेने निजकोटीरनिविष्टपन्नखाग्रम् ॥
प्रथते किमु नाटकत्रयी सेत्यमुना संयमिना ततो नियुक्तः ।
अयमुत्तरमाददे प्रमादादनले साहुतितामुपागतेति ॥
मुखतः पठितां मुनीन्दुना तां विलिखन् एष विसिस्मिये स भूपः ।
(Canto 14, verses 71-73. Ānandas'rama Series, 22, 1891).
6. A non-extant work of Kulas'ekhara according to one tradition. Vide BSOS. Vol. iii, p. 112. T. Ganapati Sastri (*ibid.*, 635) identifies it with the Act I of the *Pratima*, and ascribes it to Bhāsa.

Āścarya-cūḍāmaṇi of S'aktibhadra also[1]. Again the authorship of the *Vicchinnābhiṣeka* is doubtful ; for the author of the *Vyaṅgya-vyākhyā*, who was a contemporary of Kulaśekhara, speaks only of the other two dramas[2]. Moreover, the word Rājaśekhara in the *Tripura-dahana* verse quoted above does not refer to the name of the king ; the word is used to bring out the similarity of the king with God S'iva. The commentator Nīlakaṇṭha, also, explains it only in that way[3]. Some scholars have tried to identify the dramatist Kulaśekhara with the author of the *Mukunda-mālā* and Kulaśekhara Ālvār[4] ; but the identification is not based on any definite evidence; and, moreover, even the popular tradition is against that[5].

Regarding the date of the dramatist Kulaśekhara, there has been a great controversy. T. Ganapati Sastri stated in his preface to the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa* that, in the *Vyaṅgya-vyākhyā* commentary on the work by a contemporary of the author, there is a reference to the *Daśa-rūpaka*, and that the date of Kulas'ekhara must, consequently, be later than the tenth century. Scholars like Winternitz[6], Sten Konow[7] and Keith[8] accepted this position ; but K. Rama Pisharoti[9] and Ulloor S. Paramesvara Iyer[10] refuted this theory by saying, after examining the manuscript concerned, that the so-called reference to the *Daśa-rūpaka* must, certainly, be an addition by some later scribe. Prof. Pisharoti argued[11] that the Royal dramatist Kulaśekhara cannot be later than S'aktibhadra as in the prologue to the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa* only S'ūdraka, Kālidāsa, Harṣa and Daṇḍin are

1. Vide *Keralīyasaṃskṛtasāhityacaritram*, by V. Rajaraja Varma Raja, Part I, pp. 318f. According to this S'aṅkara dictates from memory the whole of the *Ās'carya-cūḍāmaṇi*.

2. 'एकं संवरणं नाम धनञ्जयमितीतरत्'

3. 'राजशेखरं राज्ञां क्षत्रियाणां शेखरं शिरोमणिं, राजा चन्द्रः शेखरे यस्येति शिवपक्षः' (Adyar Library, xx-s-1 (copy with C. Kunhan Raja).

4. Ulloor S. Paramesvara Iyer, *op. cit.*

5. Vide *Keralam* by Koṭuṅṅallūr Kuññikuṭṭan Tampuran, Trichur, 1912, Canto, III, verses 62, 66 and 156. According to this the Alvar is the author of the *Mukunda-mālā* and is the first Emperor of Kerala, whereas the dramatist is the last Perumāl. Of course, these traditional stories cannot be relied upon entirely.

6. *S'aktibhadra's place in the History of Sanskrit Literature*, (Kuppu-swami Sastri Commemoration Volume).

7. *Das indische Drama*, 1920, p. 103.

8. *The Sanskrit Drama*, p. 247; BSOS. Vol. III, p. 296.

9. *Vijñāna-dīpikā*, Part I. p. 42.

10. IHQ. Vol. V, p. 552 ; Vol. VII, pp. 328f.

11. *Ibid.* He and A. Krishna Pisharoti had, at first, assigned this Kulas'ekhara to the sixth century A. D. (BSOS. Vol. III, pp. 109, 112).

mentioned[1], but not S'aktibhadra. Prof. Pisharoti's statement based on this *argumentum ex silentio* is refuted by Winternitz[2]. He says: 'The Naṭī, who asks the Sutradhāra if he is going to stage a composition of the great poets S'ūdraka, Kālidāsa, Harṣa, Daṇḍin and so on, is not bound to give a complete catalogue of the poets known at that time. That the names are chosen at random, may be concluded from the mentioning of Daṇḍin who is not known as a dramatist, while we should expect only authors of dramas to be mentioned'[3]. On the other hand Winternitz maintains that S'aktibhadra must have lived before Kulaśekhara, the dramatist, as there is clear reference in the prologue to the *Āścarya-cū-ḍāmaṇi* of S'aktibhadra to the absence of original Sanskrit dramas in Kerala before his time[4]. Again, the prologue to S'aktibhadra's drama makes it clear that though its author was a South Indian, the play was not supposed to be staged in South India. If S'aktibhadra had lived after Kulaśekhara, or even if had been a contemporary of that Royal dramatist who was credited with the reformation of the Kerala stage and the adaptation of Sanskrit dramas to this reformed stage, he would, certainly, have written his drama for being staged on that reformed Kerala stage. But since the date of S'aktibhadra is not fixed with certainty, this cannot help us in finding the exact date of Kula-s'ekhara. Tradition assigns S'aktibhadra to the beginning of the ninth century[5]; if that is accepted, then, Kulaśekhara may be put later than the ninth century.

Winternitz seems to accept[6] A. S. Ramanatha Ayyar's theory that Kulaśekhara was the Emperor of Kerala between 935-955 A.D.[7] But Ramanatha Ayyar takes king Rāma mentioned in Vāsudeva's *Tripura-dahana* to be the son and successor of Kulaśekhara referred to in

1. Vide *Tapati-saṃvaraṇa*: सुद्दअ कालिदासहर्षदण्डिप्पमुहाणं महाकईणं
2. *Op. cit.* p. 4.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Vide the Naṭī's remark in the *Ās'carya-cūdāmaṇi* (S'rī Bālamanoramā Series, Mylapore, Madras, p. 8.):

अज्ज अच्चा हिदं खु पदं, आआसं पसवइ पुप्फं, सिअदाओ तेल्लं उप्पादअंति, जइ दक्खिणाओ दिसाओ आअदं णाड अणिबन्धनम् ।

5. Tradition makes him a contemporary of S'aṅkara. But the date of S'aṅkara has not yet been definitely fixed. Some scholars assume that he flourished in the beginning of the ninth century; but his date has to be shifted back by at least two more centuries. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, whom tradition considers as a contemporary of S'aṅkara, is definitely earlier than 600 A. D. since he is quoted both by Harisvāmin (638 A. D.) in his commentary on the *S'atapatha Brāhmaṇa*, and by his contemporary Mahes'vara, the commentator on the *Nirukta*.
6. *Op. cit.*
7. Travancore Archaeological Series, Vol. V, Part II.

the *Yudhiṣṭhira-vijaya*[1], whereas, according to the early commentators, Rāma (Rāmavarma) was the real name of the king, and Kulaśekhara was the title he received when he became the Emperor[2]. He also takes the word Rājaśekhara of the *Tripura-dahana* verse, mentioned above, as referring to a king, and identifies him with the father of Kulaśekhara[3]. This, we have already seen[4], is unwarranted. Equally unavailing are the arguments urged by Ulloor S. Paramesvara Iyer[5] to take Kulśekhara to the beginning of the ninth century; neither his identification of the dramatist with the Ālvār, nor the date he has given to the Ālvār on the basis of Swami Eannu Pillai's calculation[6], is acceptable[7]. The tradition, connecting S'aṅkara with the Royal dramatist of Kerala, also does not deserve any serious consideration.

The mention of Daṇḍin and Harṣa in the prologue to the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa* makes it clear that Kulaśekhara must be much later than the seventh century. In the commentary on the *Subhadrā-dhanañjaya* by the Brahmin contemporary of the author, there is clear reference to the superiority of Dhvani Kāvyas '**ध्वनियुक्काव्यसरणि: शस्तेति प्रोच्यते बुधैः**[8]' This shows that Kulaśekhara is later than Ānandavardhana, the advocate of the Dhvani doctrine, who flourished in the court of

1. JRAS. 1925, p. 226 fnn. 1. 2.

2. 'कुलशेखर इत्यभिषेककृतं नाम, पित्रादिकृतं तु रामवर्मेति' *Vijaya-dars'ikā* by Acyuta (R. 3007) 'कुलशेखरस्य कुलशेखर इति नामवतः, एतदभिषेककृतं नाम, पित्रादिकृतं तु रामवर्मेति' *Ratna-pradīpika* by S'ivadāsa quoted by V. Rajarajavarma Raja, *op. cit.* p. 183. 'कुलशेखरनाम्नः कुलालङ्कारो भवतीति विचार्य गुरुभिस्तथाकृतनामधेयस्य । पट्टबन्धादित्यर्थाद्भवति, प्राक् रामनामशालित्वात्' *Padartha-cintana* by Raghava (R. 5119)

3. JRAS. 1925, *op. cit.*

4. Vide fn. 3. on p. 210 of this article.

5. *Op. cit.*

6. *The Indian Ephemeris*, Part I, Madras 1922, p. 489.

7. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar : *The Early Histry of Vaiṣṇavism in South India*, 1920, pp. 23ff.

8. Quoted in the preface to the *Tapati-saṃvaraṇa*. Compare this with the beginning of the *Dhvanyaloka* : काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति बुधैर्यः समाम्नातपूर्वः. Other references to the Dhvani doctrine, similar to this, are also found in that. But the commentary does not betray any sign of his having studied the *Dhvanyaloka* ; it only shows that he had heard much about Ānandavardhana's Dhvani doctrine. This suggests that though he was later than Ānandavardhana, he could not have been much later than that advocate of the Dhvani doctrine.

king Avantivarman of Kashmir (855-884)[1]. This gives the lower limit to the date of Kulaśekhara.

Regarding the upper limit to his date, we can say that it must be much earlier than the fourteenth century, since in the Malayālam poem called *Uṇṇunīli-sandeśa* there is a reference to the acting of the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa* by the professional actors[2]. Kulaśekhara's prosework, *Āścarya-mañjarī-kathā* is quoted in the commentary on the *Amarakośa* both by Rāyamukuṭa (1431 A. D.) and by Vandyaghāṭīya Sarvānanda (1159 A. D.)[3]. Hence Kulaśekhara's date must be earlier than this. Again in the *Sūkti-muktāvali* of Jalhaṇa, composed in 1258 A.D.[4], the following verse praising Kulaśekhara's *Āścarya-mañjarī* is cited and is attributed to Rājaśekhara[5] :

दूरादपि सतां चित्ते लिखित्वाश्चर्यमञ्जरीम् ।
कुलशेखरवर्माख्यश्चकाराश्चर्यमञ्जरीम् ॥

This definitely shows that the dramatist Kulaśekhara cannot be later than Rājaśekhara who lived in the early half of the tenth century A. D. From these two limits Kulaśekhara's date may be fixed by about 900 A. D.

1. M. Krishnamachariar : *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, p. 740.

2. ' *Kaṇṭomallo Taliyil iruvankūttu nam anrorikkal*
Taivam keṭṭāl oru Tapatiyār Naṅṅayār enne nokki
Anyāsaṅgāt kimapi kaluṣā Prākṛtaṃ koṇṭavādit
Pinnekkaṇṭīlaṇaya vivaśaṃ vīrttu maṇḍinra ninne.,
Uṇṇunīli-sandeśa, (a work of the 14th century,) Pt. I.

3. *Catalogus Catalogorum* Pt. I, p. 56a, and preface to the *Tapatī-saṃvaraṇa*. For the dates of the commentators see Keith : *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 414.

4. Keith, *op. cit.* p. 222.

5. *Sūkti-muktāvali*, IV, 86 (Gaekwad Oriental Series, 1938).

The Vedic Schools and the Epigraphy

By

L. RENOU, *Paris*.

The data we possess on the ancient Vedic schools are rudimentary. The only account, treating of them as a whole, is supplied by the *Caraṇa-vyūha*, a badly transmitted text, known in several recensions, which gives lists of names distributed according to the four Vedas with a few summary sub-divisions. The same items of information are also found in the *Devī-purāṇa*, whilst less complete lists appear in the *Prapañca-hṛdaya*, the *Āryavidyā-sudhākara*, the *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi*, and elsewhere. On the other hand, several *Purāṇas* know the genealogy of Vedic masters, whose names extend for the most part over those of the schools.

The Buddhist and Jain sources should, also, be taken into account, as well as a curious passage from the *Divyvāvadāna* (p. 632). As to the *Yajurveda*, we have new data in a *Yajurvṛkṣa* discovered by Raghu Vira (J. Vedic Stud. II, n. 1). Cf. lastly the *Ānanda-saṃhitā* (Caland on the Sacred Books of the *Vaikhānasa*, Med. Ak. Wet. Vol. LXV. A, n. 7).

With the exception of a few commentaries on Vedic works—Sāyaṇa in some of his *Bhāṣyas*, Mahādeva in the introduction to his commentary on *Hiraṇyakeśin*, and, especially, Mahidāsa in his commentary on the *Caraṇa-vyūha* (with the fragment of the *Mahārṇava* which is quoted therein), lastly Rāmakṛṣṇa in the introduction to his commentary on the *Pāraskara* – literature does not pay much attention to the geographical situation of the schools. Even such an orthodox tradition as the *Mīmāṃsā* rarely gives the names of schools. The most interesting testimony is really that of the grammarians, from Pāṇini to the *Mahābhāṣya*.

As to the 'profane' texts, if the banal references to the Veda are frequent, all precise indications are lacking. One can look through these treasures of Brāhmaṇic literature, the tales of *Kathāsarit-sāgara*, the romances of Daṇḍin or Bāṇa, the classical drama, without noticing the slightest reference to a Vedic school. Bhavabhūti, alone, proud of his ancestry, is happy to remark in the prologue to his plays that his family tradition is akin to that of the Taittirīyas. Even the great epic, though so careful about religious matters, contains very few precise details. The *Rāmāyaṇa* mentions the Taittirīyas once (II. 32. 15) and three verses farther on the Kaṭha-kālāpāḥ : this name is instructive,

not only because it agrees with a text of the *Mahābhāṣya* (*grāme grāme kālāpakaṃ kāṭhakaṃ ca procyate* IV. 3. 101), but, also, because it shows that one can belong at the same time to two distinct schools[1].

Lastly the *Mahābhārata*, which overflows with mythical details on the Veda, gives only once (XII. 342, 97 sq.) a precise fact concerning the schools, to wit that of their number distributed according to the four Vedas, but without mentioning any names.

We are not any better informed as to the geographical situation of the *caraṇas* and *śākhās*. Even the Vedic texts seldom permit the deduction of indications as to where they were composed or over what territories their validity extends. Besides, these indications which are valid to mark the epoch in which a collection of hymns and formulas was constituted, do not determine the date of settlement of the school that received it in its keeping. We know that the geography of *Ṛgveda* takes us to the Punjab, even to the eastern boundaries of Iran : does that help us to localise the schools of the *Ṛgveda* ? Not at all. All the *Saṃhitās* of the *Yajurveda* and several *Brāhmaṇas* (even non-Yajurvedic) speak about the domain of the Kurupāñcālas : one could surmise that there was the place from which *Yajurveda* had sprung , that perhaps all the ritual activity of Vedism started from there. Yet it is stated that certain schools were in existence very far away from there, even as far as the extreme south of the Peninsula. One must take into account vast Vedic 'colonies' that render illusive all manner of research to discover primitive localisation.

1. In reality, one never belongs to more than one school, either through family tradition or initiation : that is made clear by the epigraphic data, when the double rubric ***ṛc-yajus*** or ***yajus-saman*** concerning one same person is exceptional and perhaps not authentic (for instance EI. V p. 68), as well as by the restricting rule found in the *Mīmāṃsā* and elsewhere (as in Rāmakṛṣṇa quoted by Simon *Vedische Schulen* p. 54; ***Karma-pradīpa*** ed. Schrader I. 3) enjoining him to keep within the limits of his school not to learn the texts of another school, etc. But one must make a distinction between the adhesion to a certain school and the fact for a ***paṇḍita***, a ***mīmāṃsaka***, a ***vedāntin***, to study texts belonging to different *caraṇas*. Against the ***śrotriya***, who adheres to a single school, the ***Baudhāyana-Gṛhyasūtra*** (I. 7. 3 and 7) places the ***caturveda*** in the rank of a ***ṛṣi*** : perhaps should we see there only vain pomposity ? In any case, the innumerable ***dvivedins*** and particularly ***trivedins*** and ***caturvedins*** that we find in epigraphy are merely honorific titles, having no more substance than the appellations ***bhaṭṭa***, ***agnihotrin*** or ***ṣaḍaṅga-vid***. Looking at things at their best, a ***caturvedin*** could be not so much a 'connoisseur in the four Vedas' as a member of the community of Brâhmanas among whom the four Vedas are taught side by side : one of the these ***caturvaidyasamanyas*** or ***caturvedi-mangalas*** (the latter, in the South) so often quoted in the inscriptions. The Dubes, Caubes, Tivārīs of modern castes follow one single Veda as do the other Brâhmans (cf. J. Wilson : ***Indian Caste*** II, p. 153 sqq.)

The evidence of inscriptions does not, of course, give any criterion enabling one to fix the localities, where the ancient schools were established. But it enables one to link, during a long period (from the 4th to about the 17th century), the ancient facts and modern state, such as is given in the descriptions of J. Wilson, *Indian Caste* and J. N. Bhattacharya, *Hindu Castes and Sects*[1]. The inscriptions are continually led to mention the names of donees who are Brâhmans. And for a few of them there are given, along with the *gotras*, the *pravaras*, with the places of their origin or the honorific titles, the names of the school to which they belong[2].

Let us look at the facts, Veda by Veda. Regarding the *Ṛgveda*, we can note that the frequency of the attestations of the Ṛgvedins or the Bahvṛcas is equalled by the rarity of the schools. The latter are limited to two groups of which the treatises have survived and the existence of which is averred, the Āśvalāyanas and the S'āṅkhāyanas. We have noticed the latter only three times, in two inscriptions of Kanauj, 12th c. (EI. VIII, p. 154 ; IA. XVIII, p. 17) and in an inscription of Māndhātā (in Mālva) dating from the end of the Paramāra dynasty, 12th c. (EI. IX, p. 116). The S'āṅkhāyana branch—which has always remained far behind, witness the relative scarcity of manuscripts—is noticed for the modern epoch only in the Gujrāt (J. N. Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, p. 76) : this is the very indication given at ancient date by the Mahārṇava (Bühler transl. of *Āp. Dh.* S. p. XXXIII)[3].

The Āśvalāyanas are, on the contrary, widely dispersed; judging from epigraphy some are found : in Bengal (Barrackpur, dyn. Sena, EI. XV, p. 284); in the region of Jodhpur, 8th c. (EI. V, p. 212), in the inscription, already quoted, of Māndhātā (where appear ten donees of the school) ; but especially in the South in the region of Tinnevelly, 17th c. (EI. III p. 256) and 16th c. (EI. XVI p. 289 ; six donees); in the district of Godāvarī, 15th c. (EI. V p. 60 and 63), at Kāñcīpura, 17th c. (EI. XIV p. 358), at Tanjore, dyn. Pallava

1. These two works are unfortunately insufficient. One could have hoped better from the so rich volumes of the Census : there is scarcely anything to be gleaned on the question which interests us. The informers appear to have taken no account of the question of knowing to which of the Vedas are attached the Brâhmans who still have a connecting link with a Veda. The Census of 1931 only gives very slight indications (Bengal I p. 460 sqq. Bombay I, p. 501 ; Baroda I, p. 430 ; Travancore I, p. 371).

2. We have consulted the Corpus III (Guptas), the Vols. I-XXII of ***Epigr. Indica.***, ***the South-Indian Inscriptions*** (SII. I-III) and, incidentally, certain other sources.

3. This branch is even not highly esteemed (cf. the polemic *PB.* XVII. 4. 3 ; and the note of Caland ***ad loc.*** ; also Keith's translation of the ***Ṛgveda's Br.***, p. 42 ; Weber ***Ind. Stud.*** I. p. 34 ; X p. 145). On the corruption of texts from this school, v. Bühler quoted by Peterson (***Report***, 1884, p. 4).

(SII. II p. 339 and 519) at North Arcot, kingdom of Vijayanagar, two donees, 14th c. (EI. VIII p. 316).

There is no doubt that the non-specified Ṛgvedins that abound in epigraphy as in modern caste statistics and that extend over the greater part of the territory of India are in fact Āśvalāyanas. About the original site of the school, it has been conjectured that the *Aitareya-brāhmaṇa* had been composed at the Pañcālas (Keith's transl. p. 45 ; Weber : Hist. Ind. Liter. p. 54)[1].

As to the *Atharvaveda*, the situation is quite simple. No mention of any school appears in the inscriptions. Indeed, the Paippalādas have probably been long extinct ; only the S'aunaka school remains, to which have become attached all existing texts[2].

It is not less interesting to gather the references of Atharvavedin Brâhmans to be met with in epigraphy. They are a group of Brâhmans of the *agrāhāra* of Nirmaṇḍa on the Satluj, prob. of the 7th c. (CS II. III p. 289); a scribe of Nellur, 7th c. (El. VIII p. 240); some *Atharvaveda-pāragas* near Bijāpur (dyn. Kadamba, 6th c. El. XIV p. 166) ; lastly at Bhavnagar, 7th c. (El. XXI p. 183)[3].

Concerning the Sāmavedins or Chandogas, a territorial distribution is given by Mahidāsa in his commentary on the *Caraṇa-vyūha* : the Kauthumins, he says, are settled among the Gurjaras, the

1. It appears, however, from the statements of Wilson that the Ṛgvedins are more particularly certified as existing in the South, the northern limit being marked in the West by the Gujrat. The Brâhmans of Kas'mīr claim to follow the Kaṭha s'ākhā of the Ṛgveda : this would be in accordance with the existence of the ṛcakas of the Kaṭha school, i. e. of texts for the use of *hotṛ* employed by the Yajurvedins of Kas'mīr and adapted, at least for the accentuation (eventually also for the matter) to the customs of the Kaṭha school. It is remarkable that the *Siddhantakaumudi* VII. 4. 38, referring to Haradatta, speaks of the Kaṭha school of the Bahvṛcas.

2. Bühler quoted in Schroeder (ed. of MS. I p. XXIV n. 3) remarks the case of Brâhmans who believe themselves Paippalādas and who in fact recite the S'aunaka version. Nothing allows us to decide whether the Atharvavedins who still existed at the beginning of the 19th century in Kas'mīr (K. v. Hügel : *Kaschmir* II p. 364), that is to say in the presumed homeland of the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā*, were adherents of this *s'ākhā*. The only feature that remains is that a number of Atharvavedins recite the *Saṃhitā* equally from *ye triṣaptāḥ* (beginning of S'aunaka) as from *s'aṃ no devīḥ* (beginning of *Paipp.*), cf. R. G. Bhandarkar, IA. III p. 132.

3. J. N. Bhattacharya p. 78 and 64 speaks of Atharvavedins at Girnar (cf. also Bühler IA. I p. 129 ; R. G. Bhandarkar IA. III p. 134) and in Oṛisā (debased Brâhmans). Wilson II p. 57, 76, 174 speaks of some in Dravidian counry, among the Marāṭhī Des'asthas and the Dakotas of Rājpūtana. Bühler says (transl. of *Manu* p. XLIX n.) that there are some in Central India.

Jaiminīyas in the Karnāṭaka, the Rāṇāyanīyas in the Mahārāṣṭra. He is speaking, no doubt, of the three branches still existing in his time, i. e. the 16th century. In reality, they are also the only three of which the texts have been preserved and of which epigraphy makes mention. We observed only twice the name of Jaimini, at Tinnevelly, 16th c. (EI. III p. 257) and in a Coḷa inscription of the 10th c. (EI. XV p. 64): that situation agrees with that given by Mahidāsa ; it is in harmony with that phonetic peculiarity (the use Dravidian ḷ for ḍ), a feature that the tradition of the school attributes to Agastya and that appears deeper than a mere graphic habit (Burnell : *Jaim. Ārṣeya Br.* p. IX ; Caland : *Versl. Ak. Wet.* 4, VII p. 302). Today, the Jaiminīyas seems to be extinct ; Barth., however (works III p. 314), mentions the existence of a few in the extreme South.

The Rāṇāyaniyas only appear at Indore (Gupta inscription, 5th c., CII. III p. 70.) and in Mālva (dyn. Paramāra, 12th c., EI. IX p. 115 : two donees). At the present time, a few Maithila Brâhmans, the Ojhās, are of that obedience (Wilson II p. 194), as are also the Tailaṅgas in the Āndhra country (II p. 54). One must add that three references are made of Brâhmans claiming to belong to the Drāhyāyaṇa, which is supposed to be the *sūtra* of the Rāṇāyaīya school : at Tinnevelly, 16th c. (EI. XVI p. 290) and in two inscriptions of Vijayanagar, of the same epoch, (EI. XIV p. 343 and III p. 157 : six donees : note the unprecedented expression *s'rīdrāhyāyaṇasūtraja*).

As to the Kauthumins, that modern statistics note in Bengal, at Kanauj and in the Rājpūtānā (but in reality all the present day Sāmavedins must be more or less Kauthumins), epigraphic tradition testifies to their being scattered almost everywhere, at Baghelkhaṇḍ, 6th c. (CII. III p. 108) ; at Bādāmi, 8th c. (EI. III p. 5 : it is the donor here who is in question !) ; at Kaṭak, 8th c. (*ibid.*, p. 342) ; at Dinajpur, 12th c. (EI. XII p. 10) and 11th c. (XV p. 298) ; in Oṛīsā, prob. 13th c. (EI. XII p. 324) and 10th c. (EI. XXII p. 156); in Mālva, dyn. Paramāra, 12th c. (EI. IX p. 115, two donees); at Bardvan, 11th c. (EI. XIV p. 161) ; at Ganjam, prob. 7th c. (EI. XXI p. 41)[1].

Now the *Yajurveda*. As we could expect in presence of so complex a tradition, the situation of the Yajurvedic schools puts some difficult problems before us. From the beginning we see the four

1. Besides current sources, cf. S. K. De NIA. II p. 264 ; Bühler transl. of *Manu* p. XLIX n. ; Census 1931, Bengal I p. 462. It is sometimes stated that the authoritative *sūtra* is the *Gobhila* (Wilson II p. 154 sq.). The name is never met in the inscriptions.

principal *Saṃhitās* radiating to the four cardinal points. The *Vāja-saneyi*, as is generally admitted, is an Eastern text (cf. namely Weber : *Ind. Stud.* V p. 50); the *Kāṭhaka* is from the North as the name seems to indicate and as is confirmed by the long lived tradition of Kaśmīr; the *Maitrāyaṇī* is from the West and according to Schroeder (ed. of MS. I. p. XXII) may have sprung from the Gujrāt; lastly the Taittirīyas, if they did not originate in the South, at least, spread largely in that direction. These facts seem well established. They are partly confirmed by the *Mahārṇava* (quoted by Bühler transl. of *Āp.Dh.S.* p. XXXIII), who states that the Āpastambins are settled to the South of the Narmadā; the Hiraṇyakeśins, from the Sahya mountains to the south-western sea; the Maitrāyaṇīyas in Gujrāt; the Mādhyandinas with the Aṅgas, Vaṅgas, Kaliṅgas. Gurjaras; and, lastly, the Kāṇvas 'in all regions'[1].

The Yajurvedins are mentioned many times in epigraphy, and the principal school names can be traced with variable frequency. Bhāradvāja (known as name of *gotra*) appears in the SII. II p. 519 (dyn. Pallava, Tanjore, 7th c., four donees). Hiraṇyakes'in (*alias* Satyāṣāḍha) appears also at Tanjore (*ibid.*, five donees, also IA. V p. 155); in the district of Tinnevelly, 17th c. (EI. III p. 256 sq., two donees); in Northern Koṅkaṇ, Western Cālukyas, prob. 7th c. (EI. XIV p. 151); under the Eastern Cālukyas, Vijayāditya II (SII. I p. 31 : six donees); and, lastly, under the Kongu kings, 6th c. (IA. V p. 136). The Āpastambīyas are certified as existing a great many times and always in the South. It is probable that the mention of Taittirīya, without any thing more precise, concerns the Āpastamba school, which is the highest representative of the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā*. In any case, this reference also only appears in the Southern inscriptions, the extreme points being Palanpur in the West (EI. VI p. 245), Ganjam in the East (III p. 45)[2].

1. In reality, the schools issuing from the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* seem to be from the South : this is true for Baudhāyana (Caland : *über das Sūtra des* B. p. 11 ; Kane : *History of Dharmas'.* I p. 28 is sceptical) ; for Āpastamba (Bühler transl. of *Āp.Dh.S.*, p. XXXIV) ; for Vaikhanasa (Caland : the *Sacred Books of the V.* p. 2 and 11 and transl. of *V.-smārtasūtra* p. XIV) ; for Vādhūla (Caland : *Acta Or.* I p. 3 IV p. 1 and *Med. Ak. Wet.* LXI 8 p. 2). It is certainly true also for Hiraṇyakes'in and Bhāradvāja. But the earliest situation of these schools may have been quite different. Caland states (GGA. 1898 p. 956) that it is made clear by a passage of the *Mantrapāṭha* (II. 11. 13) that Hiraṇyakes'in was settled on the Ganges, Bhāradvāja on the Yamunā. There was a first settlement of the Taittirīyas, still no doubt at that time undivided, in that same territory of the Kurupañcālas, which, as has been recalled, is probably the cradle of the whole *adhvaryava* tradition.

2. Neither Vādhūla nor Vārāha are testified to ; Vaikhānasa appears EI. XXI p. 238 (dyn. Cola, 11th c.), but it would seem that there the reference is to a community of non-Vedic ascetics.

With the exception of Āpastamba, the most common name among the Taittirīyas is Baudhāyana : one finds it regularly in the South at Tinnevelly (EI. III p. 257, 17th c. , XVI p. 289, 16th c., seven donees) ; in North Arcot, 15th c. (EI. XIV p. 314 sq., six donees) ; and in the region of Anantapur, kingdom of Vijayanagar, 16th c. (EI. XIX p. 132); the same kingdom, 15th c. (EI. VIII p. 316 sq., six donees)[1]. It is, probably, also to Baudhāyana that the name of *Pravacana-sūtra* refers, that we have EI. III p. 146 (Kāñcīpura, 8th c.) SII. II p. 373 (dyn. Nandivarman), SII. II p. 519 (dyn. Pallava, Tanjore, 7th c. : 27 donees) and cf. IA. VIII 276 sq. whatever may be the exact meaning of the word *pravacana*, which is the subject of controversy, the word is undeniably associated with that of Baudhāyana.

The other traditions of *Black Yajurveda* are much more summary. The Kaṭha school is given for the region of Baghelkhaṇḍ, in the 5th c. (SII. III p. 103), for Khaṇḍes', 8th c. (EI. VIII p. 183) and for Mālva (dyn. Paramāra, 12th c. EI. VIII p. 183) and for Mālva (dyn. Paramāra, 12th c. EI. IX p. 116). The Caraka branch (if the name really designates a particular school and not an adept of the *Black Yajus* in general) is represented by the term Cārakya (and Cāraka), which is applied to two donees of the district of Sylhet, eastern Bengal, 7th c. (EI. XIX p. 123) : the localisation is unforeseen, but the matter treats of an immigration of Brâhmans from afar (p. 116) in which all the schools are represented including the Taittirīyas (p. 124)[2].

Lastly, Maitrāyaṇīyas are mentioned in very small numbers in the district of Sambalpur, 8th c. (EI. XXII p. 137) ; in the Kāṭhiyāvār, 6th c. (EI. XI p. 18) ; in the region of Ahmadnagar, 10th c. (EI. II p. 219). And to conclude, the Mahārāja Mātṛviṣṇu is called 'learned in the lore of the Maitrāyaṇī s'ākhā' in an inscription of the Guptas (Eraṇ, 5th c., CII. III p. 89 and 159).

The well known division of the *White Yajus* is in two branches, the Mādhyandinas and the Kāṇvas (that the inscriptions are pleased to name Vājikāṇvas). The Vājasaneyins in general, the Mādhyandinas in particular are scattered over all northern India. The Kāṇvas are stated everywhere and even in the south-west districts, like that of Godāvarī,

1. That the Vedic traditions were forgotten can be observed here by the fact that four times out of six the name Baudhayana is associated with mention '*ṛc*'.

2. Carakas appear in an inscription of the Kṣatrapas of Nāsika, EI. VIII p. 78. The reference is rather to Brâhmanic ascetics (not unknown) than to members of a Vedic *carana*.

14th c. (EI. IV p. 324), of Vizagapatam, 13th c. (EI. V p. III). The remainder are stretched from the Kāṭhiyāvāṛ to the Kaliṅga and to Dacca (CII. III p. 166; EI. IV p. 200; VI p. 139 and 142; XII p. 41 ; XIX p. 136)[1].

It would be interesting to compare the modern distribution. But the descriptions of Bhattacharya and of Wilson do not go further than the elementary discrimination between White and Black Yajurvedins, the latter from the Mahārāṣṭra to the extreme South, the former almost all over India. Wilson mentions merely some Maitrāyaṇīyas at Nāsik (II p. 49), some Kāṇvas (generally near the Mādhyandinas) in the Mahārāṣṭra (the Prathamas'ākhins of Puṇā II p. 24), in Āndhra country (II p. 53 and 57), at Kanauj (II p. 153), in Utkala (II p. 228). Lastly, in Bengal, the Pārās'aras who live in the northern and eastern districts, are of either branch of the *White Yajurveda* (Census 1931, Bengal I p. 462)[2].

From these evidences, incomplete as they are, follows that :

a) the only schools known in epigraphy are those, the texts of which have come till our days ; b) the geographical distribution of these schools agrees with that is taught in the Vedic tradition, and with that the modern connections of caste allow us to admit.

1. Note that the *Kātyāyana-sūtra*, text of the *White Yajus*, is quoted in the Karṇāṭaka (EI. XIII p. 230, 16th c.) and the Tinnevelly, 16th c. (EI. XVI p. 291 : two donees), and that there is an allusion quite alone to the *S'atapatha*, in an inscription also from the South (EI. V p. 62), 14th c.

2. The inscrsption from Tanjore, already noticed, gives unprecedented names of schools partly faulty : Vaseṇi (read Vajasaneyi ?), Paviṇya (?), Kalarca (?), Āgnives'ya (an Āgnives'ya-kalpa is also noted SII. III p. 458, inscr. of Sinnamanur). The latter name is not that of a medical text, as the editor thinks, but a lost text of the *Black Yajurveda*' Āgnives'ya being according to the tradition the master of Vādhūla, cf. Caland : Acta Or. I p. 7 and *Med. Ak. Wet.* LXV A no. 7 p. 10. The *Ananda-saṃhitā* and the *Smṛti-ratnākara* know of an *Āgnives'yasūtra* in their lists of *s'ākhas*.

Siddhānta-saṃhitā-sāra-samuccaya of Sūrya Paṇḍita

By

K. MADHAVA KRISHNA SARMA, *Bikaner*.

Sūrya Paṇḍita is a well known versatile author of the sixteenth century. Besides many notable works on astronomy, there are five poems and valuable philosophic works to his credit. In his *Itihāsa of Indian Astronomy* (2nd. edn. pp. 267ff.), S. B. Dikshit gives valuable information regarding him. He was the son and pupil of Jñānarāja, and belonged to Pārthapura on the bank of the Godāvarī. He wrote his *Sūrya-prakāśa*, a commentary on Bhāskara's *Bīja-gaṇita* in S'aka 1460 (A.D. 1538), when he was 31 years old. According to this he was born in A. D. 1507-8.

Dikshit mentions the following works of Sūrya Paṇḍita :—

1. *Bhāskarīya-bījabhāṣya* (*Sūrya-prakāśa*), 2. *Līlāvatī-ṭīkā* (*Gaṇitāmṛtakūpikā*),
3. *S'rīpatipaddhati-gaṇita*, 4. *Bīja-gaṇita*,
5. *Tājika-grantha* (*Tājikālaṅkāra*), 6-7. *Kāvya-dvaya* (names not given),
8. *Bodha-sudhākara*, 9. *Padyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī*,
10. *Rāmakṛṣṇaviloma-kāvya*, 11. *S'aṅkarābharaṇa*,
12. *Nṛsiṃha-campū*, 13. *Vighna-mocana*,
14. *Bhagavatī-gītā*.

A verse at the end of the first two gives the first eight works. According to another in the fourth, Sūrya wrote eight poems :

टीके वासनयान्विते गणितयोर्लीलावतीबीजयोस्,
तद्वच्छ्रीपतिपद्धतेश्च गणितं बीजं तथैकं व्यधात् ।
एतत्ताजिकमच्युतार्थमपरं काव्याष्टकं प्रौढधीः,
सूर्यो बोधसुधाकराख्यमकरोदध्यात्मशास्त्रेऽपरम्[1] ॥

We have more information on the eight poems in the verse at the end of his *Bhāskara-bhūṣaṇa* (*Bhāskarābharaṇa*), a work hitherto unknown to scholars, the only copy of which is now available in the Anup Sanskrit Library. Here he says :

यः पञ्चायतनप्रसादविधये काव्यान्यथाष्टौ व्यधात्,
तत्र त्रीणि हरेर्हरस्य तरणेरेकैकमम्बाजनेः ।
द्वे गौर्याः परिवर्णने स विधिवत्सूर्याभिधानः कविः,
काव्यं भास्करभूषणाख्यमकरोज्ज्ञानाधिराजात्मजः ।

The MS. was copied by Gopīrāja in वत्सर (S'aka) 474. According to this he wrote three poems on Viṣṇu, one each on S'iva, Sūrya and Gaṇapati

1. A variant reading is अष्टमम्

and two on Gaurī. Dikshit notices only six, namely, Nos. 9-14. Colebrooke (*Essays*, 2nd. edn. II. p. 451) notices: 15. *Siddhānta-s'iromaṇi-ṭīkā*, 16. *Gaṇita-mālatī*, and 17. *Siddhānta-saṃhitā-sāra-samuccaya*. Dikshit notes that, in addition to the works noticed by Colebrooke, Aufrecht (C. C. I. 731) notices: 18. *Graha-vinoda*, 19. *Kavi-kalpalatā-ṭīkā*, 20. *Paramārtha-prapā* (a comm. on the *Bhagavad-gītā*), 21. *Bhakti-s'ataka*, 22. *Vedānta-s'atas'lokīṭīkā*, and 23. *Śṛṅgāra-taraṅgiṇī* (a comm. on the *Amaru-s'ataka*). He also refers (C. C. I. 54) to *Āryā-Rāmāyaṇa* of Sūrya Paṇḍita.

As regards the three works noticed by both Colebrooke and Aufrecht, viz. Nos. 15-17, Dikshit says that they are not included either in the verse enumerating the first eight, or in the list supplied to him by Kās'i-nātha S'āstrin, a modern descendant of our author and, also, have not been personally noticed by him anywhere. He is, therefore, uncertain. No. 15 was known to Colebrooke only through a quotation in No. 17. Aufrecht does not help us, as he takes his information of this only from Colebrooke. After Colebrooke, no scholar appears to have seen the *Siddhānta-saṃhitā-sāra-samuccaya* anywhere. Indologists should, however, be glad to know that there is a MS. of this rare work in the Anup Sanskrit Library, which has a large and important collection of astronomical works. On fol. 8 b of this we have the following:

अस्योपपत्तिरस्माभिः सत्सिद्धान्तशिरोमणेः ।
टीकायां सम्यगुदिता खकक्षायाश्च वासना ॥

Colebrooke, probably, referred to this. I have, however, found no allusion here to his *Gaṇita-mālatī*. That the list supplied to Dikṣit by Kās'i-nātha S'āstrin is not exhaustive is proved by the following verses at the end of *Prabodha-sudhākara* (i.e. No. 8), of which, also, there is a MS. in the Anup Sanskrit Library :—

व्यधादष्टग्रन्थान् गणितविषयेऽत्यन्तचतुरान-
कार्षीद्यः पञ्चायतननुतये काव्यनवकम् ।
शतश्लोकीगीताविवृतिमथ ऋक्सामयजुषां
सुबोधं रुद्रस्याप्यमृतमधुरं भाष्यमकरोत् ॥४३॥
एकं साषिण्ड्यगोत्रप्रवरगणविधौ चापरं गीतशास्त्रे,
गीतां सत्पञ्चतालेश्वरकरणमुखां सूडतार्णवादीन्[1] ?
छन्दःशास्त्रेऽपि वृक्षावनिसलिलविधौ सर्वभाषाप्रबन्धं
चित्रं वाग्ब्रह्मकृष्णार्पणमिदमकरोन्नूनमाचार्यसूर्यः ॥४४॥
उपनिषदुपदेशपरा वार्तिकवार्तापि न श्रुता येन ।
स कथं स्यादधिकारी ग्रन्थेऽस्मिन् सूर्यसूरिकृते ॥४५॥

1. The ending portion of the 2nd Pada might have been ··· यो मुहूर्तार्णवादीन् — ED.

वेदान्तानां रहस्यं परममसुलभं सर्वशास्त्रोदितानां
संवर्ग्यैकत्र सिद्धाशयमिव रचितं ये विचिन्वन्ति ते तु ।
ब्रह्माब्धौ मग्नकुम्भा इव परिकलयन्त्यायुरुच्चैर्जघन्या
धन्यास्तन्यं जनन्याः पुनरनुभविनो नो तदा स्वादयन्ति ॥४६॥
अन्तेवास्यनुकम्पयैव सकलाम्नायावसानोदितं
दिव्याध्यात्मरहस्यमुक्तमधुनाभ्यस्तेन स श्रीगुरोः ।
आत्मायात्यपरोक्षतां करतलन्यस्तप्रवाला···द्[1],
यस्यासौ भवति प्रयाणजननाद्यम्भोधिकुम्भोद्भवः ॥४६॥
गोदायास्तीरभागे हरिहरनिलये पूर्णतीर्थोपकण्ठे,
ग्रामे यः प्रस्तराख्ये गणकगुणगणग्रामणीर्ज्ञानराजः ।
तत्सूनुः सर्वविद्यानिधिरधिकलाकाव्यभाषाभिधायि,
प्रोवाचाध्यात्महार्दं तदनुभववतां प्रीतये सूर्यसूरिः ॥४८॥

Here we have fuller information regarding his works and wide erudition. He has written not only poems, astronomical works and Vedic commentaries but also works on other subjects. Among the Vedic commentaries it is only that on the *Sāmaveda* that is now known to scholars (see Bhagavad Datta : *Vaidika Vāṅmaya kā Itihāsa*, I, pp. 63ff). It is, however, clear from the above that he commented on the *Ṛks.* and *Yajus* as well. It is also clear that he wrote a commentary on the *S'atarudriya*. As elsewhere, here also, he shows his regard for Rāvaṇa, the Vedabhāṣyakāra :—

दशमुखमुखैराम्नायार्थः पुरा हि निरूपितः,
श्रुतिभिरथवा स्वीयं तत्त्वं मिथः प्रकटीकृतम् ।
तदिदमखिलं व्याख्याय प्राक्सुबोधमकरो-
न्निखिलनिगमाचार्यः सूर्यः प्रबोधसुधाकरम् ॥४१॥

Aufrecht is wrong in noticing *Prabodha-sudhākara* as identical with *Tājikālaṅkāra*. The former is a philosophic work, while the latter is a work on the branch of astrology called *Tājika* or *Varṣaphala*. Another mistake in the C.C. is the entry of *Kavi-kalpalatatikā* under Surya Paṇḍita. At the end of the Anup Sanskrit Library MS. of this work, the author's father is said to be Vis'varupa ; but Sūrya Paṇḍita's father, as we have already said, was Jñānarāja.

The *Siddhānta-saṃhitā-sāra-samuccaya* is divided into twelve *prakaraṇas*—the *Māna-nirūpaṇa*, the *Ṛtu-caryā*, the *Mahābhūtādipiṇḍotpatti*, the *Sṛṣṭi-pralaya*, the *Mleccha-matanirūpaṇa*, the *Graharkṣa-mūrti*, the *Graha-gatyādi-vāsanā*, the *Udayāsta-nirūpaṇa*, the *Grahaṇa-vicāra*, the *Graha-yuti*, the *Jyotiṣśāstrāmnāyamūlatva* and the *Jyotiṣs'āstra-purāṇa-virodha-parihāra*.

1. The ending portion of the 3rd *Pada* might have been °प्रवालाग्रवत् — Ed.

It is remarkable that in the 4th *prakaraṇa*, the author has a discussion on *ākarṣakatva* (i. e. gravity), the discovery of which is, usually, associated with later European Scientists. Here is an extract :—

मूर्तित्वान्निजमूर्तिवद् यदि धरासाधारतां मन्यसे
तर्हि स्यादनवस्थिकाऽथ चरमे शक्तिः किमाद्ये न हि ।
वह्नौ दाहकता द्रवत्वमुदके यद्वत्तथाऽस्यां पुनः
स्थैर्यं किं च निसर्गतो निजभुवाम् आकर्षकत्वं पुनः ॥

Similarly, the 11th *prakaraṇa* gives astronomical interpretation of some Vedic *mantras*, and, hence, it is very interesting. Some modern scholars have made similar attempts, not knowing that there is a sixteenth century work to support their way of interpretation.

The Country of Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra

By

G. D. TAMASKAR, *Jubbalpore.*

What is the country of Kauṭilīya *Arthas'āstra*, in other words, what part of India does it specially describe? The solution of this question will help us in determining for whom this work was composed. Kauṭilya says :—

सर्वशास्त्राण्यनुक्रम्य प्रयोगमुपलभ्य च ।
कौटिल्येन नरेन्द्रार्थे शासनस्य विधिः कृतः ॥ II. 10.

'Kauṭilya, having studied all the sciences and known their application, composed this manual of administration for the narendra'. Here the word 'narendra' is not clear in its meaning; it may mean 'for kings' (नरेन्द्राणाम् अर्थे) or 'for the king' (नरेन्द्रस्य अर्थे). If the first meaning is accepted, it follows that he composed his work for all kings of all times. But this meaning cannot be accepted in view of what the author has said about himself towards the end of the work. Here, he says :—

येन शास्त्रं च शस्त्रं च नन्दराजगता च भू. ।
अमर्षेणोद्धृतान्याशु तेन शास्त्रमिदं कृतम् ॥

'One, who soon restored, out of anger, the sciences, the fighting weapon (i.e. the military art) and the earth (that was) gone into the hands of the Nandaraja, composed this work'. This verse clearly points out that Kauṭilya destroyed the Nandas and placed a Kṣatriya king (Chandragupta Maurya) on the throne and composed the work for his use. It, therefore, follows that the country of the *Arthas'āstra* must be Bihar. But a question can be raised at this : is there sufficient evidence in this work to warrant the aforesaid conclusion? We shall, therefore, adduce here all that evidence available in the *Arthas'āstra*, which clearly supports the above conclusion.

The first point to be noted without contention is that the country of the Narendra, referred to in the *Arthas'āstra*, had the Ganges river flowing in it. He says : 'Should the rains fail, the king should worship Indra, the Gaṅgā, the mountain and the sea (वर्षावग्रहे शचीनाथगङ्गापर्वतमहाकच्छ-पूजा: कारयेत् ⌊IV. 3⌋)'. Besides the Gaṅgā, the mountain and the sea have been mentioned. So, it is clear that the country, under reference, cannot be the modern United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, as this province does not have the sea touching it. The other two provinces of the Ganges basin are Bihar and Bengal. In order to determine that the country of

Bihar is the country of the *Arthas'āstra*, some more evidence will have to be produced. The sea (महाकच्छ) has been referred to in another sentence in the above-quoted chapter. It has been there said that, in case a severe famine should occur, the king should go to reside near the tanks or the sea (समुद्रसरस्तटाकानि वा संश्रयेत). It can be, therefore, definitely inferred that the country of this great work had the sea touching it or very near it. In Ch. VII. 10, it has been said : 'A river fort can be taken by means of elephants, a bridge of wooden pillars and boats ; for it is not uniformly deep and it can be depleted of its water (नदीदुर्गं हि हस्तिस्तम्भसंक्रमसेतुबन्धनौभि: साध्यमनित्यगाम्भीर्यमपस्राव्युदकं च)'. The last is possible only where the banks of the river are higher than surrounding land ; where the banks are of usual lower type than the adjacent land, the river cannot be depleted of its water. All the students of geography know that this condition, usually, obtains in the provinces of Bihar and Bengal.

In Ch. VII. 12, Kautilya has written about the water-ways. While quoting the opinion of his preceptor, he says : 'Preceptors say that out of landways and waterways, the latter are more desirable, as they are less expenssive and require less labour for preparation and a large quantity can be transported (तत्रापि वारिस्थलपथयोर्वारिपथ: श्रेयान् । अल्पव्ययव्यायाम: प्रभूतपण्योदयश्चेत्याचार्या:)'. He, then, criticises this by saying : 'It is not always so ; the waterways are liable to be hindered, are not always useful, are attended with difficulties which cannot be overcome ; this is not so of landways (नेति कौटिल्य: संरुद्धगतिरसार्वकालिक: प्रकृष्टभययोनिर्निष्प्रतिकारश्च वारिपथ: । विपरीत: स्थलपथ:)'. But he, soon, comes recognise the importance of waterways and says : 'The waterways are of two kinds, (1) those that follow the banks and, (2) those that run through the water. Out of these, the former are more desirable, because there are many market places on the way. Those through the water of the river are also desirable, because the current flows permanently and there are not insurmountable difficulties in the way (वारिपथे तु कूलसंयानपथयो: कूलपथ: 'पण्यपट्टणबाहुल्याच्छ्रेयान्नदीपथो वा सातत्याद्विषह्याऽऽबाधत्वाच्च)'. This description applies more to Bihar than to Bengal, for, in the latter province the rivers have mostly perennially flowing currents. Then just after the above-quoted statement, Kautilya states : 'Preceptors say that out of the landways, the northern ways are more desirable than the southern ways, because elephants, horses, sandle-wood, ivory, hides, silver, gold etc. are found that side in plenty (स्थलपथेऽपि हैमवतो दक्षिणपथाच्छ्रेयान् । हस्त्यश्वगन्धदन्ताजिनरूप्यसुवर्णपण्या: सारवत्तरा इत्याचार्या:)'. Kautilya says at this : 'No, it is not so ; because leaving blankets, hides, horses, etc. other things as elephants etc. and such things as counches, diamonds, rubies, pearles, gold, etc. are found in the southern side more abundantly (नेति कौटिल्य: । कम्बलाजिनाश्वपण्यवर्जा: शङ्खवज्रमणिमुक्ता: सुवर्णपण्याश्च प्रभूततरा: दक्षिणपथे)'. That is

not all, further he adds: 'Out of the southern ways, those mercantile ways are more desirable where mines occur in a large number and valuable things are found, and which are more used and less troublesome (दक्षिणपथेऽपि बहुखनिः सारपण्यः प्रसिद्धगतिरल्पव्ययायामो वा वणिक्पथः श्रेयान्)'. This description of the landways of ancient India applied rather to Bihar than to Bengal, to which part southern landways followed the sea-coast. From Kauṭilya's descriptions, it is clear that there were many southern landways from the country of the author, and that there were many mines by them. This description of the southern landways is supported by some other statements in the work of Kauṭilya. *Tāmraparnika*, *Pāṇḍyaka-vāṭaka*, *kauleya*, *caurṇeya* and *māhendra* are geographical names of pearls and these all seem to relate to S. India. *Sabhārāshtrak*, *madhyama-rāṣtraka*, *s'rīkaṭanaka* and *indravānaka* (diamonds) also seem to relate to the South. *Madhyama-rāṣṭraka*, may, probably, be the modern Rewa area. Amongst the places of sandlewood, ?*Sātana*, *Gos'irṣa*, *Hariparvata*, *Triṇasā* (river), *Grameru*, *Devasabhā*. *Jāva* (modern Jāvā), *Jonga*, *Turūpa*, *Mālā*, *Kālaparvata*, *Kos'akāraparvata* *S'ītodaka*, *Nāgaparvata*, *S'ākala*, have been named. Some of these places relate, necessarily, to the South.

It is clear from the above description that from the country of the *Arthas'āstra*, there were roads to the South also. From Ch. VII. 12, it is clear that there were ways for the asses and camels also from it (देशकालसम्भावनो वा खरोष्ट्रपथः). Such an area can be Bihar and not Bengal.

But more convincing is the evidence of the harvests. While telling the would-be conqueror, Kauṭilya says: 'He should lead an expedition in the month of Mārgas'īrṣa, because at this time the stored-up grain of the people gets exhausted. The new harvest is not come to hand and the forts are not yet repaired after rains; the standing crops can be destroyed while the new crops sown can be made impossible (क्षीणपुराणभक्तमगृहीतनवभक्तमसंस्कृतदुर्गममित्रं वार्षिकं चास्य सस्यं हैमनं च मुष्टिमुपहन्तुं मार्गशीर्षीं यात्रां यायात् [IX. 1]). Should he want to destroy the winter crop and the possibility of the spring crop, he should lead an expedition in the month of Caitra (हैमनं चास्य सस्यं वासन्तिकं च मुष्टिमुपहन्तुं चैत्रीं यात्रां यायात्, [*ibid.*]). Should he want to destroy the spring crop and the possibility of the rainy crop, he should lead an expedition in the month of Jyeṣṭha: at this time, the people of the enemy do not have fodder, fuel, water etc., and the *forts* are yet to be repaired for rains (क्षीणतृणकाष्ठोदकमसंस्कृतदुर्गमामित्रं वासन्तिकं चास्य सस्यं वार्षिकीं वा मुष्टिमुपहन्तुं ज्येष्ठामूलीयां यात्रां यायात् [*ibid.*])'. In Ch. II. 24, while telling the duties of the superintendent of agriculture, Kauṭilya mentions the names of the crops and the seasons of sowing them. Here he says: '*S'āli*, *vrihi*, *kodrava* (kodon), sesamum, *priyangu*, etc. should be sown in the beginning of the rainy season; *mudga*, *māṣa* and beans in the middle of the rainy season;

and ***kusumba***, ***masūra***, ***kuluttha***, *yava*, wheat, peas, linseed and mustard at the end of the rainy season'.

There are many grains in this list which do not and cannot grow in Bengal, as this province gets too heavy rains and has too high a temperature for them. Kodon, sesamum etc. require low rainfall and, therefore, they do not grow in the area of heavy rains. Of the crops mentioned for sowing after the rains, only mustrad can grow in Bengal. Barley, wheat, etc. cannot grow there on account of heavy rains and high temperature. That is not all. In the aforesaid chapter itself, the duty of collecting cotton seeds has been mentioned. But it is clear that cotton cannot grow in Bengal. Moreover, in this very chapter, the necessity of irrigation has been mentioned and its different kinds—rivers, tanks, ponds, and wells—have been stated. Even now, Bengal does not stand in need of much irrigation, and wells are not to be found in a large number there. It has so many rivers and ponds that wells are not worth the trouble of sinking. It, thus, becomes clear that the country of Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* cannot be Bengal and that it must be Bihar.

One more additional evidence can be cited for the above conclusion. While mentioning the mixed castes, he mentions the Sutas and Māgadhas, but distinguishes them from the high caste people of the same name: 'The Sutās and Māgadhas mentioned in the Purāṇas are different from these and are of a higher status than the Brâhmans and Kṣatriyas even (**पौराणिकस्त्वन्यः सूतो मागधश्च ब्रह्मक्षत्राद्विशेषः** ⌞III. 7 ⌟)'. This boastful mention of the Māgadhas must be, probably, due to the fact that he himself was a Māgadha ; his statement cannot be otherwise justified.

It is thus evident that the country of Kauṭilīya *Arthaśāstra* Bihar and no other part of India.

SECTION VI

Studies in General History

Aryan and Non-Aryan in Kēraḷa : Their Mutual Interaction

By

K. V. KRISHNA AYYAR, Calicut.

Kērala, famous for the beauty of its damsels, is the small coast strip between the Western Ghats and the Arabian sea, stretching North and South for about 360 miles, and finally tapering and disappearing into the Indian ocean at Cape Comorin. Situated at the southern end of India and walled off from the rest of the mainland by mountains, it hardly felt the impact of those invasions which, from time to time, overflowed the uplands of Central Asia and poured into the vast plains of Hindusthan. The Aryan tribes, for example, established themselves in the Indo-Gangetic Valley, making a clean sweep of the older languages, if not the older inhabitants, and transforming it into Āryavarta or the land of the Aryans *par excellence*. But, only small bands penetrated the wilds of the Vindhyas, and came to Deccan and South India. Aryan settlements, it is well known, steadily diminish in number and strength as we proceed South from Kashmir, and become almost microscopic when we reach Kerala. Nonetheless, they had had a profound influence in shaping its history and culture, though, in many respects, they were also transformed.

1. *Nampūris and Nāyars* : The Aryans approached Keraḷa from two directions. Crossing the Ghats at Gokarnam, and threading their way between the Ghats and the sea, they infiltrated into Keraḷa from the North. At the same time, others, descending along the Cauvery, entered Keraḷa from the East through the great Palghat gap in British Malabar and the pass of Shencottah in Travancore. The descendants of the former are called *Nampūri*, a truncated form of *Nampi Tirumulpad* 'revered priest'; the descendants of the latter are known as *Pāppar*, a corrupted form of *Brāhmanar*, or *Paṭṭar* from *Bhaṭṭa*, and *Ayyar* from *Ayya* 'father' or from *Ārya* by metathesis. When they came and who came first—are still obscure. From Kātyāyana's reference to Kerala, it may be inferred that the Aryans had become acquainted with Keraḷa by B.C. 350. The ancestors of the former claim to have been brought by Paras'urāma, those of the latter seem to have come in the wake of Agastya and the exiled sons of Vis'vāmitra, the *Bṛhaccaranam* Brahmins representing perhaps the first great exodus from Āryāvarta. Though the former are supposed to have left Āryāvarta before the *Sarvasvadana* form of adoption had become obsolete there, no reference is found to them in literature and inscriptions so far till the ninth century A. D. Though the latter figure largely in the Tamil literature of the early Christian era and seem to have exercised considerable influence over the Cera Emperors of Tiruvancikkulam or Crāṅganur (in the present Cochin State), their

contribution to the peculiar culture of Kēraḷa, is, for the most part, insignificant and negligible. It was through the Nampūri and not through the Paṭṭar that Kēraḷa was Aryanized. It is not insignificant that in the customary language of the country the Nampuri is called *Kēraḷa Brahmin*, while the Paṭṭer is known as *paradesi* or stranger.

Though, according to the traditions of the Nampuris, the Nāyars, also, were brought by Paras'urāma from Northern India, comparative history and all available evidence point to their having been already in the land when the Nampūris entered it. Sometimes identified with the *Narcae* of Pliny, who might have given them this name from the predominance of the *Narī* or women among them, the Nayars originally called themselves *Lokar*, meaning inhabitants of the world, which indicates that they knew no other people than themselves and no other land than Keraḷa. Derived, probably, from the Sanskrit *nāyaka*, the word *Nāyar*, was, at first, only a military title. Later on its meaning was extended to denote the members of the military caste, and now it includes even the non-military sections of the community like the oil-presser, potter, weaver, washerman, and trader, who observe the peculiar marriage and inheritance customs of the warriors. The attitude of the Nāyars to the Nampūris, was, at first, far from friendly. While Nampuri traditions refer to the flight of the original settlers from fear of the *Nāgas* (Nāyars ?), the folksongs of the Nāyars allude to their resistance, in some cases obstinate and bloody, under a leader named Koḷman to the Aryan immigrants from the North. The Nampuris themselves admit that Paras'urāma asked them to propitiate the *Nāgas* by giving them a share, whatever it might mean.

2. *Contrast between Nāyar and Nampūri* : In every way the Nāyar offered a constrast to the Nampuri. The Nāyars went about, at first, completely nude ; but for the small strip of cloth, the *kaupīna*, passed between the legs and held in position by a string round the waist. Their women wore round their loins an untailored piece of cloth, tucking it on the right side, leaving the upper half of the body completely bare. The Nampuris, like other Brahmins seem to have, when they first set foot in Kēraḷa, dressed themselves in flowing robes (one end of which was passed between the legs), held tight by the *pancakaccam* or the five tucks. Women also dressed themselves, more or less, in the same fashion, though they drew one end over the shoulder and allowed it to hang freely on the back.

As born warriors, the Nāyars spent their morning at the *Kaḷari* or military gymnasium, practising with sword and shield. Then taking their bath, they took their midday meal, which consisted only of gruel or rice water, so that they might always be fit for fighting, reserving solid food for the night, when no fighting was allowed. They were not strict vegetarians, nor did they abstain from liquor. Men and

women alike bathed twice a day, both in the morning and in the evening. The Nampuri was a man of peace and a priest to boot. As enjoined in the *S'āstras*, he rose in the fourth quarter of the night, and after taking his bath, engaged himself in his ablutions and religious duties till noon, when he took his meal, studying or teaching the Vedas and attending to the occupations of the *grhastha* or householders. Evening summoned him once more to his spiritual exercises, after which he supped and retired for the night.

The Nāyars were divided into castes and had their rules of endogamy and exogamy. First came the warriors, then the learned professions, and last the industrial, commercial, and agricultural classes. Every caste formed an endogamous group within the tribe; but marital relations with persons outside the tribe, even though belonging to the same caste, were not allowed. Hypergamy, union with a man of a higher caste, was eagerly sought; and its opposite, hypogamy, entailed disgrace. The members of a *Taravād*, like those of an Aryan *gotra*, formed an exogamous group. But, while the members of a *gotra* consisted of the descendants of a Vedic Ṛṣi through his sons or disciples, the *Taravād* comprised only people tracing their descent through females from a single ancestress.

Among the Nāyars, marriage was, till the recent legislation, only a companionship, terminable at will by either without notice. There was nothing sacred or sacramental or even binding about it. While, among the Nampuris, marriage was indissoluble, the bond not being severed even by death, and adultery entailed expulsion from caste and even transportation and sale as a slave. Widowhood was unknown among the Nāyars, and the question of adultery could never arise. Polyandry was not uncommon and was even deemed a privilege. Ancient *terra cottas* even show us a Nāyar woman enjoying the company of as many as even six men.

Among the Nampuris, as among other Aryans, the father was the head and centre of the family. Inheritance and pollution were traced through him. Among the Nāyars, on the other hand, woman was the pivot of the family. The duty of maintaining the children devolved upon her, and property and pollution were transmitted through her, while the oldest male member for the time being managed the family property and succeeded to the *gadi* and other dignities.

The Nampuri disposed of his dead by burning. The Nāyar buried his dead and planted a jack or plantain tree over the grave.

The Nampuris brought with them the Aryan religion. They worshipped and propitiated the Vedic gods by pouring their offerings into the Sacred Fire. Idolatry was unknown to them, when they entered Kerala. The religion of the Nāyars was primitive animism, consisting in the worship of spirits. They had a mortal dread of the spirits of the dead, even of those who were not their ancestors. In spite of the

study of modern Science and Philosophy, people are still afraid of Kanteth Nāyar, a reputed *Māntrikan*, who died only at the beginning of the present century. They believed that spirits resided in trees and stones, and tried to avert their anger by periodical ceremonies. Every Nāyar *Taravāḍ* had, further, a sacred enclosure set apart for the worship of snakes, and every year a solemn worship was offered to them known as *Kaḷam Koṭukkal* to the accompaniment of suitable songs by professional minstrels called *Pulluvas*. The Nayars propitiated, also, *Munṭiyan*, who presided over the destinies of the cattle, and *Cāttan*, who could tease and harass people by putting hair, dung, and even human excreta in food, setting fire to clothes, and breaking ornaments and household furniture. Above all, they worshipped *Kāli* (*Kli* of Mohenjodaro ?), who was, in some form and under some name, the tutelary deity of every ruling house in Kerala. The Nayars secur d the favour of their deities or averted their anger by offering liquor and meat. The Sacred Fire had no part in their worship. The neck of the victim was cut and its blood was poured on the idol, which was more often than not, an uncarved block of stone. Each one of these deities, especially the *Kāli* had a *Komaram* or *Veliccappāḍ*, literally, who brings to light the deity's wishes. Possessed by the deity in the course of the worship, the *Veliccappāḍs* shriek, jump, run about, and cut their foreheads with a sharp sword called *Nandakam* With blood streaming down their face, they make their oracular utterances, revealing the deity's pleasure or anger. The annual village dance, again, formed a quasi-religious ceremony. The outbreaks of epidemics were often attributed to the omission of this annual function, from which all females are excluded. The Goddess of smallpox had her sacred place in M(V)asuripaṭṭanam, the Mouziris of the *Periplus* and the Cranganur of the present day.

The political organization of the two communities was, also, different. The Nampuris lived in independent village communities. Their settlements were states, possessing all the attributes of sovereignty. The Nayars, on the other hand, were divided into a number of tribes, each of which had its own chief and well-defined tribal territory.

3. *The Influence of the Nāyar on the Nampūri*: Living side by side in the same land, thrown one upon the other, with nothing outside to look forward to or claim allegiance, the Nāyar and the Nampūri acted and reacted upon each other. And though it was the Nampūri, who, ultimately, gained the upper hand, the Nāyar had no inconsiderable influence upon him. The Nampuri began to live like the Nāyar in isolated houses, and distinguished from the rows or streets in which the Paṭṭar and Ayyar Brahmins chose to live. And while the *paradesi* Brahmin took to Tamil or Telugu, according as he happened to reside among the Tamils or Telugus, the Nampūri adopted the language of the Nāyar as his mother tongue.

The Nampūri began to dress himself, also, like a Nāyar, wearing a *kaupīnam* only when indoors, and covering it with an untailored piece of cloth when stirring out. When performing any religious ceremony, he reverted, indeed, to the older practice of *Pancakaccam*; but even this he gave up, as time went on, in favour of the simple *Tuḷu*, which consisted in passing one end between the legs and tightly tucking it in the back. The Nampūri adopted, also, the Nāyar fashion of the tuft on the top of the head. Like Nāyar he began, also, to bathe twice a day in cold water and to observe what are collectively known as the *Sixty Four Anācāras of* Kēraḷa, like pollution by approach, prohibition of food before immersion in water, prohibition of the use of dry towel for bath, the disposal of the dead within the compound of one's own house, etc.

The contact with the Nāyar was responsible, also, for many changes in the Nampūri's family system. Like all colonists, the Nampūri, at first, came to Kērala leaving their womenfolk behind. As the Nāyars followed the custom of free love, the newcomers hardly felt the necessity of marrying in their community and bringing their wives or for Brahminizing the women of the land and marrying them, as was done by the descendants of Vis'vāmitra and Agastya on the banks of the Kistna and the Cauvery, respectively. The Nāyar custom of *sambandham* or free love enabled the Nampūris to enjoy all the comforts of a married life without any of its discomforts or responsibilities, like the maintenance of the family and rearing of children. They chose rather to enter into liaisons with the Nāyar women, returning to the ancestral roof only for the annual ceremonies of the departed. As the eldest son usually remained at home and helped the father, he alone married. Thus, in course of time, it became the rule, among the Nampūris, for the eldest son alone to marry and continue the family.

The restriction of the marriage to the eldest son led to certain consequences, which were both unexpected and far-reaching. When all the males in the community were not available for marriage, the natural equilibrium between the sexes could be maintained only by polygamy and spinsterhood, voluntary or enforced. Further, as a *Brahmacārin* has to keep his eyes away from women, *purdah*, also, became necessary. As the junior cadets could not beget lawful sons—their offspring by Nāyar women took the caste of the mother—their obsequies had to be and could be performed only by their elder brother's son. So the family property could not be divided equally among a father's sons. Thus, indirectly, on account of the custom of free love among the Nāyars, the Nampūri family became unique with its primogamy, impartibility of the family property, and seclusion of women.

But, from the point of view of culture and civilization, this was no loss. The eldest son, compelled to remain at home, preserved

the Vedic rites with meticulous care in almost their pristine purity. It is doubtful whether in only other part of India they are maintained with such perfect conformity to ancient usage and practice. And the younger sons, relieved from the all-absorbing paternal obligations, devoted themselves to Literature, Philosophy, Science, Medicine, Mantra and Tantra. The contribution of Kerala to Indian culture in these respects has yet to be fully described and properly assessed.

Some Nampuri families have given up their sacramental marriage and patrilineal succession in favour of the free *Sambandham* and *Marumakkattayam* (nephew -inheritance) of the Nāyars. The most prominent among them are the Payyanur Ammous or uncles, the Rajahs of Punnattur, and the Nampis of Varakkal and Malappuram. We know next to nothing about the circumstances of the adoption of Nāyar customs by the Payyanur Brahmins. The *Keralolpatti*, which is a collection of Malabar legends, attributes it to Paraśurāma's command. According to the same authority, the Punnattur family's degradation (?) was due to a voluntary act of self-sacrifice for the public welfare. Bhutaraya, says the *Keralolpatti*, became a tyrant, and the Punnattur Nampuri rid the country of the oppressor by assassinating him. On account of this sin of man-slaughter preying upon his mind, the conscientious Brahmin refrained of his own accord, from sitting along with others of his caste, preferring to seat himself lower down on the steps (*Nam* we, *patimel* on the steps) for which reason he came to be styled *Nampati*. The Nampis are supposed to have become *Marumakkattayis* partly under pressure from the Zamorin, whose hereditary ministers they were. He asked them, it is said, to give up their Aryan customs in favour of the Dravidian, in order that their great qualities, genius for finance and prowess on the battle-field might be conserved, the soil being considered more important for the hereditary transmission of virtues than the seed ! No trace of the former patrilineal system remains among the Punnattur Nampatis. But, among the Payyanur Brahmins, both the nephew and the son perform *S'rāddhas* for the departed. The Nampis retain the practice of tying the *Māngalya-sūtra* before the Sacred Fire, which is invariably done by a member of the caste. If the person who ties the *Tali*, as it is called in Malayalam, lives with her as husband, his sons alone perform his funeral ceremonies. If, however, he does not choose to take her to wife, these rites are performed by his sister's sons.

While, among the Nampuris, only some took to the customs of the land of their adoption ; none of the Kṣatriyas, who came to Kerala, retained any of their original customs in regard to marriage and inheritance. Though the exact circumstances, which induced the Kṣatriya rulers of Kottayam, Vettem (now extinct), Parappanād, and Cochin, to imitate the Nāyars, are still a mystery to us, the history

of Pantalam and Puññar in Travancore, who came to Kērala in A.D. 901 and 1170, respectively, points to the practical difficulty of securing suitabe husbands for their women in a strange land and absence of grown up sons to perform the obsequies as some of the probable causes of these momentous alterations in their age-old customs. After all, according to the *S'astras*, a Brahmin has to propitiate the *manes* of his mother's relatives for three generations in addition to his father's, and a sister's son is entitled to perform the *paitrika karmas* for the departed in the absence of sons or agnates. The *S'astras* allow, also, hypergamy, and Nampuris alone have the privilege of being chosen as consorts to the Kṣatriya princesses. As a matter of fact, when males were adopted in these Kṣatriya families, such adoptions had not always been confined to their particular caste. Thus, in the seventeenth century, the Sāmanta Kṣatriya family of Travancore adopted not only Kēraḷa Varma from the Surya Kṣatriya family of Koṭṭayam, but, also, a Brahmin boy. The patrilineal Tamils who had come to make their fortunes in Keraḷa have, like the *Manrāḍis* of Palghat, become Nāyars both in name and fact. These seem to have adopted the policy of 'While at Rome do as the Romans do'.

4. *The Influence of the Nampūri on the Nayar*: If the influence of the Nāyar on the Nampuri was great, greater was the ascendancy of the Nampūri over the Nayar. In adopting the language of the Nāyar as his mother tongue, the Nampūri started it on a career of its own. While the Paṭṭars and the Ayyars adopted wholesale and without modification the Tamil spoken by the people of Tamiḻakam-and what goes under the name of Samgam Literature in Tamil is mainly the work of Pattars and Ayyars-the Nampuris transformed the Malayayma Tamil, the Tamil spoken by the people or Malanad or hilly country of Kērala into Malayalam by the free use of Sanskrit words and terminology. Thanks to the Nampuris, Malāyaḷam grew up as a separate language with a separate alphabet and a separate script of its own. But this was no loss to Sanskrit. It obtained new votaries in the Nāyar descendants of Nampuri fathers. While the Nāyars refrained from learning the Vedas and other sacred literature, they studied *Kāvyas* and other secular literature, and it may be said without fear of contradiction that no part of India can claim such a high percentage of Sanskrit knowing people, especially, among women as Kēraḷa.

The Nampūri improved the dress of the Nāyar, both male and female. The Nāyar had to wear the *Taḷu* while engaged in religious ceremonies. But while the males wore it only occasionally, it became a permanent feature of female dress.

The Nampūris introduced among the Nāyars some of their *ṣoḍaśa Saṃskāras*. The latter began to perfrom under the guidance of the former the ceremonies of *Nāmakaraṇam*, *Annaprāśanam*, and *Caulam*. *Upanayanam*

was too costly except for princes, for it required preliminary purification by *Hiraṇyagarbham*, or rebirth vicariously undergone by passing through the ent-ails of a golden cow. But the *Tāliketṭu* or the tying of the *Māṅgalya sūtra* became a common feature, and no Nāyar girl was considered eligible for the 'rites mysterious of connubial love' before this ceremony. In other respects the marriage customs of the Nāyars remained unaltered. In fact, as the junior cadets of Nampūri families could not marry till recently in their own caste, the Nampūris set their face against any change. They sought rather to perpetuate the *Sambandham* and its inevitable concomitant, the *Marumakkattāyam*.

The Nāyars began also to burn their dead and perform *Asthisañcayanam* or the ceremony of collecting the bones. *S'rāddhas* also came into vogue. As they were not entitled to hear the Vedas, these rites were performed without any *Mantras*. Though they went through them as in some sort of a dumbshow and the whole ritual, with all its symbolism, was incomprehensible and meaningless to them, they went through them with scrupulous attention to every detail, however simple or silly, believing that they had the mysterious power of speeding the departed soul on its heavenward journey.

In religion, the influence of the Nampūri was equally great. He transmuted the worship of snakes into a means of controlling them. The family of Pampumekkat claims to possess the mystic secret. This Nampūri house is said to be full of deadly serpents, which may be found in all sorts of odd places where one least expects to find them—under the seat or under the cot, even in the portmanteau one may have unwittingly placed on the ground. Of the numerous spirits worshipped by the Nāyars, *Muntiyan* remained the lord of the cattle world, but *Cāttan* underwent a two-fold transformation. In some places he was exalted into *S'astha* and worshipped as *Hariharaputra*. He became also the mischievous imp of Malabar magic. The Nampūris of Kallur and Kattumatam are believed to have a number of *Cattans* to serve them, escorting them whenever go out and carrying out all their behests, however difficult. *Velan* became *Ṣaṇmukha* and *Kali* became *Durgā*. The different methods of worshipping and propitiating these deities were embodied in the *Tantra-Samuccaya* by Cennas Nampūri, who was born in A.D. 1427.

If the Nampūris became the unrivalled dictators in matters social and religious, their influence in matters political was not less paramount. Before formal installation as rulers, the prince of Kēraḷa had to obtain their blessings. They had to solemnly swear that they would protect cows and Brahmins. No Nāyar or Kṣatriya ever dared to defy a Nampūri. No prince, however powerful, violated the sanctuary of their settlements or temples without atoning for it. In *Paṭṭiṇi* or fast they had a weapon which no prince was reckless enough to provoke them to employ. In the customary language of the country, a Nampūri was a *Tirumanassu* 'august mind', he was addressed as *Tirumeni* 'Your Holiness', his words are *Kalpana* 'orders', his

movements are *Elunellattu* 'royal progresses', his food, however poor, is *Amritu* 'ambrosia', his mattress, however shabby, is *Pallimetta* 'royal couch', his illness, however serious, was only a *Covallāyma* 'slight indisposition'. As Mr. Fawcett says, 'His person is holy, his directions are commands, his movements are a procession, his meal is nectar, he is the holiest of human beings, and he is the representative of God upon earth'. For over a thousand years, the Nampūris have formed theocracy in Kēraḷa, and the study of modern science and histroy has not yet been able to shake their hold on its people.

Economic System of Ancient India

By
BRIJ NARAIN, *Lahore.*

What was the economic system of ancient India ? The subject has been largely neglected by Indian Indologists.

That, it was not *laissez faire* is clear from the ancient Indian conception of kingship[1] and our theory of social contract[2]. The king's duty of protection was interpreted in a very wide sense, and included not only protection against merchants and artizans, and natural calamities, but also poor relief[3].

Bernhard Breloer suggests State ownership of land, the most valuable instrument of production then, but this view is disputed by others. On the whole, it seems that the right of private property in land was recognized on the condition that a share of the produce was paid to the State.

But Breloer makes a more important point when he characterizes our ancient economy as *Planwirtschaft* (planned economy). There are two and only two examples of planning in recent times, Russian planning and German planning. Russia's First Five Year Plan was inaugurated in 1928 ; German planning began in 1933. Russian economy is still a planned economy ; the German planned system was destroyed by the last world war. Russian planning was based on State ownership of land and capital ; Germany was able to plan, and plan brilliantly, with private ownership of instruments of production. If our ancient economy was really a planned economy, it was based on free enterprise, controlled by the State. That such control was widely exercised is evident from our sources. But the subject deserves fuller investigation.

It is impossible for the the State to effectively control agricultural prices unless it owns large stocks of agricultural products. Now, in ancient India, most taxes were collected in kind. By bringing its stocks into play when, and as necessary, the State was in a position to influence the course of prices. There are clear references in Manu and Kauṭilya to the regulation of prices and profits[4]. One may agree with Breloer when he says: 'The State has insured itself against any upsetting of its *Planwirtschaft*. It determines the market situation and, in doing so, insures its position not only through the laws mentioned, but by securing the help of private trade through skilful manipulation'[5].

1. The Indian conception of the State was paternal. See *Rāmāyaṇa*, III. 10. 11-16 and *Mahābhārata*, XII. 56. 11 ; 67. 40 ; 69. 29 etc.
2. *Mahābhārata*, VII. 88. 5 ; XII. 13. 58 ; 78. 35-44 ; 61. 32-33.
3. Kauṭilya's *Arthas'astra*, Secs. 39 and 208 and Book IV. Chapters 1 and 2.
4. Manu's *Dharmas'āstra*, VIII. 401-02 ; *Kauṭilya*, Secs, 205-06.
5. *Kauṭilya Studien*, Vol. III. p. 394.

In recent times the control of industrial production has been made easier by the growth in the size of the business unit, an inevitable outcome of the capitalist organisation of industry. When the producers are grouped together in trusts and cartels, their output and prices may be regulated through their associations.

Our ancient economy was based on hand-work, and hand-workers are not concentrated in factories like machine-workers. Still handicraftsmen may be controlled, if they are organised in guilds. From this point of view, the study of corporate life in ancient India is of the greatest interest. The guilds covered almost all branches of production. They, undoubtedly, existed in the epic, Buddhist and post-Buddhist periods. Geldner suggests that they existed even in the Vedic age. It is in this sense that he interprets *vidatha*, which occurs in many verses of the *Ṛgveda*[1]. He finds evidence not only of guilds of craftsmen, but of learned people in the Vedic period[2]. Speaking of guilds, Dahlmann says : 'The corporate spirit unfolds itself not only in trade and industry ; it penetrates all religious and scientific interests'[3]. The guilds were under State control, for their chiefs were appointed by the king[4]. According to Kauṭilya, the king was to live 'as the only monarch of all corporations (संघेष्वयमेकराजो वर्तेत)'[5]. If that was indeed so, we have again no difficulty in agreeing with Breloer, who says : 'The severest measures of control, rigorous punishments and super-imposition of its own price and economic policy give the State the power to control the associations of hand-workers as well as traders. Every member of these associations works according to the instructions of controlling officers[6].

Indologists might throw some more light on this, unquestionably, first attempt in the history of humanity to plan economic life.

1. *ZDMG*. Vol. 52, pp. 733-34.
2. Zimmer : *Altindisches Leben*, p. 177.
3. Joseph Dahlmann : *Genesis des Mahabharata*, Berlin, 1899, p. xx.
4. *Yajñavalkya*, II. 191-92.
5. *Kauṭilya*, Sec. 381.
6. Breloer, *loc. cit.* p. 391 n.

Origin of State in Hindu Political Theory

By

BATAKRISHNA GHOSH, *Calcutta*.

It is curious that our ancient literature, though full of ingenious theories about the organisation of State, contains little about the origin of organised society. Kauṭilya, from whom *most* could be expected about the origin of State, has nothing to say on the point. Nothing, that is purely speculative, finds favour with Kauṭilya, and so he, rigorously, excludes from consideration the theories of origin of State which must have been current in his time, as we shall see below. Even the state of lawlessness (*matsya-nyāya*) is mentioned by Kauṭilya (I. 4), not as the primitive form of society which mankind has outgrown in course of evolution, but as a possible future condition fraught with danger if the State is not ruled with an iron hand. Kauṭilya, evidently, was not a Rousseau. But, that does not mean that India has not had her Rousseaus. One of them has, in fact, left behind a few words of digressive observation about the origin of State which would have enraptured Jean-Jacquis had he known them. I mean Vasubandhu, who lived in the fifth century A.D.

In the middle of a typical scholastic disquisition on cosmogony, Vasubandhu, suddenly, throws up the question : Did the men of the beginning of the cosmic age have kings ? The question is answered in the negative, because : 'At the beginning the beings were similar to the gods of Rupa ; then, gradually, through the greed of relish and the seduction of indolence, they learnt to collect provisions, and the share-holders of the joint stock began to maintain a protector of the fields'. This seems to be the meaning of the uncertain text of the verse quoted by Poussin :

प्राग् आसन् रूपिवत् सत्त्वा रसरागात् ततः शनैः ।
आलस्यात् संग्रहं कृत्वा भागादैः क्षेत्रपो भृतः ॥[1]

The beings thus deviating from the path of primitive god-like innocence degenerated rapidly. 'Then gradually arose the juice of the earth' (*pṛthivī-rasa*), the taste of which has the sweetness of honey (*madhu-svādu-rasa*). A certain creature, distiguished by the avidity of temperament, having smelt the flavour of this juice, tasted and ate it ; the other creatures also did the same afterwards. This was the beginning of alimentation by mouthfuls. In consequence of this mode of alimentation, the beings became gross and heavy in body, and their luminosity was at an end and hence the darkness. But then there appeared the sun and the moon'. It is tempting to think what an Indian Milton would have made of this noble

1. See L' *Abhidharmakoṣa* de Vasubandhu, traduit et annoté par Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Troisieme Chapitre, 1926, pp. 103 ff.

and naive vision of the origin of life on our planet. But Vasubandhu, though a dry dialectician, was not at all devoid of constructive imagination. After describing metamorphosis of the purely luminous non-material bodies of the earliest god-like creatures into bodies of flesh and blood at the touch of sin, Vasubandhu delineates a remarkable theory of the origin of human society that might well have issued from the brain of a Plato or an Engels. He continues: 'These primitive beings, with gross material bodies, became, more and more, subject to material alimentation; sexes were gradually differentiated and therewith was established the rule of *kama*. They were also seized by the thought of hoarding provisions for the future: 'At first the grains necessary for the morning meal were gathered in the morning, and those necessary for the evening meal were gathered in the evening. But a lazy fellow among them began hoarding (for future meals) and others imitated him. With the hoarding was born the idea of 'mine', i. e. the idea of property. This idea of property, necessarily, led to the formation of a State. For, the people now divided the fields among themselves and 'each became the owner of a field; but with that people also began to take forcible possession of the property of others; this was the beginning of theft. Now to prevent theft, the people united and decided to pay the sixth part to a distinguished person (*manuṣya-viśeṣa*) who whould protect the fields; to this person they gave the designation *kṣetrapa* 'protector of the fields' and, as he was *kṣetrapa*, he received the title '*kṣatriya*'. As he was highly respected (*sammata*) by the multitude (*mahājana*) and as he pleased (*√ranj*) his subjects, he became the *rāja mahāsammata*, and, this was the beginning of dynasties.'

Such was the magnificent dream of Vasubandhu. But he was neither alone, nor the first in India to dream about the origin of State. The earliest Indian speculations of this theme are to be found, perhaps, in the *Mahābhāarta*[1]. Here we are told that in the beginning, when there was no king, the lot of the people was extremely miserable, for everyone in that period of primitive anarchy was always on the lookout for a chance to destroy his weaker neighbour, just like the fish in water[2]. It is to be noted that here the state of *matsya-nyāya* is mentioned not as a future possibility as in Kauṭilya, but as a primitive form of society under which mankind had, actually, to suffer in the past.

Now, how did primitive man get rid of this curse of anarchy? By helping themselves, we are told. They assembled with the purpose of establishing order in society and bound each other closer to observe a number of conventions, resolving: 'We shall ostracise those who will be found guilty of verbal or physical injury, or adultery, as well as those who steal other peoples' property'[3]. But, soon it was discovered that mere

1. XII. 67. 17 ff.

2. *Mahabharata*, XII. 67. 17 · परस्परं भक्षयन्तो मत्स्या इव जले कृशान् ।

3. *Op. cit.* XII. 67. 18-19 : समेत्य तास्ततश्चक्रुः समयान् इति···। वाक्शूरो दण्डपरुषो यश्च स्यात् पारजायिकः यः परस्वम् अथाऽऽदद्यात् त्याज्या नस्तादृशा इति ।

convention was not enough to assure order in human society: there must be a power to enforce the laws flowing from the conventions voluntarily agreed upon. So, the people turned to the ever-obliging Brahmā with the request: 'Oh Lord, for want of a ruler we are threatened with annihilation; do assign to us a ruler whom we shall all worship together, and, who, on his part, will safeguard our interests'[1].

Moved by this appeal, Brahmā asked Manu to accept the rulership of the mortals. But Manu had no love for the shifty mortals, and he seems, moreover, to have been a squeamish fellow. So, he replied, 'I am afraid of the sinful acts (unavoidable in ruling) and ruling is, indeed, an extremely difficult task'. And, he added: 'It is, particularly, difficult to rule human beings, for they are always false in conduct'[2].

The supplicating mortals hastened to assure Manu that he need not be afraid of sin, for 'sin will recoil on those who commit it'[3]. But Manu would not be taken in by this diplomatic assurance. So, to ease his conscience, the mortals had to promise him wide privileges which should have been the basis of royal prerogatives claimed and enjoyed, at least in theory, by all princes of Hindu India[4]. He was promised one-fiftieth of cattle and gold, and one-tenth of grains[5]. The last item of royal prerogative is mentioned in the corrupt hemistich[6]:

'कन्यां शुल्के चारुरूपां विवाहेषूद्यतासु च।'

This is the reading favoured by Nīlakaṇtha. But he gives '**विवादेषु ततासु च**' as the reading of the Easterners, and, moreover, mentions another reading '**विवादे द्युततासु च**' which has been accepted by Hillebrandt[7], under the assumption that *vivāde* here stands for *vivādeṣu*. According to Hillebrandt, the whole passage means that when in the slave-market prospective buyers try to outbid each other shouting 'I purchase this girl, I purchase this girl', then a pretty slave girl should be set apart as the king's share. This meaning, however, does not follow easily from any one of the readings mentioned by Nīlakaṇtha. Nor can it be conceded in deference to Hillebrandt that the word *śulke* of this

1 *Mahabharata*, XII. 67. 20-21 : अनीश्वरा विनश्यामो भगवन्नीश्वरं दिश। यं पूजयेम संभूय यश्च नः प्रतिपालयेत्।

2 *Op. cit.*, XII. 67. 22: बिभेमि कर्मणः पापात् राज्यं हि भृशदुस्तरम्। विशेषतो मनुष्येषु मिथ्यावृत्तेषु नित्यदा॥

3. *Op. cit.*, XII. 67. 23 : कर्तृनेनो गमिष्यति

4. Cf. Manu, XII. 130-131 : later traditional rate of tax is the sixth part of produce mentioned also by *Kauṭilya*, II, 15: पिण्डकरः षड्भागः; Kālidasa (*Raghuvaṃśa* V. 8) makes even forest hermits pay symbolically one-sixth of gleaned corn.

5. *Mahabharata*, XII. 67. 23-24 : पशूनामधि पञ्चाशद्धिरण्यस्य तथैव च। धान्यस्य दशमं भागम्… ।

6. Cf. the verse quoted under the preceding fn.

7. *Altindische Politik*, p. 173.

verse signifies 'die Abgabe lines Mädchens *bun* Brautkauf also Fribut für den könig'. Some very ancient seigniorial privilege in respect of brides or slave-girls seems to be the subject of this verse, but the custom must have completely gone out of vogue by the time the text of the epic was being finally redacted.

From these and other passages of the *Mahābhārata*, it will be clear that not only Rousseau's noble savage, but also Hobbes' theory of a perpetual and restless desire of power after power[1] had been anticipated by ancient Indian thinkers. The Indian precursors of Rousseau had accepted the political State as a necessary evil, as shown above. It was not otherwise with the Indian precursors of Hobbes, for they too considered the existence of State not as something obvious, but so something imposed on society by necessity[2]. Time and again has this theme been repeated in Indian literature with significant variations. Compare, for instance, the following three passages of the *Mahābhārata*:—

परस्परभयाद् एके पापा: पापं न कुर्वते। (XII. 15. 6).
दण्डस्यैव भयादेके न खादन्ति परस्परम्। (*l. c.* 7).
प्रजा राजभयादेव न खादन्ति परस्परम्। (XII. 68. 8).

Human nature, before the birth of the restrictive state, has been represented in these passages uniformly as malignant and revengeful. In this stage, man has to be ruled by force. But when the political State has been established, the emphasis is shifted from *daṇḍa* to *dharma*. Thus, we have the well-known but almost always misinterpreted principle of Hindu Law, recognised both in *Dharmaśāstra* and *Arthaśāstra*, that of the four sources of law, namely ethics (*dharma*), judicial procedure (*vyavahāra*), custom (*caritra*) and royal edict (*rāja-śāsana*), each succeeding one will override the preceding ones[3]: which means that normally justice has to be administered according to the principles of ethics, in fewer cases by judicial procedure, in still fewer cases according to custom, and in a very few cases by royal ordinance[4]. Thus, according to Hindu political theory, the State is founded by *daṇḍa*, but maintained by *dharma*. Even so late an author as Medhātithi[5] did not hesitate to lay down that kings' authority is not supreme in matters of *dharma*. Royalty has been deified in India, but never the king himself as in Rome. In Christian political theory, the king as the Lord's Anointed is entitled to absolute allegiance. No such personal allegiance to the king has been enjoined in Hindu political theory.

1. Hobbes : *Leviathan*, C. XI.
2. The Vedic conception of immanent harmony and order (*ṛta*) is altogether different.
3. See, e. g., *Kauṭilya*, III. 1: विवादार्थश्चतुष्पद: पश्चिम: पूर्वबाधक: ।
4. No other meaning of this passage is possible if we refuse to depart from the principle of applying *Apavada*-rules current in grammar and philosophy.
5. *Ad Manu*, VII. 13.

The Legal and Political Status of Trades and Crafts in the Early Smṛtis

By

U. N. GHOSHAL, *Calcutta.*

Referring to the authorities for the law applicable to the king's court of justice, *Gautama* (XI. 19-20) mentions 'the Veda, the Smṛtis, the Aṅgas and the Purāṇa', and then 'the laws of countries, castes and families, which are not opposed to the sacred records'. After this occurs the following passage: **कर्षक-वणिक्-पशुपाल-कुसीदि-कारव: स्वे स्वे वर्गे** (XI. 21), which is thus translated by Bühler : (SBE. II. p. 237): 'Cultivators, traders, herdsmen, money-lenders and artisans (have authority to lay down rules) for their respective classes'. On the authority of this translation, scholars, in recent times, have assigned definite privileges to trades and crafts in the times of the early Smṛtis. Thus Dr. R. C. Majumdar (*Corporate Life in Ancient India*, 1st ed.,. p. 6) observes: 'This (*scil.* text of Gautama quoted above) represents a fuller stage in the development of the guild organisation (than that reached in the Jātakas). The corporations of traders and artisans are now recognised by the constitution as an important factor in the State and invested with the highly important power of making laws for themselves'. While Dr. Majumdar, thus, takes Gautama's text to be a warrant for the legislatives authority of trade-and craft-guilds, Dr. Radhakumud Mookerji finds in this passage and a number of similar texts in other Smṛtis (*Vasiṣṭha* I. 17 ; XIX. 7 ; *Baudhāyana* I. 12, 6 ; *Āpastamba* II. 15, 1 ; and *Manu* VIII. 41 and 46) evidence not only of 'legislative independence', but also of 'independent political status' of 'local bodies'. He writes (*Local Government in Ancient India*, 2nd. ed. p. 124): 'If the power of independent legislation is one of the criteria of an independent political status, it is amply fulfilled in the case of these local associations. They developed a distinct body of laws or bye-laws to regulate their work and activities, the existence and authority of which are clearly affirmed and admitted by our law-books'. Finally, we may quote the view of Dr. Beni Prashad who finds in Gautama's text proof not only of legislative authority of the occupational groups, but also of village autonomy. He observes (*The State in Ancient India*, pp. 165-66): 'Gautama thus grants legislative powers to groups or associations of men. It is more than probable that the followers of various occupations regulated a part of their life and transactions by the customs which had spontaneously arisen among them and by the rules which were enunciated to meet any emergencies ... It is significant that the cultivators are mentioned among the self-regulating groups. In practice it would mean that a village should enjoy a good deal of autonomy'.

Now it may be admitted that Gautama's text itself contains definite evidence of the organisation of trades and crafts under accredited leaders. For, in the passage (XI. 22) immediately following the one quoted above, we read: 'Having learned the (state of) affairs from those who (in each class) have authority (to speak) he shall give the legal decision'. (Bühler's transl.). This suggests that the trades and crafts of the type here referred to, had their recognised headmen who probably corresponded to the *jeṭṭhakas* of the *Jātaka* stories. On the other hand, the attempt to find reference to the conditions of local government at that time in the passage of *Gautama* and similar texts is, evidently, a forced one. Gautama makes no mention of 'local bodies' as such. His reference to cultivators (XI.21) may, indeed, be taken loosely to apply to a village unit. But none of the early Smṛtis (or for the matter of that, of the later ones) credits the villages with the enjoyment of autonomy. *Āpastamba*, on the contrary, definitely speaks (II. 10. 26. 4f) of the king's appointment of trusted officers in charge of towns and villages with well-defined jurisdictions and functions. *Viṣṇu* (III. 7-15) goes a step further and mentions a chain of royal officers in charge of one, ten and one hundered villages with well-defined duties. From this it would follow that centralised administration instead of village autonomy was the keynote of local government in the early Smṛtis.

Above all, there are grave reasons for doubting whether Gautama gives any warrant for the legislative authority of the functional groups. The plain meaning of his text (XI. 21) taken in connection with the context seems to be that cultivators etc. are authoritative with regard to the usage of their respective *vargas*[1]. Comparing this text with the one immediately preceding, Gautama's meaning appears to be that the customs of trades and crafts, equally with those of regions, caste-subdivisions and families, had legal validity. But unlike the latter the former (probably because of their technical character) required to be ascertained from the mouths of accredited representatives of the groups. That Gautama's passage (XI. 21) means nothing more than legal recognition of customs is very clearly expressed by the commentators. Thus, Haradatta says that when the spokesmen have said, 'Such is our complete custom (*nikāma ācāra*), the decision shall be given in accordance therewith'. To the same effect Maskarin observes that the king shall himself separately consider the customs (*ācāra*) as communicated to him by the cultivators and so forth, through their respective spokesmen and he shall give the legal decision thereafter. It will be seen that none of the commentators credits the trades and crafts with 'the power of making laws for themselves'. It is needless to point out that there is no authority in these ancient texts for the 'legislative inde-

1. The term *varga* was defined by Kātyāyana at a later date as comprising *gaṇas, paṣaṇḍas, pūgas, vrātas, śreṇīs* and all others who constitute groups (verse 682. in P. V. Kane's ed.).

pendence' or 'independent political status' of the local bodies, for such a statement seems to be a contradiction in terms.

Apart from the arguments given above, we may urge other considerations invalidating the alleged legislative authority of the trades and crafts concerned. It seems improbable, on general grouds, that the occupational groups could enjoy a privilege denied to the king himself in the sphere of public administration. Again, the study of comparative jurisprudence is enough to show by what slow degrees legislation, properly so-called, replaced the blind obedience to custom in ancient societies.

The History and Chronology of a Nāgara Brahmin Family of Physicians in Gujarāt (A. D. 1275–1475)

By

P. K. GODE, *Poona*.

In a recent issue[1] of the *Journal of the Gujarāt Research Society*, Durga Shaṅkar K. Shastri has published an interesting article on 'Medical Science in Ancient Gujarāt'. In this article he makes the following remarks[2] on Nārāyaṇa, who completed the commentary, *vyākhyā-Kusumāvalī* of S'rīkaṇṭhadatta on the *Vṛnda-mādhava* or *Siddha-yoga* of Vṛnda:—

'Nārāyaṇa (15th century)—The manuscript evidence of the *Kusumāvalī*, a gloss by S'rīkaṇṭha on the *Vṛnda-mādhava* indicates that a Vaidya named Nārāyaṇa, the son of Bhāmalla and a *nāgir* by caste is said to have completed the above gloss, which was left unfinished by its author through fear of its becoming too bulky[3]. Nothing certain is known about his date and domicile. He is obviously later than S'rīkaṇṭha, who lived in Bengal in the 13th century. He is more over earlier than the 17th century for a MS. of the completed *Kusumāvalī* written in 1630 A.D. is availble. It is highly probable that it took a long time for S'rīkaṇṭha's commentary to reach Gujarāt and, on the other hand, it might have been not too long an interval to blend the two works. It is, therefore, likely that Nārāyaṇa lived in the 15th century. As remarked above Vāgbhaṭa's commentary written in Bengal in the 13th century was studied in Gujarāt in the 15th, Similarly, the comments on the *Vṛnda-mādhava* were perhaps studied in the same period and some one tried to fill in the lacuna. Nārāyaṇa is associated with Gujarāt merely because he was a *Nāgir*. From amongst the numerous commentaries on the Sanskrit works on ancient medicine, not one can be credited to Gujarāt. Hence the importance of Nārāyaṇa'.

These remarks of D. K. Shastri are quite reasonable in the light of evidence adduced by him. I propose, however, to record in this paper

1. Vol. VII. Nos. 2 and 3, April and July 1945, pp. 75-88.
2. *Ibid.* p. 83.
3. The Ānandās'rama ed. of *Vṛnda-mādhava* contains the following verses at the end of the text:

' श्रीकण्ठदत्तभिषजा ग्रन्थविस्तारभीरुणा ।
टीकायां कुसुमावल्यां व्याख्या मुक्ता क्वचित् क्वचित् ॥
रत्ननागरवंशस्य भिषग् भामल्लनन्दनः ।
नारायणो द्विजवरो भिषजां हितकाम्यया ॥
टीकापूर्तिं व्यधात् सम्यक् तेन नन्दन्तु साधवः ॥'

some reliable evidence which throws a flood of light on the family of Nārāyaṇa Bhiṣaj and its history for about 200 years, say between A.D. 1300 and 1500. This evidence will, also, clarify the date of Nārāyaṇa who is assigned by Mr. Shastri to 15th century. It will also be seen from my evidence that the interest of the several members of this family of Nāgar Brahmins in the theory and practice of medicine remained unbroken for about two centuries.

Aufrecht records, CC. I. p. 289 the following works of Nārāyaṇa Bhiṣaj[1]: (1) कर्मप्रकाश khn 88, (2) वातघ्नत्वादिनिर्णय K 218, (3) वैद्यवृन्द B. 4. 242 and (4) वैद्यामृत B. 4. 244. The MSS. of the above works on medicine are not available to me for examination. I am, therefore, unable to say if Nārāyaṇa Bhiṣaj who completed व्याख्या-कुसुमावली of S'rīkaṇṭhadatta is identical with his namesake, the author of these works. The catalogues, in which these Sanskrit works are mentioned, do not describe the MSS. recorded and, consequently, it is difficult to say if these works were composed by the Nāgara Brahmin, Nārāyaṇa Bhiṣaj who completed S'rīkaṇṭhadatta's commentary on the *Vṛnda-mādhava* or *Siddha-yoga*. The only MS. of व्याख्या-कुसुमावली recorded by Aufrecht (C C. I. p. 618) is No. 375 of 1882-83 in the Govt. MSS. Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona. This work has been published[2].

In his History of Āyurveda (आयुर्वेदनो इतिहास), written in Gujarātī (Gujarāt Vernacular Society, Ahmedabad, 1942, p. 180), D. K. Shastri makes the following remarks about नारायण भिषज् : 'श्रीकण्ठदत्त composed a commentary called the व्याख्या-कुसुमावली on the सिद्ध-योग of वृन्द. This श्रीकण्ठ also composed a commentary on the माधव-निदान. He lived in the 14th century. His commentary, incomplete in parts, was completed by नारायण son of भामल्ल of नागर-ज्ञाति, as stated at the end of the Ānandāśrama ed. of the व्याख्या-कुसुमावली'.

I propose now to connect our Nārāyaṇa Bhiṣaj of नागरवंश with the family of another Nāgara Brahmin अनन्त, who composed a work called the काम-समूह in A D. 1457 and on whom I published a paper in 1940 in the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras (Vol. XV. Part I. pp. 74-81). Rao Bahadur P. C. Divanji published a Gujarātī rendering of this paper in a Gujarātī journal. Evidently, D. K. Shastri has not seen my paper or this Gujarātī rendering. In my paper under reference I have recorded the following facts :—

1. This नारायण भिषज् should not be confounded with नारायण who composed a commentary on त्रिशती of शार्ङ्गधर, called सिद्धान्त-सञ्चय. This author was the son of कृष्णभट्ट and younger brother of नागनाथ (See MSS. Nos. 622 of 1895-1902 and 947 of 1884-87 in the Govt. MSS. Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona, described by Dr. H. D. Sharma on pp. 113-115 of his *Des. Cata. of Vaidyak MSS.* ⌊B. O. R. Institute⌋ Vol. XVI. Part I, 1939).

2. Ed. by Hnumanta Sastri Padhye, Poona, 1894.

(1) अनन्त composed his काम-समूह in A. D. 1457.

(2) He belonged to भाभल्लवंश and was the son of मन्त्रिमण्डन, as stated by him in the following verse :—

'भाभल्लवंशजातेन मन्त्रिमण्डनसूनुना ।
अनन्तेन महाकाव्यप्रबन्धः क्रियते मया ॥६॥'

(3) His father मण्डन was the son of नारायण, as stated by अनन्त in the following verses :—

'विद्वज्जनसभानन्दो मन्त्री नारायणात्मजः ।
मण्डनस्तस्य पुत्रेण वर्ण्यन्ते स्मर्तवोऽधुना ॥६१॥
नारायणात्मजः श्रीमान् मन्त्री श्रीमण्डनो द्विजः ।
तत्सुतेन प्रियावस्था प्रयाणे वर्णिता मुदा ॥'

(4) अनन्त belonged to नागर ज्ञाति, as stated by him in the following verse :—

'नागरज्ञातिजातेन मन्त्रिमण्डनसूनुना ।
अनन्तेन महाकाव्या (?व्यं) सतीवृत्तं प्रकाशितम् ॥'

(5) अनन्त states that he was a resident of a town (नगर) founded by अहिम्मद :-

'अहिम्मदनिर्मितनगरे विहितावसतिश्च वृद्धनागरिकः ।
मण्डनसूनुरनन्तो रचयति सेवाविधिं नार्याः ॥'

'अहिम्मदनगर' mentioned in the above verse cannot be Ahmadnagar (founded by Ahmad Nizam Shah in A. D. 1494). It may be identical with Ahmedabad (founded in A. D. 1513) or Ahmadnagar (now Himmatnagar, the capital of Idar State [founded in A. D. 1427]). Both these towns were founded by Amad I of Gujarāt before A. D. 1457, the date of the काम-समूह of अनन्त.

(6) One आनन्दपूर्ण was the Guru of अनन्त, as stated in the following verse :—

'आनन्दपूर्णगुरुपादयुगं प्रणम्य ।
व्याख्यां विधाय सुरभे रचयत्यनन्तः ॥२७॥'

One आनन्दपूर्ण *alias* विद्यासागर, the commentator of the महाभारत, was a contemporary of Kāmadeva, the Kadamba ruler of Goa, one of whose inscription is dated A. D. 1393.

(7) अनन्त describes his father मण्डन as मन्त्रिन् 'minister', and, also, as (1) भूपतीनां भिषग्वरः 'physician to kings' and (2) गजायुर्वेदवेत्ता वै धन्वन्तरिरिवापरः 'proficient in the veterinary science dealing with elephants as धन्वन्तरि himself'.

(8) अनन्त calls himself a वृद्धनागरिक of अहिम्मदनगर. He also calls himself अनन्तशास्त्रज्ञः 'proficient in many sciences'. He also styles himself as भिषग्विद्याविद् 'expert in medical science' (like his father मण्डन expert in verterinary and general medicine).

The identity of Nārāyaṇa Bhiṣaj (who completed the व्याख्या-कुसुमावली of श्रीकण्ठदत्त) with नारायण the grandfather of अनन्त of A.D. 1457 will be clear from the following tabulated statement :—

नारायण भिषज्	नारायण grandfather of अनन्त
(1) He calls himself भामल्लनन्दन i.e. son of भामल्ल (or भाभल्ल).	(1) अनन्त tells us that his grandfather was नारायण and that he belonged to भाभल्लवंश (भाभल्ल family).
(2) He calls himself as descended from नागर वंश (Nāgara family).	(2) अनन्त also states his own caste as 'नागर-ज्ञाति'.
(3) He calls himself नारायण भिषज्.	(3) अनन्त calls his grandfather as नारायण and his father, मण्डन, son of नारायण as भिषग्वर and गजायुर्वेदवेत्ता.

The identity of the names भाम(भ)ल्ल, नारायण and नागर ज्ञाति (or नागर वंश) as revealed by the statements of अनन्त and नारायण भिषज् is not accidental but real. I have, therefore, no doubt that Nārāyaṇa Bhiṣaj who completed the व्याख्या-कुसुमावली is identical with नारायण, the grandfather of अनन्त of A.D. 1457. If this identity is accepted, we can easily see how the study of medicine was continued in this Nāgara family from the grandfather to the grandson, as represented in the following genealogy and its chronology:—

Genealogy	भाभ (म) ल्ल	->नारायणभिषज्	->मन्त्रिमण्डन (भिषग्वर and गजायुर्वेदवेत्ता)	->अनन्त (भिषग्विद्यावित्) वृद्धनागरिक in A.D 1457
Chronology	c. A.D. 1275-1350	c. A.D. 1325-1400	c. A.D. 1375-1450	c. A.D. 1400-1475

As regards the chronology, given in the above table, I have to observe as follows :-

(1) श्रीकण्ठदत्त was the pupil of विजयरक्षित whose date is about 1240 A.D. (*vide* Hoernle : *Osteology*, p. 17).

(2) The date of श्रीकण्ठदत्त, the author of व्याख्या-कुसुमावली, would be c. A. D. 1225-1300.

(3) नारायण भिषज् who completed व्याख्या-कुसुमावली, is, therefore, later than A.D. 1300. In the above table, I have assigned him to the period A.D. 1325-1400.

(4) मण्डन, the son of नारायण भिषज्, may be safely assigned to the period A.D. 1375-1450.

(5) अनन्त, son of मण्डन, composed his काम-समूह in A.D. 1457, when he was a वृद्धनागरिक. He, therefore, may be assigned to the period A.D. 1400-1475.

(6) भाभल्ल, the great grandfather of अनन्त, has been assigned by me to the period A.D. 1275-1350. He appears to have been contemporaneous with श्रीकण्ठदत्त.

I believe that the above chronology is quite reasonable within the limits available to me, viz. c. A. D 1240, the date of विजयरक्षित and A.D. 1457, the date of अनन्त. In this manner, by linking up the evidence given by नारायण भिषज् and that given by अनन्त, we have been able to give the history and chronology of this Nāgara family of physicians for 200 years (A. D. 1275-1475).

It would appear from my evidence that नारायण भिषज् belongs to the 14th century and not the 15th century to which D. K. Shastri has assigned him in his article. अनन्त calls himself as भाभल्ल-वंशजात, i. e. born in the भाभल्ल family. This vague statement of अनन्त about his great grandfather is clarified by his grandfather नारायण भिषज्, who expressly calls himself भाभल्ल-नन्दन. The great grandson had a vague memory of his great grandfather, but the grandfather had no such vagueness in calling himself भाभल्लनन्दन 'the son of भाभल्ल'. It is, therefore, clear that the genealogy established by me in this paper, viz. भाभल्ल-नारायण-मण्डन-अनन्त (A.D. 1457) is accurate and reliable.

अनन्त, frequently, calls his father as मन्त्रिन् 'minister' and भूपतीनां भिषग्वर: 'Royal Physician'. We must investigate the name of the king at whose court he flourished and served as minister. Is it possible to suppose that मण्डन (c. 1375-1450 A.D.) was patronised by Ahmad I of Gujarāt (A.D. 1411-1442) ? In this connection I may point out that Mahamud Begdā, the grandson of Ahmad I, had a court Pandit, Udayaraja[1], who composed a poem called the राजविनोद between A.D. 1458 and 1469.

1. Vide my paper : Date of *Rajavinoda* of Udayarāja, a Hindu Court Poet of Mahamud Begda, in the *Journal of the Bombay University*, 1940, pp. 102-115. उदयराज refers to the following Sultans of Gujarat :—

मुदफ्फर (A.D. 1392-1410); महम्मद son of मुदफ्फर; अहम्मद (A.D. 1411-1442); महम्मद, son of अहम्मद (A.D. 1442-1451); महमूद (Begdā) son of महम्मद (A.D. 1458-1511).

Ahmad I of Gujarāt (A.D. 1411-1442) twice attacked Malwa (in A.D. 1419 and 1422), without being able to capture Hoshang Ghori, who was ruling at Mandu fort between A.D. 1405 and 1432. I have proved, elsewhere[1], that Hoshang Ghori had a Jain Prime Minister of the name मण्डन, son of बाहड and grandson of झंझण of श्रीमालवंश. This महाप्रधान मण्डन was a Jain संघ-पति and composed several Sanskrit works like काव्य-मण्डन, शृङ्गार-मण्डन, सारस्वत-मण्डन and संगीत-मण्डन. He flourished between A.D. 1405 and 1432, the period of Hoshang Ghori's rule at Malwa. This महाप्रधानमण्डन of Malwa should not be confounded with मन्त्रिमण्डन of Gujarāt (A.D. 1375-1450) who was his contemporary with a different genealogy.

1. Vide my article : *The Genealogy of Maṇḍana*, the Jain Prime Minister of Malwa, between A. D. 1405 and 1432, in *Jaina Antiquary*, 1944.

Machiavellism in Ancient India

By

INDRA, *Lahore.*

'Prophets with arms succeed and not with sweet language' such is the dictum of those who profess to have a realistic conception of State. According to them, force is the ultimate ratio of State, strength its only virtue and success its only aim. They hold war to be a potent instrument of national strength. It is the only profession worthy of a prince, who should have 'no other design, thought or study except war'. Success being the end of State, all means including cruelty, treachery and hypocrisy are held honourable for its realisation. Machiavelli—the prince among realists—observes that a king should not be superstitiously exact in the observance of promises, pledges and treaties made by him. He must appear all sincerity while making them, but he should break them whenever they stand in the way of his success. He should not mind being terrible at home and cruel abroad. He should make his people either contented or too weak to protest. As regards his relations with other people, Machiavelli writes in his *Prince*, 'He who usurps the government of any State is to execute and put in practice all the cruelties, which he thinks material, at once'. Further he says, 'For, whosoever conquers a free town and does not demolish it, commits a great error; and may expect to be ruined, because whenever the citizens are disposed to revolt they betake themselves, of course, to the blessed name of liberty and the laws of their ancestors, which no length of time nor kind usage whatever will be able to eradicate'.

Thus, broadly speaking, Machiavellism stands for justification of all means moral or immoral, fair or foul, straight or crooked for realisation of the supreme end, i. e. the preservation and expansion of State. It is not ashamed of a display 'of naked wickedness' and of 'cool, judicious, scientific' atrocity fit only for fiends and not for even the most depraved men'[1].

Such Machiavellism certainly did not exist in ancient India, although we confess that sometimes principles of morality were not strictly adhered to in the observance of national policy. But statecraft, generally, was considered to be a clean game, wherein everything was to be above board. A war diplomat did depart, on occasions from the highest

1. T. Macswiney: *Principles of Freedom*, pp. 162 f.

standards of ethics, but a statesman in peace-time did not allow himself to be swayed by considerations of expediency against those of morality. Yājñavalkya, Manu, Gautama and Baudhāyana[1] — all ancient law-givers—are agreed on the moral dictum that 'a king should not betray his conscience for any material gain'. The *Mahābhārata* goes one step forwards and unmistakably lays down its verdict: 'If he (king) were to get the possession of the whole world by resorting to *base* methods, he should reject the suggestion'[2]. Indeed, righteousness was insisted upon in day to day administration as well as in the conduct of general diplomatic relations with other countries.

Even war itself was held to be a religious practice, to be devoid of wile, guile and other low arts. It was to be fought on lines of righteouness. *Dharma* was to guide the conduct of warriors, who had rather to sacrifice their lives than to adopt ignoble means for securing a victory over the enemy. *Kūṭa-yuddha* was a rare phenomenon, resorted to only when the opponent was unscrupulous and played foul game. 'Tit for tat' in warfare was held a pardonable crime. From the point of view of ethical sternness, such reprisals or retaliatory measures may not find any justification, but expediency did compel contending parties some times to take refuge under these responsive strategems. It is in this spirit that even the Vedas have supported wars of *māyā* against *māyāvins* who thrive on this art[3]. The *Mahābhārata* and other texts, also[4], have eulogised *kūṭa-yuddhas* as effective devices to meet villainy, treachery and other low practices on the part of an unconscientious enemy. Otherwise, in *dharma-yuddhas*, strict war-morality was laid down. Its trangression was severely reprehended. The canons of chivalry were, as a rule, observed and only in exceptional cases a departure was made from them. As we have already pointed out war was treated as a religious ceremony, where even the mounting of a chariot was propitiated by the utterance of sacred *mantras*[5] and in the same manner riding on war-elephants was accompanied by rites and rituals. The marching of an army required observance of many religious ceremonies wherein gods were invoked, divine forces were summoned and many other acts of merits were performed.

Much has been said about Cāṇaky's Machiavellism. He is said not to have hesitated to permit unscrupulous and unfair acts for the good and the greatness of the State. His treatise, *Arthas'āstra*, has been often compared to *The Prince* of Machiavelli. His critics have found out the following traits of Machiavellism in his *Arthas'āstra*:—

1. Cf. *Yājñavalkya*, 1.326; *Manu*, VII. 87; *Gautama*, X. 16 and *Baudhāyana*, I. 18; 39.
2. *Mahābhārata* (*S'ānti*), XCVI. 10.
3. *Ṛgveda*, I. 11. 1.
4. *Mahābhārata*, II. 69 and *S'ukranīti*, V. 10.
5. *Paraskara-Gṛhya-Sūtra*, III. 14; 15.

(1) To Kauṭilya, State is everything. He holds State to be an end in itself. Machiavelli also held the same view.

(2) Kauṭilya's motto is '*ātmodayaḥ paraglāniḥ*', i.e. self-aggrandisement at the expense of others. Machiavelli, also, advocated expansion of one's country at any cost to others.

(3) For the purpose of fulfilling the above motto, an enemy was to be vanquished at any sacrifice of men and money.

(4) For securing the end, no means was considered to be dishonourable. No moral scruples were allowed to stand in the way of achievement of the object. Even prostitution was legalised for getting secrets of an enemy. All this is Machiavellism in letter and in spirit.

(5) Cāṇakya does not mind even the use of poisons for the assasination of rivals.

(6) He openly favours war and militaristic organisation of the State.

(7) A stupendous department of espionage suggested by him shows that he conceived State to be a mere power-system, resting on its own majesty, existing in its own right, irresponsible and above law. He does not believe the State to be a welfare-system at all. Everyone amongst the people was to be overshadowed by spies, who were to wander everywhere in the guise of artizans, cratfsmen, actors, dancers, singers, players of musical instruments, buffoons, bards, acrobats, jugglers etc. They went over to the side of the enemy and took service to secure for themselves the privilege of free ingress, stay and egress. They could even cause the escape of hostages of their country under some guile or other.

(8) In short, both Kauṭilya and Machiavelli favoured the subordination of ethical principles to considerations of expediency.

(9) One writer says, 'A study of Kauṭilya leads to the inference that sacrifices of human lives, caused through secret agents for State-ends in inter-statal discords, in measures against sedition within the State or against enemy, were not generally regarded as obstacles at which the State would stick; the interest of the kingdom and monarch and their self-preservation, being regarded as justifying the application of the means'.

(10) This is why Kauṭilya has been referred to with contempt in several texts of the Sanskrit literature. Viśākhadatta[1] calls him *kuṭilamati* or 'one with croocked intellect', Bāṇa[2] styles his *Arthaśāstra* as a treatise on villainy, and the author of *Pañcatantra*, while calling him an accomplished statesman and diplomat, observes that he had an unscrupulous

1. Cf. *Mudrārākṣasa*, Act, I.
2. Cf. *Kadambarī*, Part I.

mind, which did not hesitate to devise the destruction of an enemy by all means, fair or foul. *Mañjus'rīmūla-kalpa*, (cf. Sec. 452 ff.) the newly discovered authoritative historical treatise, has surpassed all previous detractors of Cāṇakya and has denounced him in most vehement terms, calling him '*durmati*', '*krodhana*', '*pāpaka*' etc., implying that he had a most perverted intellect, always full of rancour towards others, with no other thoughts except those of foul sins and despicable crimes.

Indeed, it is a fairly long catalogue of charges against one who, otherwise, is spoken of as the first regenerator of Āryāvarta, who brought cosmos out of chaos and established the first consolidated united State in India. We easily forget that he lived and laboured in extraordinary circumstances. India was plunged in confusion and disorder. The conception of one unified State did not exist. It was a vision which Cāṇakya alone saw and tried to translate into practice. Dauntless and determined, he did succeed in executing in action what he believed to be a practicable ideal. He had seen a dream of India's political boundaries coinciding with her geographical boundaries. Stupendous were the difficulties in the way of realisation of this dream. He, as a realist, did face boldly and surmounted them. His efforts were crowned with success to a considerable extent and his India did extend from Afghanistan to Deccan and from Bengal to Kathiawar.

As regards the charge-sheet against this great genius, we should admit that it is not possible to defend him in all respects. Yet, bearing in mind the above-mentioned exceptional conditions, we should take a lenient view of the matter. His suggestions for the engagement of prostitutes and secret spies for the promotion of interests of the State cannot be justified, but his views about war, extermination of enemies and strong government are quite understandable. To say that he always advocates unscrupulous measures is exaggarated for we find him equally strongly enjoining on the king to follow the path of virtue and observe all bounds of propriety laid down by the *s'āstras*[1]. The comparison between Kauṭilya and Machiavelli is not tenable. For, Machiavelli has no relieving features. He advises the king, plainly, to be a brute and a lion in order to crush his foes. Towards his own subjects, also, he should be as cruel as possible. For achieving his ends, he should deem no means dishonourable. In a happy contrast, we find Cāṇakya advocating the principle of paternal kingship by which a monarch was to regard himself as the father of his subjects, in whose welfare lay his welfare, and in whose woe lay his woe[2]. He never advises the king to act like a brute or a ferocious lion.

1. *Arthas'āstra*, I. 3.
2. *Ibid.*, I. 19.

Except in war or other exceptional circumstance, he does not support departure from moral ideals. He advocates re-capture of lost power by *any means*, for the strong and capable alone can effectively do an act of virtue[1]. He was not a rank militarist. His sextuple policy and fourfold expedient indicate that when all other measures were exhausted, *then and then alone*, he was in favour of resorting to a war. Kalidas Nag has summed up very beautifully the position of Cāṇakya in the matter:—'The so-called Hindu Machiavelli, though very independent in thought, is not non-moral. When the advantages by peace and war are equal, one should prefer peace, because in war are found exhaustion, expenditure, evil and sin. The war is considered here as by the masters of the school of *dharma* as the last recourse. And when employed, the conquest must immediately be followed by conciliation'[2]. That *Mañjus'rīmūla-kalpa* has been very severe in its condemnation of Cāṇakya which might have been due to his having put a ban on embracing monkish life without the permission of the State and having been hard on Buddhists otherwise also. So the Buddhist history has taken its revenge by calumniating him.

The indictment that at least in the actual conduct of war, Cāṇakya advocated a whole science of sowing suspicions among allies, treason in army, disaffection or revolt in kingdoms[3] may be dismissed by repeating our observation that in a *kūṭa-yuddha* only these artifices were held as tolerable. When a fight diverged from the plane of morality, then an enemy was not to be treated as a person amenable to ethical standards and was to be uprooted by all means possible. 'If the enemy fought deceitfully, he should be paid in his own coins. If, however, he fights fairly, he should be resisted fairly'[4].

1. *Paras'ara Smṛti*, I. 42.
2. Kalidasa Naga : *Diplomatic Theories of Ancient India*, p. 30.
3. Cf. Rapson : *History of India*, p. 470.
4. Cf. *Mahābhārata*, (*S'anti*), XCV. 9.

The Tamilian Cultural Heritage

By

N. KANAKARĀJA IYER, *Pudakkottani.*

It is a well accepted tradition in Tamil literature that there were three *Sangams* in the Tamil country. Pandyas, who are mentioned in the As'oken edicts, were the first race of kings who shouldered the responsibility of fostering their language and literature in the early Christian era and even some centuries before. Cholas and Cheras also did their bit towards the common good. Nowhere else in the world can we come across a tradition of the gathering of many poets under the patronage of a kingly race and leaving to the posterity a rich literature, which proclaims to this day the greatness of a selfless people. *Tholkappiam* is the oldest extant grammar of this people. *Thinikkural* is one of the finest gems of literature that any language can possess. It stands second only to *Bhagavad-gītā* in its service to humanity through its many translations. In its three sections, it treats of *dharma*, *nīti* and love, respectively. Its metrical translation into English by the Oxonion savant Dr. Pope merits all praise. There are many other works of art in Tamil. The ancient poetry depicts the life of the people graphically. Love and war being the two great and eternal themes of poetic expression, the modes of expression in these two themes were studied deeply. *Akam* is the term in Tamil literature for love, and *Puram* stands for war. There are thousands of verses on these two branches of human expression, all of which were approved by the *Sangams* of those days.

Tholkappianar, the greatest Tamil grammarian, who lived about the seventh or sixth century B. C., has systematized the whole technique of poetic expression in his monumental work. The third part of his work is, really, a mine of information for all students of ancient civilization. He gives seven phases to the *Akam* and another seven phases to *Puram*. These he calls by the name of *Thinal*, which signifies in Tamil, the land, the caste and the character of people. The land was divided into five kinds. The people were also divided into five kinds according to the land they lived in. Their character, also, was named after their land. For instance, *Mullai* stands for forest land as well as the character of the people that live there.

In the *Sangam* literature love takes the lion's share, and war has a minor place in it. We shall go through some war-songs and study the ethics of those people through them :—

'May he live long our great king Kudumi,
Who proclaims to the people in his enemy country,
We are going to send our arrows soon
Hence fly ye who have no sons to perform
Their funeral rites. Brahmins of docile nature
And cows also may seek protection. Women and sickly people
Will do well to go to places of safety'. (*Puram four Hundred*).

A poet gives advice to his patron in the following lines :—

'You know well who are your servants,
You never believe in the words of calumniators.
If ever you see a crime through your own investigation,
You punish the culprit according to law ;
Even, then, if he comes and prostrates at your feet,
You lessen the punishment.' (*ibid.*).

A poet praises a Chera king in this way :—

'Even if it were possible to measure the depth of the great ocean, the length and breadth of the great earth, this expanse of space and the four quarters, you are immeasurable in your depth of knowledge, kindness, large-heartedness and prowess. The people who live under your protection do not know any oppression other than the oppressive heat of the sun. They do not know any killing-bow but the rainbow. They know not any weapon other than their plough' (*ibid.*).

Two cousins were intent on a fratricidal war. A great poet goes to them and advises them. Both belong to the Chola family of Kings :—

'He is not wearing the palmyra flower. Nor is he wearing the margosa flower. Yours as well as his garlands are of the selfsame *Athi* flowers. Even if one of you gets himself vanquished, it is your great race that gets the odium. It is uncommon to hear that both can win. Hence, I say, it is unbecoming of you to enter in such fratricidal wars' (*ibid.*).

A very young Pandya king is besieged by several chieftains at the same time. He flares up and proclaims thus :—

'The kings and chieftains who had the boldness to form an unholy combination and try to attack me think that I am young and inexperienced in the art of war, deserve all derision. I say today before all assembled heroes that if I am not able to vanquish all my foes, I shall be considered a tyrant who is ill-spoken of by his own subjects. May the great poet leave my land without any thought of praising me' (*ibid.*).

The *Puram four Hundred* is an anthology of four hundred verses, compiled in the early Christian centuries. The heroism of many kings, chiefs and even women of warlike classes is to be heard of in these verses.

Love themes find several kinds of expression in Tamil literature. There are more than fifty thousands lines of poetry on love, all of them belonging to the third *Sangam* period. Here are a few readings from this collection. A maiden friend says about her mistress, the lady of the piece :—

'Not that he has come here once or twice only, he has come here many a day and tried to impress me through his fine words. He succeeded at last in taking me into his confidence. Now he has left our lady as the honey that leaves its comb when it is ripe. I know not where he is now but my mind weeps like a great downpour of rain in another land'.

Says a lady-love, when she knows that her lover has gone to foreign lands to earn money :—

'He who has gone to far off lands in quest of wealth does not care for youth. Not knowing where he is, this rainy cloud tries to laugh at my predicament, with her teeth *Mukai* flowers'.

'We know, my love, that your lord could not have dug deep this earth of ours and gone into concealment. He could not have climbed the skies. He could not have walked in ocean with his own feet. He must be in one of our towns, cities or villages. It would be easy to find him out if we go to each and every one of these places and look for him'.

Here is another similar expression :—

'Despair not, my lovely friend. He, your lord, feels your separation much. He fears odium. The discolouration in your face and body on account of this separation will not sit permanently on you as is said of the wealth earned by a great soul who knows his duty to humanity and the impression of every thing humane'.

Human life, as liked by the Tamils, can be studied by going through these works of great depth and erudition. The Tamil language has served as a great medium for expressing very fine shades of political, moral, ethical, religious and philosophical thoughts through verses as short as the *kural* of two lines and as long as the ten idylls of several hundred lines. The civilization of a great people lies in their out-look on life and the treatment that they mete out to their neighbours. It was the Tamil land that received all people with open heart and hands, and allowed them to live here as if this was their own motherland.

The Garuḍa-dhvaja of Heliodorus

By

M. GOVIND PAI, *Manjeshwar.*

At Besnagar near Bhilsa in the extreme South of the Gwalior State there stands a stone column which is 21¼ ft. in height. Its shaft is a monolith octagonal at the base, sixteen-sided in the middle and thirtytwo-sided above with a garland dividing the upper and middle portions. This column contains an inscription in Brāhmī characters which is in two parts and reads as follows[1] :—

A.

1. देवदेवस वा(सुदे)वस गरुड-ध्वजे अयं
2. कारिते इ[अ] हेलिओदोरेण भाग-
3. वतेन दियसपुत्रेण तखसिलाकेन
4. योन-दूतेन आगतेन महाराजस
5. अंतलिकितस उप[·]ता सकासं रञो
6. कासीपुत[ऱ्]अस भागभद्रस त्रातारस
7. वसेन [चतु-]दसेन राजेन वधमानस.

B.

1. त्रिणि अमुत-पदानि [सु]अनुठितानि
2. नयंति स्वग दम चाग अप्रमाद.

(A) *'This Garuḍa-column of Vāsudeva (Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa) the god of gods, was erected here by Heliodorus, a worshipper of Viṣṇu (or Kṛṣṇa), the son of Dion, and an inhabitant of Taxila, who came as Greek ambassador from the Great King Antialkidas to King Kāśī-putra Bhāgabhadra, the Saviour, then reigning prosperously in the 14th year of his kingship'.*

(B) *'Three immortal precepts (footsteps), when practised lead to heaven , self-restraint, charity, conscientiousness'.*

It thus appears that this column was erected by Heliodorus son of Dion and a Greek ambassador from the court of mahārāja Aṃtalikita or Antialkidas to that of Rājan Bhāgabhadra. Now, who is this Greek king Antialkidas and who again is king Bhāgabhadra ? When did they flourish and when was this column erected ?

After the death of Alexander (323 B.C.) of Macedonia and the subsequent partition of Triparadisus (321 B.C.), Seleucus I recovered

1. Cf. JRAS. 1909, pp. 1087-94; Rapson : *Ancient India*, p. 157.

Babylon and made himself king of Syr a (312–280 B.C.). In about 305 B.C. he led an expedition against India in which he was defeated by the Maurya Emperor Chandragupta, who consequently obtained from him the cession of the southern half of Afghanistan and the whole of Baluchistan. Bactria[1], corresponding to northern Afghanistan, which had been planted thickly with Greek colonies by Alexander, remained, however, with Seleucus. In the reign of Antiochus II (261-246 B.C.) grandson of Seleucus, Diodotus the satrap of Bactria rebelled and had himself proclaimed its king in about 250 B.C. In c. 230 B.C. Euthydemus was on the throne of Bactria, and he was succeeded by his son Demetrius in c. 190 B.C. In c. 175 B.C. when Demetrius was on a campaign in India, another Greek Eucratidas wrested his throne and made himself king of Bactria. In c. 155 B.C. when the S'akas had driven out the Greeks from Bactria, Greek power in Bactria ceased. Thenceforth the Yavana, *i. e.* the Greek princes are met with only in kingdoms South of the Hindukush, and they are divided into two rival dynasties, the successors of Eucratidas in the Kabul valley and in north-west India, and the successors of Euthydemus in the eastern region of the Punjab.

In c. 130 B.C. a people known to the Chinese historians as the Yue-chi, drove the S'akas out of Bactria, whereupon the latter went westward and settled in Seistan, *i.e.* Sakastan. When in c. 100 B.C. they were expelled thence by the Parthian Emperor Mithradates II, they took their way to India and occupied the territories which were ruled over by the Yavanas, and therewith the Yavana rule, which lasted in those Indian provinces from c. 175 to c. 90 B.C., came to an end.

Among those two rival Yavana families, there was a king Antialkidas in the family of Eucratidas as is evident from his coins struck in the district of Takṣas'ila[2], and in neither of those families was there any other king of that name. No doubt it is this king who is mentioned as king Antalikita on the column of Heliodorus. His coins bear these legends, Greek on the obverse and Prākrit the Kharōṣṭhī script on the reverse[3].—

obv. *Basileōs nikēphoros Antialkidon.*

rev. *Maharajasa jayadharasa Aṃtialikitasa.*

The reverse legend is an exact translation of the obverse, '*Maharaja* (=Skt. *Mahārāja*) being the Prākṛta equivalent of the Greek

1. Bactria is mentioned as *Balhika* in the *Atharvaveda* (V. 5. 5, 7, 9), as in the *Ramayaṇa* (*Kiṣkiṇdha*, 42.6) and the *Mahabhārata* (*Bhīṣma-parva*, 9.47), and Bactrian products are referred to as *Bāhlavēya* in the *Arthas'astra*, (Mysore, 1919, p. 79).

2. *Cambridge History of India* (*CHI.*), I, p. 558.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 591, and plate VIII. 43.

Basileus 'monarch', and *jayadhara* that of *nikephoros* 'bearer of victory, victorious'. Since it is not possible to fix his regnal period exactly, all that can be said at present is that he ruled sometime between c. 155 B.C. when Eucratidas became king of Bactria and c. 90 B.C. when the S'akas established themselves in the territories of his successors. The coins of Antialkidas (with the type 'Pilei') indicate that he was the king of Takṣas'ila[1].

In the Purāṇas we are told that the kings of the Maurya dynasty of Chandragupta ruled for 137 years[2], whereupon the S'uṅga dynasty ruled for 112 years[3]. And when the last of S'uṅgas, Devabhūti, had reigned 10 years, he was dethroned by his minister Vasudeva of the Kāṇvāyana family whereupon the S'uṅga dynasty came to an end[3]. We further learn from the Purāṇas that the father and the immediate predecesor of Devabhūti, who is called Bhāga in some of them and Bhāgavata in others, ruled for 32 years[4]. And from the Purāṇas, again, we know, for certain, that there was no other king of the name Bhāga or Bhāgavata in any of the ancient dynasties. His name appears as Bhāgavata on a fragment of another column which is now found at Bhilsa, but which is supposed to have been taken there from Besnagar, and it is dated in his 12th regnal year[5]. There cannot be any doubt, therefore, that the king Bhāgabhadra mentioned on the Besnagar column of Heliodorus is none else than the king Bhāgavata, the penultimate king of the S'uṅga dynasty.

In one of the dramas of Kālidāsa, the *Mālavikāgnimitra* (Act V), the name of the founder of the S'uṅga dynasty, Puṣyamitra, is so closely connected with the city of Vidis'ā (पुष्यमित्रो वैदिशः), i. e. the modern Bhilsa, that that city would naturally seem to have been his capital, and it would not, therefore, be unnatural to conclude that it was also the capital of his successors, and especially, however, of the king Bhāgavata, and this inference is further strengthened by the fact that the fragment of his column as well as the column of Heliodorus are found in its vicinity.

Now Chandragupta is known to have acceded to the throne in 325 B. C.[6], and his Maurya dynasty which ruled for 137 years would accordingly come to an end in c. 188 B.C. and the subsequent rule of the S'uṅgas which lasted for 112 would come to an end in c. 76 B.C. Since Devabhūti, the last of the S'uṅgas, is said to have ruled

1. *CHI.* p. 558.
2. Pargiter : *Purāṇa Text of the Dynasties of Kali Age*, pp. 28 and 30.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
5. *CHI.* p. 522.
6. Vincent Smith : *Asoka.* p. 72.

for 10 years, he would seem to have succeeded his father Bhāgavata in c. 86 B.C., and the reign of Bhāgavata himself, who is said to have ruled for 32 years, would seem to have lasted from c. 118 to 86 B.C. So that the inscription on the column of Heliodorus, which was erected in his 14th regnal year, would assign itself to c. 105-104 B.C.

The Greek name Heliodorus means 'gift of the sun' (Gk. *helios* = sun, and *doran* = gift), and might be translated into Sanskrit as *Sūrya-datta*. Since he calls himself *Takhasilāka* in his inscription, he would seem to have hailed from Takṣaśila, i. e. the modern Taxila, which as we have just seen, was the Yavana capital of king Antialkidas whose ambassador he was. And the fact that he styles himself as *Bhāgavata*, i. e. a worshipper of God Viṣṇu, and dedicates the standard to '*Deva-deva*, *Vāsudeva*', i. e. god of gods, Viṣṇu or S'rī Kṛṣṇa, testifies that at that period the Yavanas had adopted Indian faiths.

Since in this inscription Heliodorus styles his king Antialkidas as *Mahārāja* and Bhāgabhadra as *Rāja*, it might be questioned whether the latter was subordinate to the former or to any other king for that matter. But neither is the case. For in those days, however, no king would send his ambassador to the court of a ruler who was subordinate to himself or any other king. And as a case in point, there is the instance of Megasthenes who was the ambassador of Seleucus at the court of Emperor Chandragupta. Bhāgabhadra, therefore, was an independent ruler, a monarch like Antialkidas himself. Now the word for a monarch in Greek is *Basileus*, which is invariably rendered into Sanskrit as *Mahārāja* and into Prākrit as *Maharaja* or *Maharaya*. This is the style that is usually met with in the coin-legends of the Yavana rulers, as is evident from the afore-cited Greek and Prākrit legends on the coin of Antialkidas, and it is this in full consonance with that prevalent practice that Heliodorus has styled his king as *Mahārāja*. On the other hand, though the much higher titles *Samrāṭ*[1] as well as *Rājādhirāja* and *Mahārāja*[2] were known from the Vedic times, the only title coupled with the name of Maurya Emperor As'ōka is *Rāja* as is evident from his inscriptions. The title *Rāja*, which would thus seem to have been the usual style of the Indian monarchs in those days, would further seem to have had an imperial significance. The same title would naturally be assumed by the S'uṅgas when they had succeeded the Mauryas. It is, thus, in the fitness of things that the S'uṅga king Bhāgabhadra has been styled *Rāja* on this Garuḍa column of Heliodorus.

1. *Ṛgveda* I. 100. 1, II. 28. 6, III. 56. 5, VIII. 29. 9, and *c* ; *Yajurveda* III. 38, IV. 30, V. 32 etc. ; *Atharvaveda* VI. 36. 3, 86. 3 etc.

2. *Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* I. 31. 6 :–

राजाधिराजाय प्रसह्यसाहिने नमो वयं वैश्रवणाय कुर्महे ।
स मे कामान् कामकामाय मह्यं कामेश्वरो वैश्रवणो ददातु ॥
कुबेराय वैश्रवणाय महाराजाय नमः ॥

Aryan Origins According to the Purāṇas

By

A. D. PUSALKAR, *Bombay.*

Though in their present form the *Purāṇas* belong to a comparatively late period, there is no doubt that they embody the earliest traditional history, and that much of their material is old and valuable. Like the dynastic lists in Sumer and Egypt, the genealogies in the *Purāṇas* record pre-diluvial dynasties, though as may be expected in such accounts, there is a large mixture of myths and legends in them. The Solar and Lunar dynasties, which herald the dawn of history, start only after the Flood, and trace their origin from Vaivasvata Manu, the saviour of humanity at the Flood.

Manu is said to be the father of nine valiant sons besides the eldest, who is represented to have had a dual personality as Ila and Ilā, and from whom as Ila sprang the Saudyumnas and as Ilā were derived the Ailas or the Lunar dynasty. The collated text as reconstructed by Pargiter shows the names of the nine sons of Manu to be: Ikṣvāku, Nābhāga, Dhṛṣṭa S'aryāti, Nariṣyanta, Prāṃs'u, Nābhānediṣṭha, Karuṣa and Pṛṣadhra[1]. Of these sons, only four are important, being originators of important lines. Ikṣvāku's sons founded the Solar line and the Videha line. From S'aryāti came the S'āryātas who ruled in Gujarat. Nābhānediṣṭha started the Vaiśāla line, and from Ilā came Purūravas Aila of the Lunar dynasty, which later developed into the Kānyakubjas, Yādavas, Ānavas, Druhyus, Turvas'us, Pañcālas, Chedis, Bārhadrathas, etc. Ila, transformed into a *Kiṃpuruṣa* named Sudyumna, gave rise to the Saudyumnas. The Purānic accounts thus state that all dynasties recorded in the *Purāṇas* trace their descent from Manu.

Pargiter, however, postulates the existence of three distinct stocks among these various dynasties[2]. He styles the Mānavas, by which term he designates the Solar dynasty, as the Dravidian stock; the Ailas are Aryans according to him, and the Saudyumnas belong to the Mon-khmer stock. It will be readily seen that there is absolutely no basis or support for these conclusions either from the Vedic texts or from the *Purāṇas* themselves. As Pargiter's arguments deal with Aryan origins according to the *Purāṇas*, we shall refer here to his main arguments in brief and shall attempt a brief refutation of them. Not only do the *Purāṇas* not lend any support for differentiating

1. *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, p. 84, n. 2.
2. *Op. cit.*, pp. 288-9; 295-6.

between any of the dynasties, but they also indicate their unity by making all emanate from Manu.

According to Pargiter, traditional history deals with three original stocks, viz., the Ailas, the Saudyumnas and the Mānavas, which were, respectively, the Aryan, the Munda (or Mon-khmer) and the Dravidian. The earliest hymn-singers were Mānava Kṣatriyas of Aikṣvāka family[1]. Earliest hymn-maker Ṛṣis were priests, either of Mānavas or Asuras, but not of Ailas. Earliest Brāhmaṇas are seen to be associated with Mānava non-Aryan kings, who got on well with their Purohitas. Hymn-making was an early Mānava characteristic which was passed on to the Ailas after their connection with the Brāhmaṇas from among the Mānavas. The earliest Mānava-hymns were Sanskritized later. Early Aila kings had no priests, or harassed their priests.

Now, even according to Pargiter, there is not the slightest suggestion in tradition that any change of race is involved[2]. It is not clear why such an important fact has been ignored. The *Ṛgveda* mentions several kings, who are Dravidian according to Pargiter ; but there is nothing in the *Ṛgveda* to show any difference of race. Such silence of the *Ṛgveda*, which always emphasises differences between the Aryans and other races is significant, and positively shows that there was no distinction of race between the so-called Mānavas and Ailas. There is, again, no reason why the fact of racial differences should be suppressed by the Vedic Ṛṣis. While the Vedic Ṛṣis distinguished themselves as Aryans, it is not clear why Purūravas is called Aila and not Aryan. The term Aila was never used as denoting a race. The tradition itself postulates some connection between the descendants of Purūravas and Sudyumna through Ila, so that they cannot belong to such distinct stocks as the Aryan and Munda. Further, free marriages between the Ailas and the Ikṣvākus show that the Ikṣvākus were not non-Aryans as stated by Pargiter[3]. The Vasiṣṭhas, who have been connected with the Ikṣvākus from the beginning according to Pargiter, nowhere mention the Ikṣvākus as non-Aryans in the *Ṛgveda*, nor do we find Ikṣvāku kings mentioned as Dānavas or non-Aryans in the *Purāṇas*. All traditions agree in making Ikṣvāku and Purūravas, respectively, the son and grandson of Manu, and the *Ṛgveda* also indicates the relationship between Ikṣvāku and the Pūrus[4]. It is curious how Pargiter rejects the tradition of common descent in the case of Purūravas

1. *Anceint Indian Historical Tradition*, pp. 303 ff.
2. *Op. cit.*, pp. 295-6.
3. Cf. Ghurye : *Proc. and Trans. Oriental Conference*, IX., p. 933.
4 Cf. *RV.* X. 60. 4; *Vedic Index*, I., p. 75 ; *Cam. Hist. Ind.*, I., p. 308; Dutt : *Aryanisation of India*, p. 147.

and Ikṣvāku, and accepts it in the case of the five sons of Yayāti. Further, it appears from the traditional history itself that the Ailas were of mixed origin and not pure-bred Aryans[1].

There is no evidence of the supposed non-Aryan language of Mānavas in their productions. It is not clear how the original Dravidian has been completely obliterated throughout in the Ṛgveda. The seventh book which comes from the Vasiṣṭhas (the priests of Dravidians according to Pargiter) shows the same features as the other books of the Ṛgveda in regard to language, ritual and gods. Further, if many of the hymns of the Ṛgveda are subsequently Sanskritised from original Dravidian, it is curious that there is not a large number of Dravidian or non-Aryan words and phrases in the Ṛgveda. When the Aryan race was dominant throughout, it is inexplicable how the Dravidian and Munda genealogies came to be incorporated in the Aryan books, and why the place of honour was given to Ayodhya of the Dravidian stock.

As regards the antagonistic attitude of the Ailas to their priests, it is to be observed that enmity with the Brāhmaṇas was not the monopoly of the Aila kings, that the attitude of kings to their priests was not uniform through the ages, and that there was no material difference in the attitude between the kings of the so-called Aila and Mānava stocks to their priests. With regard to the linguistic evidence adduced by Pargiter, it may be stated that the Ayodhyā people (of the Dravidian stock according to Pargiter) are nearer in relation to the people of the Gangetic Doab (pure Aila stock according to Pargiter) than the people of Bihar, Bengal, Berar and Assam who are said to be the descendants of Purūravas. Ethnologically, the people of Ayodhyā betray less non-Aryan characteristics than the people of the eastern and southern provinces[2].

This brief examination of Pargiter's arguments sufficiently shows that neither traditional history nor Vedic evidence supports the supposed existence of three racial stocks. The *Purāṇas* indicate nothing as to the ethnic characteristics of different dynasties that figure in traditional history, and suggest common origin for all dynasties, which were equally Aryans.

The *Purāṇas* state nothing as to the original home of the Aryans, nor do they countenance the theory of the entry of the Aryans through the North West into India. The wedge theory and the double invasion theory propounded to explain the linguistic phenomenon in North India

1. Tripathi : *Ind. Hist. Qtly.*, IX. p. 464.
2. Dutt : *op. cit.*, pp. 146-8.

do not find any support in traditional history[1]. It may, also, be noted that the Ṛgveda and early Vedic texts do not corroborate any of these theories. The scene of traditional history opens in India with the division of the earth, comprising the whole of North India, extending eastward up to Orissa, among the ten sons of Manu. There is absolutely no indication of any early Aryan home outside India. The earliest tradition may thus be said to indicate India as the home of the Aryans. Or, if it be taken that the Aryans entered India from outside, the event must be taken to have occurred at such a remote period that even its faintest memories had faded out by the time we get the earliest account of Indian history.

1. Cf. *Cam. Hist. Ind.*, I, pp. 119-20; *Vedic Index*, I, p. 169.

Ancient Temples and Inscription at Paleṭhī (Tehri-Garhwal)

By

SADHU RAM, *Lahore.*

Paleṭhī is a small hamlet in Paṭṭi Khās, situated in deep valley, some 12 miles North-West of Devaprayāga which stands at the confluence of the Gangā and the Alakhanandā—a picturesque situation indeed. In the fields near the village I saw on the 24th April, 1929, a small bunch of ruined temples, all facing the East. Three of them were visible above the ground and the traces of a fourth could be seen under the roots of a mango tree.

The largest of these temples is dedicated to the Sun and is the best preserved of all. It stands at a higher level than the rest. About 27 ft. behind this temple are the other three temples, standing in a line, 11 ft. apart from each other. The middle one enshrines a *S'iva-liṅgam* on pedestal; the one on the North is almost completely buried beneath the mango tree and the southernmost is empty. Of this last, only the doorway, the four walls of the cella and the pedestal of the image are surviving.

The Sun and *liṅgam* temples are pyramidal structures of the North Indian *S'ikhara* type such as exist in Jāges'vara (Almora District) with deep horizontal mouldings and ornamented doorways, and what remains of the others is sufficient to show that they were also of the same type.

The Sun temple is about 22 ft. high and is crowned with an *āmalaka* which has a socket for the pinnacle. It is square in plan with a deep projecting doorway on the East surmounted by a trefoil pediment. The doorway is ornamented with conventional leaves, lion-heads alternating with flowers and birds. The image of the Sun god (ht. 40″) is haloed and is placed on a rectangular pedestal (48″×30″×21″) against the back wall of the cella. The deity is represented as standing with a lotus in each hand, which reaches up to the shoulder. He wears a *kirīṭamukuṭa*, thick ear-rings, necklaces, *kaṅkaṇas*, bangles, *vana-mālā* and a girdle. His dress consists of a long coat reaching below the knees and his shins are covered with long boots worn on his feet. On his right and left are two female figures carrying lotuses and a garland, respectively. They are clad in close-fitting bodices and skirts, and perhaps represent two out of the four *s'aktis* of *Sūrya*.

There are about twenty other detached sculptures lying in the cella. Chief among them are the figures of *Sūrya*, *Viṣṇu* and a goddess. This second figure of *Sūrya* is similar to the main figure described above, except that the attendant figures are different. On his right hand stands a bearded man holding a pen and a folio, with the ink-pot tied to his girdle, while on the other side is a badly mutilated figure holding a spear (*śakti*). If the latter is not a woman then these two attendants must be *Piṅgala* (*Agni*) and *Daṇḍa* or *Daṇḍa-nāyaka* (*Skanda*), who were posted on the right and left sides of *Sūrya* by the gods to protect him from the attack of the *Asuras*.

The terfoil pediment is broken at the top, on which is lying a slab (26″×30″) depicting in base relief the diurnal march of the Sun. The god is sitting on a chariot with the legless *Aruṇa* in front driving his seven horses at full speed. The horses can be seen in the lower field. On either side of *Sūrya* is a chowrie-bearer, exterior to whom are *Piṅgala* and *Daṇḍa* on the right and left, respectively. This slab might have occupied the present opening in the pediment which is empty.

A long Sanskrit inscription in mixed prose and verse belonging to the main Sun temple was lying outside by the temple wall. It is engraved in 19 lines on a loose grey sandstone slab (53⅓″×27″×3½″). About one third of the writing on left hand side has suffered a good deal from the weather, but the rest of it is quite clear. The characters belong to the northern class of alphabets and are assignable to the 8th century A. D. The engraving is beautiful and the record is in easy and flowing verse with a variety of metres such as *Sragdharā*, *Upajāti*, *S'loka*, *S'ārdūlavikrīḍita*, *Vasantatilakā*, etc. As regards orthography, the use of ङ् before ह् and श् as in नरसिङ्हताम् (line 11) and वङ्श (ln. 18); irregular employment of *jihvāmūlīya* and *upadhmānīya* ; of व for ब् as in विम्व (ln. 13), and doubling of consonants in conjunction with a preceding or following र् as in सवित्त्रे (ln. 1), शक्क्र (ln. 3.), उत्कीर्ण्णा (ln. 19) may be noticed. Irregular grammatical forms like चिन्तयानो (ln. 17) also deserve attention. Punctuation, too, is not regular.

The inscription records the erection of the Sun-temple by one of the kings mentioned in the text, probably by Rājā Kalyāṇavarmman (ln. 14). Owing to the stone wearing off, the exact genealogy of the dynasty cannot be ascertained. The gist of the record is given below :—

The first two stanzas are in the praise of the Sun-god. In line 3 is mentioned king (नरपति) Ādivarmman (the metre requires one more syllable and I suggest its correction to Ādityavarmman), perhaps the founder of the dynasty. Lines 4 to 6 appear to be in prose. In line 4 occurs the

name of S'rī Kalyāṇa-varmman with the titles परमभट्टारक, महाराजाधिराज and परमेश्वर of paramount sovereignty. Being mentiond immediately after Ādi(tya)varmman, he might be his son, although the relationship cannot be established owing to the lacuna. In line 7 is mentioned the glorious Jayamanaḥ, the name of whose father is probably broken away and whose relationship with Kalyāṇavarmman is not clear. He conquered the Mleccha tribes of the Prāleyācala hill and gave away the territory to his master, who may have been some paramount sovereign. The names of Jayamanaḥ's wife and son are broken away in line 9, where also occur the names of one noble and brave the illustrious maternal grandfather Ādityavarddhana and his daughter's son Karkkravarddhana ? The latter was the devotee of the Sun and a benevolent but strong ruler. Then follow laudatory verses in his praise. In line 14 the name of another Kalyāṇavarmman is mentioned in such a way as to suggest that he was a vassal of some other paramount sovereign whom he, frequently, invited to his place. His own title is mere राजा. From what follows, it appears that he abdicated the throne in favour of his son and, turning his mind away from worldly pleasures like a recluse, resorted to the places of pilgrimage. And, for the prosperity of his family, erected this temple of the Sun within the bounds of his territory. This प्रशस्ति, as it is called in the concluding stanza, was composed and engraved by the same person whose name reads like Candradatta, the resident of Āḍhyasāra (or Vāḍhyasāra) in the *bhukti* of Kusumanagara. The name of the *viṣaya* is lost in the lacuna.

Text of the Inscription

१. ७ ओं नमः सवित्रे ॥ योतीन्द्रिय प·········देवः स्वयंभूर्ब्रह(र्वहु?) मूर्त्ति············
त्रयीम·········सहस्र ददातु सिद्धिं विधिवद्विधीनाम् ॥ बिभ्राण ⨯ पद्ममालामुदयगिरिशिखा-
शेखरस्थैर्मयूखैः क्षेपीयान्लोकचक्षु ⨯ कुपित इव त

२. म ⨯ प···मात्माथ(?) लाभः । उद्यन्ब्रह्मेन्द्ररुद्रगणपतिभिर्यस्य ··· जा···रिन्द्र (?) श ···
दित्य(?)···दशशतकिरणः श्रेयसे मङ्गलानि ॥ मन ⨯ पवन रङ्हस ⨯ प्रचलचामरश्चारव ⨯
पिवन्त इव खं क्षणं क्षुभितताराकाब्जाकरं । हरन्तु हरयो रवेर्दुरित

३. माशु··· ··· ··· ···गोचलित धूलीनीलत्विषः ··· ··· ······धा···कु···
सावित्र्या···इव सदा······नां । लक्ष्म्या शक्रप्रकाशो हरिरिव विजितानन्तसामन्तचक्रः ।
दिक्चक्रं संप्रचक्रे शशिकरधवलं यः स्वकीर्त्या महौजा [:] । श्रीमानादि[त्य] वर्म्मा

४. नरपति··· ···रियः··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···क ⨯
परमभट्टारकमहाराजाधिराजपरमेश्वरश्रीकल्याणवर्म्माभूत् ॥ श्रियः··· ··· ··· ···स्य
विधयस्सुहृन्मित्रा

५. ... ...
शरदमलचन्द्रमणिमिव···त्म धनस्य ··· ··· यस्य ··· ··· प्रभवस्य विजित··· ··· ययाति-धुन्धुमारादिराजर्षिचरितस्य शरत्क्षपाकरकरनिकरधवलस्वय

६. ... ...
राजलक्ष्मी विलासदर्पणभूतो राजराज इवेश्वरस्य स्वच्छान्तर्म्मानसस्याशेषभुवनभारविष्कम्भ-गिरिस्सुमेरोरिव मन्दरः

७. प्र··· ··· ··· श्रीजयमनः श्रेयान्सुतो समभूत् ॥ जित्वा म्लेच्छगणान्द्रि (न्द्र) सान्प्रालेयाचलवासिनः । स्वामिने यो ददौ राज्यं शक्रायेव जनार्द्दनः ॥ यस्य प्रतापदहने नक··· स्सुखे(?) षु रूढेष्वनन्यशर

८. ण··· ··· तर्क(?)··· : ··· सुर ··· गतेव मा(?सा)ध्वी······ङ्गा-जालकुसुमाभरणाजयश्रीः । नीत्वा दिनं घनतमिस्रभयानकं सुप्रालेयशैलशिखान्तमहादरीषु । भक्ष्यार्थिनस्तु(?)हिनपूरित-कन्दरायां यस्य द्विषो निशि विचेरुरधोधरायां । तस्य जज्ञे सुतो वीरः

९. श्रीमान् ··· ··· ··· : देव्या ··· ··· या महापुरुष(?)लक्षणः ॥ मातामहः क्षितिपति···ल दाक्षिणात्यः श्रीमानुदारचरित × प्रबभूव यस्य । आदित्यवर्द्धन इति प्रथित × प्रि(पृ?)थिव्यां प्रौ(प्रो)द्दामदर्प्परिपुकुञ्जरकेसरीव ॥ अभवत्तस्य दौहित्रश्श्रीमान्कर्क्करवर्द्धनः ।

१०. ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· विवर्द्धनः । ··· ··· ··· ···
··· ··· भक्त्या यो ··· न भवनादिभिः । अकरोद्भास्वतो भक्तिं भुवनयोगाय शाश्वतीम् ॥ पितेव शास्ता विधिवत्प्रजानां मातेव धाता शरणागतानां । कोपप्रसादौ च न यस्य वन्ध्यौ कल्पद्रुम × प्रार्थिजनस्य यो भूत् ॥

११. उद्द्रि ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· कर ···
मानिनश्श्रीमा··· ··· ··· लया × क्क्रूरा महामायिनः(?) । नागा × केसरिणा यथा भुजबलाद्दैत्या यथा चक्रिणा येन श्रीनरहरिसिङ्हतामुपगतेनोन्मूलिता विद्विषः ॥ संग्रामा-क्षोभदक्षो क्षितिपतिभिरसामान्य

१२. ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· इय (म?)ति(?) नयोपात्तशक्तिप्रतापैः । संरुद्धो जेतुमाजौ जगति र(?)जनितो जातु तेजोपहारो राज्ये यस्य प्रतापात्सवितुरिव परैर्म्मण्डलं लङ्घयमाणं ॥ यस्य ककुधं समुपलभ्य ससाध्वसानि सास्रायितस्फुरितदक्षिणलोचनानि ।

१३. दूर ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···
दय पर्व्वतोदयगतेनोन्मीलिता वान्धवा वध्रे(?)नेव हिमप्रपातविधुरा भूयोपि पद्मा इव । श्रीमन्तः शरदिन्दुकुन्दधवला नालावलीशालिन × प्रोत्फुल्लाब्जमुदा

१४. करा इव ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···
सारदर्पशूरो विद्वान्कृतज्ञ × प्रकट(?)रिपुघटा कु(?)ट्टि(?) संघट्ट(ट्ट) कारी । राजा कल्याणवर्म्मा यमिह नरपतिं मन्यमानातिमात्रं सौहार्द्दात्सामगर्म्यं स्वभवनमसकृन्नीतवान्प्रीति

१५. योगात्···इव··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···
राज्यं य × प्रीत्या प्रत्यपादयत् ॥ कलौ कृतात्मा नृपति × कृतोयं प्रजापतेरङ्श इवावतीर्ण्णः । इतीव संचिन्त्य परश्चतु × पाद्धर्म्मानुरागादिव यं प्रपन्नः । सजीवलोकस्य फलं

१६. समग्रं स्त्रिवर्ग ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ि···ै
धियं यज्ञ(?) समुपदधे मनः । बुध्यात्यन्तविशुद्धया परिणतस्त(?)न्धं वियो(?)ज्यात्मना दत्वा वेदविदे जनाय विधिवद्दानान्यवाप्तागमः ॥ सन्यासीव विसृज्य

१७. कर्मकलिलं राज्यं सुते ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· नराणां
पतिः पुरुषमजमनादिं चिन्तयानो महात्मा यमनियम परत्वान्मुक्तसङ्गाभिरामः। शशिकर·
धवलायामापगायां सुराणां मनुरिव विदितात्मा तीर्थसेवापरोभूत् ॥

१८. ···य ··· ··· ··· रत रव रा राम रमा(?) ··· ··· ··· ी ···
त सत्त्रादियुक्तं। भूत्यै वङ्कशस्य शैलं विषयपरिगतं भूमिपालेन भक्त्या तेनैतद्धाम भानोः
सुविहितविभवं कारितं प्रीतिभाजा ॥ कुसुमनगरभुक्तौ वा(चा?)ङ्यसारानिवासी

१९. विषयकरण··· ··· ···त्म(?) ··· ··· चन्द्रदत्तः। स्फुटा ललितपदा··· ···
ि ··ि ···पा(?)णदत्तस्य सद्भिः ॥ उत्कीर्ण्णा चेयं प्रशस्तिस्तेनैवेति ॥

The Islamic Element in the Culture of Mysore

By

K. N. V. SASTRI, *Mysore.*

Mysore is a Hindu State, the ruler is a Hindu and a native of Mysore, and there are very few non-Hindus in the population of the country. The history of Mysore, also, is a long and continuous one with the Vijayanagara tradition reinforced into it. Yet, in Mysore of to-day there is a strong Islamic element in the form of institutions, customs and etiquette.

The institutions are the Durbar, Jagirs and Inams. Then there is the office of the Dewan which was unheard of within Mysore until 1799. The head of Sosale Maṭh holds an annual durbar with all the symbols of a local ruler, viz. the throne, green turban with an exquisite lace and oath of loyalty. It is said that this is a relic of the ascetic's political subordination to the Sultan of Golkonda. Then, in the Nanjangud temple of Shiva there is a niche immediately to the left of the *sanctum sanctorum* of Pārvatī in which there is the phallus in a green stone, known Padshah *Liṅga*, worshipped every day. Domestic slavery was quite common in certain parts of Mysore till lately.

Among the many customs in vogue are the use of long coat and trousers at public functions with the waist-belt over the shirt or coat by certain classes of persons to show their lower status, the offer of presents to higher officers, the Nazar to the Sovereign, the naming of children by a few families after fakirs, and the observance of Moharam by the Hindus as Babayya's festival. Tomb-worshipping is quite common among certain classes of Hindus, the ' Dattatreya Peeta ' being the most prominent one. The structure of many important buildings is Indo-Saracenic, portrait-painting is similar to that of the Mughals (with the object seated in a box and passionately smelling a rose), music of Hindusthani type is popular, the use of a big drum to the accompaniment of a shrill, pipe music at the maṭhs during washing of the image of the deity is well known, dancing by women who wear veil and put on trousers is common even in the small towns, and, above all, *pandal* decoration is still done best by the members of the Islamic religion and in Islamic style. Round about Seringapatam, village women-folk use full-sleeved bodices.

Etiquette has undergone a revolutionary change in recent time. But a few items of social behaviour still persist. The abundant use of rose-water and sandle-stick is characteristic of Mysore in South India. Paying respects to the elderly persons by bowing low is still considered to be the best in form and style. No foot-wear should be worn on such an

occasion. Flowers and fruits have a priority in gardening, and a garden which contains them gives status to the owner. The use of silk by women is a heritage from the women of Muslim nobles, and silk and wool are still the materials of which all first-class dress in Mysore is made. Coffee-drinking and horse-riding as signs or symbols of dignity and status are easily traceable to the Muslims generally, and the care of the horses and their use for carriage and transport are still better done by the Muslims than by others as most of these animals, until recently, came from Arabia.

There are two questions which arise naturally with regard to the subject of our study: How shall we account for the existence of this element in a perfectly Hindu State? Is it prejudicial to the Hindu *dharma* which governs the culture of the people?

The first of these questions is easily answered. There are three causes for the existence of the Islamic element in Mysore. First, Hinduism is a tolerant religion. Every other religion, creed and sect finds an asylum in a Hindu State. It is well-known in history that Mysore welcomed and encouraged the reforms of the Buddhists and Jains, of S'aṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, and of Basava and the Sufis. When Baba Budan fled from Mocha (in Arabia) he took shelter in Mysore, and his coffee plantation on the slopes of Chandra-Drona hills made him so popular that the whole mountain was called after him as the Baba Budan Range. This is a proof of the catholicity of outlook of Mysore in mediaeval times. Second, the Muslim rule in India lasted for not less than five hundred years from 1200. It had a great and permanent effect on the earlier Hindu culture as it filled a gap in the history of the country. The Hindus did not have the variety of expression which the growingly complex administration of the subcontinent demanded, and the Muslim rulers had to adopt Arabic and Persian terms in judicial and revenue proceedings. When the English succeeded the Hindus and Muslims in governing India, they continued the old system and followed the example of their predecessors. Persian continued to be the language of the English courts and of correspondence with the local chiefs, and Hindusthani prevailed in the market-place. Wilson says in the preface to his Glossary as follows: 'Although the Sanskrit has not supplied the administration of India with technicalities to the same extent as Arabic, yet, being the language of the laws of the Hindus, it furnishes, in its unadulterated form, a copious vocabulary of words relating to caste, to contracts, to marriage, and to variety of the incidents of Hindu life; and it still more abundantly, pervades the different Indian dialects, supplying them with the ordinary designations of trades and occupations, the terms of agriculture, the names of plants

and animals, the affinities of relationship, and an infinity of words connected with the social circumstances of the people in all parts of India... Combined with Arabic, therefore, it forms the great groundwork of the official language of law, of revenue, and of manners and customs throughout British India. By this expression, 'British India', Wilson really means the whole of India, because in 1855, when he wrote the Glossary, India was described as East India or British India. Within Mysore, the Regulations, the Codes, the Manuals and such other Government books are full of Arabic and Persian expressions which have to be digested by every government servant before he is confirmed in his post. Sometimes the official language is so anracy that only 'bandicoots' in service can understand it.

Third, Purnayya had been brought up in the Muslim tradition and found nothing strange in it. When he became the Dewan of Mysore, he continued the old Muslim system of administration. A casual study of the political ideas, institutions and aspirations of the old Hindu rulers of Mysore shows that there was not a single expression of Arabic or Persian in the administration of the country. For instance, Chikka Devaraja Wodeyar's rule, famous for its benevolence and structural precision, was carried on with the old Hindu ideas and terminology. Perhaps the Maratha administration of Shivaji was a pointer to the ruler. But, when we come to the days of Purnayya (1799 and onwards), the language of the court and government becomes so foreign—in fact records were kept in English, Persian and Kannada—that ordinary people could not easily make it out. If we remember that literacy was low and the educated people were extremely few, we can understand the character of Purnayya's government. We can even go so far as to say that the insurrection of 1829 was greatly due to the 'foreign' government which Purnayya introduced, and to the common-sense of the people who protested against it. Defenders of Purnayya's ministry may put forward two pleas. One, that the Islamic element was introduced by Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan for the convenience of an imperial administration between 1761 and 1799, and that Purnayya had no choice in the principles and methods when he was appointed to pacify and consolidate the resources of the country and to hold himself responsible to the British government rather than to the Maharaja of Mysore for the proper administration of Mysore. And, the other, that Purnayya was more conversant with the technicalities of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan's management as well as of those of the Marathas in Tanjore, and it would be historically unjust to find fault with him for not running the Mysore administration on the lines of or in continuation of the ancient Mysore rulers. But his advocates forget that Purnayya was not indispensable as prime minister and he could not ignore the interests of a Hindu State for the sake of his own convenience.

His love of power (as the sole head of the State in practice), and his great desire to be in the good books of the British Resident on the one hand, and of the Muslims who had fallen from high estate and yet stood as sources of danger to his authority on the other, and the tender age of the Maharaja led Purnayya, naturally, to regard all the old Hindu usage, customs and institutions with contempt and to play the part of a new Haidar Ali and a new Tipu Sultan in the disguise of an orthodox Hindu[1].

The second question is more easily answered. The conception of Hindu *dharma* is so great that it can be safely stated that Mysore culture does not, in the least, run any danger of havoc by the incorporation of the Islamic element within it. There are, possibly, two lines of future development: one is that the verbal part of the Islamic element will remain permanently, and the other is that the substantial part of it will be digested.

1. It is unnecessary to blame any individual for the introduction of the Islamic elements in administration of South Indian States as these can be traced to the wide-spread influence of the Moghuls and the Sultans (of Bijapur, Golkonda Ahmednagar etc.) on Vijayanagar itself and its representatives, the Nāyaks. Persian vocabulary characterises administrative departments even in Tamilnad and other regions to this day, and should be considered to have been a historical accident connected with Muslim sovereignty and the impression made by it on the body politic —ED.

Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in Ancient Indian International Law.

By

INDRA DATT SHARMA, *Lahore.*

1. *Introduction* :— Diplomacy, in its modern theory and practice, could not be met with as such in Ancient India; though according to Dr. Shama Shastri, the word *ubhayavetana* meant an ambassador permanently accredited to a foreign court. *Arthaśāstra* classifies *ubhayavetana* under *gūḍha-puruṣāḥ* (secret persons), but does not make a clear distinction between *ubhayavetana* and other diplomatic agents. The system of appointing ambassadors permanently by one court to another is too modern to have existed in ancient times. And, it also needs to be pointed out that there was no uniformity of rules in this branch of international law in all the periods of the political history of India. This changing of rules is noticeable in modern international law also; diplomacy as it is found in its theory and practice to-day is different from what it was in the middle ages.

In Ancient India a visible change is noticeable in the character, qualifications and duties of diplomatic agents as one proceeds from the Vedic to the 'historic' period. In Ancient India the theory and practice of diplomacy, even at its highest, never reached the heights of the present age. Permanent embassies, even in the time of Kauṭilya, were unknown and perhaps considered unnecessary as it is borne out by Megasthenes who points out that the municipal administration of Chandragupta had a department which served as a special diplomatic office and looked after foreigners. The diplomatic agent of the *Arthas'āstra* resembles his counter part of the middle ages, that is, a person appointed on a special mission. But in addition to his special mission, he was entrusted with other functions also. For example, he was required to give ultimatum before war to declare war and conclude treaties, also to keep his master informed about the military preparedness and the general, political, social and economic condition of the country to which he had been appointed.

2. *History of diplomacy in Ancient India* :—In the mantric age the term *dūta* was used to denote a 'messenger' who carried news. The Vedas often speak of Agni as a *dūta* whose one function was to bear the offerings of the *yajamāna* to the gods. Thus Agni was a medium of communication between the *yajamāna* and the gods. But it must be made clear that the term Agni, as employed in the Vedas, does not mean any human being intended to serve as an agent of international intercourse between two nations.

In the *Taittirīya-Saṃhitā* (IV. 5. 7)[1] there is another term, *prahita*, which also stands for a messenger. According to Sāyaṇa the two terms *dūta* and *prahita* were not synonymous. *Dūta* meant an agent 'skilled in obtaining intelligence regarding the condition of the enemy's army', while *prahita* was simply an agent sent by his master. Vishvanatha is of the opinion that the term *dūta* had acquired a technical meaning in the Yajurvedic age in contrast to *prahita* which denoted simply an envoy.

It is in the post-Yajurvedic period that the term 'envoy' may be said to have begun to be used in any exact sense or meaning. In this period one comes across many instances of the appointment of diplomatic agents by rulers to represent them at each other's court, both in peace and on the eve of war. But it is in the epics that one finds 'illustrations and elaborate regulations regarding the foundation of embassies, their character, rights and duties and their immunities'. Again it is in the epics that one finds some of the principles of equity and fairness which are an essential element of modern international law.

But it is from the 'historic' period that diplomatic theory and practice becomes a distinct and indispensable feature of international conduct and law in Ancient India. Henceforward the work of embassies accredited to foreign courts came to be considered very important and both the secular and religious literature of the age is rich in information on the subject. Kauṭilya's work not only throws a flood of light on this branch of Ancient Indian International Law, but also demonstrates the truth that in his time international intercourse through diplomatic agents had assumed an importance of its own in the life of the State. The importance which Kauṭilya attached to the theory of 'balance of power' is amply borne out by his political system, by the structure of his empire, and by the relations between States in his time.

3. *Classification and function of diplomatic agents* :—Ancient Indian literature mentions various kinds of diplomatic agents, all being styled as *dutāḥ* irrespective of their rank and mission, and this practice continued throughout the epic period. In the post-epic period diplomatic agents came to be graded according to their status and function. *S'ukranīti* mentions two kinds of international agents—the open and the secret spies. Diplomacy in India in the Kauṭilyan age had come to be recognized as an important subject of international conduct and the complexity of the nature of inter-State relations, and numerous diplomatic agents with a variety of functions called for their classification. Vishvanatha points out that according to *Arthaśāstra* there are three classes of diplomats viz : (1) *nisṛṣṭārthaḥ*, (2) *parimitārthaḥ*, (3) *s'āsanaharaḥ*. The first was

1. Cf. S. V. Vishvanatha : *International Law in Ancient India*, (1925), p. 67.

entrusted with most delicate and responsible duties and was highest in the diplomatic hierachy. S'rī Kṛṣṇa may be said to be a classical example of a diplomat of this type. The second class were in the nature of *Attaches* to provide detailed information to their States about the army, navy and the defence works of the State to which they were appointed, while the agent of the third category was resposible only for a particular business for which he was appointed.

4. *Foreign embassies in Ancient India* :—Kings in Ancient India received embassies from foreign rulers, instances of which are to be found in the Mauryan period. For example, Megasthenes represented Seleucus in the court of Chandragupta Maurya ; Dionysisus and Deimachus represented Ptolemy Philadelphus of Egypt and Antiochus I of Syria, respectively, in the court of Bimbisāra. But the diplomatic relations between Ancient India and the outside world never came to much and were irregular, therefore, the number of foreign embassies in Ancient India was never numerous. According to MacGowan the Chinese Emperor Mingt in the post-Christian period (A. D. 58-76) sent ambassadors to India to learn tenets of Buddhism[1].

Likewise, Ancient India also despatched embassies to foreign States. The annals of Han dynasty reveal that in the time of the Chinese Emperor Hwa (A. D. 89-105) ' the Indians sent messengers and valuable presents to China '. It was about the same period that the Emperor Traian of Rome received an Indian embassy. Kaniṣka's embassy to China was a revival of India's diplomatic relations with that country which had been interrupted for about half a century. The Roman Emperor Augustus is also said to have received an embassy and presents from Porus.

It must be obvious from the above that Ancient India did not live in isolation, on the other hand, it occupied an important and an honoured place in the family of contemporary civilised nations—Egypt, China and Rome. She possesses a rich heritage in the art and science of international relations and before long may be able to assume her natural leadership in the field which had been interrupted during the last few centuries by the foreign rule[2].

1. *History of China*, p. 118.

2. In writing this paper, the writer has, largely, drawn upon Vishvanatha, S. V. *op. cit.*, other sources being : (1) *Ancient India* (Megasthenes And Arrian, tra. by Mccrindle) (2) *Arthas'astra* of Bṛhaspati, ed. and tra. by F. W. Thomas, (3) *Arthas'astra* of Kauṭilya, ed. and tra. by Shama Shastri, (4) *S'ukranīti* (Sacred Books of the Hindus Series) tra. by B. K. Sarkar.

How, Whence and When Mahārāṣṭra Came into Being ?

By

S. R. SHENDE, *Sangli.*

1. *How Mahārāṣṭra came into being ?*— Mahārāṣṭra is the name of one of the regions of Bharata-khaṇḍa. This name has been given to it on account of the colonizers being Mahārāṣṭriyans. The country is referred to in the 6th century A.D. as Mahārāṣṭrakah[1], in the 3rd or 4th century A.D. as Marattakkam[2] and in 3rd century B.C. as Mahāratta[3].

The word Mahāratta (a Prākṛta form) must have been the outcome of the amalgamation of the territories of the Rattas[4] or Rāṣṭrikas. The name of Ratta or Rāṣṭrika must have been given to those people some time after they had settled there and reached a certain stage of differentiation from the original stock.

Another thing to be noted in this connection is that these Rattas or Rāṣṭrikas are the descendants of the Vedic Aryans who entered Bharata-khaṇḍa and colonized some of its parts which, subsequently, formed themselves into one confederation of the names of Mahārāṣṭra, S'ūrasena, Magadha and Pis'ācha des'as.

To find out how this Mahārāṣṭra came into being, we shall have to peep into the history of the colonization of Bharata-khaṇḍa by the Vedic Aryans with the help of Ṛgveda, their earliest document which furnishes not only historical and cultural events but also geographical locations. Thus we get Sapta Sindhu country[5] mentioned in it which is the present N.W.F Province[6] and the Punjab. The name Sapta Sindhu is given to it on account of the seven rivers[7] it contains. This is the first colony the Vedic Aryans have made. The Vedas do not mention the names of the other colonies but mention the rivers on the banks of which these were made. Thus in and round about the Doaba of Gaṅgā[8] and Yamunā[8] they formed the second

1. Cf. *Ihole Inscription*, verse 25, (EI VI. pp. 1 ff).
2. *Maṇime-Kalai*, XIX. translation ed. by S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, 1918, pp. 100, 159.
3. K. N. Bhagwat : *Mahavanso*, 1936, p. 66.
4. R. G. Bhandarkar : *Early History of the Deccan*, 1884, pp. 9, 10.
5. RV. VIII. 24. 27 ; *Vedic Index*, II, p. 424.
6. IA. XIV, p. 144 ; ABORI. XXI, p. 24.
7. RV. I. 32. 12, 34. 8, 35. 8; IV. 28. 1; IX. 96. 1.
8. RV. X. 75. 5.

colony and on the banks of Gaṅgā as it flows further on, and on the banks of Gomatī[1] and Sarayū[2] they made their third colony and on the banks of Kṣiprā[3] they brought out their fourth colony. The whole of this process of the colonization of the Bharata Khaṇḍa by the Vedic Aryans can well be understood if the theory of the river-side-colonization is taken into consideration. The Vedic Aryas reached Kṣiprā through Carmaṇvatī[4] which meets Yamunā some miles East of Agra. And it is neither unnatural nor impracticable if some of these colonizers on the banks of Yamunā might have chosen to go by the banks of the new river, i.e. Carmaṇvatī which they met on their way. They had to proceed further rather than to settle on the banks of this new river on account of the barren and rocky nature of the region being unsuitable to make homes. They were, therefore, obliged to continue their journey till they reached the banks of Kṣiprā which is rich in fertility and being a high level plane, healthy from climatic point of view. This story of the colonization will be found still more convincing, when we see the four spoken dialects of these four colonies.

The literary and religious languages of the Vedic Aryans were Chanda[5] and Sanskrit languages throughout Bharata Khaṇḍa, the former being used for Vedas and the later for Smṛtīs and later religious, historical, philosophic and ritual literatures. These two cultured languages did not live long as spoken ones but made room for new comers which were being termed as Mlecha[6], Apabhraṃs'a[7], Apaśabda[7], Alpīyas'-s'abda[7], Apabhraṃs'a[7] from 3000 B.C. and down-wards till these types of dialects received the term Prākṛta[8] by the time of *Pāṇinīya-S'ikṣā* These Prākṛtas reached later on the literary stage in different colonies and the status as high as that of Sanskrit and hence felt the need of grammar, which was composed by Vararuci about the 5th century B.C.[9]. This treatise contains grammars of the four languages viz. Pais'ācī, S'aurasenī, Māgadhī and Mahārāṣṭrī. These being the four languages of the four prominent colonies, referred to

1. RV. X. 75. 6.
2. RV. IV. 30. 18.
3. RV. IV. 8. 8.
4. *Nāṭya-S'āstra* XVII. 62. There is no reference to Carmaṇvatī in Vedic literature but there is mention of an Ācarya Carmas'iras in *Nighaṇṭu* III. 15.
5. Oldenberg : *Culla Vagga*, 1880, Ch. V. Sec. XIII. p. 139.
6. *S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, III. 2. I. 23-24. (cf. next fn.)
7. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (Kielhorn ed.), Vol. I. p. 2.
8. *Pāṇinīya-S'ikṣā*, S'loka 3.
9. Wilson : *Sanskrit Dictionary*, Preface pp. VI. and IX ; Ketkar : *Pracīna Mahārāṣṭra* (Marathi) Vol. I, pp. 250-65 and 311-15 ; P. L. Vaidya : *Prākṛta-Prakās'a*, Preface p. VI ed. by Cowel. Dr. Bhandarkar assigns Vararuci to S'ālivāhana period ; Max Muller, Pischel, Konow say that Vararuci and Kātyāyana were one (cf. Gune : *Lectures*, 1916-17. p. 222).

above, made by the Vedic Aryans in geographical sequence. Mahārāṣṭrī Prākṛta was the spoken dialect of the Mahārāṣṭra colony. Thus the history of the Prākṛtas substantiates the story of the colonization of Vedic Aryans and the story of how Mahārāṣṭra came into being, as the last and fourth colony of the Vedic Aryans.

2. *From whence Mahārāṣṭra came into being*:— It has been already told that Mahārāṣṭra came into being on the bank of the Kṣiprā river which region was called Avanti or Mālava des'a and hence nothing more is required to say on this point.

The objection that might be raised to the above proposition is that at present Mālvā or Central India is not a part of Mahārāṣṭra, how is it that it was so in ancient days ? My answer to this is that I did not say that Mālvā is now-a-days a part of Mahārāṣṭra but it was so upto at least the 12th century A.D.[1] I give below my authorities in support of my statement.

(1) By the 6th century[2] A.D. Mālavā, i.e. Central India and Gurjaratrā, i.e. southern Rājaputānā were geographically divisions of Mahārāṣṭra and by 12th century the northern boundary of Mahārāṣṭra came down to Narmadā[1].

(2) A stone tablet[3] in Mahārāṣṭrī is found at Dhar in Central India dated 1132 of the S'aka era.

(3) Words of Mahārāṣṭrī Apabhraṃs'a[4] are given in S'loka 10th of the commentary of S'loka 17th of *Alaṅkāra-S'āstra* of Bhoja Deo of Dhar (1010-1055 of the S'aka era).

(4) In the commentary of S'loka 11th of the same book it is said :-

महाराष्ट्रदेशीयत्वात् देशीपदानां सिद्धिर्महाराष्ट्रीतः[5] ।

(5) Grierson remarks[6], 'Even western Hindi forms can be adduced to agree with Marathī and Mahārāṣṭrī as against S'aurasenī'.

(6) Prof. Patankar of Benares in 1906 in a lecture[7] at Ujjain stated that the Rangadi (**रांगडी**) dialect of that part agrees with Marathi in many respects.

(7) There is great affinity in the formation of many words and forms of Hindi and Marathi poetry of the 13th century[8].

(8) Physical unity among the Marathi and Hindi proverbs[9] current

1. Vātsyāyana's *Kāmas'āstra* II. 5. 29.
2. ABORI. XXIII, pp. 503-4.
3. EI. VIII p. 96.
4. *Saraswatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* (Kāvyamālā 94 , Baroda Oriental Library Skt. Div. 6529) p. 126.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
6. *Linguistic Survey of India*, Vol. VIII, p. 7.
7. Rajavade : *Dhānes'warī* (Marathi), Preface p. 55.
8. *Puruṣārtha* (Marathi monthly), Sept. 1941, p. 82.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-81.

to-day in both the provinces shows identical cultural and social heritage of both the societies.

(9) Gune[1], Turner[2] and Grierson[3] tell us that Mahārāṣṭrī was once a prevalent language in the North of Narmadā.

(10) That Avanti[4] or Avantija, i.e. the language of Avanti des'a was a mixture of Mahārāṣṭrī and S'aurasenī.

Out of these 10 references the 1st one proves the geographical extent of Mahārāṣṭra beyond Narmadā, 2 to 7 and 9 and 10 go to establish the existence of Mahārāṣṭrī and Mahārāṣṭri Apabhraṃs'a in that region and the 8th shows the social and cultural affinity of the people of the regions on both the banks of Narmadā river. Taking into consideration all these 10 references together, it goes beyond doubt to satify that (1) Avanti des'a was geographically, culturally, liguistically and socially a part of Maharāṣṭra till upto 12th century A.D. and (2) that Avanti was a border land where the region of S'aurasenī touches that of Mahārāṣṭrī, and, therefore, we may safely presume that Avanti des'a was the region from whence Mahārāṣṭra. came into being.

3. *When Mahārāṣṭra came into being* :— Now we have to decide the antiquity of Mahārāṣṭra. No body will doubt that Vidarbha[5] was a part of Mahārāṣṭra and (a) that it has been proved with astronomical references found in *S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa*[6] that it was colonized by the Vedic Aryans by 3100 years B.C., (b) that the Dakṣināpada[7], i.e. Dakṣiṇāpatha and Narmadā[8] have been referred to in Ṛgveda, (c) that the formation of the word Godāvarī[9] can be proved by Vedic grammar and (d) that Vidarbha reached the same cultural level as that of Kuru des'a can well be assumed by the blood relations of the residents of the those provinces reported in *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa* as Rukmiṇī, Kes'inī[10], and Damayantī[11] were married to the kings of the northern Bharata-khaṇḍa. Of the three girls mentioned above Rukmiṇī was living by the time of the Mahabhārata war which took place some time about 5000 years[12] from to-day. This date can again be ascertained by

1. Gune : *Wilson Philological Lectures*, (1916-17), p. 194.
2. Cf. Kulkarni : *Marathi Bhāṣa, Udgama and Vikasa* (Marathi), p. 96.
3. Fn. 6 on p. 287.
4. Mārkaṇḍeya : *Prakṛta-Sarvasva*, II. 1.
5. *Bala-Rāmāyaṇa* of Rajas'ekhara (ed. by Govind Deo Shastri, Benares, 1869) p. 302, S'lokas 73 and 74.
6. IA. XXIV, p. 242; Appendix (A) pp. 409 ; Ketkar : *Dhyānakos'a*, Vol. II, (Marathi).
7. RV. X. 61. 8.
8. *Ṛgveda-khila-sūkta*, II. 1. 8.
9. IA. XXX, p. 273, fn. 17.
10. *Ramayaṇa (Bala)*, XXXVIII. 3.
11. *Mahābhārata (Vana)*, LI. 21.
12. *Ihole Inscription* : S'lokas 33 and 34 give 3735th year of the Mahābhārata war by 556 years of S'aka year (1866-556=1310), add 1310 to 3735.

the date of Yudhiṣṭhira S'aka, which is about 5000 years old to-day. All this story goes to prove that Vidarbha was, by 5000 years ago, not only colonized by Vedic Aryans but it was well cultured also and that the Vedic literature was being composed when they settled in Vidarbha and extended upto Godāvarī.

Now let us go back to determine the date of the colonization of Avanti des'a by the Vedic Aryans. It can very easily be taken that they reached Vidarbha after having crossed Vindhya and Narmadā, but the question, as to wherefrom, is to be answered. Dr. D.R. Bhandarkar has shown close relations of Avanti and As'maka[1] and I have shown that out of the 9 routes[2] by which they had gone from Āryāvarta to Dakṣiṇāpatha, only two of these routes have, from *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* days[3] upto Peshava-conquests been, used frequently. These are : (1) from Avanti to Māhiṣmatī and (2) Bhopal to Handa, which clearly prove the close connection of Avanti and Vidarbha, and, therefore, we should take that the Vedic Aryans went to Vidarbha after they had colonized Avanti deśa. It can also be presumed that, after creating a colony in Avanti and feeling the necessity of going further down for a fresh land by crossing Vindhya and Narmadā for creating a new colony in Vidarbha, a new culture of its own would have certainly required some centuries, say a period of about one millennium, and I presume that the colonization of Avanti, i.e. the date of coming into being of Mahārāṣṭra dates back to the 5th millennium. The only point now left is whether from the inception of Avanti deśa, it was being called Mahārāṣṭra. My answer to this is in the affirmative, though we do not find Mahārāṣṭra referred to by so early a date as the 6th millennium.

My agrument is this : That there was a corrupt form of Sanskrit as a spoken dialect for all the classes of the Vedic Aryans from the very date they reached Sindhu river and began settling on the banks of it and created a colony of the same name. A region is called a colony after the colonizers form into a separate unit of society, independent of the former stock, having created a new culture, a new form of dialect and new modes of living. And unless the new settlement has all these aspects to suit the climate, circumstances and the

1. Cf. *Ancient History of India* (*Carmichael Lectures*, 1918), p. 53.

2 B.C. Law Vol. I. : *Routes between Āryavarta and Dakṣiṇapatha.*

3. *Mahābhārata* (*Vana*), Nīlakaṇṭha ed., LXI :—

एते गच्छन्ति बहव: पन्थानो दक्षिणापथम् ।
अवन्तीमृक्षवन्तं च समतिक्रम्य पर्वतम् ॥२१॥
एष विन्ध्यो महाशैल: पयोष्णी च समुद्रगा ॥२२॥
एष पंथा विदर्भाणाम् अयं गच्छति कोसलान् ।
अतः परं च देशोऽयं दक्षिणे दक्षिणापथः ॥२३॥

company of the former residents of the region, amongst whom they are required to mix, it will not be accepted as independent entity. According to this theory the Sapta Sindhu des'a got a new dialect of the name of Pais'ācī as it was Pis'āca des'a. Similar changes occurred when the Vedic Aryans reached the Doaba of Yamunā and Gaṅgā and further on, on the banks of Gomatī and Sarayū, to create new colonies of the names of S'ūrasen des'a and Magadha des'a with new dialects for them of the name of S'aurasenī and Māgadhī. History is repeated in the same manner in the case of the colony of Avanti hav.ng given birth to Mahārāṣṭra and a dialect of the name of Mahārāṣṭrī for the people residing there to exchange their views and express their desires.

I may take that the dialect Mahārāṣṭrī might have come into existence one thousand years after the coming into being of the colony of Avanti and, therefore, I fix that 5000 years from this day must have been the birth date of Mahārāṣṭra des'a and of its dialect Mahārāṣṭrī though the records tell us that these can be traced only as late as the earlier century of the S'aka era.

[This article is reduced in the present form to 1/3 of the original one at the request of the editor.]

The City of Udabhāṇḍa

By

DINES CHANDRA SIRCAR, *Calcutta.*

In the *Vaijayantī*[1], composed by Yādavaprakāśa in the 11th century A.D., there is a passage which runs : *gandhārās tu dihaṇḍās syuḥ* 'the Gandhāras are also known as the Dihaṇḍas'. The name Gandhāra signifying a people and their territory lying in the Uttarāpatha, i.e. the North-Western division of India is well known to all students of Indian history. According to some late lexicons[2], Gandhāra has to be identified with Kāndhāhāra, i.e. Kandahār in southern Afghanistan. But this is a mistake due to the similar sounds of the two names. Although it may not be impossible to suggest that modern Kandahār owes its name to the Gandhāra occupation of southern Afghanistan in the early period of Indian history, it seems more probable that the name is a corruption of that of the city of Alexandria founded by Alexander (Persian *Iskandar* or *Sikandar*) in the land of the Anachosians probably on the site of modern Kandahār. There is definite evidence as regards the location of the Gandhāra *janapada* about the present Rawalpindi District of the Punjab and the Peshawar District of the North-Western Frontier Province[3]. According to epic and Purāṇic traditions, the Gandhāra *viṣaya*, which lay on both sides of the Indus, contained two great cities called Takṣaśilā and Puṣkalāvatī. The remains of Takṣaśilā lie immediately to the east and North-East of the Saraikala Railway Junction, 20 miles North-West of Rawalpindi, in the valley of the river Haro. There are remains of three distinct cities of which the southernmost and oldest occupied the site of an elevated plateau now known as the Bhir mound. The ancient city of Puṣkalāvatī or Puṣkarāvatī 'the city of lotuses', was situated on the Swat in the modern Prang-Charsadda-Mir Ziyarat region about 17 miles North-East of Peshawar.

It is, however, really curious that Dihaṇḍa, as the name of the famous Gandhāra people is known from no other source excepting the *Vaijayantī*. This name seems, therefore, to have been actually based on a wrong reading of the manuscripts of Yādavaprakāśa's work, whose geographical section is full of mistakes. A people is known not only after the land occupied by them, but very often also after their capital city, and we have to see if the form Dihaṇḍa may be associated with the name of the early-mediaeval capital of the Gandhāra country.

1. Paryāyabhāga, III. 1. 24.
2. Cf. *Śabdakalpadruma*, s.v.
3. Cf. Raychaudhuri : *Pol. Hist.*, 1938, pp. 50-52, 124-25.

Alberūnī, who was a contemporary of Yādavaprakās'a and wrote his celebrated work on India about 1030 A.D., refers to the 'capital of Al Kandahār (Gandhāra), i.e. Vaihand'[1]. Elsewhere he speaks of 'Waihind, the capital of Kandhāra (Gandhāra), West of the river Sindh'[2], which is said to have been situated 14 *farsakh* (about 52 miles) to the South-East of Purshāwar (Peshwar). Both here and in another context[3] Alberunī locates Vaihand between Peshawar and the river Jailam (Jhelam). There is no doubt that Vaihand has to be identified with modern Und near Attock on the Indus. As Raychaudhuri points out, an Arabic work called *Hudud ul alam* (982-83 A. D.) speaks of Waihind as a big city, with some Muslim population, under king Jayapāla who was a feudatory of the Rāy of Kanauj, probably Pratihāra Vijayapāla (*Proc. I. H. C.*, 1939, p. 670). The Sanskrit form of the name is Udabhāṇḍapura (or Udakabhāṇḍapura) which was the capital of the great S'āhi king Lalliya (*c.* 875-90 A. D.) and his successors according to the *Rajataraṅgiṇi* of Kalhaṇa. According to Firishta, the dominions of the S'āhi king Jayapāla (c. 965-1001 A. D.), son of Ishtpāl (probably the same as Aṣṭapāladeva known from his coins), extended in length from Sirhind to Lamghan and in breadth from the kingdom of Kashmir to Multan. This ruler is further said to have resided in a fort, the correct reading of whose name is apparently Vaihand, although some writers wrongly take it to be Bhatinda in the Patiala State. Firishta frequently refers to Jayapāla as the Rājā of Lahore and, as the king residing in the above fort ' for the convenience of taking steps for opposing the Mohamedan ', it is hardly possible that the historian could have referred to a locality in the eastern Panjab. It seems that, when the S'āhi possessions lying West of the Indus were threatened by the Turkish Musalmans of Ghaznī, Jayapāla transferred his capital from ancient Udabhāṇḍapura to Lahore ; but even then he himself resided at the old capital which now became the advance base of his operations against the Mohamedans. It is thus possible that the passage *gandhārās tu dihaṇḍāh syuḥ* is actually a mistake for *gandhārās tū*(tu+u)*dabhāṇḍās syuḥ* 'the Gandhāras are also known as the Udabhāṇḍas '. But Udabhāṇḍa was probably another form of the name.

According to traditions, the Kushāṇa Emperor Kaṇiṣka, who ruled over extensive regions in India and Central Asia, had his capital at the city of Purushapura (modern Peshawar) in the Gandhāra country. Alberunī[4] says that Kanik (i. e. Kaṇiṣka) belonged to a dynasty of Hindu kings called S'āhis who were Turks of Tibetan origin and at first began to reign in Kabul. The last king of this house was Laga Turmān (i. e. Toramāṇa) who was overthrown by his Brāhmaṇa minister Kallar, a

1. Sachau : *Alb. Ind.*, I, p. 259.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
4. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 10-14.

predecessor of Jayapāla. Scholars have suggested the identification of Alberunī's Kallar with the great Lalliya S'āhi mentioned in the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*. It is, however, interesting to note that Kalhaṇa represents the S'āhis as Kṣatriyas. It has also to be remembered that the Kashmirian author does not make any distinction between the early S'āhis and the Brāhmaṇa S'āhis, who according to Alberunī succeeded them. We are told[1] that even before the reign of king Lalitāditya (c. 730-66 A. D.) the S'āhi-mukhyas, or chiefs belonging to the S'āhi family, were employed in the Kashmir administration as the *mahāpratīhāra*, *mahāsāndhivigrahika*, *mahās'vas'ālika*, *mahābhāṇḍagārika* and *mahāsādhanika*,· the *pañca-mahās'abda* were conferred by Lalitāditya on a single official named Mitras'arman whom he seems to have made his viceroy at Kanauj after having extirpated king Yas'ovarman. Of the later S'āhis, described as Brāhmaṇa by Alberunī, Kalhaṇa mentions Lalliya's successor and his son Kamaluka Toramāṇa—no doubt the same as Kamlu of Alberunī, and Kamlu Rāy of Hindustan mentioned by other Arab writers—as a contemporary of 'Amr ibn Layth who ruled in the Khorasan-Kabul region about the last two decades of the 9th century A.D. Kamaluka is said to have been raised to the throne about 902-04 A.D. by a Kashmirian general. Kalhaṇa also speaks of the S'āhi kings Bhīma and Thakkana. The former, who was the maternal grandfather of Diddā, queen of the Kashmirian king Kṣemagupta (950-58 A. D.), built a temple of Viṣṇu in Kashmir during Kṣemagupta's rule. A general of the Kashmirian king Abhimanyu (958-72 A. D.) is said to have defeated the S'āhi king Thakkana who may be identical either with Jayapala or with his father. The latest S'āhi king mentioned by Kalhaṇa is Trilocanapāla (1013-21 A. D.) whose struggle with the Hammīra, i. e. Sultān Mahmud of Ghaznī is also described. Then, after having referred to the final collapse of S'āhi rule in another contest, the Kashmirian author says that even in his days, i.e. in the middle of the 12th century A. D. 'the appellation *S'āhi* throws its lustre on a numberless host of Kṣatriyas abroad who trace their origin to that royal family'[2].

It will be seen that the Kashmirians, who knew the S'āhis from before the middle of the 8th century down at least to the 12th, regarded them as Kṣatriyas, although Alberūnī refers to the Hindu S'āhis of

1. प्रीत: पञ्चमहाशब्दभाजनं तं व्यधत्त स: ।
यशोवर्मनृपं तं तु समूलमुदपाटयत् ॥
अष्टादशानामुपरि प्राक्सिद्धानां तदुद्भवैः ।
कर्मस्थानैः स्थितिः प्र.प्ता ततःप्रभृति पञ्चभिः ॥
महाप्रतीहारपीडा स महासन्धिविग्रह: ।
मह.श्वशालापि महाभ.ण्डागारश्च पञ्चम: ॥
महास.धनभ.गश्चेत्येता यैरभिधा: श्रिता. ।
शाहिमुख्या येष्वभवन्नध्यक्षा: पृथिवीभुजः ॥ *Rājatar.*, IV. 140-43.

2. *Ibid.*, VIII, 3230.

Turko-Tibetan origin and their successors of Brāhmaṇa origin. That the early S'āhis were regarded, inspite of their foreign origin, as Kṣatriyas in India is also indicated by another evidence. In the second quarter of the 7th century A. D., when the Chinese pilgrim Huen-tsang was passing through the Uttarāpatha, Udakahāṇḍa[1] or Udabhāṇḍapura was a seat of of residence or a secondary capital of the emperor of Kāpis'a which then dominated over ten neighbouring States and comprised Lampāka (Laghman), Nagara or Nagarahāra (Jalalabad), Gandhāra and Varṇa (Bannu) and probably also Jāguḍa (southern Afghanistan with Ghaznī as the chief city)[2]. About Gandhāra, the pilgrim says that the capital was Purushapura; 'the royal family was extinct and the country was subject to Kāpiśa; the towns and villages were desolate and the inhabitants were very few'[3]. It seems that under pressure of the Turks from the North and the Arabs from the South and West the kings of Kāpiśa left their western possessions in the hands of viceroys[4] and made Udabhāṇḍa their principal seat of residence. The reason why Udabhāṇḍapura was selected in preference to the older capital Peshawar is at present unknown. But it is possible that the new city was built by the Kāpiśa kings for strategic reasons.

The facts that Kalhaṇa speaks of the S'āhis with reference to the period earlier than that of Lalitāditya (c. 730-66) and of Udabhāṇḍa as the capital of the S'āhis at least from the time of Lalliya (c. 875-90) and that Chinese evidence refers to the city as the residence of the emperor of Kāpiśa about 645 A. D. would suggest that Huen-tsang's king of Kāpiśa was a S'āhi ruler. It is interesting to note that this king has been described by Huen-tsang as a Kṣatriya[5].

1. This seems to be the Indian form that was at the root of the Chinese *Wu-to-ka-han-cha*, Cf. Watters : *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, 1904, I, p. 221.

2. Cf. Ray : *Dynastic History of Northern India*, I, pp. 60-61.

3. Watters : *op. cit*, p. 199.

4. These viceroys appear to have been mentioned as the Satraps of Zaranj, capital of Seistan and as *rantbil* or *rutbil* (probably Sanskrit *prāntapāla*) or *zumbīl* (probably Sanskrit *janapāla*) ruling over southern Afghanistan. Whether the *Kabul-Shāh* was a viceroy or the S'āhi of Kabul' indicating the paramount ruler cannot be determined. Cf. Ray : *op. cit.*, pp. 165ff.

5. Watters : *op. cit.*, p. 123.

Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian Law[1]:

Legal Position of Women whose Husbands live on their Earning[2]

By

LUDWIK STERNBACH, *New York*.

1. In the ancient Indian literature we find more than 250 synonyms for the word prostitute[3], of which some twenty are found in the Dharmaśāstras and Arthaśāstras[4]. These synonyms of the word *veśyā* denote various kinds of prostitutes, harlots, courtesans, etc.

The Dharmaśāstras, and more particularly the Arthaśāstras, contain specific rules on the rights and duties of prostitutes, so that their legal

1. This is No. 18 of the author's serial papers, entitled, 'Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian Law, the previous papers having appeared as follows: Nos. 1, 5, 10 and 14 in ABORI XXIV, 3; XXV, 4; XXVI, 3-4; XXIX, 1-4; XXX, 1; Nos. 2, 4, 8 and 9 in 'The *Poona Orientalist*' VIII, 1-2, 3-4; IX, 1-2; XIII, 1-2; X, 3-4; Nos. 3, 6 and 15 in 'The *New Indian Antiquary*' VI, 8-9; VII, 5-6; X; No. 7 in '*Bhāratīya Vidyā*' VI, 7,8, 9; Nos. 11, 12 and 13 in 'Supplement to *Bhāratīya Vidya*' VII, 3-4; No. 16 in '*Rocznik Orientalistyczny*'; No. 17 in *JAOS*. LXX.

2. The following Abbreviations are to be noted :—

Agn. P.	*Agni Purāṇa*, in Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1873-9.
B.	*Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra*, ed. by E. Hultzsch, Leipzig, 1922.
Bṛh.	*Bṛhaspati Smṛti*, ed. by R. Aiyangar, in Gaekwad's Oriental Series, LXXXV.
K.	*Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, ed. by R. Shama Sastry, University of Mysore; Oriental Library Publications; Sanskrit Series No. 37/64, Mysore, 1924.
Kāty.	*Kātyāyana Smṛti*, ed. by P. V. Kane, Bombay, 1933.
Medh.	See Mn.
Mit.	See Y.
Mn.	*Manu Smṛti*, with the Manubhāṣya of Medhātithi (Medh.), ed. by G. Jha, in Bibliotheca Indica No. 256, Calcutta, 1932-9.
N.	*Nārada Smṛti*, ed. by J. Jolly, Calcutta, 1885.
Śukr.	*Śukranītisāra*, ed. by J. Vidyāsāgara, Calcutta, 1882.
Vās.	*Vasiṣṭha Dharmaśāstra*, ed. by A. A. Fuerer, in Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, 23.
Vi.	*Viṣṇu Smṛti*, ed. by J. Jolly, Calcutta, 1881.
Y.	*Yājñavalkya Smṛti*, with the commentary Mitākṣarā (Mit.). ed. by W. L. S. Panśīkar, Bombay, 1936.

(N.B. The figures followed by and preceded by : ⌊colon⌋ indicate page and line respectively)

3. L. Sternbach : *First Supplement to Veśyā ; Synonyms and Aphorisms* in Bh. V., Bombay 1945 ; VIII, 11, p. 256 sqq. where 248 synonyms are quoted. Additional synonyms shall appear in *Second Supplement* to the same article in Bh. V.

4. Cf. L. Sternbach. : *Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian Law, 17. Legal Position of Prostitutes according to Kauṭilya's Arthaśastra*. Ch. I. 1 in JAOS.

position seems to have been clear[1]. Particularly, interesting is the legal position of prostitutes in K. It is evident from this Arthas'āstra that prostitutes, if called *gaṇikā*, are government servants, who get a fixed salary from the king's treasury, and security in the event of becoming unable to earn their living, and enjoy special protection, but lose their personal freedom as long as they serve as king's servants and are not ransomed[2].

To this group of prostitutes, irrespective of whether they are called *ves'yā, gaṇikā*, or *rūpajīvā*, etc., a new group might be added: a group of women whose husbands live on their earnings, that is, gain their livelihood from their wives' prostitution.

Mn., B., K., S'ukr. and other sources do not call these women prostitutes, but give a long list of men whose wives are known to be engaged in prostitution. These are the wives of actors (*raṅgāvatārin, naṭa, tālāpacara, nṛs'aṃsa*), wandering bards or bards (*cāraṇa, kus'īlava*[3], *bandin*), dancers (*nartaka, s'ailūṣa*), rope-dancers (*plavaka*), jugglers (*saubhika*), singers (*gāyaka*), players on musical instruments (*vādaka*)[4], buffoons (*vāgjīvana*), fishermen (*matsyabandhaka*), herdsmen (*gopālaka, gopa*), hunters (*lubdhaka, vyādha*), washermen (*rajaka, kāruka*), vintners (*s'auṇḍika, saurika, surājīvin*), and barbers (*nāpita*).

To this group procurers *sensu stricto* (*strīvyavahārin, bandhakīpoṣaka, plavaka, naṭa, nartaka, saubhika*) are added.

2. We find some specific statements in respect to these persons in Mn., B., Y., Kāty., N. and, particularly, K. and S'ukr.

Mn. (VIII. 362), after having explained that no man, under the penalty of one *suvarṇa*, should converse with wives of others (Mn. VIII. 361), states :

नैष चारणदारेषु विधिर्नात्मोपजीविषु ।
सज्जयन्ति हि ते नारीर्निगूढाश्चारयन्ति च ॥

'This rule does not apply to wives of wandering bards or of those who live on (prostitution of) their own (wives); for, such men secretly bring their wives into contact (with other men) and tempt them on'.

1. Cf. fn. 3 on the preceding p. 2. Cf. fn. 3 on the preceding p. ; Ch. V.

3. Vātsyāyana (*Kāmasūtra*, 262 : 7) clearly states that bards (*kus'īlava*) live upon the prostitution of their wives, and Yas'odhara in his commentary identifies them with actors (*naṭa*) and dancers (*nartaka*) and says that their wives, usually are prostitutes (*kus'ī-lavabhāryā naṭanartakādīnāṃ bhāryā ves'yaprāyāḥ* 263 : 5) ; similarly, as wives of *cokṣas* (263 : 22-3 ; cf. 262 : 13). Vatsyāyana also mentions ***inter alia*** the wives of vintners ***(saurika)*** herdsmen ***(gopālaka)*** and washermen ***(rajaka)*** as those with whom men about the town should live on good terms (72 : 3-6).

4. And those, who make their living by playing musical instruments, also live on the earnings of their wives (*vādyajāyāprajīvinaḥ*, S'ukr. II. 202).

An almost identical rule is found in B. (II. 2. 4. 3), where it is said :

न तु चारणदारेषु न रङ्गावतरे वधः ।
संसर्जयन्ति ता ह्येतान्निगुप्तांश्चालयन्त्यपि ॥

'But no punishment for (intercourse) with wives of wandering bards and actors ; for, such men carry them (to other men) or, lying concealed, permit them to have culpable intercourse '.

Both these texts state in similar words that men might have sexual intercourse with wives of *cāraṇa* (according to Medh. the word *cāraṇa* denotes not only wandering bards, but also dancers, actors and singers and according to Govinda also *devadasīs*), *raṅgāvatārm* (actors') and other *ātmopajīvin* (those living on prostitution of their wives[1]), but *nigūḍhāḥ*, that is, as Medh. explains (*ad* Mn. VIII. 362, 222/4), 'not in an open market'. In this lies the difference between regular prostitutes and the group of women whose husbands live on their prostitution. The latter cannot be found in an open market, but carry on their occupation within their own houses[2].

These women have, according to the commentary by Medh., another additional duty : they have to seduce wives of other men, in order that they also act as prostitutes[3]. In that way this group of women acts as prostitutes as well as procuresses.

3. According to many Sanskrit sources, prostitutes were considered as impure persons, and food given by them should not be eaten (Mn. IV. 209 ; Y. I. 161 ; VI. LI. 7 ; Vās. XIV. 10 ; Agn. P. CLXVIII. 3-7 and other). In conformity with this rule, the Dharmaśāstras and other Sanskrit sources state that persons living on the prostitution of their wives are, also, considered as impure. Thus Mn. (IV. 214-6) states

1. This construction of *ātmopajīvin*, which is the pivot of this study, even though carrying the authority of Medhātithi and Kulluka followed by the modern lexicons, is unwarranted. The word being an adjective wants *dāreṣu* to be re-read, separately, with it. If *ātmopajīvin* men (and not *ātmopajīvin* women) had been intended, the text should have been *ātmopajīvinām* (gen.) to be in consonance with the gen. compound, *cāraṇa-dāreṣu*. Loc. here means 'in the case of' and refers, directly, to a certain class of women who depended upon themselves (may be, their bodies) for their maintenance and, probably had no husbands. This is supported by the similar use of loc. in the next verse in Mn. (VIII. 364), where a few more classes of women are referred to, namely, maids, mono-fidels and nuns. We contemplate readverting to this point shortly in a separate paper—ED.

2. गृहवेषत्वादेव ताः प्रसिद्धवेश्याभ्यो भिद्यन्ते । (Medh. *ad* Mn. VIII. 362, 222 : 7).

3. अथवा स्वा नारीः 'सज्जयन्ति' योजयन्ति, अन्याश्च स्वस्त्रीभि : 'चारयन्ति' प्रवर्तयन्ति वेश्यात्वं कुट्टनीत्वं च स्वदाराणां कारयन्तीत्यर्थः । (Medh. *ad* Mn. VIII. 362, 222 : 9, 10).

that food of actors (*śailūṣa*), washermen (*rajaka*, *kāruka*)[1], vintners (*śauṇḍika*) and bards (*nṛśaṃsa*) should not be eaten[2]. *Naṭas* are considered by Medh. also as *śailūṣa*, that is those who sell their wives in public (Medh. *ad* Mn. IV. 214)[3]; Vi. (LI. 13-5) mentions, similarly, actors (*śailūṣa*, *raṅgāvatārin*), washermen (*rajaka*) and vintners (*śauṇḍika*)[4]. Similarly, Y. (I. 161-5) adding *inter alia* bards (*bandin*) and those who sell liquors (*surājīvin*)[5] and Vās. (XIV. 3) mentioning washermen (*rajaka*) and vintners (*śauṇḍika*)[6]. Agn. P. (CLXVIII. 4, 5) mentions washermen and actors (*śailūṣa*) [7]. The latter are, also, mentioned

1. We also read in *Āpastamba-Saṃhita* (VII. 4) that washerwomen are impure.

2. पिशुनानृतिनोश्चान्नं क्रतुविक्रयकस्य च ।
शैलूषतुन्नवायान्नं कृतघ्नस्यान्नमेव च ॥
कर्मारस्य निषादस्य रङ्गावतरकस्य च ।
सुवर्णकर्तुर्वेणस्य शस्त्रविक्रयिणस्तथा ॥
श्ववतां शौण्डिकानां च चैलनिर्णेजकस्य च ।
रजकस्य नृशंसस्य यस्य चोपपतिर्गृहे ॥ (Mn. IV. 214-6).

3. शैलूषो नटः (Medh. *ad* Mn. IV. 214).

4. शैलूषतन्तुवायकृतघ्नरजकानां च । कर्मकारनिषादरङ्गावतारिवेणशस्त्रविक्रयिणां च । श्वाजीवि-
शौण्डिकतैलिकचैलनिर्णेजकानां च ॥ (Vi. LI.13-15).

5. कदर्यबद्धचौराणां क्लीबरङ्गावतारिणाम् ।
वैणाभिशस्तवार्धुष्यगणिकागणदीक्षिणाम् ॥
चिकित्सकातुरक्रुद्धपुंश्चलीमत्तविद्विषाम् ।
क्रूरोग्रपतितव्रात्यदाम्भिकोच्छिष्टभोजिनाम् ॥
अवीरस्त्रीस्वर्णकारस्त्रीजितग्रामयाजिनाम् ।
शस्त्रविक्रयिकर्मारतन्तुवायश्ववृत्तिनाम् ॥
नृशंसराजरजककृतघ्नवधजीविनाम् ।
चैलधावसुराजीविसहोपपतिवेश्मनाम् ॥
पिशुनानृतिनोश्चैव तथा चाक्रिकबन्दिनाम् ।
एषामन्नं न भोक्तव्यं सोमविक्रयिणस्तथा ॥ (Y. I. 161-5).

6. कदर्यदीक्षितबद्धातुरसोमविक्रयितक्षरजकशौण्डिकसूचकवार्धुषिकचर्मावकृन्तानाम् । (Vās.
XIV. 3).

7. रजकस्य नृशंसस्य वन्दिनः कितवस्य च ।
मिथ्यातपस्विनश्चैव चौरदण्डिकयोस्तथा ॥
कुण्डगोलकस्त्रीजितानां वेदविक्रयिणस्तथा ।
शैलूषतन्त्रवायान्नं कृतघ्नस्यान्नमेव च ॥ (Agn. P. CLVIII. 4-5)

in *Atri-Saṃhita* (168)[1] ; actors (*naṭa*) in *Aṅgiras-Saṃhitā* (I. 3)[2], *Yama-Saṃhitā* (I. 54-5)[3], *Atri-Saṃhitā* (195-6, 282)[4] ; those who live from singing and playing on musical instruments in *Uśanas-Saṃhitā* (IV.30)[5].

Since these persons are impure, a *dvija*, who had sexual intercourse with their wives, had to be purified by *taptakṛcchra*, *cāndrāyaṇa*, *parāka*, or other penance (*Atri-Saṃhitā* 169, 195-6[6,7] ; *Yama-Saṃhitā* 1. 18-9; 55[8,9]).

4. K. almost at the end of the Chapter (II. 27) entitled *gaṇikā'dhyakṣa* and dealing with *gaṇikās* states :

एतेन नट-नर्तक-गायक-वादक-वाग्जीवन-कुशीलव-प्लवक-सौभिक-चारणानां स्त्रीव्यवहारिणां स्त्रियो गूढजीवाश्च व्याख्याताः । (125 : 9-10).

'By that are explained (the duties) of women making their living

1. रजकः शैलूषश्चैव वेणुकर्म्मोपजीविनः ।
एतेषां यस्तु भुङ्क्ते वै द्विजश्चान्द्रायणं चरेत् ॥ (*Atri*. 168).

2. रजकश्चर्म्मकारश्च नटो वरूड एव च ।
कैवर्त्तमेदभिल्लाश्च सप्तैते चान्त्यजाः स्मृताः ॥ (*Aṅgira*. 3).

3. रजकश्चर्म्मकारश्च नटो वरूड एव च ।
कैवर्त्तमेदभिल्लाश्च सप्तैते चान्त्यजाः स्मृताः ।
एषां गत्वा तु योषां वै तप्तकृच्छ्रं समाचरेत् ॥ (*Yama*. 54-5).

4. रजकश्चर्म्मकारश्च नटो वरूड एव च ।
कैवर्त्तमेदभिल्लाश्च सप्तैते चान्त्यजाः स्मृताः ॥
एषां गत्वा स्त्रियो मोहाद्भुक्त्वा च प्रतिगृह्य च ।
कृच्छ्राब्दमाचरेज्ज्ञानादज्ञानादैन्दवद्वयम् ॥ (*Atri*. 195-6).
चर्म्मको रजको वैणयो धीवरो नटकस्तथा ।
एतान् स्पृष्ट्वा द्विजो मोहादाचामेत् प्रयतोऽपि सन् ॥ (*Atri*. 282).

5. पौनर्भवः कुसीदी च तथा नक्षत्रदर्शकः ।
गीतवादित्रशीलश्च व्याधितः काण एव च ॥ (*Us'ana*. IV. 30).

6. सर्वान्त्यजानां गमने भोजने सम्प्रवेशने ।
पराकेण विशुद्धिः स्याद्भगवानत्रिरब्रवीत् ॥ (*Atri*. 169).

7. See fn. 4.

8. अस्तं गतो यदा सूर्य्यश्चाण्डालरजकस्त्रियः ।
संस्पृष्टास्तु तदा कैश्चित्प्रायश्चित्तं कथं भवेत् ॥
जातरूपं सुवर्णं च दिवानीतं च यज्जलम् ।
तेन स्नात्वा च पीत्वा च सर्वे ते शुचयः स्मृताः ॥ (*Yama*. 18, 19).

9. See fn. 3.

secretly (*gūḍhajīvin*, such as), women of actors (*naṭa*), dancers (*nartaka*), singers (*gāyaka*), players on musical instruments (*vādaka*), buffoons (*vāgjīvana*) , bards (*kuśīlava*), rope-dancers (*plavaka*), jugglers (*saubhika*), wandering bards (*cāraṇa*) and procurers (*strīvyavahārin*)'.

It is not clear from this context what the words 'by that are explained' mean. They may either mean that to these persons all the preceding rules which refer to *gaṇikās* apply, or that these persons have to be engaged in espionage activities, as *gaṇikās* are.

Both translators of K., Shama Sastry and J. J. Meyer, do not touch upon this problem, but translate this sentence as if they were of the opinion that all the preceding rules contained in the Chapter of the *gaṇikā'dhyakṣa* refer to persons engaged in halotry[1].

It seems, however, that words 'by that are explained' refer only to the espionage activities of these persons, that is to their obligation to inform about the men who were under their influence. The preceding sentence reads: *gaṇikā bhogam āyatiṃ puruṣaṃ ca nivedayet* and K. continues: *etena naṭa . . . vyākhyātāḥ* (125 : 8-10).

According to K. the *gaṇikā* was a government servant, and had specific rights and duties which could not be performed by other prostitutes (e. g. to hold the royal umbrella, pitcher, fan ; to attend upon the royal litter, throne or chariot ; to receive a periodic salary and many other rights and duties arising from the fact that the *gaṇikā*, by entering the king's service, has lost her personal freedom). In view of that, and in view of the fact that the sentence beginning with *etena* follows closely the rule stating that the *gaṇikā* has also special espionage duties, it seems that this rule means that the person enumerated in K. 125 : 9-10 (including those living on prostitution of their wives and quoted above) and *per analogiam* also other persons who were engaged in prostitution and enumerated in K. 151 : 11-2, such as *tālāpacara*, *cāraṇa*, *matsyabandhaka*, *lubdhaka*, *gopālaka* and *śauṇḍika*[2] were obliged to perform some espionage duties, in particular to inform the police and city officials about persons who were under their influence. According to K. the *gaṇikā* was obliged to inform the *gaṇikā'dhyakṣa* about the *puruṣa*, that is the man who had spent time with her, once or more frequently, as well as about the payment for enjoyment and other receipts received by her[3,4].

1. Shama Sastry translates : 'The same rules shall apply to an actor,...'. J. J. Meyer translates : '*Mit dieser (bisheriger Darlegung) ist auch das noetige ueber die Weiber der Schauspieler...gesagt.*'

2. As well as enumerated in some Dharmas'āstras (see above).

3. गणिका भोगमायतिं पुरुषं च निवेदयेत् । (K. 125 :8).

4. It should be noted that 'Abul Qādir Ibn i Mulūk Shah of Badaōn in his *Muntakhab-ul-Tawārīkh*, the commentary on 'Abul Fazl 'Allani's *Āīn-i-Akbarī* mentions

This is due to the fact that the persons who had sexual intercourse with prostitutes were considered to be suspect[1] and dangerous[2] persons with whom enemies of the king might hide[3, 4].

The point of view that the sentence beginning with the word *etena* refers to the special espionage duties of persons engaged in prostitution is strengthened by the fact that K. in the last verse (125:17-8) of the Chapter entitled *gaṇikā'dhyakṣa* states:

संज्ञा-भाषान्तरज्ञाश्च स्त्रियस्तेषाम्-अनात्मसु ।
चारघात-प्रमादार्थं प्रयोज्या बन्धुवाहनाः ॥

'The wives of these persons[5] who know the signals and foreign languages as well as their relatives, shall be used against the wicked ones (spies), shall spy on them, kill them and make them incautious'.

Thus, K. explains in this context that these persons were used generally as spies for many purposes. It should be, also, noted that we find in K. very often various references to *naṭa*[6], *nartaka*[7], *gāyaka*[8], *vādaka*[9],

that a Darogah (similar to the *gaṇikā'dhyakṣya*) and a clerk also were appointed to register the name of those men who went to prostitutes, or wanted to take some of them to their houses; no one was allowed to take dancing girls to his house without permission.

1. Cf. K. 214:14.

2. Cf. Mn. XI. 259., IV. 209, 219., V. 90; Y. I. 161; Vi., LI. 7, LXIII. 29; Vas. XIV. 10 and others.

3. Cf. L. Sternbach: *Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian Law*; *14. Legal Position of Physicians in Ancient India*, Chapter III. C, ABORI. XXIX.1-4; XXX, 1; K. 203:13 sqq., 144:11 sqq.

4. Mahabharata (XII. 88. 14-5) states:

पानागारनिवेशाश्च वेश्याः प्रापणिकस्तथा ।
कुशीलवाः सकितवा ये चान्ये केचिदीदृशाः ॥
नियम्याः सर्वं एवैते ये राष्ट्रस्योपघातकाः ।
एते राष्ट्रेऽभितिष्ठन्तो बाधन्ते भद्रिकाः प्रजाः ॥

(Similarly MBh. XII.140. 40-2; the history of Agaḍadatta in J. Jacobi's *Ausgewaehlte Erzaehlungen in Mahārāṣṭrī*). These places should be carefully watched (Barhaspatyasūtra ⌊Nitis'astra, III. 27⌋).

Also the very often repeated aphorism reading:

दशसूनासमं चक्रं दशचक्रसमो ध्वजः ।
दशध्वजसमा वेश्या दशवेश्यासमो नृपः ॥ (MBh. XIII. 125, 9).

(cf. Mn. IV. 84 or 85 in the Bombay edition, Y. I. 141 and Vivadaratnakara 335:7; MBh. II. 68. 1, where it is stated that gamblers have in their homes many loose women (*bandhakī*), shows that prostitutes (the word *gaṇikā* is here not used) were considered as dangerous persons.

5. That is those enumerated in K. 125:9-10.

6. E.g. K. 21:2; 315:17; 380:1.

7. E.g. K. 21:2; 315:7.

8. E.g. K. 315:17.

9. E.g. K. 21:3; 315:17.

vāgjivana[1], *kuśilava*[2], *plavaka*[3], *saubhika* or *sauhika*[3], *cāraṇa*[4], as well as *lubdhaka*[5] and *śauṇḍika*[6] used as spies who had to convey some special informations.

5. According to the Sanskrit sources prostitutes, who were not government servants (*gaṇikā*), had to pay taxes to the Collector-General[7]. *Rūpājīvās* had to pay monthly a tax twice the amount of their payment for enjoyment (*bhoga*, ⌊K. 125:12⌋)[8] and if the king was in distress he could collect from them an extraordinary tax amounting to half of their salary K. (243:11)[9].

However, persons living on the prostitution of their wives, being considered as nomadic, had to pay not ordinary taxes but special fees for their public shows. K. (125 : 11) in a sentence immediately following the word *etena* states :

तेषां तूर्यम् आगन्तुकं पञ्चपणं प्रेक्षावेतनं दद्यात् ।

'Those, who bring musical instruments, shall pay five *paṇas* as fee for public show'.

This mean that according to K. they should pay a special fee to the king's treasury, whenever they gave a public performance. They, like *rūpājīvās* and other prostitutes, had to pay taxes, although not periodic taxes, while *gaṇikās* were exempt from paying taxes; that seems to be another reason that the preceding part of the Chapter on the *gaṇikā'dhyakṣa* contained in K. does not apply to them.

6. Persons living on the prostitution of their wives depended on their earnings. Therefore, they were obliged to pay for the debts incurred by them. According to Y. (II. 48)[10], Vi. (VI.37)[11], Bṛh. (X.119)[12],

1. E.g. K.21:3; 36:11; 315:17. 2. E.g. K. 21:3; 249:17; 315:17. Cf. K.44:11; 202:12; 248:2.
3. E.g. K. 315:18. 4. E.g. K.210:15.
5. E.g. K. 390:4, 44; 402:10. 6. E.g. K.210:17; 378:12; 379:9; 389:13.

7. Cf. L. Sternbach : *Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian Law ; 17. Legal Position of Prostitutes according to Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra*; paragraph 27.

8. The word *rūpajīva* means in this context all kinds of prostitutes with the exception of *gaṇikas*, cf. fn. 7.

9. E.g. *vetana*. This sentence refers, probably, to *avaruddhas* or *bhujiṣyas*. Cf. fn. 7.

10. गोपशौण्डिकशैलूषरजकव्याधयोषिताम् ।
ऋणं दद्यात् पतिस्तासां यस्माद् वृत्तिस्तदाश्रया ॥ (Y. II. 48).

11. गोपशौण्डिकशैलूषरजकव्याधस्त्रीणां पतिर्दद्यात् । (Vi. VI. 37).

12. शौण्डिकव्याधरजकगोपनापितयोषिताम् ।
अधिष्ठाता ऋणं दाप्यस्तासां भर्तृक्रियासु तत् ॥ (Bṛh. X. 119).

N. (I. 19)[1] and Kāty. (568-70)[2] in case of *śauṇḍika* (Y. and Mit. *ad* Y., Vi., Bṛh., N., Kāty.), *gopa* (Y., Vi., Bṛh., N., Kāty.), *vyādha* (Y. Vi., Bṛh., N., Kāty.), *śailūṣa* (Y., Mit. *ad* Y., Vi.,) and *nāpita*[3] (Bṛh., Kāty.) the general rule contained in the Smṛtis about the division of the estates of married people was not applied, and the husbands of these persons were under the obligation to pay for the debts incurred by their wives.

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7. In conclusion it might be stated that in addition to various kinds of *veśyā*, *rūpājīvā*, *gaṇikā*, etc., who were considered as harlots, prostitutes or courtesans and whose legal position was quite clearly defined in the Dharmaśāstras, another group of persons should be added: women whose husbands live on their earnings (prostitution). They are wives of actors, bards, dancers, jugglers, singers, etc., that is women who do not need to be necessarily their legal wives. The difference between these women and regular prostitutes lies in the fact that the first carry out their occupation in their own houses and cannot be found 'in an open market', they act not only as prostitutes but also as procuresses as they had to seduce also wives of other men. Acting in both capacities, they were considered as if they were prostitutes of the lowest class. They were, therefore, always considered as impure and a *dvija* was not allowed to have sexual intercourse with them; according to K. they had to perform espionage work, like other prostitutes.

According to K. these women were, like *gaṇikās*, not completely free persons. However, while *gaṇikās*, according to K., depended on the king, these women depended on their husbands, and in some cases, procurers. Therefore, according to the Dharmaśāstras, there does not exist in their case any division of conjugal estate, or, better to say, the husbands of these women were under the obligation to pay for the debts incurred by their wives, although, usually, they would not be under this obligation. They[4] also had to pay taxes not depending on their income but fees for each public performance.

Although the women, whose husbands lived on their prostitution might be considered as regular prostitutes, the Dharmaśāstras and Arthaśāstras made some small distinctions between them and regular prostitutes.

1. अन्यत्र रजकव्याधगोपशौण्डिकयोषिताम् ।
तेषां तत्प्रत्यया वृत्तिः कुटुम्बं च तदाश्रयम् ॥ (N. I. 19).

2. शौण्डिकव्याधरजकगोपनाविकयोषिताम् ।
अधिष्ठाता ऋणं दाप्यस्तासां भर्तृक्रियासु तत् ॥
न च भार्याकृतमृणं कथंचित्पत्युराभवेत् ।
आपत्कृतादृते पुंसां कुटुम्बार्थे हि विस्तरः ॥
अन्यत्र रजकव्याधगोपशौण्डिकयोषिताम् ।
तेषां तु तत्परा वृत्तिः कुटुम्बं च तदाश्रयम् ॥ (Kāty. 568-70).

3. Not *navika*.

4. These women.

Kingship and Allied Institutions of the Buddha's Days[1]

By

YASH PAL, *Hoshiarpur.*

Kingship in the days of Gautama Buddha had certain interesting features. Thus, the king was not so by his right but because the king-makers (*rāja-kattāro*) made him the king[2].

While discussing the evolution of kingship, Gautama makes a very illuminating comment on the theory of kingship. Says he, "Now those beings, gathered themselves together, and bewailed these things, saying: 'From our evil deeds, Sirs, becoming manifest inasmuch as stealing, censure, lying, punishment have become known, what if we were to select a certain being, who should be wrathful when indignation is right, who should censure that which should rightly be censured and should banish him who deserves to be banished ? But we will give him in return a proportion of the rice.' Then those beings went to the being among them who was the handsomest, the best favoured, the most attractive, the most capable and said to him: 'come now, good being, be indignant at that whereat one should rightly be indignant, censure that which should rightly be censured, banish him who deserves to be banished. And, we will contribute to thee a proportion of our rice'. And, he consented and did so, and they gave him a proportion of their rice. Chosen by the whole people is what is meant by *mahā-sammata*; so *mahā-sammata* (the Great Elect) was the first standing phrase to arise for such a one. Lord of the fields is what is meant by *khattiya* ; so *khattiya* (noble) was the next expression to arise. He charms others by his norm-by what ought (to charm) is what is ment by *rāja* ; so this was the third standing phrase to arise[3]". This is probably the earliest recorded statement of the social contract.

The *cakkavatti* king or the 'all-round king' was thought to hold supreme lordship and domain over the four continents[4]. It is suggested that it was the term for an ideal king[5]. He was said to possess seven valuables (the best of their kind), viz. the wheel, the elephant, the horse, the jewel, the woman, the housefather and their heir-apparent, i. e. he possessed the best of all these seven things[6]. The story of a certain king Mahasuddassana throws an interesting light on the 'Wheel the Jewel'

1. Abbreviations used here :— DN. = Dīgha-Nikāya ; AN. = Angutta-Nikāya ; SN. = Saṃyutta-Nikāya ; MN. = Majjhima-Nikāya ; V. = Vinaya-Piṭaka.

2. DN. II. 233.

3. DN. III. 92-3.

4. SN. V. 342.

5. *Kindred Sayings*, Vol. V. 82 fn.

6. SN. V. 99.

(*cakkaratna*). The king after purifying himself on the Full Moon Day (*uqosthe Punnarse*), went to the upper storey of his palace and there appeared to him the heavenly *cakkaratna* (the Wheel the Jewel). He rose from his seat and reverently uncovered his shoulder, held a water-pitcher in his left hand and with his right he sprinkled water on the Wheel and said, ' Roll onwards, O my lord, the Wheel '. Then that wondrous Wheel rolled onwards towards the East, and after it went the king followed by his fourfold army. It rolled on to the very boundaries of the earth, to the ocean, and, then, it went, in a similar manner, in all the other three directions and after that it returned to the royal capital and remained fixed on the open terrace in front of the entrance to the inner apartments of the king and there it stood fixed[1]. At another place a similar story is told about another king[2]. This description very much resembles the famous *Aśvamedha* sacrifice. Was this an earlier form of that ritual ? It was believed that if this celestial Wheel sank a little or slipped down from its place, that king had not many days to live and so he would shave his head and beard and donning the yellow robe went forth from home into homelessness[3].

King was also to possess many personal qualities. He should be well-born on both sides, pure in descent as far back as seven generations, both on the father's and mother's sides. He should be rich with great wealth and resources and his treasuries and granaries over-flowing. He should have a strong army that is loyal to him. He should have a very wise minister, intelligent, discreet and able to judge rightly the future from the past happenings[4]. He should be a pious person, knowing the path of virtue (*dhamma*), the right measure (*mättä*) of punishment and taxation. He should know proper time (*kāla*) for pleasure, court-work and touring the country. He should know, alike, all men, whether nobles or Brāhmaṇas etc[5]. He should be beloved to and popular with priests and laymen alike[6].

We, also, read of a king who ordered that tanks be built outside the city gates and that all sorts of comforts be provided for the people, to wit, food for the hungry, drink for the thirsty, raiment for the naked, means of conveyance for those who had need of it, couches for the tired, wives for those who wanted wives, gold for the poor and money for the needy[7].

At another place is mentioned a king who used to give charity at the various gates of his capital. His people too wanted to give charity and they asked of him some place to give their charity at. So, the king allotted the various gates to the ladies of harem, nobles, army people, *Brāhmaṇas* and *Vais'yas*. When he found that his gifts were coming

1. DN. II. 172-74.
2. DN. III. 59.
3. DN. II. 175 ; III. 59.
4. AN. III, 151.
5. AN. III. 148. cf. Gradual Sayings III. 113 fnn.
6. DN. II, 178.
7. DN. II. 179.

back to his palace, as there was none to accept the gifts, he ordered, 'Pass the word, then, that of the revenue coming in from the outlying provinces, one half shall be sent into the palace, and one half shall be, there and then, given as gifts to those who ask : *Brāhmaṇas*, recluses, paupers, cripples, wayfarers, and beggars'[1].

The kings were held responsible by the people for all heavenly calamities like draught etc[2].

It seems that the enemies when captured were sometimes treated very cruelly. We find a king order his people to bind his enemy king and his consort firmly with a strong rope, tie their arms to their backs, have them close shaven, lead them around with beatings of drums from road to road and from crossway to crossway, then lead them out of the town by the southern gate, hew them in four pieces to the South of the town, and throw the pieces away to four quarters[3]. Thus we find that he was not given even an ordinary cremation.

A king would live in constant fear of treachery, sometimes at the hands of his most trusted servants, too, and would be unwilling to go to lonely places at odd hours, even though just outside his own capital[4]. His household servants were bound by very strict discipline. They were not allowed to be ordained as monks. Those, who ordained a royal servant, were to be severly dealt with. Thus reads a text, 'He, who took on the disciple under training, should be beheaded, of him, who recited the formula of ordination, the tongue should be torn out, of those who formed the chapter, the ribs should be broken[5]. It was believed that a servant would be thrown into the purgatory if he did not serve his king well[6].

But sometimes, there would be revolts, too, especially among the frontier provinces. To quell them the commander-in-chief would be sent[7]. king's palace was the hotbed of secret plans. We find Gautama giving a tip to the monks not to enter a palace, lest, in case of leaking of king's plans, the monk's integrity should be questioned, and it should be said that he was the source of that leakage[8].

A king would live in great pomp. He would go to the bathing places accompanied by drums and other kinds of music[9].

A king would have a number of ministers. At one place, the king Ajātsʹatru is said to have been surrounded by a number of minisrers—more than six, at least[10]. One of Bimbisara's ministers, was designated as *Sabbatthaka Mahāmatta*, who was probably the minister incharge of general

1. SN. I. 58-9.
2. Theragatha, vs. 1, 51-4 ; 325-29 etc.
3. V. I. 345.
4. DN. I. 49-50.
5. V. I. 74.
6. AN. II. 19.
7. V. I. 74.
8. AN. III. 129.
9. AN. III. 345.
10. DN. I. 49.

affairs[1]. Among the Licchavis the most important minister mentioned is Siha, the commander-in-chief (*senāpati*)[2]. We also hear of a catagory of important ministers who were the king-makers. Sometimes even the eldest son of a dying king had to seek his appointment as the king at their hands[3].

It seems that the viceroyalty (*uparajja*) was the highest aim for the king's eldest son. This he got not as a matter of right, but by virtue of his qualities, of head, heart and personality[4].

From the centre the power was relegated to the *māṇḍalikarāja* of a province or the *rāja* of a district[5]. What were the powers of these *rājas* is difficult to say. In the Dīgha-Nikāya we hear of a number of people who were ruling certain towns, granted to them by the kings as royal gifts (*rāja-bhogga*), with powers of actual kings[6]. Whether both the above offices were identical or not it is hard to ascertain. Then, there was an officer who was called the *setthi*. Usually, this word is rendered as a ' councillor ', but, sometimes, as an ' overseer ' too[7]. He was of course a local man. Every town had one. He would, sometimes, be sent for by a king to attend a meeting of the assembly[8]. He was held in esteem by a king. Thus, when a certain setthi's son fell ill, Jivaka was sent by the king, Bimbisāra, to cure him[9]. He too would, sometimes, invite a king, together with his retinue, to dine with him[10]. Another officer mentioned is a *bhojarājā* (a subordinate king)[11]. Among other dignitaries, a mention is made of the jagirdars (*pattanikassa*), the generals of the army (*senāpati*), the governors of villages (*gāmagāmika*), the guildmasters (*pūgagāmanī*) and the leaders of the clans[12].

There were republics, too, in the country. The Vajjians were the most important one. The Licchavis used to discuss all their affairs in their mote-hall (*santhāgāra*)[13]. The Vajjian confederacy was composed of several people. Among them the Licchavis were well known for their bad temper[12].

1. V. I. 207 ; 240. Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in his Hindi translation renders it as 'private secretary'.
2. V. I. 233.
3. DN. I. 233.
4. An. III. 154.
5. V. III. 47.
6. DN. I. 87, 111, 114, 127, 131 etc. V, III. 222. MN. ii. 64.
7. V. Texts, tra. by Rhys Davids, I. 1-2.
8. V. I. 179.
9. V. I. 273, 275.
10. V. II. 155.
11. MN. III. 173. Theragatha, vs. 823.
12. AN. III. 76.
13. MN. I. 228. ; V. I. 233.

SECTION VII

Miscellaneous Studies

Hindus and Study of Persian

By

S. M. ABDULLAH, *Lahore.*

'All real art in the East is court art', says Prof. E. G. Browne[1]. It is equally true in the case of Persian literature produced in India. In these courts, scholars held very high positions and Mughal history is full of such instances. The Hindus, too, could rise to the highest positions, and proficiency was never deprived of its due reward. Among the Hindu authors there were *Rais*, *Dīwāns*, *Mīr Munshis*, *Bakhshis*, *Kānūngos*, *Kāmdars*, *Amīns*, *Peshdasts*, *Musharrifs*, *Peshkārs*, *Mīr Sāmāns*, *Nāib Diwāns*, etc.[2]—all servants of the Imperial Government. These Hindu authors, like their Muslim co-workers, wrote books at the suggestion or by the order of their royal patrons, and were the recipients of favour, even as the Muslim were. In short, the Hindu-Persian literature like all Persian literature produced in India, was mostly produced by the servants of the Mughal Empire.

The Kāyasthas[3] constituted a majority of the Hindu authors. They appear to be highly cultured people, and the cause of their being so is evident. They claim to be Kṣatriyas, who took to clerical work from time immemorial. When the early Muslims settled in India, they employed this talent in their revenue offices. In the reign of Sultan Sikandar Lodhi, a section of the Kāyasthas was reconciled to the idea of learning Persian. Under Shershah, they seem to have made still more progress. In the reign of Akbar, when Persian was made official language of the Mughals, the Kāyasthas were, probably, the foremost people who entered into the Imperial service without any difficulty. They made themselves perfect masters of the Persian language. About the middle of the 18th century (A. D.), they were a very influential community and were remarkably forward in the field of education. Durga Prashad Nādir remarks[4] that the Kāyastha women could also read and write Persian, and a woman of Aligarh could

1. *A Literary History of Persia*, III, 396.

2. For terms, see J. N. Sarkar : *Mughal Administration*, Vol. I ; Moreland : *Agrarian System* ; Anand Ram Mukhlis : *Mirat-ul-Isilah* (P. Univ. Ms.) ; *Malūmāt-ul-Āfak* (P. Univ. Ms.) ; Yusuf Mirak : *Dastur-ul-Amal* (P. Univ. Ms.).

3. For Kāyasthas see Sherrings, I, 335 13 ; Risley : *Peoples of India*, 136-137 and 114 ; *Ency. Indica*, 483, 513 ; *Kayastha-Darpaṇa* (Hindi), I, 9, 664 ; *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. V, p. 57 ; JAS. 1875, p. 5 ; Hunter : *Indian Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 321, 327.

4. *Tazkiratun Nisa*, p. 3.

successfully transact official business, and was well-versed in *Siyak*, and *Inshā*. During the reign of Muhammad Shah, the Imperial offices were mostly manned by the Kāyasthas[1]. Under the Marhattas[2], too, the work of official correspondence was conducted by the same class. The principal reason of their progress and prosperity under Muslim rule is to be found in their capacity of easily adapting themselves to the new environments, and also in their intellectual superiority over their co-religionists. The Rajputs being a martial race took to military profession and were averse to literary avocations. The Brāhmans, on the other hand, thought it below dignity to serve under a Muslim ruler[3]. The consequence was that the Kāyasthas naturally rose to high places without any sort of competition. When the Mughal power declined and the British made themselves masters of India, the Kāyasthas still occupied a high position in India. The Kashmiris joined the Kāyasthas at a later date. It was, in the reign of Emperor Shah Jahan, that we first notice the early migrations of the Kashmiri Pandits who were fully acquainted with the Persian language since the reign of Sultan Zainul-Abidin, and were consequently admitted to the Imperial services under the Mughals. We find that Diwan Bakhtamal (Kashmiri) and his kinsmen were the organisers and consolidators of the Sikh Empire, which was founded by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Apart from the Kāyasthas and Kashmiris, a considerable number of the Khatris also contributed to Persian literature.

It has already been remarked that the first attempt at studying Persian by the Hindus was made in the reign of Sultan Sikandar Lodhi. During the reign of Akbar, Raja Todarmal issued orders to the effect that all government work must be conducted in Persian, with the consequence that the knowledge of the language became compulsory for those who had any idea of joining the government service. We know that Persian was not universally studied by the Hindus in the pre-Mughal period. It was due to the fact that the Hindus could get employment in revenue offices without taking any trouble of learning Persian. But, when the doors of the government institutions were closed upon those who had no knowledge of Persian, it came as a severe blow to the pecuniary interests of the Hindus. The pressure of need makes people forget their old prejudices and pre-possessions, and it was the same economic necessity which made Persian a subject of serious study for the people who once kept aloof from it, or at any rate, remained indifferent, for about six centuries.

1. *Majm* : *Nafais* (P. Univ. Ms.), p. 478.
2. Sarkar : *Shivaji*, p. 484.
3. *Firishtah*, Vol. I, p. 278.

The Jami Masjid of Jaunpur

By

S. K. BANERJI, *Lucknow.*

The Jami masjid is one of the most magnificent of the Sharqi works. There are different versions of its foundations. Some attribute it to Ibrahim Sharqi who planned it for the worship of the old hermit, Hazrat Khwaja Isa, and to spare him the trouble of going a mile to offer his prayers at the Khalis Mukhlis masjid. Others attribute it to Mahmud Shah's reign and give one of the two dates that correspond to 1438 or 1448 of the Christian era, and in favour of the latter date quotes the chronogram '*masjid-i-Jami-us-Sharq*'. Since the chronogram has disappeared from the eastern gate, the others have disbelieved its existence and suggest the chronogram, '*Al-masjid-i-Jami-us-Sharq*', which comes out to be 885 A. H. (1478 A.D.) as a more probable date for, though, Husain Shah's glory and magnificence had declined, he did not cease to be the ruler of Jaunpur till the following year. In common parlance, Husain Shah is associated with its construction and it is said that even when he was turned out of the city by Buhlul Lodi, the latter spared him the province of Bihar and added the income of the Chunar District to bring to completion his great project. Since the Sharqi kings from Ibrahim's time are burried in the graveyard north of the masjid, it is probable that Ibrahim may have intended to raise a prayer house in its vicinity and Husain had only given shape to his grandfather's intentions. He obtained his opportunity during a seven-year famine when he employed the famine stricken labourers to raise the level of the site some 16' to 20' above the road-level and for several decades he spared a protion of his dwindling funds to complete it.

It is the most ambitious of the Sharqi works. The square courtyard of 211' is surrounded by cloisters on the north, east, and south sides and the *līwān*, 59' in depth on the west. The cloisters are two aisles deep, the inner one being a row of shops and the outer forming an open verandah. The external measurements of the work are 290' east to west and 255' north to south. The same arrangement is seen in the upper storey, the only difference being that there both the aisles are open cloisters. It is clear from the arrangement that while the lower cells were meant for the shopkeepers, the upper open corridor was intended for the resting votaries.

The *liwān* measures 59'×235' and is divided into five areas, the central domical room measuring 39' 8½" by 39' 7½", a low pillared room of size 25' 4" by 44' 7" on each side of it with a *zanānā* gallery over each of them and large vaulted chambers each 49' 3" by 39' 7" beyond these low

rooms. The *zanānā* galleries were approchable by two staircases running through the piers of the entrance propylons and were meant to be used by the women votaries only. As in the Lal Darwaza masjid, each of the galleries is provided with two *mihrābs* and the space for a third was kept open for lighting the area. Since the galleries looked into the central room where the sermons would be delivered, the women could benefit from the pious speeches. The two wing vaults with their pointed roofs have been highly praised by P. Brown. He calls it a bold experiment but entirely successful as it kept the whole interior unobstructed by any pillar or support. The only mild suggestion that can be made is that the length of each vault should have been increased by 10′ or so, thus making the *līwān* of the same length as the rest of the mosque from north to south. The *mihrābs* of the central room are recessed $3\frac{1}{2}'$ and are very ornate, the greatest attention being paid to the middle one. There are in all nine *mihrābs* on the ground floor and four in the upper *zanānā* galleries.

The central chamber is truly artistic, and is covered by a dome which rises internally to 67′ 6″ and externally to 72′ 6″ and its thickness is slightly more than 3′. It is, therefore, clear that it is a single and not a double dome. Probably the artifice of a double dome had, not as yet, been discovered by the Indian artists[1]. Its octagonal drum is provided with decorated arches and also with eight kiosks and the inside of the base of the dome has also been elaborately treated.

The chief entrance to the *līwān* is a propylon formed of two piers connected by an arch. The propylon measures 84′ 3″ in height and 76′ $10\frac{1}{2}''$ across the base and 70′ 10″ across the top, thus showing a batter of slightly more than three feet on each side. The tympanum of the arch is screened and contains a number of openings disposed in four rows, through which a glimpse of the great dome behind may be obtained. The spandrels were adorned with raised diaper work and rosettes are provided here as well as on the smaller arches. Each of the side piers is divided in five storeys by string courses, and each storey except the lowest is provided with an arch and two rosettes. The piers as well as the central arch contains several other skilled carvings and decorations. Since the floor of the mosque is 16′ to 20′ higher than the road below, the top of the propylon, approachable by a flight of stairs behind, is full 100′ from the road. Hence, it towers over the vicinity and long lingers in the mind of the visitor.

The propylon was first introduced at Jaunpur, (1) as a piece of architecture distinct from that prevailing in Delhi, (2) as an economy of expenditure. In place of the lofty buildings of Delhi, Jaunpur thought of the device first introduced by Qutub-ud-din Aibak in the *Quwwat-ul-Islam*

1. Its first use in India takes place in Sikandar Lodi's reign.

mosque but later given up there. The propylon formed the modulus for measuring the magnificence of a building, so that, so long as the central facade was raised to an enormous height, the wings might be neglected. The Jaunpur rulers, thus, spent lavishly on the main entrances to the *liwān* and the gateways only and not on the other parts of the buildings. And (3) as against the Delhi kings, the Jaunpur Shahs indicated their militant character. The absence of the *minārs*, the extraordinary height of the solid propylon, the batter of the piers, the slope of the massive west wall, the screened central arch, the rounded buttresses at the rear angles, the lofty gateways and the high external walls all make the mosque look like a fort. The decay and insignificance of the Sayyid rulers of the Delhi kingdom had brought them into contempt. In contrast to it, the Sharqi rulers were looked upon as mighty rulers and patrons of learning, architecture, poetry and music. While much can be said in favour of the introduction of the propylon as an architectural device, attention may be drawn to its defects. No doubt it affords a satisfactory frontal view but when looked at from any other angle, the screen behind or by the side of the dome appears meaningless or even incongruous. It is due to this defect that the Sharqi style of architecture, though prevalent in the east as far as Bengal for a time and to some extent adopted by Akbar also in his Jami Masjid at Fatehpur Sikri, was ultimately allowed to disappear from the country.

Of the three entrance gateways to the mosque, the east one known as the Shahi Darwaza was demolished by Sikandar Lodi as a punishment for Husain Sharqi's continued contumacy. The north and south gateways both measure, above the flights of steps, 43′ 11½″ in height, 40′ across the base and 37′ 10½″ across the top and projects 22′ in front of the cloisters. Of the two, the north gate was in a dilapidated condition and money came from the Muslim public for its repair. This was done not very skilfully and there are some small differences between it and the south gate, though each should have been an exact copy of the other. Each gateway is a miniature of the central entrance to the *liwān*, and has two piers with a connecting arch, panels, string courses, small arches, recesses and rosettes. Still the two gateways look much plainer than the other.

There are inscriptions but they are mostly of a sacred character, being the texts of the *Qurān*. There are innumerable mason marks which clearly indicate that many of them were Hindus, for the trident, birds, lotus, double triangles, and swastika could not have been used by the Muslim artists. They attest to the statement that the Muslim buildings were the joint products of the Hindus and Muslims of the country and should be called Indian and not Indo-Saracenic.

There is an attached cemetry where lie Muhammad Sharqi and his wife and Husain, the last ruler of Jaunpur, who though hated by Sikandar Lodi, was allowed to be buried in Jaunpur. Today the stones of some of the tombs are turning white and the local guides point out the effect of the

weather on Husain's tomb also, adding that even nature seems to recognize his greatness and rectify Sikandar's mistake in neglecting his foe.

The Jami masjid is a magnificent product of the Sharqi period; and if Husain is its principal builder, he must get every credit in spite of his failure against Buhlul and Sikandar. Husain has been blamed for his poor strategy in his wars against the Delhi rulers and has also been accused of being a rank coward. These may be true but no less are true his intellectual attainments, his love for scholastic studies and music, his sedulous devotion to architecture and ardent love for his capital, Jaunpur. There the people sing airs composed by him, and like Ibrahim he was the patron of the numerous colleges of the city.

Above all, his determination to complete the Jami masjid, even when he had lost the city and was content with the possession of Bihar, makes the historian soften towards him. He spent much of his dwindled resources towards his pet project and the result has been highly satisfactory. It is the largest work in Jaunpur and the main propylon, the highest; the cloisters are two-storeyed and the vaults of the *līwān* unique adjuncts. Even though Sikandar Lodi had destroyed the Shahi or east gate and the upper storey of the cloisters, yet the huge size of the mosque, its fortlike massiveness, the chaste decorations in the central chamber on the *mihrābs* and the propylon, the excellence of the domes and the ornamentations of their drums easily make it as a striking building of the country. For at least a century afterwards, in the central regions of North India, the Sharqi style of architecture exercised influence and so late as the third quarter of the sixteenth century, the cosmopolitan Akbar introduced in his Jami masjid at Fatehpur, features strikingly similar to those found at Jaunpur.

The question of the origin of the Sharqi style has been touched above. At Delhi, the *Quwwat-ul-Islam* masjid had at first no *mīnārs, the Qutb-ki-lāth* being an afterthought, and the central entrance to the *līwān* was lofty and jutted out far beyond the roof of the prayer hall. Once this extra height was added to the entrance, it became necessary to make it massive so that the whole structure might not topple down. The battering walls and the sloping bastions would be the next natural devices to emphasize the solidity of the building. It is possible that the Egyptian influence may have worked on the Jaunpur architecture but no direct communication between the two countries is traceable. Similarly the Tughluq style might have exercised influence so far as the massiveness and batter were concerned, but the influence stopped there. Firoz Tughluq's works do not show the abundance of the Sharqi decorations. It is the combination of the massiveness and ornamentation, the economy of materials and expenditure on the details, and above all, the king's eagerness to bring to completion the pious work, even when he had lost touch with the city that make it a striking work of the country.

Spirit Communication

By

HIRALAL L. KAJI, *Bombay.*

Greater interest in spiritualism and in talks and messages from the spirit world is being evinced in recent years throughout the world and also in India. India has been for ages dominant in spiritual development, and spirit communication was not unknown. On the contrary the Ṛṣis, Munis and Yogins—the great sages of old—were persons with very advanced souls who could communicate with the dead and also with the living, and whose vision was not limited or restricted by time and space. The *samādhi* or deep concentration was the instrument employed to place the soul of the sage *enrapport* or in tune with other souls whether living or dead, and with scenes whether of the past, present or future. Modern science has been able by patient research to penetrate the mystery of elimination of space restriction to vision and audibility. The telegraph, the telephone, wireless and television are all important stages on that road. The difference, however, consists in this that while to-day instruments are necessary to establish communication or vision between places, the sages of old could make use of the great instrument of the soul (or the mind, may be) to project themsleves across space and time. It is high time that modern science has turned from mere mechanical instruments to the great forces imbedded in the human mind and soul; and carried out research in Thought and Vision Rays, their emanation and their reception. It is the development of the man rather than of the machine, of his internal than of the external forces that should engage the attention of scientists more and more, so that contacts can be established between countries and people through the medium not of machinery but of advanced souls. There is nothing of charlatanism in such research which should really represent the highest and truest effort; for it spells not mere development in man's accessories, but in his own self. It is true that such great developments of soulforce may be possible in the case of a few only. But such knowledge and power, which brings projection beyond the barriers of space and time, must always in any case belong to a few. Man in the mass cannot obviously so elevate himself; it is only the advanced few who can soar above ordinary human limitations.

To-day, however, we find very little serious effort among the educated to carry on research and experiment along these lines for self development. Spirit communication is desired more and more and several methods for simplifying the process and assisting in the transmission of messages are in vogue. The clairvoyant needs the help of a crystal

or some object so as to produce the intense concentration or tu-ning up of his own mental equipment to respond to the other person and other times about which information is sought. For audible messages, darkened rooms and sensitive mediums are necessary; for ordinary communications, the planchette or the Ouija Board is necessary. These aids, it is true, facilitate communication with intelligences, entities, identities spirits, call them by whatever name you like, so as to bring the possibility of such communication to a far larger number of men whose souls have not soared up to Yogic heights and yet who are receptive enough to receive thought transmissions from beyond.

I do not claim to have made any very deep research in these matters, but I do claim to have some experiences which prove to me that there are intelligences outside our human ken and that these do communicate with us. Explanation of such messages is often sought in telepathy; but my experiences show to me that there are cases which cannot possibly be explained by telepathy. I have been practising with the Ouija Board, I find it convenient, rapid and reliable, for when operated by two mediums, the mental bias or predisposition of either is not likely to intrude itself, unconsciously even, in the messages that are spelt out letter by letter on the Board.

I may set forth here some of the conclusions which I have reached so far as a result of my experiences with the Ouija Board. An advanced soul has cooled down very much and is not interested, in questions about individuals—their welfare and distress; he is interested, however, in the destiny of countries and even then from the long range vision of centuries or decades, but not in the passing events of the day however enthralling and absorbing these might seem to us. The spirit of a person dead long ago is calm and unruffled even when his son or near relatives seek to communicate with him, the bond of affection that united their souls having worn out with the passage of time. But one spirit of a person who has died but recently, is aglow with great warmth for his near relations and chokes with emotion as it were, as revealed in the words and sentences spelt out by him, in the references to the absent dear ones, and in the thirst for information about the people he had left behind him. He breaks down as it were in the end, closes abruptly and goes off, the poor sitters being saddened very visibly and often weeping and sobbing. The proof, which men of science require for identification of the spirit invoked, comes in such cases by realisation. Those who seek proof often seek in vain, those who do not seek proof get it unasked in their hearts.

The great pity about spirit communications is, to my mind, the instinctive desire of almost every person to get a forecast of the future about themsleves and in some cases of their countries and world problems. The desire to probe into the future is understandable; but to resort

to spirit communications as you resort to astrology, palmistry and what not, is an absurd approach to the phenomena. A spirit of reverence, a sense of sobriety, a restraint on inordinate curiosity and a genuine desire to know and understand and build up friendships across the gap created by Death and to construct a bridge over the gulf is the correct mental or heart attitude of the seeker, the sitter and the medium. Predictions are there, sometimes almost uncanny. But these are and should be regarded as rather by the way, as a sort of by-products.

Spirits do desire to help us. Of this, I am certain. Those with whom we have established a certain degree of friendship discuss our problems with great sagacity and wisdom ; they suggest possible lines of action just as living friends do, they advise us, they share our joys and anxieties, they congratulate us, they sympathise with us, they pray for us, they intercede with the higher powers on our behalf.

It is of interest, however, to note that our friends in the spirit world are more concerned with and are genuinely anxious to help us in problems of health, not so much in those of wealth.

I had once a very strange experience of aid from the spirit world. On our return from the summer holidays, I was informed of the illness of my daughter. My wife immediately went out to her house to ascertain facts. She did not return for some hours. I became anxious and sought relief in the Ouija Board. A spirit doctor was invoked ; he went off to my daugter's house, examined her and told us on his return in a few minutes that she had rheumatic fever, the temperature was 102, she was confined to her bed with legs wrapped in flannell. He asked me not to worry and said she would be all right in ten days. These details were to my astonishment confirmed by my wife. My daughter went on, however, from bad to worse, specialists and consultants came in, injections were the order of the day and matters came to a crisis on the 9th day. Strange to say, however, the morning of the 10th day saw the patient quite normal and able to get up.

Believe it or not, the illness left my daughter on the 10th day and has not returned till now. I do not pretend to offer any explanation. I cannot explain except by taking this to be a clear case of a spirit friend helping us here through his goodwill or blessings (*āśīrvāda*).

Some Social Customs as gathered from Travancore Inscription

By

R. VASUDEVA PUDUVAL, *Trivandrum.*

An inscription in Tamil characters engraved on the four faces of a pillar which stood originally by the road-side at Tiruvitāṅkōṭu in South Travancore and which is now set on display in the Museum of Antiquities at Padmanābhapuram, the old capital of the State, makes mention of two quaint social practices and their abolition by a Royal edict. The record belongs to the reign of the Travancore King Vīra Kēraḷa Varman, and is dated in the Kollam year 871 i.e. A.D. 1696. The social practices referred to in the edict and prohibited by the king are known as *pulappēḍi* and *maṇṇāppēḍi*. *Pulappēḍi* is also called *pulappiḍi*, and they respectively mean 'fear from Pulaiyas' and 'capture by Pulaiyas'. Pulaiyas are low class agricultural labourers, while '*maṇṇāns*' are washermen doing service for the low castes and are, therefore, themselves considered to belong to the polluting classes. This custom was prevalent in the northern parts of Travancore, where it was associated with the Paṛayas, another untouchable caste and known as Paṛappēdi.

Dr. Gundert has stated that in the month of Karkaṭaka, i.e. July-August, high caste women may lose caste if a slave happens to throw a stone at them after sunset[1]. In these cases, this contamination was considered so obnoxious that the polluted women were excommunicated on the spot, and it is said that they had to accompany the low caste assailants. This fear of excommunication was so great that, in the particular period, women did not go out after dusk without proper escort. Women, who were accompanied by a male child at least three years old, were exempt from this polluting power of the Pulaiyas. One other curious feature of this practice was that a pregnant woman who happened to be captured by a Pulaiya was kept separate by them till the time of her delivery, and she was retained by them or set at liberty, according as she gave birth to a female or a male child. But now excepting a reminiscene of it in the expression *pulappēḍi-kālam*, which means 'an age of lawlessness', no definite information is available as to how the polluting classes acquired this privilege.

King Vīra Kēraḷa Varman[2] took the matter in hand and ordered that from the time of the record, Kollam 871, any Pulaiya who was caught molesting women according to this *pulappēḍi* practice would be killed. It

1. *A Malayalam and English Dictionary*, p. 682.
2. *Travancore Archaeological Series*, Vol. VII, p. 26.

was also ordered that the women so polluted could cleanse themselves of the pollution by bathing in a tank. This easy solution of the question and the punishment that was threatened to be meted out to the transgressors must have effectively put a stop to the practice in a short time.

Barbosa[1] mentions about this custom. ' These low people ', says he, ' During certain months of the year, try as hard as they can to touch some of the Nair women, as best they may be able to manage it, and secretly by night to do them harm. So they go by night amongst the hous es of the Nairs to touch women; and these take many precautions against this injury during these seasons. And if they touch any woman, even though no one sees it, and though there shall be no witnesses, she, the Nair woman herself, publishes it immediately crying out, and leaves her house without choosing to enter it again to damage her lineage. And what she most thinks of doing is to run to the house of some low people to hide herself, that her relations may not kill her as a remedy for what has happened, or sell her to some strangers as they are accustomed to do. It is not necessary that there should be actual contact. It is enough if the person is hit by a stone or stick and then that person remains touched and lost. From this custom arose a popular error that, during the months of February and March, if a Pulaiya meets a S'ūdra woman alone, he may seize her. This time of the year was called *pulapiṭi-kālam* (season during which Pulaiyas may seize).

The late Mr. L. K. Ananda Krishna Iyer makes the following remarks[2]:— ' A curious system also existed, which is said to have added to the number of the enslaved. Among the various caste men at fighting grounds at Pallam, Ochira, etc. at this season, it was supposed that low caste men were at liberty to seize high caste women if they could manage it, and to retain them. Perhaps this practice took its origin in some kinds of faction fights. The Paṛayans in North Travancore formerly kidnapped females of the high caste, whom they were said to tease for rewards in a brutal manner. Their custom was to turn robbers in the month of February just after the in-gathering of the harvest, when they were free from field work, and at the same time excited by demon worship, dancing and drink. They broke into the houses of Brāhmins and Nairs carrying away their children and property, in excuse for which they, on pretended motives of revenge, rather than interest, brought forward a tradition that they were once a division of Brāhmins, but were entrapped into a breach of caste rules by their enemies making them eat beef. '

1. *History of Kerala*, Vol. II, p. 273.
2. *Anthropology of the Syrian Christians*, p. 209.

GENERAL INDEX

Etymologies and Word studies (contd.)

Etymologies and Word studies (contd.)

Etymologies and Word studies (contd.)

Etymologies and Word studies (contd.)

Etymologies and Word studies (contd.)

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PART I

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174	fn.10	,,	द्यवस	,,	द्यवस्
177	23	,,	word	,,	world
178	22	,,	द्यलोक°	,,	द्युलोक°
181	19	,,	नित्य	,,	नित्यं
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PART II

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209	5,9	,,	Tolan	,,	Tolah
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245	29	,,	*Mahābhāarata*	,,	*Mahābhārata*
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